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Policymaking in the field of migration and
integration in Europe: An introduction
Maren Borkert and Rinus Penninx
International migration movements are often explained from an economic
perspective. To do so, scholars may refer to the real or perceived differ-
ences in wage and employment opportunities between countries that cause
‘flows’ of labour and capital (Harris & Todaro 1970; Lee 1969; Piore 1979;
Ravenstein 1885; Stark 1981, 1991; Stark & Levhari 1982). Structural
forces such as unequal access to resources and power (Frank 1966; Massey
1989; Wallerstein 1974) must also be taken into account, along with mi-
grant networks (Kritz et al. 1992; Mabogunje 1970; Portes & Böröcz 1987)
and other constraining factors. When it comes to international migration,
the state becomes an undeniably significant actor that may influence the
push-and-pull factor balance of migration itself, as well as the process of
settlement that may or may not follow it (Zolberg 1981, 1989).
In Europe, migration has been an important factor of change and devel-
opment for a very long time (Bade et al. 2007; Moch 1992). In this sense,
the growth of migration and immigrant communities during the last dec-
ades represents a clear continuity (although it is seldom perceived as such).
But there have also been significant changes in recent times, both in term
of the characteristics of migration movements themselves and of state ef-
forts to regulate them. Let us summarise these two elements.
Changing migration patterns in Europe
The first change regards that of migration movements and their directions.
Europe was predominantly a source continent for emigrants for more than
a century, roughly between 1850 and 1950. This situation changed after
the 1960s. Emigration decreased and immigration became dominant.
Between 1985 and 2000, the European continent experienced a steep in-
crease of resident immigrants, from an estimated 23 million in 1985
(United Nations 1998: 1) to more than 56 million or 7.7 per cent of the to-
tal European population in 2000 (IOM 2003: 29).
Apart from its scale, the geography of immigration also changed signifi-
cantly. The origin of migrants in Europe up until the 1980s may, for
simplicity’s sake, be grouped under three headings: a) migration with a co-
lonial background that connected European countries to their former colo-
nies; b) labour migration that connected European recruiting countries to a
number of selected recruitment countries; and c) refugee migration that
was strongly dominated by those moving from Eastern Europe to Western
Europe (i.e. displaced persons after WWII and refugees from East to West
during the Cold War). In terms of immigrant origins, what emerged were
patterns of geography heavily dotted by migration from Europe and the
Mediterranean countries, plus a limited number of colonies. Today this pic-
ture is blurred completely. Immigrants from all over the world come to
Europe in significant numbers: expatriates working for multinational com-
panies and international organisations, skilled workers such as nurses and
doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum seekers from Africa, the
Middle East and Asia, the Balkan states and former Soviet Union coun-
tries, students from China and Korea, undocumented workers from African
and Asian countries – to single out some of the major immigrant cate-
gories. In some places the result is a population so heterogeneous it merits
the term ‘super-diversity’, as coined by Vertovec (2006) to illustrate the
phenomenon found in the London metropolis.
Furthermore, while formerly migration tended to be viewed predomi-
nantly as a once-off movement leading to permanent resettlement (a con-
ception that prevailed in classic immigration countries), recent migration –
helped by strongly increased transport and communication facilities – has
shifted to more fluid practices of international migration in which more mi-
grants have consecutive stays in different countries, alternate their resi-
dence between countries, etc. This leads to new practices of residence, set-
tlement, integration and community formation. Researchers are exploring
these new phenomena under the concept of transnationalism.
New structures for the regulation of migration and settlement
Things have also changed significantly over time concerning state and gov-
ernment efforts to influence migration and settlement patterns. In times be-
fore the nation-state was born, it was particularly cities and local authori-
ties that had fulfilled the need to ‘regulate’ some aspects of admission and
residence, for example by providing people a ‘pass’ through the territory
and permission to exert a profession. From the beginning of the twentieth
century, nation-states in Europe have developed national instruments in or-
der to regulate not only admission (via controlled physical borders, pass-
ports for citizens and specialised aliens’ police), but also access to the la-
bour market and important state institutions (for the Netherlands see
Lucassen 1995 and Lucassen & Penninx 1997).
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The gradual evolution of nation-states into welfare states in the post-war
era brought yet another change. Liberal-democratic welfare states progres-
sively developed ever more intense relations between the state and its citi-
zens, whose rights and protection increased. In such a situation, the case of
non-citizens provoked two urgent questions. First, who can or should be
admitted to the territory of the state? As Zolberg (1981, 1989: 405-6)
stated:
[...] it is precisely the control which states exercise over borders that
defines international migration as a distinctive social process. This
arises from the irreducible political element, in that the process en-
tails not only physical relocation, but a change of jurisdiction and
membership.
Second, how can admitted ‘outsiders’ fit into nationally developed patterns
of welfare states?
Against the background of such long-term changes in migration itself as
well as its regulation, it becomes clear why policymaking in the field of
migration, integration and social cohesion has become so prominent and si-
multaneously contested at the national, regional and local levels.
Finally, during the last ten years a significant new supra-national politi-
cal institution has been developed: the European Union and its policies in
the field of immigration and integration. As for immigration policies, the
EU’s history as the cradle of free circulation of workers and later of mem-
ber state citizens within a growing European area goes back as far as the
European Community for Coal and Steel in 1950 (Goedings 2006).
However, the EU’s common policies towards third-country nationals are
much more recent, initiated by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. This agree-
ment stipulated that in May 2004, five years after its ratification, asylum
and migration should become subject to communitarian policymaking,
being thus shifted from the third, intergovernmental pillar of the EU to its
first pillar. In the period 1999-2004 there was indeed a harmonisation of
existing policies and practices (European Commission 2000), even though
most of the agreements and directives focused on restrictive policies aimed
to combat illegal migration and keep potential asylum seekers at bay, as
well as to synchronise asylum policies. A much smaller set of EU direc-
tives served to improve the legal position of immigrants (Groenendijk &
Minderhoud 2004; Van Selm & Tsolakis 2004).
European Commission policy initiative concerning integration is dated
as recent as 2003, when the first Communication on the topic was issued
(European Commission 2003). EU integration policies are ‘soft’ third pillar
policies, based on intergovernmental consensus and implemented through
the open method of coordination. Collecting information, monitoring,
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exchange of good practices and mobilisation of civil society actors are the
most important policy instruments (Süssmuth & Weidenfeld 2005).
The study of migration policymaking and settlement of migrants
The study of migration in Europe followed the recent expansion of this mi-
gration and is thus a relatively young field. A first instance since the 1980s
compelling research was when it became evident in the 1980s that the
guestworkers who were recruited to sustain and expand post-war econo-
mies in North-Western Europe were in fact staying. Such research was first
and foremost concentrated on numerical aspects of migration flows to
European countries, on the emerging immigrant communities and their de-
mographic composition. In a second turn, migration studies began high-
lighting questions concerning the integration of migrants into the economic
and social spheres of the new places of settlement. In a third phase, focus
fell on the political participation and integration of immigrants and their
descendants in a more comprehensive sense.
Zincone and Caponio (2006) have shown that the specific analysis of
migration policymaking is an even younger field of research. In this, what
they call the fourth phase, scientific investigations pose the question of
how immigration and integration policies are created, operationalised and
implemented. This does not focus on the content or frames of these poli-
cies per se, but on the political process through which such policies come
into existence and how their implementation is steered. Very little work
has been done yet from this particular perspective: what is available is
mainly grey literature in the form of PhD dissertations and research reports
(Zincone & Caponio 2006).
It is from such a starting point that researchers from ten different
European countries joined forces to write this first comparative study on
policymaking related to migration and settlement in Europe. The initiative
was undertaken by one of the research clusters of the IMISCOE Research
Network, which defined its task as studying the multilevel governance of
immigrant and immigration policies. This group of researchers is richly
multi-disciplinary, bringing together scholars from political science, policy
analysis, sociology, anthropology, geography, history and legal studies.
Although based primarily on scientific traditions of political science and
policy analysis, the approach taken by this group also reflects significant
input from other disciplines.
Crucial to understanding the multilevel governance of migration in con-
temporary societies is the awareness that policymaking is a process rather
than an event. This process allows for different levels where policies are
made and their interconnectedness: the supra-national, the national, the re-
gional and the local levels of cities and municipalities. It also has different
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phases, such as that of policy formulation, operationalisation and instru-
mentalisation and actual policy implementation (Borkert 2008). If this is
primarily an analytical distinction, we should add that such a process often
is of a cyclical nature: after a phase of scientific or political evaluation of a
policy, a new cycle of formulation, operationalisation and implementation
may start.
This study investigates the multilevel governance of migration and set-
tlement in two dimensions: at the institutional level and in terms of the ac-
tors involved at different levels. Although we have chosen – for practical
purposes – countries as the primary unit for analysis and reporting, the aim
was to identify how decisions are made at various levels of government
and how such decisions were influenced by policymaking and action at
other levels. Looking at the mechanisms of decision-making and related
political struggles, we studied the various actors involved, their institu-
tional background and strategies and how they exert their influence. In the
contextualised analysis of each country case, policy fields that are some-
how related to immigration and integration of immigrants are also included
wherever appropriate to encourage understanding of how the policies
developed.
A strategy for the comparative study of policymaking
Within Europe, the making of migration policies developed unevenly in
terms of both time and place. Depending on national trajectories and ex-
periences, such policies have also been articulated in various ways and at
different points along the way. For example, countries like the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands and France, needing to redefine their relations
with former colonies and migrants coming from them, had to develop poli-
cies and instruments unique from countries without such flows.
Alternatively, countries such as Italy and Spain that were marked by strong
emigration tendencies until their recent transformation into immigration
countries – nearly overnight, in many eyes – had quite a different start than
North-Western European nations. Meanwhile new EU accession states,
such as Poland and the Czech Republic, are forming migration policies
(with an EU acquis in this policy domain accepted beforehand) from yet
another position altogether. In the domain of integration policies, starting
points and traditions across different countries are still more diverse. This
is testified to the great variation in descriptive terminology for such poli-
cies: guestworker, race relations, minority, multicultural, integration, assim-
ilation and citizenship.
As a consequence, the state of research on such policy processes also
varies remarkably. This has been signalled by Zincone and Caponio
(2006), who identify four major factors contributing to the variation in
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research across countries: a) the timing of immigration and migrant settle-
ment; b) the maturity of policy-oriented studies in social science; c) the
participation of experts and academics in the making of policies; and d)
when the country joined the EU.
In view of the divergent policymaking as well as research related to it,
doing a first comparative study of policymaking in the field of migration
and integration is by no means straight forward. A first requirement for the
success of such a venture was to recruit contributors who were well ac-
quainted with processes and actors of migration policymaking in specific
countries and with the state of the art of related research. Existing docu-
ments in the single countries formed the primary source for these contribu-
tions. Since in many cases such sources were only partial, if not lacking
completely, the authors often applied a combination of methods for their
inquiry. Apart from analysis of primary sources, such as political and ad-
ministrative documents, and secondary literature, such as research papers,
some authors also conducted interviews with key informants to varying de-
grees. In many cases, identifying and interpreting sources was greatly en-
hanced by the authors’ own personal curricula. Some have been engaged
in the topic themselves – in different roles, as researchers, advisors or pol-
icymakers – thus bringing in valuable insights and insider information
from such experiences. Another way of enriching the contributions was to
invite several authors to collaborate on one country, thus welcoming var-
ious disciplinary backgrounds into the analysis and balancing information
from ‘inside’ with distanced analysis from ‘outside’. We were able to col-
lect ten cases to form the core of this comparative study. These contribu-
tions reflect a state of the art, namely what is known about the policymak-
ing process in the field of migration and integration in Austria, the Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain,
Switzerland and the UK.
A second requirement for the success of the study was to, insofar as pos-
sible, enable comparison between the national case studies. A theoretical
grid was thus devised to guide the teams of contributors in their data col-
lection, analysis and reporting. A first version of a grid was devised by the
IMISCOE research cluster on multi-level governance before the work even
started. After the first drafts of the country reports had been written, the
grid was adjusted according to discussions among the contributors.
The main elements of the grid will be recognisable for the reader as
forming the structure of the ten ensuing country chapters. The first section
of each chapter describes the development and composition of immigration
flows and their economic and political background in the country con-
cerned. The second section outlines the evolution of both immigration and
integration policies, describing their main directions, turning points and
possible interconnections.
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Sections three and four are devoted to a detailed analysis of policymak-
ing processes on migration and integration, respectively. Within each of
these domains, specific sub-domains of policy are analysed if relevant for
the country. For example, distinctions may be made between the develop-
ment of the regulation of labour market-driven migration, secondary migra-
tion such as family reunification and formation and asylum and refugee mi-
gration. For integration, specific sub-domains rely on the framing of inte-
gration as well as specific policies. Included may be key domains like the
legal and political (e.g. access to welfare state facilities, naturalisation), the
socio-economic (e.g. labour market access, social security, education) and
the cultural and religious. Both sections are chronologically organised,
from oldest to most recent policy and legislation initiatives. In view of the
countries’ different histories, the period covered differs. For North-Western
European countries, the analysis generally spans the whole post-war era.
For Italy and Spain, it begins in the mid-1980s. For Poland and the Czech
Republic, the starting point is the years immediately before EU accession.
Despite such differences, however, the 1990s marked a turning point for
the majority of European countries vis-à-vis how national governments ap-
proached migration matters. As a consequence, most country studies differ-
entiate between migration policies before the 1990s and those thereafter.
Our grid also served to define the content of such historical-analytic
descriptions in the third and fourth sections of each chapter. The main
characteristics of decision-making in immigration and integration policies
are highlighted by using three analytical foci: a) development of the institu-
tional structures that are formally responsible for policies; b) actors and
networks that concretely take part in the policymaking process (or, for that
matter, do not participate); and c) internal and external factors that influ-
ence these decision-making processes.
The final section prepares a ground for comparison. Authors were asked
to summarise here the specificities of their national case studies and sug-
gest factors that could explain migration and integration policymaking that
often seems to follow unpredictable, uncertain patterns. In doing so, parti-
cular attention was given to the following points:
– the relation (or absence thereof) between immigration and integration
policies
– the governance patterns and networks of actors in these policy fields
– the relevance of politics, the political system and of different govern-
ment coalitions
– the style of policymaking, for example, strategies of negotiation and
bargaining versus opposition and conflict.
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Terminology
The common grid for this study functioned as a general framework within
which authors could comparably provide the phenomena we wished to ob-
serve, analyse and report on. It did not, however, anticipate the challenge
of terminology. As indicated above, not only do policies and their framing
differ remarkably across European countries, so too is the related terminol-
ogy divergent. It is not only a matter of language. Framing and concepts
behind the words have far-reaching implications for the demarcation of do-
mains and the operational terms used in actual implementation. For exam-
ple, post-independence migration by inhabitants of former colonies to the
countries that were once the colonisers may not be framed or defined as
‘immigration’, as was the case with migrants from Indonesia to the
Netherlands between 1948 and 1962. Dutch policies called this group ‘re-
patriates’, although the great majority had never been in the patria before.
One of the clearest examples of divergent terminology stemming from op-
erational definitions is to be found in the formulation and identification of
policy target groups. The various figures provided for immigration and the
stock of immigrants in the first section of every national case chapter are
based on different criteria, such as legal status of immigrants (for foreign-
ers), place of birth outside the country of residence (for those with first-
hand migration experience), place of birth of parents (for the so-called
second-generation migrants) or even self-categorisation of residents in clas-
sifications of ‘ethnic origin’ in censuses. This results in data that are very
divergent, if not incomparable.1
We tried to resolve this volume’s competing terminology by defining a
number of key terms that clearly mark the common ground covered by our
comparative study. This is particularly the case with the terms ‘immigration
policies’ and ‘immigrant policies’, as applied in this introductory chapter
and the conclusion. On the other hand, it was decided that within the case
studies, the description and analysis of the different countries was best
served by using terminology traditionally used in the national context. Not
doing so would render the cases incomprehensible. In this sense, the uni-
formity of language was abandoned to promote an unencumbered approach
to the subject. As a result, the national chapters provide insights into cur-
rent perceptions, discourses in member states and information about how
an issue is investigated by different scientific communities. At the same
time, the analysis follows broader definitions within the grid.
We use the term ‘migration policies’ as common shorthand for indicat-
ing both policies that relate to mobility of a certain duration across state
borders and policies that relate to the settlement process of such migrants
in the new place.
More specifically, we define ‘immigration policies’ as any policies that
relate to admission, entrance and expulsion of people who used to live
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outside the national territory concerned, irrespective of their legal status
(e.g. foreign citizens, recognised refugees, illegal immigrants) and the title
given to them (e.g. aliens, returnees, Aussiedler, racial minorities).
In contrast, ‘immigrant policies’ are defined in this volume as all poli-
cies related to immigrants and their position in the new society of settle-
ment, irrespective of the individuals’ legal status and notwithstanding the
names for such policies (e.g. ethnic minorities’ policies, race relations poli-
cies, integration policies, multicultural policies). To a great extent, we have
followed terminology developed by Hammar (1985).
The structure of the book
The structure of the book is straightforward. This introduction is followed
by ten chapters that should be read as individual case studies of policymak-
ing. They are grouped in three clusters that represent different types of im-
migration experiences. The countries described in the first six chapters are
all to be found in Western Europe: Austria, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. They share a longer history of post-
war immigration going back to the 1950s and 1960s. This commonality
does not imply, however, that the countries have developed the same pol-
icy responses to migration. On the contrary, their responses are remarkably
different, in terms of both content and timeline. And most interestingly, in
view of the study’s impetus, the processes of policymaking in this field are
also remarkably divergent, particularly in the period before 1990.
Following the Western European cases, Italy and Spain are presented as
two recent immigration countries in Southern Europe. They do not only
share this background, but also the common experience of having been sig-
nificant emigration countries until recently.
Finally, two countries from Central Europe are included. Migration – at
least in a sense that is comparable to other Western European countries –
became a viable option only after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the com-
munist regimes in 1989. Since then, the Czech Republic and Poland have
experienced a mix of migration movements from, through and into their
countries, especially since their 2004 accession. Entrance into the EU has
also had significant implications for policymaking processes, as we will see.
In the concluding chapter, Zincone makes up the balance of what we
can learn from the ten cases. She does so by asking two basic questions to
be answered on the basis of comparison. First, which forces, actors and
mechanisms discourage or hinder change in policies and their making, and
which ones promote, encourage or even enforce such changes? Systematic
observations based on this question give us insight into how to explain
continuity and change, particularly at times and in situations where other
outcomes would be expected than are actually observed. The second
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question is whether change, when it occurs, also leads to convergence of
policies and of policymaking in different countries. This is not necessarily
the case, as is shown.
Finally, Zincone calls attention to strong outside forces – those external
to the mechanisms of policymaking within national contexts – that increas-
ingly influence policies and policymaking. Sometimes such forces may
press directly towards convergence, as in the case of the supra-national, i.e.
international and EU-wide approaches towards migration and integration.
In other cases, convergence is just one possible outcome of such pressure
but, as Zincone suggests, in this era of globalisation it is often the most
likely one.
Note
1 The United Nations (2006) has tried to present comparable data on stocks of immi-
grants by using – in the organisation’s opinion – the best proxy: stocks of legal resi-
dents born outside the country of domicile. Such data are available for all countries
within this study except for Germany, in whose case the UN counts a resident alien
(i.e. non-citizen) as an immigrant. This best available comparison of the ten coun-
tries results in the following percentages of resident immigrants within a nation’s to-
tal population in mid-2005: Austria: 15.1, the Czech Republic: 4.4, France: 10.7,
Germany: 12.3 (aliens), Italy: 4.3, The Netherlands: 10.1, Poland: 1.8, Spain: 11.1,
Switzerland 22.9 and the UK: 9.1.
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PART I
POST-WAR MIGRATION COUNTRIES

1 The case of Austria
Albert Kraler
1 Introduction
In the past two decades, Austrian migration policy as well as its making
have undergone radical changes. Though once a subject dealt with mostly
by small groups of experts within the administration, trade unions, labour
market authorities and employers’ associations, migration has moved to the
centre of political debate and to the centre of government. At the same
time, there have been several shifts in the institutional framework dealing
with migration beginning in the late 1980s. Initial monopolisation of all
migration-related issues by the Ministry of Interior has given way to a sub-
sequent emergence of new actors and institutions in the course of the
1990s and into the new millennium.
These changes are linked to broader changes in Austria’s political system
as well as to changing patterns of migration and its diversification both in
terms of types of migration and migrants’ countries of origin. The changing
geopolitical context after 1989 – the collapse of Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe and the rise of migration flows from them – as well as the
Yugoslav crises and their related refugee influxes have functioned as impor-
tant triggering events for reforming migration policies in the 1990s. The in-
creasing Europeanisation of migration policymaking in the past fifteen
years and the EU’s enlargements are additional factors shaping both the
contents of migration policies as well as the way they are made in Austria.
As background to a more detailed analysis of policymaking, I will first
sketch out the main features of immigration into Austria and characteristics
of the immigrant populations. In the second part of this introduction, I out-
line the history of migration policy before the 1990s.
1.1 Evolution of immigration and the immigrant population
Post-war migration policies in Austria have been largely shaped by guest
worker recruitment. However, what was intended as a temporary, circular
form of labour migration soon developed more permanent features based
on self-reproducing mechanisms (family migration, chain migration and
migrant networks). Already during the initial recruitment period, a consid-
erable share of migrants moved with or joined family members, although
they were usually admitted as workers rather than relatives. The recruit-
ment stop in 1974 further increased family migration, in particular children
of migrant workers (Kraler 2010: 70ff).
While reunification with children abated in the mid-1980s and dwindled
to an insignificant level by the late 1990s, family reunification of spouses
consistently increased since the 1970s, reaching almost 28 per cent of all
immigrants entering between 2004 and 2008 who were residents in Austria
in 2008.1 By contrast, family formation – migration for the purpose of con-
cluding a marriage in Austria – has rarely exceeded 10 per cent of all resi-
dent immigrants at any given period. Above all, this reflects the absence of
family formation as a legal entry channel for third-country nationals.2 In
total, more than 53 per cent of the current immigrant population migrated
for family-related reasons, making this the main source of immigration.
The share of family-related migrants among Turks is highest: almost three
quarters of the Turkish population have immigrated either as a child, for
the purpose of family reunification or to conclude a marriage in Austria.3
Despite restrictions, labour migration continued to be an important rea-
son for migration until the early 1990s, when new restrictions drastically
reduced the opportunities. This trend reversed only with a renewed rise of
labour migration in the wake of the latest EU enlargements. Changes have
been twofold. Firstly, while the share of migrants immigrating to search for
work has consistently been on the decline since the 1990s, the share of re-
cruited migrants and migrants who had found a job from abroad has re-
cently experienced a significant increase. Secondly, recruitment of migrants
from other EU countries had become dominant, particularly for short-term
assignments (Statistics Austria 2009c: 33ff; Gregoritsch, Kernbeiß,
Prammer-Waldhör, Timar & Wagner-Pinter 2009).
Finally, about 9 per cent of the foreign-born population immigrated to
Austria as refugees or asylum seekers, mostly between the mid-1980s and
the late 1990s. In the Cold War period, Austria was an important country of
transit and, to a lesser extent, a country of asylum, for refugees from
Communist-ruled Eastern Europe. During the 1980s, however, the share of
asylum seekers from other countries of origin progressively increased.
Refugees from the former Yugoslavia who fled to Austria in the early 1990s
constitute the single most significant refugee flow of the past two decades
in quantitative terms, followed by Chechen refugees from the Russian
Federation. The inflow of refugees from the former Yugoslavia coincided
with a significant increase of immigration from Eastern Europe in the wake
of the abolition of exit controls. After 2000, the relative share of refugees
and asylum seekers decreased, reflecting both a drop in asylum-related in-
flows in absolute terms as well as a new peak in legal immigration.
As a result, 43 per cent of refugees and asylum seekers originate from
the former Yugoslavia, notably Bosnia, while some 18 per cent come from
new EU member states, reflecting the legacy of the Cold War. About a
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third of all refugees come from non-EU countries, the former Yugoslavia
or Turkey. Thus, while the share of non-European refugees and asylum
seekers has undoubtedly increased over the past two decades, the vast ma-
jority of refugees and asylum seekers has come from a European country.
As a result of these flows mainly coming from the East, the population
of foreign citizenship almost doubled between 1988 and 1993, from
344,000 to an estimated 690,000. While the current composition of the mi-
grant population still reflects guest worker recruitment, the immigrant pop-
ulation is increasingly diversifying as a result of ‘new immigration’ from
other European countries, including Germany and those in Eastern Europe,
as well as Africa and South-East and Central Asia.
After 1993, the foreign resident population continued to grow, but at a
much lower rate. Between 1999 and 2004, there was another steep rise in
immigration, with net migration climbing to two thirds of its all-time peak
in 1991. After 2004, immigration decreased considerably. Between 2004
and 2006, total net migration more than halved from 50,826 in 2004 to
24,103 in 2006. As of 2009, it stood at just over 20,000. The decline is lar-
gely due to the effects of the aliens reforms package of 2006, which con-
siderably restricted immigration of third-country nationals. However,
Figure 1.1 Reasons for migration, over time (in %)
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on 2008 LFS ad hoc module on immi-
grants and their descendants in Statistics Austria (2009c)
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current low levels undoubtedly also reflect the generally tense economic
climate in the country.
Throughout the last fifteen years, net migration of nationals has been ne-
gative. On average, 21,143 Austrian nationals left Austria annually be-
tween 1996 and 2009, whereas just over 15,501 re-migrated, amounting to
a net loss of -5,311 annually. By contrast, 80,330 non-nationals immigrated
to Austria annually, while close to 50,000 emigrated, resulting in a net mi-
gration average of 31,426.
In 2009, the total foreign population was numbered at 870,704 or 10.4
per cent of the population, while 1,277,098 or 15.3 per cent of the popula-
tion were foreign-born. Over 85 per cent of the foreign-born population
was born in another European country. Close to 40 per cent originated
from another EU country, roughly half of whom were born in a new mem-
ber state. Reflecting the lasting legacies of guest worker recruitment from
the former Yugoslavia and Turkey, persons born in the two countries made
up a respective 12.4 per cent and 29.4 per cent of the foreign-born
Figure 1.2 Net migration, 1961-2009
Sources: Author’s own elaboration based on data from Statistics Austria provided
to the author and Statistics Austria (2011); 1961-1995 figures based on intercensal
population estimates; 1996-2001 figures based on aggregate migration statistics
derived from municipal population registers; 2002-2009 figures calculated ac-
cording to Austrian Population Register (POPREG) data
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population. The share of the population with a migration background –
persons with two parents born abroad – was around 17.5 per cent in mid-
2008 (Statistics Austria 2009b).
1.2 Migration policies before the 1990s
Austria’s migration history in the twentieth century shows four main water-
sheds. The first is the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy and
the concomitant emergence of new states and new borders within its for-
mer territory. The second is World War II, which not only brought massive
displacement of persons, but also led in its Cold War aftermath to Europe’s
split into Communist-ruled and Western states. The third commences with
the recruitment of guest workers in 1961. And the final watershed took
place between 1989 and 1993, marked by changing patterns of both migra-
tion and migration policymaking. It is meaningful to outline here the early
evolution of migration policy since elements of its legacy are reflected in
later policies.
The Habsburg Empire did not have a migration policy in the modern
sense, though it had various mechanisms of controlling the movement of
people within its territory. Such mechanisms were primarily concerned
with documenting individual identity and regulating entitlements to differ-
ent bundles of rights and related obligations. A crucial set of regulations,
which did much of the regulating of movements, was the so-called
Heimatrecht (‘right of residence’), which tied every individual to his or her
municipality of origin. The Heimatrecht was closely tied to social policy,
particularly to poor relief, but also functioned as an important mechanism
of population control more generally. In cases of poverty, delinquency or
political activism, individuals not possessing a right to residence where
they were living were liable to be deported to their community of origin.
As a corollary, an elaborated set of deportation and expulsion mechanisms
was erected to enforce the Heimatrecht. In a way, the Heimatrecht was a
functional substitute for citizenship, gaining importance as a guiding prin-
ciple for population control in the second half of the nineteenth century
(Burger & Wendelin 2002).
Migration policies in a narrow sense – understood as policies that regu-
late the movement of both citizens and non-nationals across international
borders – did not emerge until the break-up of the Habsburg Empire and
the establishment the Austrian Republic in 1918. One of its prominent
starting points was 1925’s adoption of the so-called Protection of Native
Workers Act (Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz) (Heiss 1995: 91). The act estab-
lished a system of work permits for foreign citizens that has existed in
varying forms ever since. Importantly, the act shifted the locus of control
from the public welfare system (and municipalities as guardians of
Heimatrecht regulations) to the labour market and labour market
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authorities, thus also signalling the growing importance of the state for the
regulation of employment. Reflecting its socialist origins, the act also pro-
vided for the co-option of formally organised social partners (Chamber of
Labour and the Chamber of Commerce) in the administrative procedures
for issuing work permits. That was an expression of the expansion of neo-
corporatist modes of welfare and labour market policymaking in the First
Republic. Conceptually, the Protection of Native Workers Act rested on the
idea that labour markets had a limited ‘absorption capacity’ and thus
needed to be controlled, an idea that continued to guide migration policy
ever since.
During World War II and its immediate aftermath, the numbers of ‘mi-
grants’ grew enormously. By and large, they were ethnic Germans who
were accepted as permanent residents and, eventually, as citizens. The ma-
jority of the remaining foreign nationals were quickly repatriated, or, in the
case of Jews, channelled to Israel (Albrich 1995; Fassmann & Münz 1995:
34). Throughout the first decade after the war, displaced persons (DPs) re-
mained the focus of public debates on migration and related public poli-
cies, including citizenship policy. In tackling the ‘refugee problem’, the
government focused on international solutions, notably resettlement, de-
spite the fact that fairly high numbers of ethnic Germans were integrated.
Indeed, resettlement remained the preferred policy until well into the
1970s.
During the 1950s, the majority of refugees came from the Communist
countries surrounding Austria, in particular, Yugoslavia. However, most of
them were denied refugee status and branded ‘economic refugees’ – a term
first entering public debates on migration and asylum at that time (Sensenig
1998: 556f). Many of them were forcibly returned to Yugoslavia. Many
others were resettled to third countries by the Intergovernmental Committee
for European Migration (ICEM, precursor to the International Organization
for Migration).
The Hungarian crisis of 1956 led to a massive inflow of some 180,000
refugees, of whom some 10 per cent stayed in Austria (Zierer 1995). The
Hungarian crisis was important in giving rise to Austria’s perception – and
self-perception – as a welcoming ‘safe haven’ for refugees.4 In balance,
however, Austria was a country of net emigration during the 1950s
(Waldrauch 2003: 2).
In early 1968, Austria adopted its first asylum act. However, only a few
of the total 162,000 Czechoslovakians who fled to Austria in the summer
of 1968 actually applied for refugee status in Austria. As in the Hungarian
crisis a decade earlier, most refugees moved on to other states, not least
since recruitment agencies from other states offering higher wages actively
recruited Czechoslovakian refugees. Many also returned to
Czechoslovakia. Those who stayed were quickly integrated into the labour
market and received nationality rather soon (Vales 1995).5
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By the late 1950s, employers found it increasingly difficult to fill labour
shortages in certain industries (Matuschek 1985: 160). Their requests to
liberalise the employment of foreign labour to meet the demand, however,
were initially rejected by trade unions. So employers’ attempts to find a le-
gal solution failed, but the social partners6 reached an agreement on the
temporary employment of foreign workers in the framework of the existing
regulations in 1961. The agreement set a quota of 37,120 foreign workers
that could be employed in the calendar year of 1962.
Initially meant as a temporary measure, the practice of setting quotas
each year in the form of agreements between employers, trade unions and
the state continued in slightly modified form up to 1975. By then, the an-
nual quota had been raised to just under 150,000. Although these official
quota appear to have been never exhausted, the actual overall number of
foreign employees was significantly higher, due to the fact that local
branch offices of the Austrian labour market authority could issue permits
outside the quota regime to migrants who were informally recruited.
This practice of informal recruitment had been reinforced by the ineffec-
tiveness of the official recruitment system. Like other European states,
Austria had turned to recruitment agreements with Mediterranean countries
as a means to ensure sufficient supply of labour. In 1962, the government
signed a first agreement with Spain, but it remained largely ineffective. In
1964, an agreement with Turkey followed and, in 1966, the last agreement
of this kind was signed with Yugoslavia. In both countries, recruitment of-
fices were set up, run by the Chamber of Commerce. Partly because of the
relatively low wage levels prevailing in Austria at the time, however, the
response to recruitment initiatives remained unsatisfactory from the point
of view of employers. As a consequence, the bulk of employment permits
were actually issued to migrants who either were ‘chain-recruited’ by em-
ployers through migrants already in Austria or who came on their own ac-
cord i.e. without the required labour-related visa – a practice that came to
be known as ‘tourist employment’ (Gächter 2000: 69).
A law on the employment of foreign workers was finally passed in 1975
and the state – namely, the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was in charge
of labour market policy) – henceforth played a much more important role.
Yet the informal mechanisms of designing the main tenets of migration
policy in the framework of social partnership remained in place (Gächter
2000; Matuschek 1985).
The oil crisis and the following recession in 1973 radically reduced the
demand for labour. In response, labour recruitment and the more informal
practices of chain recruitment and ‘tourist employment’ ended. Foreigners’
access to employment became restricted. In 1975, the Employment of
Foreign Workers Act (Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz) was passed. Apart
from legalising the hitherto informal quota system, the new law entrenched
employers’ and labour market authorities’ dominant position vis-à-vis
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migrants’ employment as well as the prioritisation of nationals over for-
eigners on the labour market. From then on, employers had to prove they
could not fill vacancies with equally qualified nationals before an employ-
ment permit was issued. As a result, numbers of foreign workers, particu-
larly those from Yugoslavia, steeply dropped, as did (albeit to a lesser
extent) the number of foreign nationals resident in Austria – a phenomenon
repeated after the second oil crisis in 1981. What is revealing in these
events is that migration, labour or otherwise, continued to be regulated lar-
gely by controlling foreigners’ access to the labour market and in the fra-
mework of an employment act rather than by adjusting entry regulations.
This framework remained in place until the great changes of the early
1990s.
2 Immigration policies and policymaking since the early
1990s
The period between 1989 and 1993 was a major watershed. Three changes
were key: patterns of migration, modes of migration policymaking and, last
but not least, modes of migration regulation. Preceding these changes was
a major change on the political scene: the politicisation of migration, re-
lated to the rise of the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs,
FPÖ), the emergence of the Green Party (Die Grüne) and the ‘parliamen-
tarisation’7 of migration policymaking.
The immediate context in that period was a massive rise in the numbers
of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. This was caused by increased
immigration from Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron
Curtain, rising numbers of asylum applications (an average of 20,800 ap-
plications submitted each year between 1988 and 1992) and a massive in-
flow of refugees from the territory of the disintegrating Yugoslavia.
2.1 In search of coherence: Policymaking in the 1990s
The developments in the second half of the 1980s triggered a major revi-
sion of the relevant legislation in all concerned areas during the 1990s.
Whereas asylum policy and labour migration policy had been kept separate
in the previous periods and admission was regulated by controlling access
to the labour market, rather than through admission policy per se, migra-
tion policy was now discussed as a coherent policy field. The field in-
cluded admission, the regulation of foreigners’ access to employment and
asylum. The guiding principle under which migration policy henceforth
was discussed was that of ‘managed migration’ (geregelte Zuwanderung).
The politicisation of migration had been visible since the mid-1980s,
seen in the topic’s rising prominence within political debates. It was
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pushed particularly by Jörg Haider’s FPÖ and, to a lesser yet still signifi-
cant extent, the Green Party. The FPÖ’s anti-immigrant plebiscite ‘Austria
First’ (1992) further helped make migration a key issue in political debates,
also leading to the emergence of a vocal pro-immigrant advocacy coalition.
This coalition, in its turn, gave rise to an unprecedented series of highly
politically active NGOs that publicly commented on public policies. In ad-
dition, from 1989 onwards, the new centre-left daily broadsheet Der
Standard acted as a forum for NGOs and government critics to voice their
concerns over migration and integration policy. On the other side of the
political spectrum, Austria’s largest tabloid, Die Kron, readily served as the
main arena for anti-immigrant mobilisation by the FPÖ.
Institutionally, there was a shift of competences at the governmental
level. The Ministry of Interior took over the lead in formulating overall
goals in migration policy from the Ministry of Social Affairs and its social
partners. In 1987, then Minister of Interior Karl Blecha claimed a leading
role in migration policymaking for the Ministry of Interior for the first
time: a first attempt to undertake a comprehensive reform of immigration
regulations, including the Employment of Foreign Workers Act. Yet the
attempt failed (Fritz 2003: 304). The actual shift of competences in migra-
tion policymaking can be considerably credited to his successor, Franz
Löschnak, and his chief of cabinet between 1989 and 1993, Manfred
Figure 1.3 Asylum applications, 1988-2009
Source: Ministry of Interior
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Matzka.8 Löschnak (1993: 59) centralised all agendas concerning admis-
sion, policing of aliens, asylum and integration9 in a single ministry depart-
ment soon after he took office in February 1989. He had also forged con-
sensus among all four parties represented in Parliament: the framework for
governing migration was to be completely reformed and a comprehensive
policy needed to be formulated. With this move, Löschnak claimed a lead-
ing role for the Ministry of Interior.
The need to reform immigration policy, however, was seen by a much
broader range of actors, including trade unions, academics and sections of
the wider public. Proponents of a new law argued that existing control
mechanisms (essentially, the control of access to the labour market) were
ineffective. Instead, a quota system (Quotenregelung) that could distinguish
between categories of migrants and between different purposes of stay and
would set annual ceilings for the maximum intake of migrants in a particu-
lar category would allow a much more effective management and regula-
tion of migration. This would make separate labour market controls
obsolete.
Initially, however, trade unions had pushed for a major reform of the
Employment of Foreign Workers Act – traditionally, the main instrument
of migration policy. In their view, the legislation should be amended to bet-
ter differentiate between new arrivals and foreigners already present in
order to protect the latter against the former. Furthermore, they wanted
more effective instruments against unregistered employment, the introduc-
tion of which were to go hand in hand with a one-shot regularisation of
irregularly employed foreigners (Gächter 2000: 73-74). The actual reform
of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act in 1990, however, incorporated
trade unions’ demands only to a limited extent. Trade unions subsequently
became one of the main allies of the Ministry of Interior in its drive for a
comprehensive immigration reform via a reform of immigration legislation
(i.e. entry and residence regulations). In the long term, however, trade un-
ions’ support in shifting the ‘locus of control from the factory gate to the
national border’ (ibid.: 73) – and thus the locus of migration policymaking
to the Ministry of Interior – actually helped undermine their power to influ-
ence migration policymaking, a fact already apparent by the 1990s.
The aliens package of 1991
The Minister of Interior announced the so-called aliens package
(Fremdenpaket) in January 1991. Much of the public debate on the pack-
age, including statements by the ministry, however, focused on asylum.
Immigration regulations were also closely linked to asylum, which itself
became almost synonymous with irregular migration. Labour migration
policy and policies towards settled immigrants hardly featured in the de-
bate that influenced the legislation eventually adopted.
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This almost exclusive focus on asylum and the mingling of asylum and
wider migration issues in the public debate must be seen in light of the
time’s actual immigration and the public perception of it. The number of
asylum applications had soared dramatically in the late 1980s, with
Romanian asylum applicants being at the centre of public debate. In the
public perception, asylum migration was indeed the dominant form of mi-
gration. In terms of content, the public discourse on asylum increasingly
shifted the terms of the debate on general migration to security issues (‘il-
legal migration’, ‘bogus-asylum seekers’, trafficking and smuggling of mi-
grants, organised crime, etc.).
A new Asylum Act was passed in 1991 (Asylgesetz 1991). This law in-
troduced accelerated procedures for manifestly unfounded cases, the princi-
ple of ‘safe third countries’ and ‘safe countries of origin’ as well as the
possibility to take fingerprints of asylum applicants. In the short term, the
Asylum Act seemed to reach its immediate objective of reducing asylum
applications: their numbers fell from 16,238 in 1992 to 4,788 in the fol-
lowing year.10
A year later, in 1992, the government reformed the legislation on entry
and residence of foreigners, replacing the 1954 Policing of Aliens Act with
the 1992 Aliens Act (Fremdengesetz). It also included provisions on enfor-
cement measures (deportation, rejection at the border, etc.). Furthermore,
the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) was adopted in the same year, enter-
ing into force in 1993. It established a number of categories of migrants by
their different purposes of stay and introduced quota for these categories.
The exact category descriptions were subject to frequent changes in the fol-
lowing years. In addition, the law made provincial authorities responsible
for issuing residence titles (up until then the Aliens Police was the compe-
tent authority). Shifting the competence of residence title issuance to the
provinces soon created major problems in terms of implementation of the
law, including a soaring backlog of cases and arbitrary as well as unconsti-
tutional decisions (Jawhari 2000). The decentralisation of decision-making
on residence permits was also difficult to combine with the implementation
of the quota system. The fact that provinces were only poorly prepared for
their new task11 and that many provisions of the law were vague – leaving
considerable discretion to implementing authorities – exacerbated these
problems.
In response to the 1992 Residence Act’s obvious challenges, Caspar
Einem, who succeeded Löschnak as Minister of Interior after the general
elections 1994, proposed a complete reform of the aliens legislation under
the title ‘integration package’ (Integrationspaket). In a sense, this can be re-
garded as the birth of integration policy as a distinct policy concern at the
national level and as the beginning of targeted immigrant policies.12
Drafted as a response to the obvious adverse consequences of the 1992 re-
form for settled immigrants, the ‘integration package’ acknowledged the
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need for ‘legal integration’: to grant settled immigrants rights similar, if not
equal to, those of citizens. A first draft proposal was rejected by the junior
party in government, the conservative People’s Party (Österreichische
Volkspartei, ÖVP) (Bauböck & Perchinig 2006). In May 1996, a second
draft was presented, also to be rejected by a number of conservative-led
provinces, the Ministry of Labour and trade unions. Trade unions feared
that automatically giving residence rights to settled immigrants after a cer-
tain time period (as proposed in the law) would infringe on the principles
of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Gächter 2000: 75).
The 1997 Aliens Act
A new law that merged the 1992 Aliens Act with the 1992 Residence Act
into a single piece of legislation eventually was adopted under Einem’s
successor, Karl Schlögl, in 1997. It entered into force in 1998. This new
law took up a number of elements of previous proposals and had a new
focus: its central aim was to promote the integration of aliens instead of
new immigration (‘integration before new immigration’). The most impor-
tant novelty introduced was the principle of successive consolidation of re-
sidence after five, eight and ten years (Sohler 1999: 84ff). At the same
time, new restrictions were also imposed.
The principle of ‘consolidation of residence’ – essentially a pathway to
denizenship – gradually emerged from the discussions on the main tenets
of the reform. It responded to the numerous, much-publicised cases of
hardship under the 1992 Residence Act affecting, in particular, settled mi-
grants and their family members. In addition, the act aimed to ‘repair’ the
irregular status in which a great number of foreign children, born or raised
in Austria, had found themselves – the result of the 1992 Residence Act,
Firstly, a special quota for family reunion cases was introduced. While also
open for spouses and children not yet reunited with the principle permit
holder, it mainly served to regularise the status of minors already in
Austria.13 Secondly, the law established an absolute right for foreign chil-
dren born or raised in the country to remain in Austria (Sohler 1999: 84ff).
Proposals to harmonise immigration legislation with the Employment of
Foreign Workers Act (notably by linking a long-term residence permit with
access to employment, regardless of the alien’s employment history), were
not pursued, as concession to the trade unions. In preparing the act, the
Ministry of Interior informally consulted a wide range of experts, encoura-
ging them to identify provisions needing to be ‘repaired’ to prevent re-
newed cases of hardship and, in particular, irregularity.14
Institutionally, the 1997 Aliens Act shifted part of the competence of re-
sidence title issuance back to the Aliens Police, which henceforth issued
short-term residence titles (Aufenthaltserlaubnisse). The new Aliens Act
was adopted together with an amendment of the Asylum Act, mainly to
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bring it in line with EU legislation (such as the Dublin convention and the
Schengen agreement).
2.2 A new mode of governance? Right-wing coalitions, 2000-2006
The formation of a coalition government between the conservative
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the populist FPÖ in early February
2000 brought a major change to Austria’s political system. It meant ending
a long period of grand coalitions between the two major parties, ÖVP and
the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ), and
also undermined the importance of the (largely informal) mechanisms of
social partnership in a wide range of policy areas. In addition, FPÖ’s inclu-
sion into government provoked the imposition of – largely symbolic –
sanctions against the Austrian government by the leaders of other EU-14
member states. These sanctions clearly had a major impact on government
policies. Apart from leading to the resignation of Haider as FPÖ party
chairman, they also greatly facilitated reaching an agreement on the com-
pensation of World War II slave labourers and the restitution of property
expropriated from Jews to their owners and heirs. Not least, the heightened
external scrutiny of the government’s performance, particularly in respect
to human rights and minority and immigrant policy, certainly helped pre-
vent (or at least postpone) major changes pushed for by the FPÖ (Kraler
2003; Wodak & Reisigl 2002).
The government programme of early February 2000 proposed several
concrete measures on migration policy, notably on integration, some of
which were subsequently adopted in the framework of the aliens legislation
reform in 2002 (BKA 2000: 49ff).
The 2002 reforms and their aftermath
In July 2002, Parliament adopted significant amendments to the Aliens Act
and the Asylum Law, both of which anticipated several EU directives
already adopted or then still in the making.15 For example, introduced in
anticipation of directive 109/2003/EC was a ‘residence certificate’, a title
issued after five years of continuous residence and entitling unlimited em-
ployment. This finally harmonised residence rights with employment rights
– such a harmonisation had been fiercely resisted by trade unions in the
1997 reform.
In general, the reform followed the line of earlier legislation, but it intro-
duced three crucial novelties. Firstly, labour immigration of unskilled and
semi-skilled workers was formally ended by abolishing the quota for em-
ployees – only a quota for highly skilled migrants with a concrete job offer
(termed ‘key personnel’) henceforth existed – and the introduction of a
minimum wage requirement for prospective migrants, initially set at
E 2,016 per month.16 Secondly, as compensation, the employment of
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seasonal workers was greatly facilitated. In the same vein, provinces shar-
ing a border with a new member state were allowed to reach bilateral
agreements on commuters and employees in training, thus providing a me-
chanism for limited recruitment and, after 2004, to selectively modify tran-
sition rules. Thirdly, under the conditions of the so-called ‘integration
agreement’, all third-country nationals newly immigrating or those who liv-
ing on Austrian territory since 1998, were obliged to sign the agreement
(see section 3).
As a migration control instrument, however, the 2002 Aliens Acts (like
the 1997 act preceding it) failed to reach their tacit objectives: to reduce
immigration flows. Concerned about rising numbers of asylum seekers, the
government introduced important amendments to the Asylum Act in 2003,
including a special admission procedures and a ban on new evidence dur-
ing appeal procedures. In addition, appeals against inadmissible decisions
under the Dublin Convention no longer had suspensive effects. Thus, as
had been the case since the early 1990s, asylum legislation was being used
as a major instrument of migration control at large. In the fall of 2004,
however, the Austrian Constitutional Court ruled various new provisions
unconstitutional, subsequently annulling them and necessitating yet another
reform (ECRE 2005).
As far as the regulation of labour migration is concerned, the 2002 act
also proved unsuccessful at diminishing inflows. It rather kept the doors
half closed. Admittedly, there was an attempt to restrict permanent immi-
gration to highly skilled migrants in the 2002 reform, but temporary forms
of labour migration were still permitted and even expanded. The share of
temporarily admitted migrants increased continuously since the Aliens Law
of 1997, with seasonal labour in agriculture and tourism accounting for the
overwhelming share of temporary labour. The number of seasonal employ-
ment permits issued under the Employment of Foreign Workers Act in-
creased more than tenfold, from 5,161 permits in 1999 to 56,500 in 2002
(Mayer 2009: 57).17 Annual quota were decided by way of decree by the
Ministry of Economy and Labour.18 With the 2002 Aliens Act, the defini-
tion of seasonal labour was expanded to include economic branches where
seasonal labour was uncommon, while extending the timeframe of possible
employment to up to twelve months, thus essentially creating a new form
of temporary (rather than seasonal) labour migration channel (Kraler &
Stacher 2002: 62; Mayer 2009: 57). The newly created opportunities
clearly signalled to business that their interests were heard, while also
being an expression of the decline of social partnership and, in particular,
the marginalisation of trade unions during the rightwing coalition
government.
Actual developments of both temporary labour migration and immigra-
tion, in general, were strongly influenced by the 2004 EU enlargement that
notably shifted recruitment of temporary labour from third countries to the
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new EU member states. To understand this major watershed in Austrian
immigration, we must return for a moment to the significance of Austria’s
accession to the EU in 1995. While Austrian policymakers never explicitly
articulated it, Austrian policy was very similar to that of Switzerland (see
D’Amato in this volume): the EU was made the main source of immigrant
labour after Austria’s accession, with Germany being by far the single most
significant country of origin for all skill levels. EU citizens – both from
new EU member states and Germany – also became the main source of
seasonal labour. As a result, quota for seasonal labour were successively
lowered in the past decade, notably as inflows from Eastern Germany, in
particular, quickly became the main source of seasonal labour in the tour-
ism industry. As of 2011, a new temporary labour scheme is under discus-
sion. This scheme prioritises circular migrants – i.e. seasonal workers re-
turning to work in Austria every year – and foresees only a very small
quota for first-time seasonal migrants from third countries.19
While using labour migration from old EU member states, as described
above, the Austrian government successfully lobbied – along with the
Netherlands and Germany – for a long transition period for full freedom of
movement of citizens of new EU member states (Mayer 2009: 62).
Ultimately, only Austria and Germany maintained restrictions on freedom
of movement for EU-8 citizens for the full seven-year period that lasted
until May 2011. However, exemptions for specific professions were made
by way of decree. Furthermore, Austria, like Germany, also negotiated re-
strictions on the freedom of service provision, notably for the self-
employed. This was done against a backdrop of political debates in Austria
before the 2004 enlargement that greatly anticipated freedom of move-
ment’s negative effects on Austria. In addition, there was a fear that citi-
zens of new EU member states would use seasonal labour as an entry gate
for permanent immigration. An unexpected coalition consisting of the
right-wing FPÖ, trade unions and the Chamber of Labour demanded it be
made clear that seasonal workers are not meant to be integrated into the
Austrian labour market. On such arguments, legal provisions were changed
to exclude seasonal migrants from unemployment benefits – from which,
in theory, they should benefit because the maximum duration of a ‘season’
was extended to twelve months under the 2002 Aliens Law reform. At the
same time, European Economic Area (EEA) citizens were to be preferen-
tially recruited for vacancies before third-country nationals would be ad-
mitted (Mayer 2009: 60ff).
The aliens legislation package 2005
Only three years after its reform, in mid-2005, the government undertook
yet another complete revision of the aliens legislation, entering into force
in January 2006.20 In addition, nationality law was changed later that year,
bringing it in line with immigration regulations. To a large degree, the
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immigration reform was necessitated by EU legislation that had to be trans-
posed, including directives on long-term residents (2003/109/EC), on fa-
mily reunion (2003/86/EC) and on freedom of movement of EU citizens
and their family members (2004/38/EC). The way the directives were
transposed greatly increased the diversity of Austria’s legal statuses, nota-
bly in respect to family reunion. Family members who used their mobility
rights under EU legislation enjoyed rights that were different – on the
whole, superior – from those who had not done so (König & Perchinig
2005).
While these changes improved the legal position of some immigrants,
other important and mostly restrictive changes were also introduced. The
(already limited) number of purposes of stay for long-term residence per-
mits was further reduced. Hence, regular immigration (the prerequisite for
obtaining a long-term permit) only became feasible for: a) key personnel;
b) persons outside employment who have a regular minimum income of
E 1,300; c) family members of settled migrants (provided their quota is
not already exhausted); and d) non-nationals holding a long-term permit in
another EU member state. For all other purposes, short-term permits would
be issued, thus excluding a sizable number of migrants from the benefits
of denizenship.
Furthermore, requirements under the integration agreements were com-
pletely revised (for more details section 3). To clamp down on ‘bogus mar-
riages’, residence permits must be applied for from abroad, whereas before
they could, subject to certain conditions, be obtained by the spouse of an
Austrian or EEA national after marriage, regardless of whether he or she
was illegally present. To be eligible for family reunion, a couple’s mini-
mum net household income must be at least E 1,056 per month. In con-
junction with institutional changes (through which provincial authorities
are again exclusively responsible for issuing residence permits) and related
difficulties in implementation, this has created considerable hardship for
many bi-national couples involving asylum applicants and other irregular
migrants. They can be deported despite having married an Austrian citi-
zen.21 In a similar vein, civil registrars must now report marriages invol-
ving a third-country national to the Aliens Police for further investigation.
Under the new Policing of Aliens Act (policing measures were regulated
in the Aliens Act between 1997-2003), aliens liable to be deported can
now be held in detention for up to twelve months. That limit used to be
six months.
In summary, the 2005 reform significantly increases the power and in-
struments of state organs to clamp down on migrants in an irregular situa-
tion, while maintaining the restrictive position towards new immigration
and increasing the integration requirements demanded from new migrants.
Remarkably, unlike the 2002 reform, which was heavily rejected by both
opposing parties, the Greens and the Social Democrats, the 2005 reform
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was supported by the Social Democrats. Presumably, this was part of a
package deal between the government and the conservative party: the for-
mer would approve the Aliens Act in exchange for the latter’s concessions
on the School Constitution Act, for which a qualified majority was re-
quired (Perchinig 2006).
2.3 Governance, old style? Renewed grand coalitions since 2006
In 2006, the second term of the centre-right coalition of the ÖVP and
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ)22
came to an end. General elections were held in October 2006. The Social
Democrats emerged as the strongest party and, after long negotiations,
formed a coalition government with the ÖVP in early 2007. Migration pol-
icy was again a major issue during the election campaign. It was pushed
by Heinz Strache’s FPÖ – the faction that did not join Haider’s re-launched
BZÖ – but also touted by the Social Democrats and the Greens.
Migration, asylum and integration featured prominently in the coalition
agreement of the new government, and continued so in the second term of
office after early elections were called by the ÖVP in October 2008. As
with its predecessor governments, one major focus of policymaking contin-
ued to be asylum and policies on irregular migration, addressed in major
amendments of aliens legislation in 2007, twice in 2009 and again in 2011.
Another major focus (discussed further in section 3) was integration policy.
The coalition’s third – and perhaps the most significant – policy focus,
which only emerged in its second term, was on labour migration. This ef-
fectively ended the ‘zero immigration’ policy maintained by successive
previous governments and involved a major change from a quota to a
points-based system for managing labour migration. These three major is-
sues will be separately analysed in the following paragraphs.
Asylum policy and the politics of regularisation
A first step in asylum policy was late 2007’s creation of the Asylum Court.
Besides serving as a second-instance court, the new body was mandated to
judge the compliance of asylum procedures with general administrative
procedural principles, which were previously adjudicated by the
Administrative Court. The expectation was that appeal procedures would
be sped up, the backlog of cases at the second instance would be reduced
and that Austria’s Higher Court would be relieved of asylum cases.
However, the new court generally did not relieve the burden of the
Constitutional Court, which continued to receive a high volume of cases
involving asylum seekers, partly receiving those that would prior have
gone to the Administrative Court.23 By contrast, the Asylum Court’s back-
log of cases had, compared to the previous second-instance tribunal,
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considerably decreased, something also helped by the low in asylum appli-
cations overall.
Apart from clearing the backlog of court cases, the government’s efforts
also continued to focus on making asylum less accessible to what it saw as
‘bogus asylum seekers’ and introducing further restrictions. Thus, in an-
other major reform of asylum legislation – again packaged in a broader re-
form of immigration legislation in 2009 – a residence obligation was intro-
duced. It required asylum seekers to stay within the boundaries of a desig-
nated district, modelled after similar provisions in Germany (i.e. the
Residenzpflicht). Moreover, ‘Dublin cases’ – i.e. persons alleged to have
transited through another EU member state and thus obliged to submit asy-
lum application there – were to be detained systematically.24 At the time of
writing, new residence restrictions have been adopted that oblige asylum
seekers to remain in reception centres up to a week after submitting an asy-
lum claim.
While the pressure on the asylum system has decreased overall thanks to
lower numbers of applications as well as the partial reorganisation of asy-
lum administration, the asylum system continues to provoke public contro-
versies. These have notably arisen around the issue of long-term asylum
seekers and rejected asylum seekers liable to be deported.
The main trigger for these debates was the widely publicised and pro-
tracted case of a family originating from Kosovo. The Zogaj family had
come to Austria in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis and had lodged an
asylum claim, which was rejected in 2002. Going into appeal, the family
continued to live in Austria, while the father of the family managed to find
legal employment. After the family had exhausted all legal remedies and
just before their scheduled deportation date in September 2007, the eldest
daughter, a secondary student, went into hiding. In video messages posted
on YouTube, Arigona Zogaj threatened to commit suicide if the deportation
would not be suspended. The case received wide sympathetic coverage by
the media, including the tabloid press. The Zogajs also received support
from the municipality where they lived, the district authorities and the pro-
vincial government, which filed a humanitarian residence permit request
for the family. Specifics of the Zogaj case notwithstanding, the media-pow-
ered debate and the responses from lower-level administrative authorities
raised a series of issues regarding long-term resident irregular migrants,
many of whom were well integrated. Furthermore, it initiated a public de-
bate about regularisation of irregular migrants with de facto long-term resi-
dence in Austria.
The case itself developed into an outright saga. The Zogajs caused a
public relations disaster for the Ministry of Interior, with part of the family
being deported, yet ultimately re-admitted (for more details on the case see
Eybl 2009). Generally, the case – and several similar less high-profile ones
– fit well with Ellerman’s (2006: 294) thesis that, although the public may
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have a strong preference for restrictive migration policies and strict imple-
mentation of immigration controls, ‘once confronted with concrete and, by
necessity, harsh policy consequences, the public will be sympathetic to
calls by immigrant advocates for a more compassionate approach to
enforcement’.
Politically, the Zogaj case initiated debate on the regularisation of long-
term resident rejected asylum seekers and other irregular migrants and the
inadequacies of regulations for granting residence on humanitarian
grounds. Indeed, the case also necessitated a complete overhaul of relevant
legal provisions, after a ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Zogaj
case found that existing regulations for granting residence on humanitarian
grounds breached the constitution: they only allowed for the ex officio
granting of residence on humanitarian grounds, not upon application. The
resulting reform of April 2009 introduced a right to apply for humanitarian
stay. This considerably improved access to humanitarian stay, resulting in
higher numbers of beneficiaries of such status. It did not, however, stop
the political debate on regularisation. Nor did it apply a more consistent
administrative practice to granting humanitarian stay. As a recent report by
a number of NGOs vividly documents, the outcomes of humanitarian stay
procedures remain highly unpredictable (Asylkoordination, Diakonie,
Volkshilfe, Integrationshaus & SOS Mitmensch 2010).
From quota to a points-based system
While 1993’s establishment of the quota system was intended to regulate
migration on a new basis, it proved to be an inherently limited instrument
of migration management from its very inception. It covered always only a
small and declining share of immigrants. Austria’s accession to the EEA in
1994 and to the EU in 1995 – implying the transposition of freedom of
movement – meant that the quota requirements could not be applied to
EEA or EU citizens, nor to Swiss citizens who were put on equal footing
with EEA citizens under the 1993 Residence Act. Also, the initially com-
prehensive application of the quota system to all third-country nationals ap-
plying for or renewing residence permits proved to be impractical.
Exemptions for specific categories of foreigners, such as students, were
quickly incorporated into law. Thus, in 1995, children born in Austria were
exempted from quota requirements, as were family members of Austrian
citizens, who were exempted on constitutional grounds and would quickly
become the most significant single category of third-country nationals ad-
mitted, by far exceeding family reunification with third-country national
sponsors (see Kraler 2010: 79ff).
After the two most recent EU enlargements, in 2004 and 2007, the quota
system became all but irrelevant. In 2007, a total of 18,398 first permits
was issued to third-country nationals (excluding those for children born in
Austria), but a total of 91,950 non-nationals was recorded as immigrants to
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Austria. EU citizens accounted for close to 57 per cent of the total immi-
gration of non-nationals, and third-country nationals for the remainder. Not
taking into account residence and work visas for a duration of up to six
months, legal temporary or permanent admission of third-country nationals
thus only accounted for 20 per cent of total immigration of non-nationals
and for 47 per cent of total immigration of third-country nationals.
Moreover, of the 18,398 first permits issued to third-country nationals only
28.5 per cent were subject to quota restrictions, indicating the growing pre-
sence of quota-free immigration channels, such as temporary admission
and family reunion with Austrian and EEA citizens. Overall, only 5.7 per-
cent of all immigrants recorded in 2007 immigrated under the quota restric-
tions.25 The quota system as a mechanism of migration control was thus
reduced to its symbolic policy – a function it always had, allowing succes-
sive governments to be strict on migration by maintaining previous quota
levels or lowering them for particular categories of aliens.
The most elaborate proposal to revise a merely symbolic policy came
from the Greens.26 They forwarded the introduction of a points-based sys-
tem for skilled labour migration, something which resonated with business
representatives.27 While the proposal by the Social Democrats28 empha-
sised obligations of immigrants in respect to integration, and phrased im-
migration as a ‘privilege’ rather than a right, it too demanded a ‘pragmatic’
regulation of immigration that would meet the needs of the Austrian econ-
omy. Concretely, they proposed to establish a commission for immigration,
modelled after Germany’s Süssmuth Commission (see Borkert & Bosswick
this volume). Calls for a comprehensive reform also came from interest
groups. Thus, in the recommendations to the new government issued by
the Federation of Austrian Industries (Industriellenvereinigung, IV) shortly
before the general elections of October 2006, the IV explicitly called to
adopt a Canada-like model for the regulation of migration, largely follow-
ing the Greens’ proposal.29
The debate on a more far-reaching immigration reform regained momen-
tum after the September 2008 elections. The coalition agreement between
the Social Democrats and the ÖVP announced the introduction of a so-
called red-white-red card, essentially a points-based system for labour mi-
gration to be elaborated in consultation with social partners (BKA 2008).
In November 2008, the IV and the Federal Economic Chamber presented
their proposal for a new framework for immigration admission. This came
in the form of a joint discussion paper prepared with the assistance of IOM
Austria, calling for admission for employment purposes to be more flexible
and thus for Austria to become more attractive to skilled and highly skilled
migrants (Industriellenvereinigung, International Organization for
Migration & Wirtschaftskammer Österreich 2008). The proposal subse-
quently served as a basis for discussions with trade unions, the Chamber of
Labour and, in turn, at the governmental level. Nevertheless, it was not
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before December 2010 that a legal proposal was presented and eventually
adopted in April 2011 by Parliament. Like earlier reforms, the reform was
a package: apart from giving immigration regulation a completely new ba-
sis, one of the act’s main novelties was requisite pre-migration language
knowledge, aimed particularly at family members.
As for the regulation of immigration, the new schemes define three skill
categories. They include: 1) specifically highly skilled persons with a uni-
versity degree who are allowed to enter Austria to search for a job; 2)
skilled workers with key qualifications particularly in need on the domestic
labour market and to be defined by administrative decree and subject to a
minimum gross monthly salary of E 1,786 per month; and 3) other skilled
workers who need to comply with the minimum monthly gross salary cur-
rently set at E 2,520. Like skilled persons under the second category, ap-
plicants under the third need to produce a concrete job offer. All key work-
ers are exempt from the new requirement to prove German language skills
before entry, although family members of those falling under the second
and third categories must comply with the integration conditions. In addi-
tion, knowledge of German before immigration earns additional points.
While the points-based system was initially intended to replace the quota
system completely, quotas will be maintained for family reunification, as
will the three-year waiting period for migrants not belonging to any of the
three skilled categories, despite protest by business and other groups
(Hollomey 2011).
The impact of the new points-based system is uncertain. It will probably
facilitate labour mobility at the very high end of the labour market. Yet, in
terms of numerical impact, much will depend on which professions are de-
clared by decree as being in need. In terms of policy process, the most not-
able element of discussions leading to the new points-based system is the
degree of social partners’ involvement, as their influence was marginalised
during the right-wing coalition government’s rule between 2000 and 2006.
3 The making of integration policies
3.1 The slow emergence of integration policies
Even though guest worker recruitment had ended with the oil crisis in
1973, migrants continued to be perceived as ‘guest workers’ until the
major immigration law reforms of the 1990s. As a corollary, there was vir-
tually no explicit national-level immigrant policymaking; the working as-
sumption was that migrants would eventually return. Nevertheless, at both
local and national levels specific policies did emerge. However, these
remained disconnected from each other and essentially accommodated spe-
cific needs of immigrants in selected fields. Thus, in 1972 Vienna estab-
lished the Zuwanderungsfonds, a fund to support immigrants. Its target
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group comprised internal migrants from other Austrian provinces as well
as guest workers. For guest workers, it was charged to ‘provide the neces-
sary information […] that is required […so] foreign workers […] can live
in dignity’ (cited in Payer 2004: 11). This included legal advice in Turkish
and Serbo-Croatian, support to find housing, employment-related matters –
all effectively amounting to integration support for new immigrants.30
At the national level, there were generally much more limited measures
and initiatives. One was a major study commissioned by the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Labour in 1984 (Wimmer 1986). It clearly showed that
migrants were there to stay, thus putting integration on the table for the
first time. In terms of legislation, an amendment to the Employment of
Foreign Workers Act in 1988 gave second-generation children immediate
access to a long-term work permit (Befreiungsschein) under certain condi-
tions and subsequent unrestricted access to the labour market, thereby re-
cognising the permanence of migrants’ presence in Austria (Mayer 2009:
49). However, on the whole, policies at the national level perpetuated the
fiction of migrants as a temporary presence and legally excluded third-
country nationals from social benefits, like welfare, as well as other rights
– access to the labour market included. A telling example is the long-
lasting exclusion of non-nationals (initially also including EU nationals)
from participation in work councils as shop stewards or standing for office
in Chamber of Labour Elections.31 Beyond their immediate significance,
the restrictive rules governing migrants’ participation in employment-
related bodies show a much broader pattern of immigrant policymaking
until fairly recently, aptly paraphrased by Gächter (2000) in the same-titled
book as ‘protecting indigenous workers from immigrants’. That was indeed
the very rationale of the 1975 Employment of Foreign Workers Act as par-
liamentary debates reveal (Mayer 2009: 44ff).
So integration did not enter public debates as a major issue until the re-
forms of the early 1990s. Yet, when it did emerge, it was immediately
linked to immigration – a tie expressed in the slogan ‘integration before
new immigration’. The slogan also served to justify restrictions and exclu-
sionary policies vis-à-vis migrants.
The immigration part – i.e. a restrictive policy – was indeed introduced
in the early 1990s, but promoting integration only followed late in the dec-
ade, and it was piecemeal at that. Such measures notably focused on im-
proving the legal status of long-term residents (König & Stadler 2003:
231). An overall integration strategy remained absent. Initial government
plans in preparation of the 1992 Residence Act had foreseen formulating
one in which an important task would be assigned to the Austrian
Integration Fund. But this did not materialise.32
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3.2 A shift towards language and other integration requirements
From the second half of the 1990s, integration was increasingly debated in
terms of the requirements that migrants needed to fulfil to qualify for citi-
zenship or ‘denizenship’ (long-term residence status). A first expression of
this changing philosophy of integration is found in the 1998 amendment to
the nationality law in which the requisite conditions to acquire citizenship
were made explicit. The commentary to the law framed citizenship as the
end of a ‘successful integration process’ and thus a reward rather than a
means of legal integration. According to the 1998 nationality law, appli-
cants must show their ‘personal and professional integration’. In addition,
the law stipulates a minimum-level knowledge of German as a pre-condi-
tion for acquiring Austrian citizenship (Çinar & Waldrauch 2006: 28-29).
Under the same law, however, the practicalities for testing language profi-
ciency were lenient: assessment would be carried out by the administration
through a simple interview, without clear guidelines as to which level of
German proficiency was required. Stronger requirements and stricter test-
ing were to follow later. In an amendment to the law that entered into force
in 2006, a formal citizenship test was introduced and the Common
European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFRL)’s A2 level
was set as the minimum for German language proficiency. In the most re-
cent reform in 2011, the minimum was raised to the B1 level.
The 1998 nationality law reform is significant in that citizenship was for
the first time explicitly linked to migration and integration. Throughout the
post-war period (1945-1989), citizenship policy had followed a largely in-
ternal logic in which migrants simply did not appear. In as early as the
1980s some provincial authorities responsible for implementing citizenship
policy – notably Vienna – began to frame naturalisation as a tool for inte-
grating settled migrants already and used their discretionary powers to
award citizenship after a reduced waiting period. Yet, it was not until 1998
that citizenship came to be seen as part of the overall migration regime.
The 2006 reform considerably strengthened that connection. It did so
firstly by linking language requirements under the nationality law to the
language requirements demanded from new immigrants under immigration
provisions. And secondly, it made legal residence on a long-term settle-
ment permit for at least five out of ten years of residence a prerequisite for
acquiring nationality.33
The pressure to bring nationality into the orbit of broader immigrant pol-
icymaking came from two sources: political parties and an informal forum
of provincial government officials responsible for citizenship matters. In
terms of the former, the FPÖ and its split-off BZÖ had long demanded re-
strictions on ‘premature naturalisation’ (Perchinig 2009: 31); the conserva-
tive ÖVP had also demanded nationality restrictions from the mid-1990s
onwards, albeit for slightly different reasons. The latter was the main force
THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 45
driving the introduction of a language requirement in the 1998 reform. The
2006 nationality reform emerged in the context of the 2005 immigration
reform and was used by the BZÖ to sharpen its profile in the field of mi-
gration, while the ÖVP, hosting the Ministry of Interior, was the dominant
actor. Important details for the 2006 reform, notably regarding the technical
linkage of nationality and immigration laws, came from the association of
civil servants responsible for nationality. This private association compris-
ing public officials responsible for citizenship matters from all nine pro-
vinces had become an important informal arena of policymaking for
nationality law (ibid.: 32).
As a result of the changes, naturalisations steeply dropped. Their number
thus decreased by 67 per cent from 10,695 in the first quarter of 2006 to
3,700 in the first quarter of 2007 (Statistics Austria 2007).
Linking integration to admission policy: Language tests
Modelled after Dutch integration policies, language requirements were
eventually also incorporated into aliens legislation in the framework of the
immigration reform 2002. The so-called ‘integration agreement’ essentially
obliges long-term immigrants to attend language courses and conclude
them with a test. In terms of institutional responsibility, the Austrian
Integration was given charge to develop curricula and to certify course
providers.34
Language requirements that immigrants must meet have been repeatedly
upped in successive immigration reforms. Before the latest immigration
law reform in 2011, migrants needed to achieve CEFRL A2 level German
within five years of arrival (Perchinig 2010). Should the integration agree-
ment not be fulfilled, immigrants may face sanctions. In actuality – and in-
creasingly reflected in public debates – ‘integration requirements’ very
much focused on family members, while key personnel were exempted;
there are almost no other channels to enter the country with a long-term
perspective.
The initial 2002 version of the integration agreement was largely a sym-
bolic measure, with little effect. While 118,055 migrants were, in principle,
obliged to sign the integration agreement in its first year of implementa-
tion, some 90 per cent of migrants (105,690) were exempted from the man-
datory courses, mainly because they were found to possess sufficient lan-
guage proficiency (ICMPD 2005b: 65). Symbolic politics also lay at the
origin of the integration agreement, which was especially pushed by the
FPÖ and its erstwhile parliamentary leader, Peter Westenthaler. As ex-
plained when presenting the draft law before Parliament, Westenthaler’s
aim was to convey to immigrants and the wider public that ‘abuse of the
social system will no longer be possible’ (cited in Mourão-Permoser 2009:
199). Public debates subsequently focused on the possibility of sanctioning
non-compliant immigrants rather than on the beneficial effects of courses.
46 ALBERT KRALER
Such politicking was also important for the coalition government’s leading
ÖVP. For this reason, adoption of the integration agreement can be seen as
a symbolic concession towards the FPÖ, which had an otherwise limited
direct influence on immigration and immigrant policy – something almost
exclusively crafted by the Ministry of Interior and thereby driven by the
ÖVP (Kraler 2003).
A major overhaul of the integration agreement took place in the course
of 2005’s immigration legislation. This was the result of concerns ex-
pressed by the FPÖ and other political actors that regulations were too le-
nient and exempted far too many persons, in addition to a professional as-
sessment stating that 100 hours of German language schooling was insuffi-
cient. Hours for language instruction were upped to 300 and the
achievement level for German proficiency was increased from CEFRL A1
to A2 (Perchinig 2010). In addition, literacy courses for illiterate migrants
were introduced. In the reform adopted in April 2011, the language level
increased further, to CEFRL B1.
Finally, the 2011 reform also introduced pre-entry language requirements
at the CEFRL A1 level. Even more than the post-entry integration require-
ments, the new pre-entry tests specifically target family members. This
measure reflects longer-standing perceptions of family-related migration as
being deeply problematic for integration and bringing in overwhelmingly
unskilled and low-skilled persons.
Both in practice and in political rhetoric, the new pre-entry requirements
are very much about women and Muslims. This follows the reform’s mod-
el countries, the Netherlands and Germany. As Minister of Interior Maria
Fekter put it in a newspaper interview, it is about ‘the woman from the
Anatolian mountain village’ (cited in Hollomey 2011: 9). Tellingly, the
initiative for both the enhanced language requirements for post-entry inte-
gration tests and the new pre-entry tests seem to have come largely from
within the government, notably the Ministry of Interior, without any signif-
icant involvement of the two coalition parties (Hollomey 2011). Formally,
however, the intention to introduce pre-entry tests was published as the ‘re-
sult’ of a major consultation process on integration policy. Launched in
2009, it became known as the National Action Plan for Integration (NAPI)
(Austrian Integration Fund 2010; see following section).
On the whole, the pre-entry tests were introduced without much public
debate. Other major changes in immigration legislation, notably controver-
sial changes with regard to asylum policy and the introduction of the new
points-based system, overshadowed the introduction of pre-entry tests.
3.3 NAPI: Changing paradigms of integration policymaking?
Upon renewal of the grand coalition between the Social Democrats and the
ÖVP in early 2007, an important element for agreement was to elaborate a
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National Action Plan for Integration (NAPI). This was to be done in con-
sultation with relevant stakeholders, including public authorities from dif-
ferent ministries and levels of governments, selected NGOs and other ex-
perts (BKA 2008: 107).
The consultation process was launched in 2009. It involved a series of
roundtable talks on seven themes (language and education; employment
and occupation; rule of law and values; health and social affairs; intercul-
tural dialogue; sports and leisure; housing; and the regional dimension of
integration). This constituted a first attempt for a more coordinated ap-
proach to integration policymaking involving different actors. The consul-
tation process was tightly controlled by the Ministry of Interior and, within
it, the Austrian Integration Fund. The resulting plan was adopted by the
Council of Ministers in January 2010. Its main outcome was defining ma-
jor challenges, principle policy positions and measures for the seven the-
matic areas.
In many ways, the NAPI departed from established thinking on integra-
tion at the national level, which was preoccupied with language skills.
While German proficiency remained an important issue within the NAPI,
integration and integration policy was seen as being about much more than
language. Furthermore, integration now seemed to be understood as a
‘two-way process’ (‘two-way’ was little more than a buzzword in the past).
While the responsibility of the mainstream population – or, for that matter,
the state – was not a particularly prominent concern in earlier debates, the
NAPI underscored responsibilities held by the migrant and the host society,
both. It stressed the need to provide opportunities for migrants and to
counter discrimination and xenophobia. Nevertheless, the plan still empha-
sised the obligations of migrants, rather than those of the state or the
public.
Two new bodies were created in the context of the NAPI. The Advisory
Committee on Integration (Integrationsbeirat), comprising representatives
of different ministries, provinces, social partners, municipalities and NGOs,
emerged from the NAPI consultation process steering group. Meanwhile,
the task of the Expert Committee on Integration (Expertenrat für
Integration), comprising a range of experts, is to support NAPI’s implemen-
tation and elaborate its recommendations (Hollomey & Wöger 2011: 8).
The NAPI did not go uncontested. NGOs as well as various municipali-
ties and provinces – above all, Vienna – were critical of how the process
was managed and its resulting action plan. Against this backdrop, in 2009,
Vienna established its own commission on immigration and integration,
which presented its first report in 2010. The city also promoted an Expert
Committee on Integration of the Austrian Association of Cities and Towns
established just prior to the NAPI process in 2008 as an alternative forum
for coordinating integration activities of larger cities and municipalities
(ibid.: 6ff).
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4 The interaction of immigration and immigrant policies
This analysis has shown that, unlike other Western European countries, im-
migrant and immigration policy at the national level in Austria has been
highly coordinated and, moreover, framed as closely linked policy fields.
The reality at the local level has always been quite different, seeing various
forms emerge for the pragmatic accommodation of immigrants’ needs.
Elaboration of specific local social policies dates back to the 1970s, but
they had little, if any, impact on national policymaking. Only in the recent
wake of the NAPI process have more comprehensive attempts for a coordi-
nated approach to integration policymaking at regional and local levels
been seriously considered within the overall integration strategy.
At the national level, immigrant policies have clearly been ancillary to
those prior to the late 1990s. Immigrant and integration policy reflected
migration policy decisions much more than it conceived or shaped them in
its own right. A sharp focus on ‘protecting natives from immigrants’
(Gächter 2000) that shaped the nexus of immigrant and immigration poli-
cies up until the late 1990s resulted in a rather exclusionary legal frame-
work for newcomers and settled migrants, thereby contributing to the
absence of positive social policy measures for immigrants. Unlike
Germany or France, where major strikes in the 1970s and social unrest in
the 1980s and 1990s helped articulate immigrants’ political demands and
put integration (or multiculturalism) on the agenda early on, no such pres-
sure emerged in Austria. Integration was slapped onto the political agenda
only during the early 1990s’ reforms, when a vocal pro-immigrant alliance
comprising NGOs, the Greens, liberal media and individual public person-
alities on the left of the political spectrum went head to head with an
equally vocal anti-immigrant alliance composed largely of the right-wing
FPÖ and the tabloid press.
Integration was essentially a guiding principle used to differentiate rights
across different categories of immigrants according to the perceived ‘need
for integration’. This, in turn, gave way to an emphasis on the obligations
immigrants had. After 2000, the new focus on integration in immigration
policymaking was successful in several regards. It not only framed integra-
tion as a matter of immigration policy, but also helped establish the
Ministry of Interior as the leading actor in national integration policymak-
ing. The ministry successfully claimed the coordination of integration-
related matters in a wide spectrum of policy fields within the NAPI pro-
cess. Concentration of both integration and immigration policymaking in
the ministry helped achieve overall consistency and coherence across dif-
ferent policy fields.
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5 External factors
As shown in this chapter’s descriptive analysis, the evolution of immigra-
tion and immigrant policies, along with their changing patterns in policy-
making, closely links to a number of contextual factors within Austria.
These include the evolution of the Austrian political system, economic cy-
cles, broader social changes and issues outside Austria, like political recon-
figurations during and after the Cold War, changing patterns of migration
and transforming international contexts of migration policymaking, such as
the EU. This section focuses on the broader political context of migration
policymaking within Austria, notably, the transformation of the political
system since the 1980s.
For a long stretch, from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, post-war
Austria’s political system was characterised by remarkable stability.
Although not free of conflicts, contradictions or crises, the system was
dominated by the two major parties. The SPÖ-ÖVP rule reached virtually
every domain of public (and sometimes even private) life. The two parties’
pervasive influence was based on extensive networks of wide-ranging or-
ganisations, including associations, cooperatives and enterprises. After
World War II, the parties had reached a historical compromise, which came
to be reflected in their long-lasting grand coalitions, a complex system of
post allocations in the public sector on the basis of party membership and
their congenial arrangements of social partnership. Such arrangements
helped diffuse social tensions and, in particular, prevented the emergence
of more open conflicts between employers and labour.
Overall, post-war economic policy under the grand coalitions followed a
Keynesian rationale. It aimed at full employment, supported by high deficit
spending (on average 6.5 per cent of GDP between 1976 and 1995)
(Stiefel 2006).
Throughout this period, the main principle in migration policy was that
labour migration should not undermine the wider objective of full employ-
ment and the employment-based welfare regime. Originally, trade unions
only agreed to the recruitment of labour because employers committed
themselves to employing migrants on the same conditions as workers as far
as wages and workers’ rights were concerned. In turn, the state committed
itself to engage in an ‘active labour market policy’ as a compensatory mea-
sure that would increase labour force participation of natives and hence
keep demand for migrant labour to a minimum.35 Because thorough em-
ployment of the native population was the primary goal of economic and
labour market policy, migrant workers had to be kept ‘flexible’. This was
accomplished by keeping them in a legally precarious position, in order to
reduce supply of migrant labour in times of recession. Because of the close
linkage of migration policy and wider social and economic policy con-
cerns, social partnership was the main arena for migration policymaking.
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Social partnership essentially rested on a non-public mode of negotiation
and decision-making, while migration policymaking was largely framed
outside formal institutions and thus kept outside the public debate.
From the early 1980s onwards, these relatively stable arrangements of
Austria’s post-war political system began to erode. One major factor was
the fiscal crisis emerging as the combined effect of a severe recession, the
near collapse of the state-owned industrial sector, an emerging funding gap
in the welfare state system and large deficit spending. Its most immediate
effect was the end of ‘Austrokeynesianism’, an economic policy focused
on full employment and an alignment of Austrian economic policies with
the neo-liberal policies of other Western states (Lauber & Pesendorfer
2006: 611ff). A second major factor was the emergence of new social
movements, notably, environmentalism and a host of local-level civic orga-
nisations. This contributed significantly to the more general crisis concern-
ing the political system’s legitimacy.
Nineteen eighty-six, the year when the Social Democrats and the ÖVP
entered into a grand coalition, was a turning point in several respects.
Firstly, the electorate had pluralised the party system: an absolute majority
for either of the large parties became increasingly unlikely. Secondly, the
coalition explicitly understood itself as a reform government charged to
resolve the state’s fiscal crisis, to reinvigorate the economy and to reform
the increasingly ailing welfare state. The reform agenda entailed a series of
harsh measures, including massive lay-offs in the obsolete parts of the in-
dustrial sector and budget cuts in various other domains, notably the wel-
fare state. The reform agenda followed by the government also implied that
it increasingly opted to overrule the social partners, whose overall influ-
ence thereby decreased considerably. At the same time, social partnership
itself suffered a wider crisis in legitimacy. This further reduced its power
to influence policies. As the influence and efficiency of social partnership
declined, the role of the administration rose.
Although the reforms adopted in response to the state’s financial crisis
affected the population very unevenly (and in hindsight were not as radical
as initially appearing), they certainly added to a general feeling of insecur-
ity. Coupled with a series of scandals involving the two large parties’
senior officials as well as the social partners, the security compounded the
crisis of the political system’s legitimacy as a whole. This crisis, in turn,
formed fertile ground for the anti-systemic populism practised by the FPÖ
after Haider had taken over its leadership in 1986. Immigration became
one of the FPÖ’s main campaign issues. In so doing, the party could exert
considerable pressure on the government and greatly influence the kind of
policies adopted (Kraler 2003).
Once in government, however, the FPÖ was far less able to capitalise on
anti-immigrant sentiments or, indeed, to mobilise on that issue. After the
party split in April 2005 – forming the government wing, renamed BZÖ,
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and the remaining FPÖ – it was the FPÖ that proved more successful at
mobilising on the basis of anti-immigration slogans.
6 Conclusions
The parliamentarisation of migration policy in the mid-1980s combined
with the reconfiguration of migration policymaking in the late 1980s and
early 1990s caused the disappearance of the informal, non-public decision-
making mechanisms so characteristic of social partnership in post-war
Austria. Henceforth, it was increasingly the political system –and its bu-
reaucracy – that dominated the policymaking process and determined the
contents of migration policies. Nevertheless, on not one of the three times
that the government composition changed between 1987 and 2011 (in
1987, 2000 and 2008) were immediate changes effected in migration pol-
icy. Nor did changing electoral turnouts for the parties in governing coali-
tions have a noticeable effect on migration policy.
So, we have a somewhat paradoxical situation. On the one hand, immi-
gration and integration (in 2006 and 2008 specifically) were – with few ex-
ceptions – central issues in virtually all parliamentary election campaigns.
Yet on the other hand, success (or failure) of political parties in election
campaigns – whether or not they mobilised on immigration issues –
seemed to have very limited influence on the migration policy eventually
adopted by the very same parties once in government. By all standards,
continuity prevailed. To some degree, this might be a reflection of the
dominant role the bureaucracy plays in framing and making migration pol-
icy. But it also can be interpreted as a reflection of a wider consensus on
key principles – a consensus that to no small degree was influenced by the
FPÖ’s anti-immigrant populism. The most recent shift to a points-based ad-
mission system may signal a more radical change, although it keeps in
place many tenets of previous policies (including a quota for family mem-
bers). Effectively, it only offers a more differentiated, flexible system to ad-
mit migrants on the higher end of the skills spectrum.
This remarkable outcome may also have to do with the way immigration
policy is dealt with and formulated within parties. Particularly for the two
larger ones, parliamentary spokespersons for migration and/or integration
issues rarely have enough clout to formulate policy positions. Their role is
usually limited to defending party positions in public, though, more often,
only in Parliament. Meanwhile, parties’ policy positions are formulated by
the leaders of their respective ‘parliamentary clubs’ or by the government
in the first place. Thus, positions as represented by parliamentary spokes-
persons for migration and integration issues may differ markedly from the
positions eventually pressed through by party leaders when it comes to ne-
gotiating concrete pieces of legislation. In addition, political parties
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normally adopt a common position (binding for the individual MPs) before
voting on a legislative proposal. This privileges mainstream positions and
thus contributes to continuity in terms of the substance of policies. Such
procedures also make package deals between parties a much securer under-
taking than would be otherwise. The practice of ‘packaging’ immigration,
asylum and integration policy reforms has further enhanced the role of par-
liamentary leaders, while also becoming a convenient way to manage pub-
lic opinion and the wide range of stakeholders in the field.
Although the institutional set-up significantly changed in the 1990s,
there are at the same time important institutional continuities and a remark-
able stability in terms of the policy networks and policy communities in-
volved. Rather than a break in, or emergence of, new actors, the 1990s are
thus characterised by a reconfiguration of the institutions, networks and
policy communities involved, which had an important effect on the kind of
policies made.
In terms of policymaking, the EU has major significance. Its influence is
both direct – via policies and directives produced by the European
Commission – and indirect – through the information exchange mechan-
isms established at the EU level (e.g. the European Integration Network,
the European Migration Network, etc.). To date, one of the most important
consequences of these mechanisms is how experiences of the EU’s other
major countries of immigration are taken on board in policy development
at the national level. In recent years, we have seen a proliferation of trans-
national policy communities. It is likely that their influence on policymak-
ing will increase in the future, especially in the EU context. Beyond their
immediate relevance for learning about policy and the circulation of ideas,
they also contribute to the emergence of similar networks at the national le-
vel. In turn, these new policy networks may, in the long-term, profoundly
reshape the policy networks engaged in migration and integration policy.
Notes
1 Figures are based on the EU’s 2008 labour force surveys (LFS) ad hoc module on
migrants on the labour market. Because the LFS only covers migrants resident in
Austria at the time of the survey, data cannot show the actual historical composition
of migration flows towards Austria, but rather, the composition of the current mi-
grant population by reflecting migration history. In terms according to the LFS, this
chapter uses ‘resident immigrants’ when referring to immigrants by their reasons
for migration.
2 The share of marriage migrants is highest among EU nationals (more than 18 per
cent); EU migrants are the only who may legally migrate for the purpose of family
formation.
3 The source of this figure, the 2008 LFS ad hoc module on migrants on the labour
market, kept the meaning of ‘reasons for migration’ deliberately open. Legally,
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Turkish marriage migrants would have been admitted either as labour migrants or
through family reunification, i.e. after conclusion of the marriage.
4 This perception was reinforced by the influx of refugees provoked by the
Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968. The reality for refugees was often less welcoming, if
hospitable at all.
5 The 1965 Nationality Act contained a general clause stipulating that due regard be
given to convention refugees in the course of discretionary decisions on
naturalisation.
6 The origins of so-called ‘social partnership’ date back to the First Republic, upon es-
tablishment of statutory representative bodies for employees (Chamber of Labour),
for employers (Chamber of Commerce, now the Austrian Federal Economic
Chamber) and for agricultural employers (Chamber of Agriculture). Incorporating
also the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions (O¨sterrechischer Gewerkschaftsbund,
O¨GB) and the Federation of Industries (Industriellenvereinigung, IV), these differ-
ent organisations collectively came to be known as Austria’s social partnership.
Although formal institutions (e.g. the parity commission) were also involved, it re-
mained largely an informal institution. Politically speaking, social partnership was a
key mechanism of the country’s consociationalist post-war arrangements.
7 By ‘parliamentarisation’, I refer to two related, albeit distinct, developments: 1) a
shift from informal policymaking in the context of social partnership and the related
dominance of administrative decisions to formal legislative policymaking and 2) the
growing importance of discussions on migration policy and general migration-re-
lated issues in parliamentary debates. As shown later in the chapter, the parliamen-
tarisation of migration policymaking did not enhance Parliament’s role in policy-
making per se; rather, Parliament became an important arena in which to debate
and defend migration policies.
8 In 1993, Matzka subsequently became head of the Ministry of Interior’s immigra-
tion and asylum division, a position he held until 1999.
9 National integration policy then was explicitly limited to recognised refugees (see
Lo¨schnak 1994).
10 Other measures, notably the acceptance of Bosnian war refugees outside the asylum
system, also played a major role in reducing asylum figures. Asylum figures rose to
their previous levels again in 1998 and 1999.
11 Interview with Ministry of Interior’s migration division head, March 2006.
12 Within the Ministry of Interior’s department of immigration and asylum, an integra-
tion department was set up back in 1989by Lo¨schnak. Initially, it was meant to have
a broad mandate on integration policy. Yet in the wake of the Bosnian crisis and be-
cause it already administered a refugee fund, established with support from
UNHCR in 1960, it came to deal only with integration of refugees. Interview with
integration unit former head.
13 By 2001, most minors in an irregular situation had been regularised (personal com-
munication, August Ga¨chter, August 2005).
14 Personal communication, August Ga¨chter, February 2006.
15 Interview with Ministry of Interior’s migration division head, March 2006.
16 Requisite minimum wage for new immigrants is set at 60 per cent of the upper in-
come threshold used for calculations of social security contributions. In 2006, this
threshold was set at E 3,750. In order to qualify as key personnel, foreign workers
thus had to earn over E 2,250 (well above the national median income) (Ko¨nig &
Perchinig 2005: 3).
17 As the contingents refer to specific positions rather than the individuals filling these
conditions, the number of seasonal migrants for whom work permits were issued
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proved considerably higher than the contingents set by the decree (Kraler & Stacher
2002: 62).
18 Labour affairs transferred from the Ministry of Social affairs to the Ministry of
Economy in 2002 under the O¨VP-FPO¨ coalition government.
19 ‘Ansturm der Deutschen: Viel Weniger Saisonniers’, Tiroler Tageszeitung 4 February
2011.
20 The reform package consists of three main components: the Asylum Act, the
Settlement and Residence Act and the Aliens Police Act. In addition, it amends sev-
eral other laws, including the Employment of Foreign Workers Act.
21 See ‘Verliebt, verlobt und abgeschoben’, Die Presse 18 March 2006. The difficulties
are compounded by the fact that under the old regulations, applicants who married
a spouse from Austria or another EEA country were advised by the Aliens Police to
withdraw their asylum applications in order to be eligible for a residence permit.
Those doing so are now liable to be deported. Indeed, the first returns were effected.
22 In April 2005, Haider re-launched the FPO¨ under the name Bu¨ndnis Zukunft
O¨sterreich (BZO¨), thus effectively splitting the party into two. Although all but two
old FPO¨ MPs support the BZO¨, the original leftover FPO¨ has much more support
among the electorate.
23 ‘Ein Jahr Asylgerichtshof: 21.000 Verfahren sind anha¨ngig’, Der Standard 6
September 2009.
24 ‘Leben fu¨r Asylsuchende wird ha¨rter: Fremdenrechtspaket beschra¨nkt
Asylbewerberrechte – o¨fter Schubhaft als bisher’, Die Presse 10 November 2009.
25 Asylum applicants accounted for some 30 per cent of total immigration of third-
country nationals. Compared to the limited number of legally admitted persons,
they constituted quite a substantial inflow (author’s own calculations based on BMI
2008a, 2008b; Statistics Austria 2010).
26 See ‘Gru¨ne: Punktesystem statt “Deportation”’, Die Presse 2 June 2006.
27 See ‘Interview: Veit Sorger: “Nicht auf den O¨GB Ru¨cksicht nehmen”’, Die Presse 1
July 2006.
28 See ‘SPO¨: Kommission soll Zuwanderung regeln’, Der Standard 19 June 2006.
29 See ‘IV stellt Maßnahmenprogramm fu¨r neue Bundesregierung vor’, press release,
Industriellenvereinigung, 14 September 2006.
30 These tasks were taken over by the Vienna Integration Funds in 1992 until it was
dissolved in 2004. The Zuwanderungsfonds now solely arranges housing for new
immigrants (both from within and outside Austria).
31 These restrictions were abolished only in 2006.
32 Interview with Ministry of Interior integration unit’s former head, 29 August 2006.
The Austrian Integration Fund was an entity under the Ministry of Interior, estab-
lished in 1960 with the aid of UNHCR. Its original core mandate was to support
the integration of recognised refugees, with the intention to expand to legal mi-
grants. However, the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia and the sudden influx of tens of
thousands of Bosnian war refugees meant that resources had to be rechanneled to
refugees. Plans for a more comprehensive and proactive national integration strat-
egy led by the Ministry of Interior were therefore also abandoned.
33 Before the reform, the minimum waiting period to be eligible for naturalisation was
defined in years of residence and did not require a particular permit.
34 Its new mandate allowed the fund to expand its competences and increase its weight
as an integration policymaking institution. Over the last decade, the fund has be-
come an important government think tank, playing an increasingly important role
in regard to knowledge production on integration.
35 Interview with Josef Wallner, head of the labour market policy division of the
Chamber of Labour, Vienna, 22 July 2005.
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2 The case of France
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
1 Introduction
France has been an immigration country for a long time. Always having
hesitated between a policy of settlement and a labour force policy, it has
had a highly specific policymaking path.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, a shortage of labour
and prospective future soldiers prompted a call for foreign workers. The
objective was to enhance the population and development of France,
despite the public debates were focusing on the risks immigration posed to
French identity. Issues related to immigration were treated in a rather prag-
matic manner, with no coherent policy. They were dealt with in a very con-
crete way by employers and civil society organisations. A turning point
occurred in 1974 when France decided to cease recruitment of a salaried
labour force. Initially, this decision was meant to be temporary. It resulted
in putting a stop to the mobility of foreigners between France and their
country of origin and in defining a policy of integration that was led by the
state but also involved various partners, such as municipalities and associa-
tions. In the 1980s, and especially with the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen in
1983’s local elections, immigration and integration became highly politi-
cised. This happened relatively early in comparison with other countries.
Immigration, once a matter of low politics, had become a matter of high
politics – dealt with in genuine political debates. As Europe became a new
actor in immigration policy and intellectuals got more and more involved,
the debate on immigration took on a new scale. It led to the development
of symbolic politics and short-term policies, along with growing gaps be-
tween the actual new immigration, various modes of living together and
control policy. The revival of republican values, largely forgotten during
Les Trente Glorieuses (the 30 so-called ‘glorious’ years between 1945 and
1974), also helped set the tone for how immigration matters would be
framed.
When examining France’s policymaking process, we must distinguish
between immigration, policies of flows, integration and policies of stocks.
Admittedly, these are sometimes linked. ‘Illegal migrants are an obstacle to
those who are here’ is a slogan frequently used in political discourses to
link the matters. Remarkably, there has been more political controversy
between the political left and the right about the control of flows (i.e. im-
migration) than about the management of stocks (i.e. integration). Unlike
what can be observed in other European countries, there is a heated debate
between France’s left and right regarding national border control policy,
while public opinion and political parties agree rather consensually on the
French republican model of integration. This is all the more remarkable in
view of the fact that decisions concerning immigration are significantly in-
fluenced by EU policies, whereas France has full sovereignty on integra-
tion issues.
France is, as Dominique Schnapper (1996: 42) put it, ‘un pays d’immi-
gration qui s’ignore’ (‘an immigration country that ignores the fact that it
is one’). Although the state has always tried to elaborate an immigration
policy, it has never fully succeeded to implement one. For the last 50
years, an ongoing debate has questioned whether France has even had an
immigration and integration policy. While some historians, such as Patrick
Weil (1995) and Gérard Noiriel (1987), stress the existence of long-term
policies, others like lawyer Danièle Lochak (2006) and political scientist
Alexis Spire (2005) underscore France’s bureaucracy and short-term deci-
sion-making processes (see also Schnapper 1996; Tapinos 1975; Vasta &
Vuddamalay 2006; Wihtol de Wenden 1988, 2002). With these varying in-
terpretations in mind, this chapter analyses the driving forces behind immi-
gration and integration policymaking in France.
1.1 Development and composition of immigration flows
During the period 1980-2008, immigration figures were rather stable. The
number of newcomers (150,000 per year; 167,000 in 2008) was equivalent
to the number who acquired French nationality (Français par acquisition)
through regular naturalisation, marriage, acquisition of French citizenship
at age eighteen by second-generation children born in France and reintegra-
tion by citizens of former colonies or French Overseas Departments and
Territories (again, 150,000 each year; 137,000 in 2008). From 1982 on-
wards, figures of foreigners living in France were also stable: between 3.5
million foreigners and 4.5 million immigrants (6 per cent of the total popu-
lation).1 The distinction between foreigners and immigrants was introduced
in the French census of 1999. The ‘foreigner’ category comprises those
who do not hold French nationality; the ‘immigrant’ category comprises
those who were born abroad, irrespective whether they acquired French ci-
tizenship or not.
As illustrated in Table 2.1, the composition of the immigrant population
in France has shifted over time. Census data show that from 1975 onwards,
European immigrants (Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards and Yugoslavs)
ceased to be the majority, while the number of non-European immigrants
increased. Maghrebians (with a strong rise in the number of Moroccans,
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Tunisians and Algerians), Turkish, South Saharan Africans and Asians be-
came increasingly represented. This shift was due to several factors.
– Family reunification: the end of labour immigration gave way to family
reunification among those who come and go between France and the
southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea. Many immigrants who were
moving in and out settled permanently with their families. Family re-
unification is also the primary reason for migration among Africans
(more than 50 per cent of entries in 2008).
– Rise of asylum: France used to grant asylum to some 25,000 asylum
seekers each year. In the 2000s, with over 100,000 annual applications
for asylum, France became Europe’s leading country of asylum. This
was due partly to asylum flows coming from French-speaking African
countries where civil wars had broken out (e.g. the Great Lakes refugee
crisis in former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo; the
1995 Algerian crisis). It was also partly due to transnational networks
using asylum as a means for access, when all other opportunities for
entering the country were closed off (as in the case of Romanians and
Chinese). Today, total figures of asylum applications have fallen, reach-
ing less than 50,000 per year. In 2009, France received 42,000 asylum
seekers. As for procedures of asylum applications, 85 per cent are re-
fused refugee status at the first stage of the procedure and 70 per cent
after the second stage (Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile). This restric-
tive policy has produced a large part of irregular migration in France.
The number of departures is rather stable, at an estimated 40,000 per
year, including repatriations (25,000 in 2005; 27,000 in 2008).
– Rise of immigrants with a permanent residence status: since 1999, per-
manent immigrants have increased by 10 per cent annually. Each year,
150,000 foreigners enter the country with the aim of permanent immi-
gration. Of them, 125,000 come from outside the EU, and 30,000 come
from a European country. Sixty-three per cent of entries originate from
Africa (Maghreb and sub-Saharan countries), and 18 per cent from
Asia. There has been an increase in the number of permanent workers
coming from South-East Asia, India and Poland. In 2008, 64 per cent
Table 2.1 Foreigners in France according to the 1982, 1990 and 1999 censuses
Nationality 1982 census 1990 census 1999 census
Portuguese 767,300 649,700 553,700
Moroccan 442,300 572,700 504,100
Algerian 805,100 614,200 477,500
Turkish 122,300 197,700 208,000
Italian 340,300 252,800 201,700
Spanish 327,200 216,000 161,800
Tunisian 190,800 206,300 114,400
Sources: French population censuses 1982, 1990 and 1999
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came from Africa, 38 per cent from North Africa, 19 per cent from
Asia and 7.5 per cent from EU countries.
– Temporary and seasonal immigration: this group comprises seasonal
workers who stay, at most, nine months, as well as asylum seekers and
students. While the number of students decreased in 2007 (43,000), it
has increased since 2008 (49,000). Furthermore, there has been an in-
crease in the number of seasonal workers, most of whom are
Moroccans and Poles, working in the agriculture sector.
– The presence of illegals: an estimated 300,000 illegal immigrants live
in France presently. They include tourists who overstayed their visas,
refused refugees (or asylum seekers whose applications were rejected),
women, unaccompanied minors and young men looking to find em-
ployment in Europe. A few of them have crossed the Mediterranean
Sea as a way of illegal entrance.
Another shift in the composition of the population, not shown in the table,
is the increased feminisation of immigration, mostly among Portuguese,
Moroccans, Algerians and Spaniards, who together comprise 50 per cent
of all foreigners.
The 1999 census was the last one that counted the whole population
through a questionnaire. Since 2004, data are provided on a 14,000-person
sample each year.
1.2 Crucial events and main turning points
French immigration policy has been marked by several crucial events and
turning points, showing the importance not only of state action, but also of
non-state actors. In 1932, when three million foreigners were living in
France, the renowned migration specialist and geographer Georges Mauco
published Les étrangers en France. Besides writing about foreigners and
their role in the French economy, the author put forward a hierarchical
approach to nationalities and, in later writings, expressed ideas that were
taken over by the Vichy Government. His approach was inspired by the
crisis of the early 1930s, when the French government facing economic
disaster decided to end immigration in 1932. At that time, immigration
was dominated by Italians (Lucassen 2005), Poles, colonial labourers from
Algeria, Belgian workers and refugees from Russia, Armenians from
Turkey, immigrants from Central Europe, Germany and, in 1939, Spain.
Ironically, as France was refusing further immigration in 1932 from all
European countries, it was also celebrating its powerful colonial empire
and the diversity of people living in it. This was done most visibly at the
1931 colonial exhibition in Paris.
After World War II, France tried to define an immigration policy known
as the Ordinance of 1945, which was coupled with a reform of the
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nationality law. The objective of these changes was to introduce a more
selective immigration policy as well as a policy on population through the
reform of the nationality act. However, this policy failed due to scarce
labour and pressure by employers who managed to impose their own will
on political decision-makers (Tapinos 1975).
Another pivotal year was 1974, more memorable for unintended conse-
quences of policymaking than the non-implementation of existing legisla-
tion. Like other European countries, France was compelled by several rea-
sons – the oil crisis, rising unemployment and Marseilles’ xenophobic riots
in 1973 – to opt for a recruitment ban on foreign labour. Sooner than in
other European countries, the ban resulted in significant settlement by
families (and the build-up of a second generation) as well as in illegal im-
migrants working in sectors where (contrary to all expectations) foreigners
were not replaced by French workers.
A more recent turning point in the history of French immigration policy-
making was then Home Minister Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2006 decision to lift
the general recruitment ban on all salaried workers. To remain competitive
in the global competition for the highly skilled (Freeman 2004) and to face
the shortage of manual labour, the immigration law of 24 July 2006 intro-
duced the notion of immigration choisie (‘selective migration’) as opposed
to immigration subie (‘unasked-for migration’). ‘Yes to chosen immigra-
tion, no to unasked-for immigration’ went the slogan. The law foresaw the
creation of the Carte d’Entrée et de Séjour Compétences et Talents, a resi-
dence card meant to facilitate the entrance of skilled migrants as well as
seasonal workers and students on a yearly basis. It reopened salaried work
to foreigners, a right that had been denied since 1974. However, the effec-
tiveness of the law was mostly symbolic, only opening borders to some
thousands of newcomers while at the same time strongly reducing opportu-
nities for family reunification and asylum.
The chronology of integration policymaking is distinct from the chronol-
ogy of immigration. The history of integration policymaking is usually
taken as starting in 1974, when the State Secretary for Immigration Paul
Dijoud launched a new immigration policy based on the term ‘integration’
instead of the formerly preferred ‘assimilation’. The semantic change was
complemented by the introduction of measures aimed at preserving cul-
tures of origin, a rather unusual approach in France. Social rights were also
extended to migrants and, in the 1980s, they also gained and acquired
more political rights. The right to associate, for example, was extended to
foreigners in 1981. In 1983, strikes in the car industry and at collective
housing for foreigners, known as foyers, put forward claims for Islam to
be accommodated in the foyers, in business firms and in cemeteries.2
Although new actors and migrants clearly influenced French integration
policies, a blindness towards ethnic and religious difference also impacted
such policies. This ideology provided fertile ground for a new policy that
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was introduced in 1990, aiming to give special support to urban regions
particularly struck by unemployment, poverty and social exclusion.
Immigrants who were concentrated in these areas became one of the target
groups of this new urban policy (Politique de la ville, as it was called),
without explicitly mentioning them as such.
Another turning point for integration, which more directly addressed im-
migrants, was the 1993 reform of the nationality act. For the first time in
French history, the Pasqua Méhaignerie Law restricted access to French
citizenship on the basis of jus soli. As analysed by Hagedorn (2001a,
2001b), these and further changes in French nationality law were not a re-
sult of the French model of republican integration (or assimilation), but
rather the result of frequent political confrontations between the left and
the right. Each time either side won an election, changes were introduced
in the nationality act in order to signify the scope of the political change.
Although the nationality act underwent further changes since 1993, the in-
itial restriction of jus soli was never totally abolished.
Integration policy’s turning point in 1990, which led to the new urban
policies was not the result of a deliberate decision by the French state.
Rather, it was a reaction to the violent protests of young second-generation
immigrants in the suburbs of France’s big cities. The riots attracted global
attention to their difficult living situation, and this forced the French gov-
ernment to introduce a bundle of measures directed towards the banlieues.
Following this overview of the main turning points in immigration and
integration policymaking, the following section turns to the evolution of
migration policy and the main policymaking paths in France. The second
section analyses integration, nationality and multiculturalism in the coun-
try. The chapter will conclude by focusing on the specificities of the so-
called ‘French exception’ in the management of immigration and
integration.
2 The evolution of immigration policy
Since the mid-nineteenth century, demographic and economic pressure,
among other sometimes contradictory forces, has forced France to come to
terms with immigration. French immigration policy has been characterised
by swings between polarities: opening versus closing borders, a culturally
assimilative approach versus one giving room to collective identities and
immigration for settlement versus temporary work-related migration.
Looking back at the history of immigration control, it seems that the state
has always tried to exert control although it never has fully succeeded in
doing so. It took a long time for France to acknowledge that it was the
greatest immigration country in Europe between 1880 and 1970; once this
was acknowledged, controversies unfolded between the state, employers,
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public opinion and various political forces, from nationalists to liberals,
from the right to the left. In France, national identity has never been
defined through immigration, as is the case in classic immigration coun-
tries. This is because French national identity was built upon the myth of
an ethnically homogeneous population, as well as ideas of ‘social contract’
and the ‘political community of citizens’ (though it should be noted that
the recent debate on national identity launched by Minister of Immigration
Eric Besson tried to link identity with immigration and Islam). Newcomers
were considered individuals who had to disappear into the pre-defined
political model by renouncing their own attributes – cultural, religious or
otherwise – in the public sphere.
Before World War II, immigration was mostly ruled by employers in the
great industries (mines, metallurgy, iron and steel), while the state only
played a weak role in migration management. In 1900, there were approxi-
mately one million foreigners living in France who largely originated from
neighbouring countries: Germans, Belgians and Italians from the north.
There were relatively few from North Africa and Indo-China. They worked
in business firms in the housing and public sectors. Competition with
French workers gave rise to many riots (such as in Aigues-Mortes in the
late nineteenth century, where several Italians were killed). After World
War I, France attracted newcomers to help reconstruct the country, mostly
Italians, Poles and expatriates from the collapsed great (Russian, Austro-
Hungarian, Ottoman) empires. Armenians who escaped the genocide of
1916, Russians, Romanians and Jews from Eastern Europe found refuge in
big cities such as Paris and Marseilles, where they took part in arts and cul-
ture and worked hard in the garment industry. In 1930, France was the
most significant immigration country in Europe: it received more foreign-
ers each year than the United States during the same period.
As far as these immigrants were recruited, that process was not state-led,
but private. It was managed by the Société Générale d’Immigration, a con-
sortium of big firms comprising mainly the mines and steel companies.
From 1919 to 1939, social associations – namely, the Service Social
d’Aide aux Émigrants – and trade unions also helped with receiving and
providing social care to immigrants. The establishment of authoritarian re-
gimes in Italy, Germany and Spain brought in new flows of refugees who
participated in resistance movements and joined trade unions so as to make
contact with activist workers.
However, the crisis of 1930 saw the rise of a new actor in the field of
immigration policy: public opinion. Growing xenophobia and anti-
Semitism (Schor 1985) compelled the decision to stop immigration and
repatriate many of the workers and their families (namely, back to Poland
and Italy).
During Les Trente Glorieuses, the state tried to elaborate an effective immi-
gration policy, though it largely failed. As post-World War II reconstruction
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required a renewed labour force, employers in the sectors of housing, agri-
culture and industry put pressure on the government. The Office National
d’Immigration (ONI) was created by the Ordinance of 1945 to deal with
the entry and stay of foreigners in France. The Ordinance of 1945 estab-
lished a state monopoly in the field of recruitment, except for Algerians.
The same year produced a new law reformed the nationality act (earlier re-
forms date back to 1889 and 1927) and introduced jus soli.
During this period, demographer Alfred Sauvy started to play an impor-
tant role. He was a highly influential scholar at the Institut National Études
Démographiques (INED), the French demography institute that replaced
the Alexis Carel Foundation after it was criticised for a dubious population
policy based on racial selection ideas. Sauvy proposed a selective immigra-
tion policy resting on the idea that a migrant’s capacity to assimilate de-
pended on nationality. In his vision, Italians who had been seen as strongly
undesirable in the 1930s became very desirable in the 1950s. However, the
policy based on this idea rapidly failed because Italians did not come as
numerously as foreseen, except in the Toulouse region, where they had the
opportunity to become landowners and farmers. This is why employers ra-
pidly went directly to various countries of origin to recruit workers illeg-
ally, thereby organising short-term work-related migration and leaving the
families of migrants behind. These young male workers (approximately
200,000 per year) were then legalised by public institutions. The Ministry
of Employment, which was in charge, thought the immigration would be
temporary and that these migrants would return to their home country. As
a consequence of these procedures, the ONI controlled only 18 per cent of
entries in 1968. The remaining 82 per cent were legalised a posteriori. No
law on immigration was voted between the Ordinance of 1945 and 1980.
The Bonnet Law of 1980, which regulated entry and stay, did not
change the situation. In fact, it was never implemented because the major-
ity in government shifted in 1981. In other words, over a considerable peri-
od of time, infringements to legislation on the control of immigration were
tolerated. However, the French government did not fully give up control
on immigration; it shifted to a more informal mode, via ministerial circu-
lars, notes, telephone calls and telex. For example, an important circular at
the time was the 1972 ‘Fontanet-Marcellin’ (named after the Minister for
Employment and the Home Minister), stipulating that automatic legalisa-
tion of illegal migrants had to stop. Such informal decisions not carrying
democratic legitimacy but with still far-reaching impact were called infra
droit (‘sub-law’) by the French lawyer Danièle Lochak (1976). Indeed,
such decisions made it very difficult to exert judicial control since most
measures were decided with no publicity, in secrecy, within small circles
of decision-makers (i.e. the Ministry of Labour and some councillors close
to General Charles Gaulle, such as Massenet). As a result, immigration
was treated in a segmented way and without public debate. This
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technocratic, non-democratic approach was the result of decision-makers’
efforts to keep immigration non-politicised (Freeman 1979; for politicisa-
tion linked with security issues see Guiraudon 2000). On demand of busi-
ness firms, the state only intervened to confirm, institutionalise and legalise
movements of populations that had appeared.
For a while, Algerians were accepted as immigrants in France against
the will of French colonial landowners in rural Algeria who feared labour
force losses. Algerians entered more freely after World War II, when
Algeria was still French. Algerian immigration was regulated through a
special immigration policy, according to which immigrants from Algeria
were ruled separately by the Office National Algérien de la Main d’Oeuvre
(ONAMO). This policy was maintained by the Evian agreements of 1962
and lasted until 1973, when Algeria decided to stop labour emigration after
racist riots in Marseilles. The unregulated introduction of immigrants was
combined with à la carte-type management by the labour administration
and the Home Ministry.
Public declarations by Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou and some
Ministers of Labour (André Gorse, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney) show that im-
migration was considered in the post-war period up util 1974 within a
short-term approach. It was seen as a means to reduce social pressure and
to answer demands for labour. Public institutions tried to keep the question
of immigration separate from the great debates of the time (e.g. industrial
policy, urban planning, reconstruction, housing, growth, the Algerian War,
May 1968). Economically desirable immigration was to be kept apart from
political struggles.
After Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was elected president (1974-1981), the
government decided to stop immigration. The oil crisis, the rise of unem-
ployment, the influence of similar decisions in 1973 in Germany, the
Netherlands and Belgium and Algeria’s unilateral decision to end emigra-
tion altogether explain this major turning point.
The period 1980-2006 is characterised by a series of laws and law initia-
tives that were introduced immediately following a shift from right to left,
or vice versa, in the majority party in power. Each time, the new govern-
ment wanted to present a new law on immigration within the framework of
a symbolic policy addressed to public opinion. In 1980, the Bonnet Law
on entrance and stay of immigrants was voted (Jean Bonnet was Giscard
d’Estaing’s last Home Minister). However, the law was never implemen-
ted. The left’s arrival into power through François Mitterrand’s 1981 presi-
dential election can be seen as a starting point in the elaboration of a legal
framework on immigration. Twelve laws on entrance and stay of foreigners
were voted on over the 26 years of this period. Alternation of left and right
governments, coupled with a major politicisation of the debate (particularly
after Le Pen emerged at local elections in 1983, putting immigration at the
core of his argument), explain the legislative franticness as well as the high
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symbolic value attached to immigration policymaking. The practice was to
make small changes while conveying to the public the illusion that every
new law would change immigration trends fundamentally. The security ap-
proach that stresses dissuasion of newcomers and criminalises illegal resi-
dence was introduced in the 1990s, as French immigration policy grew in-
creasingly dependent on European decision-making processes, namely the
acquis communautaire and a series of agreements defining European immi-
gration policy, including Schengen in 1985, Dublin in 1990, Maastricht in
1992, Amsterdam in 1997, Nice in 2000 as well as summits on border con-
trols such as Seville in 2002, Thessaloniki in 2003, The Hague in 2004
and the elaboration of a green book on economic migration in 2005. EU
policies also introduced divided public competences, with asylum flows
being decided at the European level and integration managed at national
and local levels.
A general appreciation of the whole period between 1980 and 2006 can
be fine-tuned by looking at specific policymaking initiatives. To start with
1981, hopes for a fundamental change were running high. In August, new
State Secretary for Immigration François Autain wanted to strengthen leg-
ality by introducing judicial control for most administrative decisions.
After deciding for a large regularisation of 150,000 illegal migrants
(143,000 of whom were legalised), Autain introduced two new laws: one
on entrance and stay that should restore judicial control; and one on the
freedom of association for non-nationals. The law of 9 October 1981 estab-
lished general freedom of association for foreigners, thus superseding the
former requirement that an association be authorised by the Home Ministry
once it declared its existence. The law of 17 October 1981 on entrance and
stay modified the Ordinance of 1945 by confirming the halt on labour im-
migration and simultaneously protecting foreigners against unilateral deci-
sion-making and abuses by the administration. It also sanctioned employers
of irregular migrants and fought illegal migration at large while strengthen-
ing the legal status of those who had settled in France. Some categories of
migrants benefited from a consolidated stay. That was the case for second-
generation migrants who were born in France and lived there, as well as
for long-term residents, for foreigners who had married a French national
and for parents of French children. The logic implied was that for integra-
tion to work, illegal immigration had to be fought (‘Illegals are an obstacle
to the integration of others,’ said Minister of Labour Georgina Dufoix in
1983). The change in the political majority (towards the left) was thus de-
cisive for changes in French immigration policy. However, it was not only
this change in official power that made for the new laws: leftist associa-
tions had gained influence and did contribute to initiate these laws.
In 1983, an equality and anti-discrimination protest, the Marche des
Beurs, united second-generation migrants in a walk from Marseilles to
Paris, where they arrived triumphantly on 1 December 1983. The
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movement supported the unanimous adoption of a second leftist law in
Parliament on 17 August 1984. This law automatically granted a ten-year
residence card to foreigners who had lived in France for a certain period of
time. The card could be renewed automatically for foreigners who had
married a French national, for parents of French children and persons who
residing in France for more than fifteen years. Furthermore, the permanent
resident card allowed access to all professions throughout the entire French
territory. This step was considered one of the associative movement’s main
successes. Although foreigners had equal social rights since 1975, it was
not until 1984 that the French public recognised immigrants not only as
workers, but also as settlers. This law was a major step, though it did not
mean that immigrants had managed to reach a truly equal position in so-
ciety. For example, local voting rights for immigrants were postponed even
though the left’s 1981 common programme had promised to implement
them. Indeed, the left feared public opinion that was increasingly under the
influence of the National Front.
With Parliament’s 1986 shift in majority and the right’s subsequent arri-
val into power, security concerns were for the first time introduced in the
ministerial discourse on immigration. New Home Minister Charles Pasqua,
supported by rightist MPs, set the tone with his constant pledge for
enhanced border controls. The Pasqua Law of 9 September 1986 thus
restricted conditions for entrance and stay, though it did not suppress the
ten-year residence card. Along with the new law, enforced repatriation
measures led to the repatriation of 101 Malians on charter flights – a sym-
bolic operation, with much media attention, that aimed to deter illegal new-
comers. On the other hand, Pasqua’s attempts to change the nationality
code remained unsuccessful in the political climate of the upcoming presi-
dential elections of 1988.
In 1988, the left came into power as Mitterrand was for the second time
elected President and the National Assembly was dissolved. New Home
Minister Pierre Joxe initiated a new law on entrance and stay, which was
passed on 2 August 1989. This law restored judicial control on expulsions
and indirectly introduced a possibility for legalising undocumented mi-
grants. The ten-year residence card of 1984 was again maintained, showing
that the left and the right had, for the most part, reached a consensus on
the issue. Because of the outrage provoked by the First Gulf War in 1991
amongst civic beur associations (second-generation migrants of Maghreb-
ian descent), the French government started doubting the second genera-
tion’s allegiance. However, the strong associative movement finally mana-
ged to convince the French government of their loyalty to France. (This
was a politically sensitive issue, since France had sent its troops to the
First Gulf War).
In 1993, the right regained power. Pasqua was again in charge of the
Home Ministry. New Pasqua laws on entrance and stay were adopted,
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modifying anew the Ordinance of 1945. With the laws of 24 August 1993
and 30 December 1993, Pasqua announced a ‘zero immigration’ objective,
thus presenting a challenge for French immigration policy. The objective,
however, was – and still is – impossible: family reunification and asylum
cannot be stopped because they are protected under the Constitution (‘the
right to have a family life’) and under international conventions (the
Geneva Convention of 1951 on asylum). For the first time, the law of
1993 situated French legislation on migration in a European context and
the relevant authorities in charge changed, as elsewhere in the EU.
Ministers for Social Affairs and Employment who had dominated discus-
sions at the European level before Maastricht were replaced by Home
Ministries. This change in the locus of authority was an important element
for the paradigm shift in public policy. It can be explained by the fact that
immigration has come to be understood as an issue of internal security
rather than a social matter. Included in the Pasqua Law were the Schengen
agreements of 1985 on reinforcing external European border controls and
the Dublin agreements of 1990 on solidarity between European countries
in the treatment of asylum seekers. This law also addressed French debates
on dubious forms of entrance and stay. In France, there were rumours
about sham marriages, pregnant Algerian mothers coming to France to give
birth so their children could get French citizenship and they would be non-
expellable and black polygamic families from Africa living on social subsi-
dies. The law restricted family reunification, prohibited polygamy, intro-
duced town mayors’ control of mixed marriages – especially when the
partner did not have a valid residence permit – and abolished reintegration
of French citizenship for former colonials (except for Algerians who, as in-
habitants of a former French département, fell under a special regime).
Immigration to France was submitted to the possession of a housing certifi-
cate, which was delivered discretionarily by mayors. Residence cards were
refused to those who had entered illegally. In polygamic couples, second
spouses’ residence cards were suppressed. Foreigners who had been con-
demned for criminal offence could be expelled under double peine (‘double
punishment’). Administrative retention in ad hoc retention centres was le-
galised for those confronted with repatriation.
This restrictive law was severely criticised by human rights associations
like Human Rights League (LDH in France), the Mouvement contre le
Racisme et Pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples (the movement against racism
and for friendship between peoples known as MRAP), the Groupe
d’Information et de Soutien des Immigrés (an information and support
group for immigrant workers known as GISTI) and the Movement de
l’Immigration et des Banlieues (an organisation dealing with immigration
and the banlieues known as MIB). Nevertheless, leftist associations’ influ-
ence on a right-wing government was limited. In fact, things turned out to
be worse for the oppositional movements, as the Pasqua-Méhaignerie law,
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a reform of the nationality law rendering access to French nationality more
difficult, came to support the new law on entrance and stay.
In 1995, Jacques Chirac, who had led the right in the presidential elec-
tions, did indeed become President. Under the government led by Alain
Juppé, no law was voted on entrance and stay. Mobilisation of a group of
illegal migrants on a hunger strike for their legalisation led to the occupa-
tion of St. Bernard Church in Paris’ immigrant district of La Goutte d’Or
in the summer of 1996. As supporters of this sans-papiers movement put
forward, it was exactly on 26 August, the annual remembrance day of the
1789 Declaration of Human Rights and Citizenship, that the protest was
stopped by the police. They broke the door of the church to enter and ar-
rest a number of irregular migrants inside. The event’s actual violence as
well as its symbolic meaning made public opinion massively supportive of
the sans-papiers cause. As a result, some ‘St. Bernard migrants’ were lega-
lised in a discretionary fashion. Meanwhile, terrorism had struck Paris: tra-
vellers were killed in two attacks on the regional express railway at a major
connecting station. The young Muslim Khaled Kelkal who presumably
took part in the terrorist attacks also planted bombs on a train in Lyon’s
surroundings. (He was finally killed by police in 1995.) In spring 1997, a
restrictive law on immigration was passed. Inspired by Jean-Louis Debré,
it penalised the housing of illegal migrants and encouraged denunciation.
However, the law was not implemented due to another political shift.
In May 1997, the left returned to power with Lionel Jospin as Prime
Minister. Home Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a strong jacobinist – a
republican and defender of a centralised democracy with a strong executive
power – proved open to dialogue connecting sending countries around the
Mediterranean with France as a receiving country. As such, Chevènement
decided to implement a new immigration policy, one inspired by researcher
Weil’s July 1997 report on immigration and nationality, which Jospin had
requested. Still in 1997, Chevènement decided to start a legalisation cam-
paign that took as its primary criteria length of stay and existing family ties
with people living in France. Such criteria contrast with the 1981 regulari-
sation programme in which irregular migrants able to prove they were
working had been regularised. In 1997, 90,000 of the 150,000 applicants
were granted a French residency permit, mainly on the basis of existing fa-
mily ties in France. In 1998, the Chevènement law on entrance and stay
enforced keeping borders closed to salaried workers. However, it facilitated
entrance and stay for some categories of immigrants not considered a ‘mi-
gration risk’, such as experts, traders, parents of families settled in France
coming for short-term stay or ill persons who could not receive adequate
medical care in their home countries. The law also foresaw automatic lega-
lisation of long-term visa overstayers related to length of stay – between
ten and fifteen years of residing in the country for students and twelve
years for workers – and existing family ties in the country. Based on this
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law, about a thousand migrants were legalised up until 2006. Under this
law, the right to asylum is divided into three categories that take into
account the new profiles of asylum seekers: constitutional asylum for ‘free-
dom fighters’ (very few have been recognised as such), conventional asy-
lum under the Geneva Convention and territorial asylum for those not fit-
ting within the convention’s criteria (namely, Algerians, who in the context
of the Algerian crisis of 1995 were threatened by non-state military
groups). The left strongly supported this law, although it had generally
been reluctant to take actions that might have resulted in attracting new mi-
grants (Gaxie 1998). However, the law did not address the problem of
non-regularised sans-papiers and, in 2002, 60,000 applicants had been
waiting to be legalised since 1997. Other criticisms included local voting
rights not being granted, not suppressing the double peine and restricting
salaried workers’ immigration to France through implementation of a
labour market test. The test was a protectionist measure that had been in-
troduced in 1974 for the first time to reserve employment for French na-
tionals, but was extended to cover European workers in 1994. It stipulates
that before giving a job to a third-country national, French authorities must
check whether a French or a European worker is instead available.
The last year of the period during which the left was in power and
Jospin was Prime Minister was characterised by non-decisive governance.
In Sangatte, a small village on the French side of the Chunnel, thousands
of illegal migrants had gathered in hope of reaching the United Kingdom
by boat, lorry or train. They had come from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran
and Iraq, and they had family or community ties to Pakistanis settled in the
UK. They were looking for better living conditions in a country where
there were no identity controls on the streets and where asylum seekers
had the right to work after a six-month stay. By contrast, the right to work
for asylum seekers had been suppressed in France in 1991. This unfolded
under the pressure of public opinion, fearing that asylum procedures en-
abling access to work would attract newcomers. These illegal migrants
were hosted by the Red Cross, subsidised by the Ministry of Social Affairs
for this specific operation. Although the Dublin agreements provided that
asylum be requested in the first country where protection is possible, the
police and the Sangatte Red Cross administration dissuaded the migrants
from staying in France. How the issue was managed led to heated discus-
sions with the British government, followed by a short-term agreement.
Again, the French leftist government seemed to fear that a decision taken
in accordance with immigrant rights associations’ claims would spark a
counteraction from the National Front and public opinion. Such a reluctant
political attitude drove many leftist activists who were disappointed by the
socialist policy to vote for the extreme left in the first round of the 2002
presidential elections, thus leaving no chance for Jospin to take part in the
second round. Chirac and Le Pen meeting face to face in the second round
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was the predictable result of this voting behaviour. The socialist party was
not in favour of generous measures for immigration because it feared los-
ing votes.
With no left-wing candidate in the second round of May 2002, Chirac
was successfully elected President (with 86 per cent of all votes). This was
his second mandate. Hence, the right was back in power again. Prime
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin nominated Sarkozy for Home Ministry.
Sarkozy immediately launched several reforms on immigration. A law on
entrance and stay of foreigners reforming the Ordinance of 1945 anew was
passed on 26 November 2003. It sharpened the conditions for family reuni-
fication and marriage-based entrance. The law also intensified the fight
against illegal immigration, putting in place sanctions against those who
helped illegal migrants stay. It also introduced a contrat d’accueil et
d’intégration (‘reception and integration contract’), stating that newcomers
had to learn French, as well as civic and republican values. From the start,
the integration contract was delivered by what was then the Office des
Migrations Internationals (OMI) and is now the L’Agence Nationale de
l’Accueil des Étrangers et des Migrations (the national agency for the re-
ception of foreigners and migration known as ANAEM) (Michalowski
2006). The second law of 10 December 2003, named the Villepin Law on
Asylum after the Minister of Foreign Affairs,3 abolished the three statuses
of asylum put in place by the 1998 law. Constitutional and territorial asy-
lum disappeared, and all applicants were instead submitted to conventional
asylum. New restrictive notions were introduced, such as ‘internal protec-
tion’ (protected zones in departure countries where one cannot ask for asy-
lum), ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘third safe country’ (countries of provi-
sional settlement). These notions diminished further chances to obtain refu-
gee status, in a context where over 80 per cent of applicants were already
refused. An unintended consequence of this restrictive regulation of asylum
procedures was the increased number of illegal migrants. Another of its
perverse effects was the application of the criterion ‘safe country’. It is dif-
ficult to evaluate what a ‘safe’ country of origin is, especially in cases
when the French Home Ministry or Ministry of Defence takes a leading
role in peacekeeping, as occurred in the Ivory Coast. In such cases, the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which heads the Office Français de
Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides known as OFPRA) would have to de-
termine how work has been executed by the Home Ministry (i.e. police) or
Ministry of Defence (i.e. army). This could prove a touchy undertaking.
In 2005, after it was reorganised, Sarkozy returned to the government
headed by De Villepin as Home Minister. He introduced another bill on
immigration, the proposition for which was supported by slogans such as
‘Yes to chosen immigration, no to unasked for immigration’ and ‘Selected
immigration – successful integration’. Thus, Sarkozy was acting once more
as a political entrepreneur in the field of migration and integration. This
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time, however, the overall context had changed: the European Commission
had issued a green book focusing on the benefits of reopening borders to
new workers; employers were complaining about shortages of labour force
in some sectors; and with economic liberalism, world competition for
highly skilled recruitment was underway. These changes favoured the re-
opening of borders that had been closed to salaried workers since 1974.
However, Sarkozy’s project was confronted by resistance from the extreme
right and part of his own party, the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle
(UMP). Hence, a compromise: stricter controls were introduced for other
forms of migration such as family reunification and asylum, though these
are difficult to reduce because, in practice, they are protected by interna-
tional rules and treaties. The law of 24 July 2006 announced a new immi-
gration policy as its objective, which according to Sarkozy had never been
put in place in France. This new immigration policy was presented as
drawing upon foreign selective immigration policies, like Canada’s. Such a
shift required the UMP’s agreement with Sarkozy; the party was reluctant
to increase immigrant numbers and would have been more familiar with
Pasqua’s ‘zero immigration’ credo. The law of 2006 was presented as a
diptych of the 2003 law. Although not using the term ‘quotas’ (which had
been rejected by Villepin), it opened borders to highly skilled and entrepre-
neurs (introducing the special category of ‘capacities and talents’). The law
permitted entry of qualified migrants as needed, as well as entry of low-
qualified workers to fill gaps in sectors suffering from labour shortages
(agriculture, construction, domestic and cleaning work, hotel and catering).
Reopening the borders to ‘useful’ immigrants has been called immigration
jetable (‘disposable immigration’) by left-wing opposition associations. In
fact, it goes hand in hand with increased restrictions in the field of family
reunification, mixed marriages and access to French citizenship.
Furthermore, the legalisation procedure introduced in the Chevènement
Law of 1998 is now closed, except when justified through humanitarian
reasons. However, pressure by teachers, parents and networks, such as
Réseau Éducation sans Frontières (the network for education without bor-
ders known as RSF) that defended the cause of pupils threatened with ex-
pulsion in the summer of 2006, led to the legalisation of 30,000 irregular
families in August 2006 (i.e. only a few weeks after the new law was
passed).
The last law, passed in November 2007, continued to open borders for
selected workers. The Hortefeux Law, as it was called, mainly stressed lim-
itations concerning family reunification. Its aim was increasing work-
related immigration under the motto ‘If we want be successful integration,
we must master immigration’. Besson was nominated in 2009 as the new
Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity
Development. He decided to follow the repatriation and co-development
policy undertaken by his predecessor, Brice Hortefeux, though he also
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launched a debate on national identity. It failed, however, because the pub-
lic did not see the debate as being necessary. The government that was
formed in November 2010 decided to discontinue the Ministry of
Immigration, due to the bad image Besson and his controversial policy had
promulgated. Immigration now falls under the remit of Home Minister
Hortefeux.
3 Access to citizenship and integration policies
As stated above, the terminology of integration and integration policies in
France was first introduced in 1974. Before that, policies relating to how
newcomers should become part of French society were provided for under
the question of how newcomers could become French citizens: i.e. through
nationality law. The following section looks at access to French citizenship
through nationality over a longer period. The subsequent section analyses
broader integration policies since 1974.
3.1 Nationality laws and its reforms
Since the beginning of the Third Republic in 1875, nationality in France
has been seen as a potential tool for implementing assimilationist policies.
The country’s model for acquiring nationality is based on an equilibrium
between jus sanguinis and jus soli – this balance being the result of
France’s long immigration history, catalysed by demographic and military
needs in the second part of the nineteenth century. The French law on na-
tionality was inspired by the 1804 civil code of Napoleon I, which substi-
tuted jus sanguinis with the former jus soli inherited from the Ancien
Régime.4 Decision-makers tried to ‘build France’, as the expression went.
They did this by giving foreigners easier access to French citizenship (in
1851, 1867 and 1889) in order to compete with Germany, whose popula-
tion had rapidly grown over the nineteenth century (Bade 2002). The 1851
census (the first that counted foreigners separately) shows that, at the time,
300,000 foreigners were living in France. In 1900, the number had risen to
one million. In 1889, an important reform of the nationality law gave
greater importance to jus soli principles, which were further expanded
through the reforms of 1927, 1945 and, finally, 1973. No political debates
rose around these reforms because the nationality code was not a political
issue and citizenship was seen as an outmoded topic (contrary to, for ex-
ample, the question of class struggle that was at the forefront of the politi-
cal scene in the 1970s).
However, citizenship rapidly became the subject of political debates, un-
der the pressure of the extreme right during the mid-1980s. During this
period, the National Front and its think-tank, the Club de l’Horloge,
THE CASE OF FRANCE 77
launched a new debate on French identity. Their slogan was ‘Etre français,
cela se mérite’ (‘Being French is something you earn’), and they began
talking about ‘les Français de papier’ (those who are French only on pa-
per). The extreme right was suspicious of French persons of foreign origin
(especially the so-called second generation). It suggested that these persons
did not wish to be French, and that French nationality had been given to
them against their will (they were considered ‘Français malgré eux’).
Symbolically, the association was made with inhabitants of the former
Alsace-Lorraine, who during both world wars were considered German
citizens enrolled in the German army against their will.
The question of nationality and citizenship rapidly entered the field of
high politics. Debates on identity grew (what does it mean to be French?),
as well as on allegiances and loyalty. Such debates often pointed to double
nationality as a problem, especially when citizens, current or prospective,
were Muslim or Jewish; France had agreements on military service with
Algeria and Israel. Supposed intrusions by countries of origin, especially
when French nationals had to accomplish military service abroad, formed
part of these debates. The left contributed to the debate by publishing an
edited volume entitled Identité française (Espaces 89, 1985), in order to
show that it refused to turn over the debate on French identity and citizen-
ship to the extreme right.
The book’s impact on public opinion was great. In November 1985, Le
Figaro Magazine published an issue entitled ‘Serons-nous encore Français
dans trente ans?’ (‘Will we still be French in thirty years?’). Its impact
compelled the Chirac Government to appoint the Commission des Sages,
the so-called Wise Men Commission, meant to advise on reform of the
French nationality code. Set up in 1987, the commission was headed by
high-ranking civil servant Marceau Long, who was vice-president of the
Council of State, the highest administrative court. The commission orga-
nised some hundred hearings on the issue of nationality and citizenship.
Contrary to expectations, the left and the right inversed their historical ar-
guments: the right defended a definition of French nationality based on so-
cial contract and collective will to live together, arguments that had been
defended in Rousseau’s Social Contract and Ernest Renan’s essay ‘Qu’est-
ce qu’une nation?’ in 1871. The left went with the theme of ‘socialisation
through residency’, stressing the importance of the soil and using a late
nineteenth-century rightist terminology that had been developed by right-
wing ideologists like Maurice Barrès. This version of the debate helped
many second-generation immigrants feel more at ease with their French
identity, rather than doubting it, and to understand French nationality
mainly as a protection against restrictive immigration reforms.
Leftist associations such as LDH, MRAP and SOS Racism were very
opposed to the reform proposed by the commission. The reform debated
the suppression of automatic access of French nationality to children of
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foreigners born on the French territory, and found no need for a reform.
On the other hand – and because it had been introduced to them by civic
associations of the beur movement – many double nationals were con-
vinced by the ‘citizenship of residency’ slogan, which strengthened their
ties with the place where they lived. The commission concluded its work
with many proposals, such as the idea of a naturalisation oath. It did not,
however, conclude that there was a need for an actual reform. As a result,
no decision was made on the eve of the 1988 presidential elections.
After this episode, debates developed within leftist associations for sev-
eral years around the issue of renewed citizenship, amongst others during
the bicentennial celebration of the French revolution in 1989. The Pasqua
Méhaignerie Law was passed on 22 July 1993, when the right had returned
to power after five years of a socialist government. This new law sup-
pressed automatic access to French nationality for second-generation mi-
grants who had turned eighteen, were born in France to foreign parents
and had continuously lived in the country for five years (i.e. former article
44 of the law of 1973). The law did grant automatic access to French na-
tionality for minors naturalised together with their parents, even if they did
not live with them. A novelty in French migration history, the law intro-
duced the notion of a will to become French. Young foreigners eighteen
years and older who were ‘candidates’ for French nationality had to ad-
dress their request for acquiring French citizenship to a judge. The law also
prolonged the length of time it took to acquire French nationality through
marriage; suppressed reintegration of French nationality for former colo-
nials (except Algerians) whose parents had served in the army, worked in
the administration or had been elected in public office; and denied access
to French nationality to young people who had been condemned to penal
sanctions exceeding six months. Although the law drew on ideas devel-
oped by the National Front, it was well received by parts of the jacobinist
left who were traditionally sensitive to republican ideals of a shared social
contract. For the first time since 1851, the jus soli principle lost some
ground to jus sanguinis.
Supported by leftist associations, the left’s campaign pledged to revert to
the law of 1973 if elected. Indeed, a year after the left had returned to
power in 1997 (with Jospin as Prime Minister), a new law reinstalled the
former equilibrium between jus soli and jus sanguinis. The Guigou Law
(1998), as it was called, suppressed the need to declare one’s will to be-
come French and restored automatic access to French nationality for eigh-
teen year olds born in France to foreign parents. Nonetheless, and similar
to the 1993 law, the reintegration of French nationality was only available
to Algerians on the argument that, unlike populations in other French colo-
nies, they enjoyed a specific status under colonial administration when
Algeria was part of France, divided into three French départements.
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Since the reform of 1998, the French nationality code has not undergone
any major changes, except for some introduced through Sarkozy’s law of
2006 concerning access to nationality through marriage. According to
Guiraudon (2000), this is partly due to the fact that the debates around this
issue ceased to be politicised. Today, the equilibrium between jus soli and
jus sanguinis seems to have found political consensus.
3.2 Integration policy
Many foreign observers consider France a centralised, assimilationist coun-
try led by a strong state based on jacobinist and republican values. With
this view, newcomers are expected to accept such values, while abandon-
ing their individual and collective identities and corresponding attitudes
and behaviour. The reality is of course more complex. Although the use of
French as the official language became the rule early in history (with
L’ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts in 1539), France has always been de fac-
to a multicultural country built on internal diversity. Diversity has been re-
ligious (e.g. Catholics versus Protestants) as well as regional and linguistic
(Goubert 1966; Wihtol de Wenden 2004). These differences have been
claimed at various moments throughout history, but the state has not taken
them on board. The refusal to recognise Corsicans as a distinct people is a
well-known example. In 1991, the Constitutional Council declared the spe-
cial treatment of a people to be contradictory to the French Constitution,
on the argument that the Constitution recognises one and only one French
people, with no distinction of origin, race or religion. In 1999, this same
high court also rejected the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages as contradicting republican principles, and it reasserted the
unity of the French people according to the Constitutional Council formula
indivisibilité de la République, égalité devant la loi et unicité du people
(‘inseparable unity of the Republic, equality before the law and uniqueness
of the French people’). However, there are many exceptions to the rules in
France and French overseas territories: polygamy is commonly practiced in
Mayotte, there are three kings in Polynesia and secularism is usually re-
spected with reluctance.
De facto multiculturalism is also a problem for the republican vision,
particularly since there is a growing awareness that members of ethnic
groups are also potential voters. Abroad, France is considered an old-fash-
ioned assimilationist, sovereignist country that pursues its own ‘intégration
à la française (‘French-style integration’). Indeed, the term ‘assimilation’
remained in public discourse on inclusion policy from the 1880s to the
1960s. The term ‘integration’, already in use at the end of the French pre-
sence in colonial Algeria, was reintroduced in 1974 by Dijoud, the new
State Secretary on Immigration appointed by Giscard d’Estaing. Invoking
this term, the idea was to abandon an excessively individualistic,
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authoritarian approach and to allow a certain expression of cultural diver-
sity. From 1974 onwards, ‘language and culture of origin’ were thus taught
in schools to children of foreigners, as was the case in the Netherlands and
Germany. Beyond ‘integration’, public discourse referred to ‘insertion’ (a
functionalist definition that reduced integration to the main instruments
needed to live in France, used by Dijoud’s successor Lionel Stoleru), and
vivre ensemble (‘living together’) introduced in 1983 by Minister of Social
Affairs Georgina Dufoix.
After the 1983 Marche des Beurs, several civic associations stemming
from the beur movement were created, e.g. SOS Racisme and France Plus,
both established in 1984. Some of them tried to spread the notion of a right
to ‘difference’ (according to the term used by SOS Racisme). When the
National Front responded to this formula, the associations devised the no-
tion of a ‘right to indifference’ (France Plus). Concomitantly, researchers,
like André Taguieff (1988), denounced the risk that ethnic claims would
lead to cultural and social determinisms.
France has managed the legitimacy of Islam in the public sphere in a
different way than other nations. For example, in Germany the question of
whether teachers should have the right to wear a headscarf at school was
submitted to discussion. The corresponding French debate concentrated on
whether the pupils should have the right to wear a headscarf at school. The
decision of the Constitutional Council in 1989 and the law of 2004 take
the same stance on the question and prohibit ostentatious religious signs
(e.g. headscarves) in schools, both allowing a public school to send a stu-
dent home if he or she continues to bear such signs and stressing secular-
ism as a republican value to be shared by all citizens. At the same time,
other emblematic values have disappeared (e.g. military service was sup-
pressed in 1995 by Chirac) and fraternité (brotherhood) is being seriously
challenged by la fracture sociale (‘the social gap’), a term used by Chirac
during his 1995 presidential campaign.
Recently, a debate was reinvigorated concerning whether ethnic origin
should be accounted for in French statistics. Begun in 1998, the heated
academic discussion involved Michèle Tribalat supporting the introduction
of ethnic categories in the French census and Hervé le Bras who was
against it. Sarkozy declared himself in favour of such reform, arguing it
would help assess discrimination. On his side were demographers, like
Patrick Simon. However, public opinion does not seem ready for such a
turning point vis-à-vis the French definition of citizenship. So far, the only
category included is that of immigré (‘immigrant’), i.e. a person born
abroad with or without French nationality. An immigrant may acquire
French citizenship in France, but if not, he or she remains a foreigner.
Ultimately, what is interesting about policymaking in the field of integra-
tion in France is not only these hesitations about assimilation, integration,
insertion or plural citizenship, but also the territorial approach through
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which existing differences are dealt with. The territorial approach was cho-
sen because it allows treatment of difference in social terms vis-à-vis
France’s refusal to recognise ethnic groups. In a way, the introduction of
this policy may be considered revolutionary: by pointing to existing differ-
ences within the French territory, it implies a certain infringement on jaco-
binist ideology. To give a concrete example: in 1981, the French govern-
ment introduced zones d’éducation prioritaires (ZEP for short, referring to
an educational priority zone), a positive discrimination scheme based on
social criteria for districts where children suffered from cumulated discri-
mination. Throughout the 1980s and under pressure by several leftist
mayors, such as Grenoble’s socialist mayor Hubert Dubedout and Gilbert
Bonnemaison, a mayor in France’s poorest district, Seine-Saint-Denis, sev-
eral measures relating to immigrants were included into an urban social de-
velopment programme aimed at preventing violence. Several districts were
concerned by this territorialised public intervention in the politique de la
ville (urban policy). In 1990, a Ministry for Urban Affairs was created.
The second minister of this ministry was the renowned Bernard Tapie, a
self-made man of influence in Marseilles, who had been chosen by the so-
cialist government because he was able to challenge Le Pen in TV broad-
casts. The urban policy aimed to fight exclusion in ‘territories of economic
and social poverty’. Neither ‘ethnicity’ nor ‘positive discrimination’ was
ever mentioned. These two terms are still taboo in France, where formal
equality of rights is consecrated.
Since the mid-1980s, subsidies have been allocated to civic associations
in an effort to maintain what are called ‘social bonds’ in districts struck by
de-industrialisation and high rates of unemployment among first- and sec-
ond-generation immigrants. These associations work with the local popula-
tion and combat urban violence. This policy also introduced a division of
competences between the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Urban
Affairs and their local partners, mainly municipalities. Since 1991, thirteen
sous-préfets (high-ranking civil servants of the Home Ministry) also expli-
citly cooperated with actors of this urban policy. In 1993, the reunification
of competences was symbolised through Prime Minister Edouard
Balladur’s appointment of Simone Veil to the position of Minister of
Social Affairs, Health and Urban Affairs. A contractual policy was created
between municipalities of the banlieues and the Ministry of the Town to
delegate national competences to local actors (towns, regions, associa-
tions). In 1996, a pact was adopted to boost city development. Directed by
Prime Minister Juppé, the pact identified 751 disadvantaged urban zones
that required territorialised public intervention. In 1999, 1,300 districts and
six million inhabitants were targeted in these urban contracts. Today, 750
zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS for short, referring to vulnerable urban
zones) comprising 4.5 million inhabitants are included in the urban policy.
In France, there are also 911 ZEPs in which 20 per cent of all the pupils of
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the country are schooled, and 85 zones franches urbaines (ZFU for short,
referring to a franchised urban zone) where firms can be exempted from
municipality and state taxes if they create employment for locals.
As for cultural policy, emphasis on the local level led many associative
activists who were formerly included in town partnerships to join formal
municipal structures. Competences were delegated to cultural mediators
and ethnic leaders from the top – by the state and municipalities – in order
to manage urban, social and cultural projects at the grass root level.
However, there were hesitations about how the republican model should be
implemented. This was demonstrated in the choice between facilitating par-
ticipative democracy and diversity through urban mediators and other ac-
tors in the urban context, thus reinforcing security around the value of
rights and duties of French citizenship, versus helping elites born in the
banlieues to leave so as to give them a chance for individual performance.
Another important aspect of integration policymaking concerns anti-dis-
crimination. France has taken a long time to include discrimination policy
in its credo of equal rights. The very fact that the French citizenship model
is grounded in the notion of ‘formal equality’ – consecrated in the declara-
tion of 1789 with ‘Tous les hommes naissent libres et égaux en droits’
(‘All people are born free and equal in rights’) – has delayed awareness of
actual inequalities built upon ethnic and religious discrimination. Article
13 of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 forced France to implement an anti-
discrimination public policy. In 1999, the Groupe d’Etudes sur les
Discriminations (GED) was established under the auspices of leftist
Minister of Social Affairs Martine Aubry to serve as a light structure for
researching discrimination. Quickly thereafter, GED became the Groupe
d’Etude et de Lutte Contre les Discriminations (GELD), now an organisa-
tion aiming to research, as well as fight, against discrimination. In 2000, a
toll-free telephone number was created to collect testimonies from victims
of discriminations and, in so doing, address some of their issues. Most of
those who called in complained about discrimination at work and police
discrimination, though GELD took very few claims to court.
GELD ceased to exist in 2003, but the Commission Nationale de
Déontologie de la Sécurité (CNDS) was created by the law of 6 June
2000. Headed by former president of the Highest Court of Justice (the
Court of Cassation) Pierre Truche, the independent commission was meant
to combat institutional abuses caused by security forces (e.g. police, prison
and army) during the repatriation of irregular migrants. The CNDS dealt
with contradictory hearings between victims and members of security
forces. The CNDS annual report, which was addressed to the President,
pointed to the existence of police discrimination against French persons of
Arab, African and Roma origins. So far, this institutional discrimination
had been taboo in the French administration (Body-Gendrot & Wihtol de
Wenden 2003; Wihtol de Wenden & Bertossi 2005). Two laws were
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subsequently adopted: in 2001, one on discrimination in the workplace fol-
lowing the publication of a research report that had been commissioned by
trade union CFDT and sociologist Philippe Bataille; in 2002, another ad-
dressing racist practices among employers and obliging them to prove they
were innocent of indirect discrimination.
The government also took symbolic actions, such as expanding the
Fonds d’Action Sociale pour les Travailleurs Musulmans d’Algérie en
Métropole et Pour leur Famille (that is, a social action fund for Muslim
workers from Algeria in France and their families known as FAS). FAS
was created in 1959 for Algerian workers and their families and progres-
sively extended its actions to cover the sociocultural needs of all foreigners
and their descendants. In 2002, it was renamed the Fonds d’Action et de
Soutien pour l’Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations (an action
fund to support integration and anti-discrimination known as FASILD).
FASILD was formally dissolved in 2006 and reorganised as the Agence
Nationale pour la Cohésion Sociale et l’Egalité des Chances (the national
agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities known as ANCSEC),
with a stronger focus on citizenship and solidarity. In 2004, another inde-
pendent authority has been created, the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les
Discriminations et pour l’Égalité (HALDE), the high authority in anti-dis-
crimination and equality headed by Louis Schweitzer, a high-ranking civil
servant and former president director general of Renault. Despite its level
of authority, HALDE has received little media attention and therefore re-
mains largely ignored.5 As already stated, the fact that recognition of dis-
crimination is still taboo in France contributes to this situation.
Another pillar of French integration policy is political inclusion.
However, even after 30 years of debates – and although public opinion is
now finally in favour of it – local voting rights have yet to be granted to
foreigners. Following the creation of local consultative commissions in
Belgium in 1972 and Germany and the Netherlands in 1975 (called ‘parlia-
ments of foreigners’), several French leftist associations such as the
Fédération des Associations de Solidarité avec les Travailleurs Immigrés
(the federation of associations for solidarity with immigrant workers
known as FASTI) started claiming local voting rights and eligibility for all
foreigners settled in France in 1975. They were followed by the French
Communist party in 1980. They proposed to distinguish citizenship from
nationality, the former to be understood as being based on active participa-
tion and the latter being a formal status that depends on the civil code.
Defenders of local voting rights for immigrants encouraged municipalities
(mostly leftist ones) to organise municipal consultative commissions of im-
migrants, which were either appointed by local powers or elected by for-
eigners. These consultative commissions were set up to prepare immigrants
who generally came from non-democratic states to deal with political in-
clusion, as well as to help develop deliberative forms of citizenship in
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municipal councils. The best-known examples were Mons-en-Baroeul, les
Ullis and Amiens, where foreign inhabitants voted for their representatives
in the municipal councils. Strasbourg also used to be part of the pro-
gramme, and representatives are now also appointed in Grenoble and Paris.
In 1981, socialist candidate Mitterrand’s leftist programme promised all
foreigners local voting rights, along with freedom of association. Freedom
of association was granted in the same year. During his long mandate
(1981-1995), Mitterrand often repeated that he was personally in favour of
such reform, but that public opinion was not ready for it.
For such reform to take place, it would have been necessary to change
article 3 of the Constitution. The article foresaw that voters in local elec-
tions participate in the designation of the electoral group, which, in turn,
proceeded to the election of senators. As a result, foreigners would have
touched upon national sovereignty, which, according to the Constitution
belongs to the French people (‘La souveraineté nationale appartient au
peuple français’). After years of internal debates within the socialist party,
the Jospin Government (1997-2002) decided to abandon the project for
fear of strengthening the extreme right’s vote.
In 2002, the Green party proposed a bill that was adopted by the
National Assembly but not passed by the Senate. This draft bill was based
on the legitimacy of ‘citizenship of residence’ ideas that civic associations
had been defending since 1981. To challenge local extreme-right tenden-
cies in the suburbs, the bill spelled out arguments of socialisation such as
length of stay, tax payment and the need to be involved in the city’s grass
roots campaigns towards local voting rights in order to show the extreme
right another way of citizenship. The civic associations based their claims
on the Constitution of 1793, which granted citizenship to foreigners who
shared the revolutionary ideals and who had demonstrated solidarity with
the movement even though they were not nationals. Thomas Paine and
Anarchasis Clootz are illustrious examples of foreigners honoured with ci-
tizenship for their engagement in the French Revolution.
Since the French Revolution, and particularly upon signing the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the debate on local voting rights has shifted.
Article 8 of the treaty defines European citizenship and grants local voting
rights and eligibility to Europeans who are settled in a European country
other than their own. As a result, the French Constitution was changed,
now stipulating that European voters do not participate in the designation
of senators and cannot be elected as mayors. With this example of possible
change at hand, leftist associations have kept claiming local voting rights
on the basis of socialisation through residency. One of their main argu-
ments has been the democratic deficit that arises from non-voting residents.
Lately, even some rightist leaders (Yves Jego, who is close to Sarkozy, as
well as the Minister of Education and former UDF Mayor of Amiens,
Gilles de Robien) are now pleading for such reform. The initial
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counterargument that the reform would bring about an ethnic (i.e. Arab or
Muslim) vote has been weakened by second- and third-generation immi-
grants voting as French citizens. Most recent polls show that they are
French like the others, slightly more leftist, more abstentionist and more
conservative in their private values than their compatriots, but showing no
sign of retrieval into their own community on the political level (Brouard
& Tiberj 2005).
Among European countries of immigration, France is one of the last to
grant political mandates to French people of foreign origin (Bird 2007).
There are no MPs of immigrant background in the French National
Assembly, and there is only one senator of immigrant background. There
are only two or three MPs of immigrant background for each mandate in
the European Parliament. And at the local level, councillors of immigrant
background (when there are any) are usually in charge of urban policy is-
sues, not finances or international affairs. The lack of political inclusion of
migrants in France – as compared with the UK, the Netherlands and
Germany – illustrates the reservations of the French political elite who are
trained at elitist universities and wary of ‘outside intruders’. During autumn
2005’s riots in Clichy-sous-Bois and other municipalities in Paris’ sur-
rounds, a lack of inclusion was the feeling largely shared among young-
sters holding French citizenship. Many rioters felt they were not considered
full French citizens, and that the republican values they had been taught in
school did not apply to them. They did not claim for a special ethnic or re-
ligious identity to be recognised. Rather, they requested equal rights and
equal quality of life.
The recognition of Islam is another recent pillar of French integration
policy. France has the biggest presence of Muslims in Europe, namely five
million people of diverse national origin. Most are Maghrebians
(Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians), second- and third-generation immi-
grants with French nationality – about 500,000 of whom are Harkis and
their families who fought with the French during the Algerian War. There
are also Turkish and Pakistani immigrants, refugees from the Middle East
(Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, Lebanese) as well as sub-Saharan Africans from
Senegal, Mali and Mauritania.6 Only a few Muslims come from English-
speaking African countries, such as Nigeria.
The presence of Islam emerged as a question in the French public space
in the mid-1980s, when Muslims started raising collective claims. For ex-
ample, in 1984, strikes in the car industry combined working-class and
Islamic mobilisation (one of the leaders of a Citroën strike, Akka Ghazi,
became an MP in Morocco). Other claims concerned collective housing for
foreign workers, prayer rooms, separate areas in graveyards, mosques that
would be visible in the urban landscape and halal meat slaughterers and
markets. Most public discussion concerned the question of headscarves at
French schools. The issue was first raised in 1989, leading to broader
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debate about Islam’s compatibility with republican values. In France, Islam
is mainly seen as a religion of the poor and the colonised, rarely associated
with elites. There are many forms of Islamophobic rejection in the public
opinion (Geisser 1997, 2004).
In order to establish a permanent dialogue with religious leaders and to
manage Islam within secularised rules, two Home Ministers have endea-
voured to create structures for dialogue and representation. The first was
Joxe, who in 1989 established the Conseil de Reflexion sur l’Avenir de
l’Islam en France (the council for reflection on Islam in France known as
CORIF). Sarkozy followed in 2002, setting up the Conseil Français du
Culte Musulman (the French council of the Muslim faith known as
CFCM). The representiveness of France’s main Islamic associations in the
councils is controversial. The criterion used to select associations repre-
senting the community was the number of square metres of an associa-
tion’s prayer room. This criterion awarded less influence to smaller asso-
ciations financed by Muslim families and more to big associations subsi-
dised by, for example, Saudi Arabia (the Union des Organisations
Islamiques de France, UOIF) and Morocco (the Fédération Nationale des
Musulmans de France, FNMF). As a result, some Muslims, like Turkish
Alevi groups who practice religion at home and never go to the mosque,
are unrepresented.
Although the legitimacy of a national structure facilitating dialogue be-
tween public ministries and local authorities remains debatable, discussion
about integrating Islam in secularised daily life has clearly been estab-
lished. French home ministers have, for example, enjoyed a privileged
partnership with the rector of the Great Mosque of Paris. This mosque was
built in 1926 to thank Muslim soldiers who conquered Douaumont Fort
near Verdun in World War I. Originally, the mosque depended on the
French government in Algiers, but after independence, Hamza Boubaker
was named rector and eventually superseded by his son Dalil Boubaker.
Rector to this day, Boubaker is a French and Algerian binational, appointed
by Algeria, who chairs the CFCM. He shares the Home Ministry’s republi-
can values, though is also considered a man open to dialogue and
compromises.
Nonetheless, this institutionalised dialogue has not prevented France
from hard conflicts, namely about wearing headscarves. After a Council of
State decision prohibited the wearing of ‘ostentatious signs of religious be-
longing’ in schools, a law was voted on 15 March 2004 to similarly prohi-
bit wearing ‘ostensible signs’. What had changed in fifteen years was a
slight shift from the word ‘ostentatious’ to ‘ostensible’, as well as the re-
placement of a juridical decision by a law. Despite some protests by intel-
lectuals and foreign observers defending a multiculturalist approach, the
law seems to have closed off the discussion, since only very few girls at
school insist on wearing a headscarf. School-going girls refusing to take
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off the headscarf must attend either private classes or have distance educa-
tion. As critics have argued, this brings them back to a very traditional
way of life.
The question of Islam in the public domain has also compelled a con-
certed effort by the President and some ministers to increase the visibility
of exemplary persons of Muslim culture and/or belief in the decision-mak-
ing sphere. In 2004, a Muslim préfet (a high-ranking civil servant repre-
senting the state’s authority in a département) and a Muslim school rector
were appointed. Such willingness to exhibit religious inclusion may seem
strange in a secularised republic such as France. Although these high-rank-
ing civil servants were mostly French of Maghrebian origin, ethnicity was
never mentioned because it has no legal status in France, unlike religious
diversity. Ministers of immigrant origin have also been appointed to appeal
to voters of similar background, such as Tokia Saïfi in 2002 and Azouz
Begag in 2005, followed by Rachida Dati, Rama Yade and Fadela Amara
in 2007. Besides these examples, only a few French of Maghrebian origin
hold important positions in the headquarters of main political parties. The
appointment of a black (non-Muslim) journalist as a presenter of the 8 PM
news on a public television channel in summer 2006 was considered a very
important – even extraordinary – event.
4 Conclusion
To conclude, there is some consensus between the left and the right in the
management of integration policy, while the policy of entrance and stay is
a much more controversial issue. Since 2000, several public reports on im-
migration policy severely criticised the segmentation of immigration and
integration responsibilities across several ministries. A recent report of the
national audit court (Cour des Comptes 2006) focused on the fragmenta-
tion and dispersion of decision-making in immigration and integration pol-
icy. In fact, at least five ministries are traditionally concerned with these
questions: the Home Ministry with entrance, stay and border control; the
Ministry of Social Affairs with work, integration, population and national-
ity; the Ministry of Urban Affairs with urban and local management; the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with refugees; the Ministry of Justice with pris-
ons and reintegration into French citizenship. So far, all attempts to change
the division of powers and competences to avoid dispersion of decision-
making have failed: power is concentrated in the hands of the Home
Ministry, but other public administrations are reluctant to let migration and
integration be exclusively ruled by that ministry. Former Home Minister
and now President, Sarkozy argued in favour of the Home Ministry’s play-
ing a stronger role in migration and integration issues. During his cam-
paign, Sarkozy even announced that once elected, he would create a
88 CATHERINE WIHTOL DE WENDEN
ministry of immigration and national identity to consolidate all responsibil-
ities and strengthen coherent decision-making.
What are – in a comparative perspective – the peculiarities of policy-
making vis-à-vis migratory issues in France? In principal, the nation state
is in charge of these matters. However, the state has not always been able
to actually control immigration flows and borders. This was particularly
difficult during the economic boom, after World War II. The state has often
found refuge in non-decision-making politics. That was the case during
Les Trente Glorieuses (1945-1975), when attempts to control immigration
failed. On the other hand, immigrant integration policies were long ne-
glected by the state, and still are in many respects. More recently, the left
who were in power (1998-2002) refused to make any decision in the field
of integration for fearing of losing the presidential elections (which did in
fact happen).
How does the picture appear when we look in more detail at specific ac-
tors? As stated, in France migration policies have mainly been decided at
the national level. This has been strongly inspired by republican ideas, but
at the same time – at least partially – influenced and negotiated by the
most influent immigrant group: Maghrebians and their descendants. This
group dominated civic movements and was called upon to negotiate with
the government on several occasions. The beur movement transpired
among civic associations with whom negotiations regarding integration
policy took place at the Elysée. Maghrebians were called upon by the high-
est state representatives during the First Gulf War to guarantee the loyalty
of the militancy. And the group is also consulted on the eve of each presi-
dential election because of the ethnic vote’s persisting phantasm.
Maghrebians and their descendants are the most important ethnic actors in
this game. They became familiar with the centralised, jacobinist state over
130 years of colonisation, and they know how to deal with citizenship and
secularism, in spite of still being confronted with exclusion and
discrimination.
Other traditional actors, such as employers and trade unions, were very
strong between 1945 and 1975, but lost influence between 1980 and 2000,
when de-industrialisation and unemployment were prominent. Employers
have recently regained some strength, as labour shortages have led liberal
economic ideas to have a greater impact on decision-making, especially
concerning the reopening borders. By contrast, trade unions seem to be
playing a very small role, being little involved with new issues linked to
immigration, such as irregular migrants, ‘immigrant pressure’ on the labour
market, sub-contracting methods with Eastern workers and transnational
networks of human abuses (e.g. prostitution, modern slavery).
Since the 1990s, security concerns have become a very important factor
in public policymaking. They first became prominent at the European level
with the progressive criminalisation of illegal immigration that had started
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in the early 1990s (the Schengen Acquis). Concerns became more predo-
minant following terrorist attacks in Europe and even more so after 9/11.
However, 9/11 cannot be identified as a turning point for immigration pol-
icy in France. Rather, it was an event that led to increased identity controls
on the streets and, more generally, to Islam’s conflation with illegality, de-
linquency and terrorism.
In the decision-making process, the most important referee has been
public opinion. For quite a long period (1945-1975), immigration was a
depoliticised issue. This was due to the fact that immigrant workers were
needed for the booming economy. The rise of the extreme right in the
1980s and the way it placed immigration as the core of its political pro-
gramme contributed to its higher profile. Immigration, formerly an issue in
low politics, became an issue of high politics. In many cases, security argu-
ments predominated and symbolic policies were favoured in order to reas-
sure the right-wing electorate. The strategy of the left has been non-deci-
sion-making, as a means to differentiate itself from the right and to avoid
appearing too much in favour of immigration or on migrants’ side (e.g.
concerning voting rights for foreigners, the legalisation of irregular mi-
grants or Sangatte’s asylum seekers).
At the local level, the question of how responsibilities were shared be-
tween the Ministry of Urban Affairs, municipalities, social actors and asso-
ciations has varied on a case-by-case basis. However, the riots of autumn
2005 attracted public and political attention to the living situation in the
suburbs of big French agglomerations, and new strategies were discussed.
A strategy put in place as early as 2001 was by Sciences Po director
Richard Descoings to open his Paris Institute of Political Studies to ZEP
pupils. Access to such an emblematic institution, known for training future
elites of the state, was enabled by establishing a simplified test and special
pre-entry courses. Every year since, some twenty students from ZEP
schools enter Sciences Po. Municipalities raised other strategic ideas, like
offering job-seekers who live in notorious suburbs a public domicile ad-
dress, in order to avoid automatic rejections by geographically prejudiced
employers. In the same vein, associations working for social insertion in-
troduced anonymous CVs, in order to avoid systematic dismissal of candi-
dates with Arabic names. Restricted geographic and social mobility among
inhabitants of the inner cities is perhaps the greatest challenge for future
public immigration policy in France.
The role of civil society organisations (NGOs, human rights associa-
tions, solidarity associations and churches), experts and journalists is, ac-
cording to French tradition in policymaking, very small. High-ranking civil
servants do not trust civil society actors. Indeed, because they were not
trained in the same places, neither group knows each other very well. The
grandes écoles system – France’s institutions of elitist higher education –
influences French public policy heavily. In particular, civil servants
90 CATHERINE WIHTOL DE WENDEN
working in the grands corps (mainly the Conseil d’Etat, Cour des
Comptes, Inspection of Finances) were trained at the École Nationale
d’Administration (ENA), the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) and the
Polytechnic School (the top engineering school in France known as ‘the
X’). As a consequence, when immigration becomes a problem in high poli-
tics, opportunities for discussion, negotiation and bargaining with decision-
makers are very limited; high civil servants generally do not take into
account the reality of migratory flows. Most directors in the ministerial
administration overseeing immigration and integration come from elite net-
works trained in the above-mentioned schools. Furthermore, they usually
hold these positions for a short period.
However, the dynamics of policymaking in France are changing. Factors
and actors in favour of immigration and integration and factors and actors
working against it are shifting. In favour of new policies are – besides poli-
tical entrepreneurs like Sarkozy or some European institutions – employers
needing labour, human rights associations struggling for more rights to be
granted to foreigners and second-generation immigrants, churches, immi-
grants organisations, lawyers and ethnic leaders. Opposing immigration
and holding conservative positions are most of the administration and pub-
lic decision-makers, defenders of the welfare state who see newcomers as a
challenge, European directives on border control and security issues, defen-
ders of a French identity and a sovereign nation-state. There is a general
consensus on integration between the left and the right, yet, when it comes
to immigration, the two political camps fight fiercely – perhaps more sym-
bolically than effectively. Today, however, the frontier is less between the
‘left’ and the ‘right’, but increasingly one of liberal versus authoritarian po-
sitions, even though those in favour of reopening borders are not always
sensitive to integration challenges and vice versa. Because change would
imply negotiating, status quo is preferred over trying out innovative poli-
cies. To sum up, the new configuration of the French decision-making pro-
cess in the field of immigration is characterised as follows: employers and
the government are deciding; Parliament obeys the government majority;
unions and associations are pleading without much support for the recogni-
tion of new rights or the effectiveness of rights in general; and international
structures are considered rather abstract principles (except for Europe
whose influence is growing). There are very few factual, realistic debates
about integration. Short-term thinking prevails, along with pressure coming
from public opinion and electoral agendas.
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Notes
1 Figures may differ depending on the sources and definitions used. For example, ac-
cording to the UN Population Division, France had 6.6 million international mi-
grants in 2009 (10 per cent).
2 Muslim organisations from Morocco and the Gulf countries participated in these
discussions, for instance, by offering financial support to build prayer rooms.
3 The Minister of Foreign Affairs has headed the refugee management organisation
OFPRA in partnership with the Home Minister since 2003.
4 In the Ancien Regime peasants were considered landowners’ property if they were
not free (i.e. serfs).
5 In 2010 it was announced that HALDE would be replaced by the Defender of the
Citizen, along with the CNDS and the Defender of Children.
6 Half of the sub-Saharan Africans in France are Catholic, coming from Congo,
Cameroon and the Ivory Coast.
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3 The case of Germany
Maren Borkert and Wolfgang Bosswick
1 Introduction
The making of migration policies is a multidimensional and complex pro-
cess. It both involves and affects different spheres of society – local, regio-
nal, national, international – and calls for interaction across a multitude of
social-political actors. What’s more, policies have a double nature: their in-
tentions and outcomes are not necessarily one in the same. Besides inten-
tionally constructed policies, it is important to consider the effects of sha-
dow decision-making as well as the non-policies and contra-intentional
outcomes of policy measures. These aspects of post-war Germany’s policy
formulation and outcomes, both intended and unintended, will be described
in this chapter. The following sections will suggest possible linkages be-
tween these driving factors and their reciprocal influence.
German migration history is marked by the continual employment of
foreign labour, beginning with agriculture in the Prussian era and shifting
to industrial work in World War II, which has remained a major source of
employment up until the present-day. In 1944, several sectors, such as agri-
culture, mining and chemicals, saw the share of foreign labourers grow up
to 40 per cent (Bade 1983: 56). This pattern was interrupted only during
the economic crisis at the end of the 1920s and during the end of World
War II when, in four years, 13.7 million refugees and expelled ethnic
Germans from Central Europe immigrated to the three western zones of
what would become the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (Bade 1983:
59).1 Although immigration constitutes an integral part of German history,
the first substantial migration movements to the country took place as a
consequence of World War II. This benchmark, therefore, marks the start-
ing point of this chapter.
In post-war West Germany, a large share of the labour demand could be
met by returning German prisoners of war (4 million until the end of
1950), refugees of German descent from Central Europe (approximately
4.7 million) and by persons emigrating from the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) (approximately 1.8 million until 1961) (Bade 1985: 60).
In 1950, these three groups of migrants amounted to 16.7 per cent of the
West German population, increasing to 23.9 per cent in 1960 (Herbert
1990: 196). Although by law they were treated like Germans and
considered themselves Germans, their integration took place not without
conflicts. The autochthonous population often showed open hostility to-
wards these Flüchtlinge (‘refugees’), raising concerns about their different
culture and showing prejudices about their unwillingness to work, per-
ceived uncleanliness and assumed tendency towards criminality
(Oberpenning 1999: 302; Schulze 1997: 53-72).
Nevertheless, these migrants integrated themselves successfully into the
German economy and political system. Enjoying full citizenship rights,
they were legally enabled to articulate and safeguard their interests in the
given economic-political structure of West Germany. This mobilisation led
to an assimilation process in which the political structure of the host so-
ciety had to respond to the migrants’ demands, instead of giving in to the
resentments expressed by the autochthonous population. Even though la-
bour demands of the Wirtschaftswunder, the booming economy of the
1950s, could be met by many migrants of ethnic German origin, regional
labour demands emerged in specific sectors. The sectoral labour shortages
compelled farmers in south-western Germany to employ the first Italian
‘guest workers’ in 1952, even in spite of the general unemployment rate of
9.5 per cent at that time (Heckmann 1981: 149f).
An increasing demand in construction and industry, partly due to the for-
mation and rearmament of the German armed forces in 1956, led to an ex-
tension of active recruitment of foreign workers. This occurred through
agreements with several European countries: Italy in 1955, followed by
Spain and Greece in 1960 and Turkey in 1961. These agreements were not
unilateral in the German interest; several sending countries intervened in
order to expand their migrant numbers or to be considered for the guest
worker programme (Steinert 1995). After the construction of the Berlin
Wall and the closure of the GDR’s border in 1961, further agreements with
Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia were signed up until 1968.
One of the most important decisions of Germany’s post-war labour recruit-
ment was made in 1955, when the government, together with employers’
associations and unions, agreed upon the full integration of labour migrants
into the social security system (Mehrländer 1980: 77ff). Since then, the
German social security system did not, in principle, differentiate between
foreigners and German nationals.
As a consequence of the oil crisis of 1973, a halt on recruitment was im-
posed. At that time, 2.6 million foreign workers were employed in the
German economy, among them Turks (23 per cent), Yugoslavians (18 per
cent) and Italians (16 per cent) (Lederer 1997: 52). Although the employ-
ment of guest workers was intended to be temporary by both the host
society and the migrants themselves, there was no enforcement of the rota-
tion scheme. On the contrary, since the migrants were employed in unat-
tractive sectors of the industry (mining, construction, metals and textiles),
German employers were interested in keeping these trained foreign
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labourers. In the early 1970s, as it was becoming more and more obvious
that the rotation strategy was not feasible, the share of non-European mi-
grants and their public visibility increased. Parallel to the 1973 halt on re-
cruitment for non-European Economic Community (EEC) nationals, the of-
ficial rotation policy was replaced by one promoting voluntary repatriation.
Family reunion (providing for spouses and children below age sixteen) has
been the only option for regular immigration into Germany from 1973 on-
wards. As such, the ambiguous policy to stop new recruitment, to promote
voluntary return and to socially integrate those who were unlikely to return
was introduced into German migration management (Heckmann 1994:
161).
The 1990s brought a new turn in Germany’s migration policy. The dis-
mantling of the Iron Curtain and German reunification eliminated a major
migration barrier to the country. At the same time, the civil war in
Yugoslavia generated massive refugee movements, which were hosted pre-
dominantly by Germany and Austria (see Annex 1 Figure 1). These refu-
gee movements culminated in 1992 at a peak of 438,000 applications,
while the immigration of ethnic Germans – since 1990, predominantly
stemming from states of the former Soviet Union – climaxed in 1990,
counting 397,000 immigrants (see Annex 2 Table 1).
2 The evolution of Germany’s migration provisions
In 1965, post-war West Germany enacted its first legal provision in matters
of immigration and stay. It replaced the Foreigner’s Police Decree from
1938, thus harmonising the variety of regulations adopted at the
Bundesland level with a new Foreigners Law (Santel & Weber 2000: 111;
Treibel 1999: 56f).
2.1 Halt on recruiting non-EEC nationals (1973)
The 1973 halt on recruiting non-EEC nationals, referred to as the
Anwerbestopp, and the official policy of promoting voluntary repatriation
as central elements of the new paradigm of Germany’s migration policy
unintentionally led many foreigners to stay in the country. After all, the op-
tion for re-entry had been explicitly rejected. When in 1978 concerns arose
about growing conflicts among immigrant and autochthonous populations
due to housing, medical service and education problems, German
Parliament approved the establishment of a Commissioner for the
Promotion of Integration of Foreign Employees and their Families, af-
filiated to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In September 1979,
its first commissioner, Heinz Kühn, published a memorandum on the state
of integration of foreign migrants, demanding an active integration policy
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for the given migrant population (Geiß 2001: 128). Even if the establish-
ment of such an office might suggest that the need for integrating migrants
was officially recognised, in the following two decades Germany’s migra-
tion policy was marked by defensive and restrictive measures.
Development of a comprehensive integration policy stagnated.
2.2 Promotion of repatriation (1983)
In December 1983, the Law for Promoting the Repatriation of Foreigners
(Rückkehrförderungsgesetz) came into force. The law subsidised voluntary
return by granting the foreign workers a share of their prospective German
pension in cases where there was permanent resettlement abroad. About
250,000 migrants returned under this scheme, but the government’s expec-
tations went unmet. Repatriation numbers fell far below the intended fig-
ures, and it turned out that many of the returnees only accelerated their al-
ready planned return project in order to benefit from the programme
(Santel 2000: 112). While the intended result of the law was very limited,
its implicit message to both the foreign population and the German public
was loud: counteracting the goals for social integration among settled mi-
grants (Meier-Braun 1988: 69). Although the recruitment halt officially
stopped demand-driven migration to Germany and the figure of employed
foreign workers consequently decreased from 2.6 million in 1973 to 1.6
million in 1984, approximately 3 million foreigners settled in Germany up
until 1980 via family reunion (Lederer 2001: 141). Besides the widely ig-
nored family reunion, in the late 1970s, a second side door for immigration
became relevant: supply-driven immigration via the asylum procedure ac-
cording to article 16 (2.2) of the Grundgesetz, Germany’s Basic Law. From
1980 onwards, the right to asylum became the focus of public discourse on
migration and numerous legal initiatives and deterring measures (Bosswick
1997: 56f). In the national elections campaign of 1986-1987, conservatives
claimed that multicultural foreign infiltration posed a serious threat to
German national identity, which coincided with increasing numbers of asy-
lum seekers from non-European countries such as Sri Lanka, Iran and
Lebanon (Bosswick 2000: 46; Lederer 1997: 274). During the same year,
the number of xenophobic attacks against asylum seekers and foreigners
increased (Lederer 1997: 167), suggesting a direct link to the heated public
debate on asylum in the country. Nevertheless, the government argued that
the number of asylum seekers should be reduced in order to solve unrest
within the German population and to combat this violence, thus legitimat-
ing the alleged causes of xenophobic attacks (Bielefeld 1993).
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2.3 Naturalisation provisions and openings for labour immigration (1991)
In 1990-1991, the conservative government under Helmut Kohl established
a new Foreigners Law to replace the 1965 regulations. The new law regu-
lated immigration and the legal status of immigrants under the family re-
union scheme, thus replacing various Länder regulations and what had
been the foreign authorities’ powerful discretion. Further, it guaranteed re-
turn to Germany for foreigners with permanent residence status. Although
the new law was heavily criticised for its restrictive tendency in many as-
pects (see e.g. Huber 1992), its provisions regarding German naturalisation
law, in particular, were innovative. For the first time, foreigners residing in
Germany for fifteen years were entitled to a right to naturalise, no longer
being subjected to decisions by the foreign authorities (§§85, 86 AuslG
90), and naturalisation was made easier for foreigners between sixteen and
23 years old if they had already stayed continuously in Germany for eight
years. This introduction of jus domicili into German citizenship legislation
officially acknowledged long-term resident migrant minorities as a fact,
although the right to naturalise was temporarily granted until a deadline in
1995. For the first time in the history of German migration policy, these
amendments introduced elements of citizenship regulations found in classic
countries of immigration, albeit under quite restrictive conditions.
Naturalisation was understood by the government as the final step of a suc-
cessful integration process, a concept still upheld by the conservative main-
stream today.
At the beginning of the 1990s, two other schemes for immigration were
introduced into Germany’s migration policy. They raised little interest in
public, though in fact concluded the policy of non-immigration adopted
since 1973.
One legal entry to immigration was opened by the last, already democra-
tically elected government of the post-revolution GDR in 1990. This was a
law allowing the immigration of Jewish persons from the former Soviet
Union via a facilitated procedure. After the reunification in October 1990,
united Germany continued to practice this scheme. Although numbers were
comparatively low (approximately 160,000), this immigration had a huge
impact on Germany’s small Jewish communities. Some quadrupled within
a decade, which posed serious challenges for communities faced with the
immense task of integrating their new members. This immigration path
was strongly restricted in 2006 by new administrative regulations that were
issued in consensus with Germany’s Jewish communities.
The second scheme was constituted by the so-called Anwerbestoppaus-
nahmeverordnung, a decree on exceptions from the halt on recruitment.
Enacted in 1990, this affected German society on a larger scale by defining
the groups of labour migrants admitted to entry. Within this regulation,
Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer (‘contract labourers’) and Saisonarbeitnehmer
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(‘seasonal workers’) were the most relevant. The term ‘contract labourers’
defined employees of foreign companies subcontracted by German enter-
prises, usually in the construction industry. They were admitted to stay for
a maximum of three years; to meet labour market requirements, the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs determined regular annual quotas.
Bilateral agreements on this programme were concluded with several
Central and South-Eastern European countries. Although contracting for-
eign labour had existed de facto since 1982 on a small scale (10,000-
20,000 labourers), these numbers only started to grow during the 1990s. In
1992, they reached a maximum of 95,000. Nevertheless, the programme
provoked harsh criticism by German labour unions. During the following
years, the quota was no longer exhausted (Lederer 1997: 249). In contrast,
the employment of seasonal workers did not raise major opposition. Since
1991, seasonal workers were admitted for a maximum of three months per
year provided the given labour demand in certain sectors (e.g. farming, for-
esting and restaurant workers) could not be fulfilled by German or EU citi-
zens. Their numbers ranged from 130,000 in 1991 to 221,000 in 1996.
Furthermore, since 1991, guest employees from Central Europe have
been granted entry for an eighteen-month maximum stay in order to ac-
quire language and special professional skills. Qualified labourers of cer-
tain professions (hospital and geriatric nurses, language teachers, speciality
restaurant cooks, scientists, managers, highly qualified specialists, artists,
models, professional athletes and coaches) have also been accepted in
small numbers without explicit caps on quotas or duration of stay. Finally,
citizens of neighbouring countries have been accepted as commuters
(spending, at most, two nights per week in Germany).
In substance, these immigration programmes did not contribute signifi-
cantly to the migrant population in Germany, though they did regularise
demand-driven immigration for the first time since 1973. A few admitted
migrants notwithstanding, irregular movement and employment, to varying
degrees, also came through each of Germany’s nine doors for immigration.
Those entryways are as follows:
1 internal EU migrants
2 spouses and children of permanently resident foreigners
3 ethnic Germans
4 Jewish immigrants from Commonwealth of Independent State CIS
countries
5 asylum seekers
6 Geneva Convention refugees
7 temporary protection refugees
8 new guest workers (e.g. contract labourers)
9 foreign students.
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The supply-driven asylum system, in particular, became increasingly
linked to illegal migration and human smuggling, or failed asylum claims
resulted in disappearance and illegal stay. Being a relevant entryway for
regular immigration, family reunion can only be estimated in terms of size,
since no central statistics are available. A calculation of the upper limit for
family reunion immigration during the 1990s resulted in an annual average
estimate of 400,000 persons (Lederer 2001: 154). Although actual numbers
would be lower than these limits, family reunion immigration is likely to
be Germany’s most significant immigration source, clearly exceeding all
other immigration schemes during the 1990s.
Ignoring these immigration sources, which often substantially exceeded
the number of newly incoming asylum seekers, the 1990s in Germany
were dominated by a heated political and public discourse on asylum.
Facing increasing political pressure from local communities sheltering in-
coming migrants – and with a view to comply with 1992’s EU-level
London regulations, adopted by EU ministers of immigration on the criter-
ia for designating a third country as ‘safe’ – the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) agreed to amend article 16 of German Basic Law (GG) in
December 1992 (resulting in introduction of article 16a). Among other reg-
ulations, the right to asylum became restricted by the safe third country
rule, the immigration of ethnic Germans was limited to approximately
225,000 persons annually and the citizenship law was amended (Bosswick
1997: 67). Since legal access into the German asylum procedure was lit-
erally only possible via an airport (approximately 17,500 applications were
counted up until the end of 1999), the vast majority of 811,000 asylum
seekers between 1993 and the end of 1999 entered illegally and disguised
their entry paths to avoid deportation to a safe third country of transit, thus
rendering the safe third country rule of the amendment ineffective. (Illegal
entry followed by an immediate asylum application is not persecuted.) A
consequence of 1992’s ‘asylum compromise’, together with an intensified
border control, created a bustling market for the professional smugglers
who became necessary for crossing the German border.
In general, the policy on foreigners continued its restrictive course dur-
ing the 1990s. Introduced in 1997 was another amendment to the
Foreigners Law, which required visas for unaccompanied minors from
Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as the appli-
cation for a residence permit for already resident foreign children from
these states, most of them already born in Germany. The asylum and tem-
porary protection regulations, especially, became extremely restrictive; they
pushed the vast majority of civil war refugees from the Balkans into ‘vo-
luntary’ return (Bosswick 2000: 50).
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2.4 Migration as a resource and a new Foreigners Law (2000-2005)
The new millennium, though, brought significant changes to Germany’s
migration policy. German discourse on immigration underwent a profound
transformation, where the emphasis shifted from restriction to the notion of
immigration as an important resource in global competition. Minister of
Interior at the time Otto Schily promoted the general reform of legislation
concerning immigration and foreigners, and installed an independent immi-
gration commission whose task was proposal development. The commis-
sion assembled politicians, representatives of important institutions such as
churches, unions, industry associations and experts. It was chaired by the
former president of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Rita
Süssmuth (CDU). Results were presented on 4 July 2001 in a comprehen-
sive, well-founded report (Zuwanderungskommission 2001) concluding
that immigration had become necessary for economic and demographic
reasons. As such, the report recommended introduction of a point system
similar to the Canadian model, as well as establishment of a Federal Office
for Immigration and Integration whose function would be to coordinate im-
migration and refugee protection. The commission’s recommendations
were welcomed by the SPD, the FDP and the Green Party, as well as
UNHCR, various churches, employers, unions, foreigners’ councils and re-
presentatives of migrant groups. However, the two main conservative par-
ties, the CDU and the CSU, rejected the proposals, criticising them for ex-
tending rather than limiting immigration.
Shortly after the commission’s report was presented, Minister Schily
proposed a new immigration and foreigners’ law. The proposal only partly
followed the commission’s recommendations, such as plans for a complete
restructuring of the Foreigners Law; it fell behind in several areas (espe-
cially in the field of asylum and concerning the age limit for children to
immigrate within the family reunion scheme). Making such concessions to
the conservative opposition, the government tried to gain support in the
second chamber, the Bundesrat, despite its being dominated by conserva-
tive-led Länder. Efforts were squashed by the conservative opposition,
jointly composed of the CDU and the CSU, ruled by Bavarian Prime
Minister Edmund Stoiber (CSU). In April 2004 following intense discus-
sions and several rounds of conferences in the two chambers, representa-
tives of the governing Bündnis 90-Green coalition declared that the nego-
tiations had reached an impasse. Further exploratory talks would be needed
in which then chancellor Gerhard Schröder would negotiate face to face
with opposition party leaders Guido Westerwelle (FDP), Angela Merkel
(CDU) and Edmund Stoiber (CSU). In May 2004, Schröder proposed a
compromise that was eventually accepted by all involved parties. Follow-
up talks ensued among Federal Minister of Interior Schily (SPD), Saarland
Premier Peter Müller (CDU) and Bavarian Minister of Interior Günther
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Beckstein (CSU). On 1 July 2004, the compromise passed the Bundestag,
to be followed by the Bundesrat, on 9 July, and eventually came into force
on 1 January 2005.
This new immigration law introduced several innovations into
Germany’s migration management. Notably, it reduced the various resi-
dence types from past migration schemes to two permits: for limited resi-
dence and for permanent settlement.
This law offers highly qualified immigrants the option for permanent re-
sidency if they invest at least E 1 million in their business in the country
and, through their own employment, create at least ten jobs. Foreign na-
tionals who have graduated from a German university or polytechnic are
allowed to stay a year after graduation to seek employment in Germany. A
general ban on recruiting low-skilled labour was maintained, restricting the
recruitment of qualified persons as well. For the latter, in individual cases
exemptions are made when public interest in such employment can be
raised. The originally proposed point system modelled after the Canadian
regulations was abandoned as part of the compromise.
Concerning humanitarian immigration, the law grants refugee status in
cases of non-state and gender-specific persecution. This complies with the
EU asylum directive.
Several provisions for integration measures were also implemented in
the new law. New immigrants eligible for permanent residency are entitled
to participate in integration courses. Under certain conditions, participation
is mandatory for resident foreigners, such as long-term residents receiving
welfare payments or migrants classified by the authorities as being ‘in spe-
cial need of integration’. For those refusing to participate in the courses,
possible sanctions include a reduction of welfare payments; refusals, more-
over, are considered during decisions on residence permit extension. These
integration courses are funded by the federal government, while the
Länder cover costs for accompanying social counselling and child-care
while participants attend the course units.
With regard to ethnic German immigrants, family members accompany-
ing Spätaussiedler are now made to prove their basic German language
skills before immigrating. This came in reaction to this group’s increasing
integration problems.
In the area of security, the compromise introduced an extended deporta-
tion order that can be issued by state or federal authorities on the basis of
an ‘evidence-based threat assessment’. Legal redress is limited to a single
appeal to the Federal Administrative Court. Mandatory expulsion was in-
troduced for foreign nationals who are members or supporters of terrorist
organisations. Discretionary expulsions can also be imposed on so-called
‘intellectual arsonists’ (e.g. ‘hate preachers’ in mosques). If a deportation
cannot be effected due to some obstacle (e.g. facing risk of torture or the
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death penalty in the country of origin), the foreigner must report to the
authorities on a regular basis.
For the first time in Germany’s legislative history, regulations for immi-
gration, labour market access, the stay of foreigners and the integration of
resident migrants were combined under an integrated legislative act, differ-
entiated only according to purpose of residence. Meanwhile, a parallel ap-
plication process for residence and work permits at the respective authori-
ties for foreigners and labour – which had operated as interdependent
bodies sharing bureaucratic overhead – was replaced by a single procedure
at the local foreign authorities, creating what some called a ‘one-stop gov-
ernment’. With regard to refugees, the law no longer referred to the right
to asylum, which carries a long history of political controversies, but came
to regulate residence permits for political asylees as well as other refugees
(e.g. Geneva Convention, de facto refugees) under the common heading of
‘humanitarian immigration’. The law thus abolished discrimination of refu-
gees who did not meet the narrow criteria for political asylum (Bosswick
2002: 46). A completely new feature of the law was the inclusion of inte-
gration measures.
The former Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees
(BAFl) in Nuremberg was renamed the Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees (BAMF). Assigned to the administration and implementation of
the new law, BAMF now cooperates with labour offices and the federal la-
bour administration. It is in charge of issuing regulations for integration
courses and implementing integration measures at the federal level in coop-
eration with local institutions.
2.5 European harmonisation and German migration policy (2007)
On 28 August 2007, the Directive Implementation Act for EU Directives
on Residence and Asylum Issues – herein referred to as the Directive
Implementation Act – entered into force, thus changing the 2005 provi-
sions again. Apart from implementing eleven EU residence and asylum di-
rectives, the act incorporated evidence from evaluation of the 2005
Immigration Act, particularly concerning family reunification and its
potential abuse through sham marriages and bogus adoptions as well as
combating forced marriages. The 2007 Directive Implementation Act also
emphasised the need for a consistent fight against terrorism through
immediate expulsion of individuals like so-called Hassprediger (‘hate
preachers’) or geistige Brandstifter (‘mental arsonists’) and sentencing traf-
fickers to imprisonment. It also introduced a residence title for victims of
trafficking. Those willing to testify in criminal proceedings are granted
legal residence for the duration of the proceedings.
Of particular political significance was 2007’s introduction of the
Gesetzliche Altfallregelung, the regulation for longstanding cases. These
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legal provisions concern refugees who for many years have been ‘toler-
ated’ in Germany (thus falling under the category of Duldung: i.e. enjoying
a suspension of the obligation to depart or be deported, but lacking a regu-
lar residence title). Contrary to initial expectations, this regulation was used
only by a relatively small number of potential claimants: by the end of
2007, requests were made only by 22,900 of the 100,000 refugees with
humanitarian stay who fulfilled the application requirement of a six- to
eight-year minimum stay in Germany. What’s more, the claim success rate
was very modest: only half of the claimants (approximately 12,000 per-
sons) were awarded a residence permit.
With concerns that family reunification was often being misused,
Germany introduced the proof of basic German skills for spouses in 2007,
invoking an optional EU law. Aiming to combat forced marriages and to
promote integration processes, the law established a minimum spousal age
of eighteen. To avoid social welfare abuses, the migration of spouses was
also contingent on a Lebensunterhaltssicherung, prior assessment of a
means of their subsistence.
Table 3.1 Milestones in Germany’s migration provisions
1965 Foreigners Law
1973 Anwerbestopp: halt on recruitment of non-EEC nationals
1978 German Parliament approved establishment of the Commissioner for the
Promotion of Integration of Foreign Employees and their Families, affiliated with
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
1983 Law for the Promotion of Foreigners’ Repatriation, political mobilisation against
‘abuse of the right to asylum’
1990 New Foreigners Law, replacing the 1965 regulations
1990 Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung: decree on exceptions from the halt on
recruitment, escalation of the dispute on asylum and constitutional article 16
(right to asylum for political refugees)
1992 So-called ‘asylum compromise’: amendment of article 16 of German Basic Law,
restricting the right to asylum by the safe third country rule; amendment to the
German citizenship law (introducing a limited jus domicili)
1997 Amendment to the Foreigners Law: increasing visa requirements for foreign
unaccompanied minors
2000 Installation of Independent Commission on Immigration (important
representatives of NGOs, churches and business), recommending in its final
report in 2001 the introduction of a point system similar to the Canadian model;
introduction of jus soli
2001 Proposal for an Immigration and Foreigners Law by Minister of Interior Schily,
resulting in a prolonged political conflict between the conservative opposition
and the government being largely supported by civil society and trade
associations
2005 New Foreigners Law, combining regulations for immigration, labour market
access, the stay of foreigners and the integration of resident migrants under an
integrated legislative concept for the first time
2007 EU Directive Implementation Act amending national law entered into force on 28
August 2007
2008 Labour Migration Law adopted by the Federal Cabinet on 27 August 2008
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To foster the overall integration and participation of immigrants in
German society, the federal government introduced integration courses at
the national level. These were primarily geared to teach German language
skills, while simultaneously promoting the ‘historical, cultural and legal
orientation’ of German society (Federal Ministry of Interior 2010).
3 Immigration and immigrant policymaking in contemporary
Germany
Although a consistent integration policy only came into force in Germany
in 2005, initial practices of immigrant inclusion are closely intertwined
with immigration policies from the early 1950s onwards. Thus, immigra-
tion and integration policies are dealt with jointly in this chapter.
Moreover, the German nation and its society experienced profound
changes only recently – with reunification in 1990. This year will thus con-
stitute the starting point of this section, highlighting discourses and policy-
making actors along the way.
3.1 Policies from 1990 onwards
Migration policy in a unified Germany during the 1990s was coloured by
worries that major movements would follow the fall of the Iron Curtain.
From 1990 until 1997, restrictive amendments related to the Foreigners
Law, ethnic Germans and readmission agreements came in short successive
intervals. Public discussion first focused on the asylum issue and, after
1993, on bills and measures aiming to restrict immigration. Treibel (2001:
115) has described this policy as a way for the state to declare to the resi-
dent population with a migratory background as well as to potential immi-
grants its fundamental position: conditioned ‘toleration’ and maintenance
of control for immigrated persons, scepticism and deterrence towards po-
tential immigrants. Some aspects of the amendments also introduced liberal
elements, such as the right to naturalise under certain conditions for long-
term legal residents and children born in Germany to foreign parents.
These aspects, however, remained largely unknown within the public
discourse.
Ethnic Germans (Spätaussiedler)
The immigration origins of ethnic Germans, known as Spätaussiedler,
changed considerably at the beginning of the 1990s. A predominant per-
centage began arriving from former Soviet Union successor states, though
up until then were primarily German-speaking minorities from Romania
and Poland. Due to their high rate of intermarriage and considerable assim-
ilation in the Soviet Union, most immigrating Spätaussiedler lacked
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proficiency in German and had no ties to the culture of the traditional
German minorities in some Central European countries. In public dis-
course, these immigrants encountered increasing restraints. Their presum-
ably quick immersion – which generally held true until the late 1980s for
the majority coming from Romania and Poland – became seriously chal-
lenged. A ceiling to the immigration quota of ethnic Germans had already
been provided for as part of the 1992 constitutional amendment compro-
mise. Factual immigration was further limited by slowed processing at the
German embassies, and the 2005 immigration law increased restrictions by
requiring family members accompanying ethnic German immigrants to
prove basic German language skills before immigrating.
Hitherto well-funded integration provisions for ethnic Germans faced
serious cuts during the 1990s as well as an institutional resetting. The
Federal Commissioner for Ethnic Germans at the Federal Administration
Office (Bundesverwaltungsamt), which had been allocated to the Federal
Ministry of Interior, was reassigned by the new Foreigners Law.
Competences of the Federal Administration Office, particularly regarding
integration measures for ethnic Germans, were incorporated into the
BAMF.
Labour migration
A significant, yet barely noticed, change in labour migration policy was en-
acted in 1990. The Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung was a decree on ex-
ceptions from the halt on recruitment. This change generally went unnoticed
by the public; only the contract labour scheme (Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer)
triggered a public dispute since these contract labourers were subject to the
social security regulations of their country of origin. The unions strongly
opposed this programme affecting wage levels and unemployment in the
construction sector, and criticised it for being a pilot programme for lower-
ing social standards on the labour market. Further openings for labour mi-
gration following in 1991 (e.g. seasonal labour, guest employees from
Central Europe, qualified labourers of certain professions, commuters) were
less controversial, although they constituted regularised demand-driven im-
migration for the first time since 1973, since these groups were included
into the German social security system. Restrictive amendments to the
Foreigners Law of 1997 (see last paragraph of section 2.3) were barely
picked up by the general public discourse, though did create considerable
disappointment and some bitterness among residents with a migratory
background.
With regard to immigrant inclusion, the 1990 Foreigners Law introduced
for the first time a right to naturalise that was not under discretion of the
foreign authorities. Nevertheless, the still restrictive naturalisation policy
on the integration of resident families with a migratory background had an
impact that could no longer be ignored. After the national election
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campaign of 1994, the conservative government promised a reform of the
citizenship law as a measure against xenophobic violence. It was not im-
plemented, however, due to the impracticality of the Kinderstaats-
zugehörigkeit proposed by the conservative Bavarian government, provid-
ing for a kind of limited citizenship for foreign children born in
Germany. When the Social Democratic-Green coalition came to power in
1998, one of its first activities was to amend the citizenship legislation
(May 1999). The governing coalition introduced jus soli for children of
foreigners born in Germany and reduced the 1992 jus domicilii regula-
tion’s requirement from fifteen to eight years of legal residence.
Originally, dual citizenship should have been accepted as a rule for first
and second generations. This intended regulation was exploited by the
conservative CDU in Hesse’s 1999 election, starting a massive campaign
against dual citizenship. This campaign, which mirrored the population’s
xenophobic mood, contributed to the CDU coalition’s narrow success
over the liberals, thus voiding the previous Social Democratic-Green ma-
jority in the Bundesrat. Since the amendment needed to pass the second
chamber, the dual citizenship regulation had to be removed from the bill.
This resulted in forcing jus soli children’ between the ages of eighteen
and 23 to opt for either German citizenship or the citizenship of their par-
ents. The consequences of implementing this rule and its potential consti-
tutional problems are still unclear. Reforming German citizenship law in-
troduced the concept of naturalisation as an important step for promoting
the integration process into official policy. What’s more, it also finally
ended a situation in which the number of naturalisations during the first
half of the 1990s was exceeded by the number of foreign children born
in Germany by over 80 per cent, thus resulting in a foreign population
that would grow even at zero net immigration levels.
As with citizenship and naturalisation law, no major changes in official
immigration policy took place until the change to the SPD-Green govern-
ment in 1998. The social integration of resident labour migrants and the
second generation, however, had been actively promoted since the early
1970s by numerous institutions, namely, large publicly funded welfare
organisations known as Wohlfahrtsverbände,2 local communities and local
labour administrations (who oversaw the incorporation of integration mea-
sures into the labour market). During the 1990s, these programmes offered
a broad scope of services for migrants such as community-related social
work, counselling by social education workers notably for migrant families
and young migrants, health care, support for transitioning onto the labour
market, language acquisition, counselling for drug addiction, support for
adolescent criminal offenders on probation, school and career counselling
as well as vocational training. In most cases, these services were not expli-
citly directed towards migrants, though happened to have a large share of
resident migrant population among their clients. Programmes at the local
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level have made an important contribution to the integration of the migrant
population and helped in the prevention of conflicts. An analysis of the ex-
tent to which the services are used showed that annual expenses amount to
a E 70 million minimum (1999-2000) just for measures explicitly directed
at the foreign migrant population and implemented by Wohlfahrtsverbände;
actual efforts have been considerably higher since this calculation could
not include measures funded by local communities or implemented by
other organisations. The total spent only by Wohlfahrtsverbände for speci-
fic migrant integration measures summed up to a minimum of 158 million
per year (Bosswick 2001: 46). The decentralised integration activities by
welfare NGOs and local communities were widely ignored in the political
discourse. Nevertheless, as a result of these massive migrant integration
efforts throughout the 1990s, the social integration of second-generation
migrant youth has proved adequate enough to prevent riots and major con-
flicts. Particularly in providing support for transitioning onto the labour
market, the German practice has been relatively successful. Still, legal ad-
mission and integration in terms of self-identification with the country falls
behind other European nations, likely due to Germany’s restrictive citizen-
ship practice (Heckmann, Lederer & Worbs 2001: 16).
With the enacting of 2005’s new migration law, the BAMF took charge
of issuing guidelines for integration measures. The obligatory 600 hours of
language training required of newcomers came to be implemented by local
providers, comprising over 5,000 institutions. To a large extent, it was wel-
fare organisations and private institutions that provided language training
in the previous regimen, mainly being funded by the Federal Labour
Office in the form of courses for unemployed foreigners. The new market,
however, also attracted new providers, such as schools for Russian-speak-
ing relatives of ethnic Germans. Although the funding guidelines of the
BAMF forbade ethnically homogenous classrooms, the new providers of-
ten specialised in the instruction of Russian-speaking participants from
their community, using Russian language to a certain extent during the
training. In 2006, a major evaluation of the language course programme
prescribed by law was implemented. Results have only partly been pub-
lished at the time of this writing, though the low numbers of participants
passing final exams point to the new programme’s limited effectiveness.
The BAMF also started several pilot programmes for integration measures
at the local level, cooperating with cities and welfare NGOs with long-
standing experience in integration programmes. The traditional separation
of integration programmes for ethnic Germans, guest worker families and
recognised asylum holders was, to a certain extent, abolished under the
new regulations, since the BAMF now also oversees ethnic German immi-
grants and their relatives.
Since the period 1998-2000, the discourse on migration issues changed
considerably within the national policy. This has led to a series of political
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actions and legal amendments (see Table 3.1). One of the most relevant
events was the introduction of a so-called ‘green card’ for recruiting for-
eign IT experts, as first announced by Chancellor Schröder at Hanover’s
CeBIT computer expo in March 2000 (Currle 2004: 21f). The proposed
regulation was more like those specified by the United States’ H-1B visa,
rather than being comparable to the American Green Card. And although
the German green card did not substantially exceed exemptions for specific
professions from the general halt on recruitment that was in force since
1991 (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung), this proposal had a massive
side effect. Public discourse on immigration took a sharp turn from its re-
strictive tendencies – with the perception of immigration as a burden – to-
wards the notion of immigration as an important resource in global compe-
tition. To its surprise, the conservative mainstream faced harsh criticism
from the industry sector, now adjusting its once very restrictive position to
demand liberal immigration regulations. It was clear there was a departure
from the prominent paradigm Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland
(‘Germany is not an immigration country’) (CSU position paper 23 April
2001). This CSU position paper, however, marked the beginning of an al-
most four-year struggle over German migration policy between the conser-
vative CDU and CSU parties and the governing SPD-Green coalition.
While the coalition held a majority in Parliament, its lacking majority in
the Bundesrat resulted in the new immigration law coming to a deadlock.
In this period, the most prominent actors such as the industry sector, em-
ployers, unions, churches, welfare organisations and other major NGOs
mounted pressure on the conservative parties, getting them to agree to a
new law in 2005.
This kind of society-driven development of national policies was also
observable in the German education system. Because of a federal-based
discretion on education issues, a comprehensive national school strategy
was missing for years. Educational fragmentism became a national matter
only recently due to European-wide harmonisation and the ‘PISA shock’.
In 2000 and 2003, results from the international comparative study entitled
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) exposed the
low ranking and subsequent poor support that migrant children were re-
ceiving in the German educational system. The study showed that in no
other comparable country, worldwide, did the academic success of students
depended as heavily on the income and education of their parents as it did
in Germany. Researchers concluded that Germany’s schools fail miserably
at supporting the children of migrant workers and immigrants. According
to their findings, a child in Germany born to parents with a degree from a
German university has more than three times the opportunities to obtain a
high school diploma than the equally gifted child of a migrant worker or
an immigrant. The strikingly poor language proficiency and generally poor
educational performance of pupils with a migration background across the
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country have encouraged local schools to highlight the limits of federalised
education and demand effective diversity policies. At the same time,
German education policies have faced increasing pressure from EU direc-
tives to ‘Europeanise’. The recent combination of bottom-up and top-down
pressures has thus come to engage national politicians in the subject
(Kellner & Strunz 2006; Migration und Bevölkerung 2002, 2003, 2006a;
Özcan 2005).
Asylum
Since 1987, the conservative government made the argument in several na-
tional and state election campaigns that rising numbers of asylum seekers
could only be stopped by an amendment to the Constitution (Grundgesetz,
GG). According to them, the opposition’s refusing to vote for the required
two-third parliamentary majority hindered the government from solving
what had become a serious problem. Steeply rising application figures at
the beginning of the 1990s compelled the government and the media to
portray the state of an emergency. In the face of political pressure and an
escalation of violence, the Social Democratic opposition finally agreed on
a compromise to amend article 16 (2) as part of a whole package of other
regulations concerning policy on foreigners. An important reason for this
fundamental shift in the opposition’s stance was the massive pressure felt
within the party from local communities coping with the problem of inade-
quate resources for taking care of asylum seekers en masse. Although
amendment of the GG raised some criticism among intellectuals and Social
Democrats, the general public believed the problem was solved, and the
capacity politicians had for dealing with high asylum seeker numbers
seemed to be restored. A sharp decrease in applications and a considerable
increase in expulsions gave the public the impression that the amendment
had been the key element in ending the emergency situation. There are
strong indications, however, that the amendment merely played a minor
role (Bosswick 1995: 328), constituting a case of symbolic politics on an
old conflict line within the German political discourse: ethnic nation-state
versus republican constitutional patriotism (Mommsen 1990: 272). The le-
vel of xenophobic attacks, however, remained high compared to the figures
before the asylum debate escalated in 1990.
Although the amendment had created a cordon sanitaire for legal access
to asylum with its safe third country rule – and applications had, by 1995,
already fallen below their level in 1989 – German asylum policy perpetu-
ated a very restrictive course in the ensuing years. Unlike prior decades,
the high courts generally supported this policy. Due to the low asylum ap-
plication figures and minimal recognition rates, this policy focused on re-
patriation and deportation. In 1996, approximately 345,000 war refugees
from Bosnia-Herzegovina lived in Germany. Because the 1992
Parteienkompromiss (‘party compromise’) regulations on war refugees
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(§ 32a AuslG) were not implemented – due to conflicts between the federal
and state governments about funding under their envisioned temporary re-
sidence status – some 80 per cent of the refugees only obtained a ‘tolera-
tion’ status (Lederer 1997: 309). After signing a readmission agreement
with Bosnia in November 1996, an intensive repatriation campaign was
launched in the following year. Applying a certain amount of pressure for
voluntary return, the programme resulted in repatriation of approximately
250,000 refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina up until autumn 1998 (see Schlee
1998). For Albanian refugees from Kosovo, a general readmission agree-
ment was signed on 10 October 1996 by the German and Yugoslavian gov-
ernments (Lehnguth 1998: 362ff); expulsions (mostly of criminal offen-
ders) continued until 8 September 1998, when the EU embargo impeded
deportation via Yugoslavian airlines. In mid-1999, approximately 180,000
‘tolerated’ Albanians from Kosovo still lived in Germany, most of them
having entered illegally (Lederer 1999: 35). Both groups of war refugees
from former Yugoslavia were effectively excluded from access to asylum
and were in their vast majority locked in a precarious ‘tolerated’ status.
From the beginning, Germany was an important actor in work towards
EU-level migration policy (e.g. the Saarbrücken Agreement with France on
border controls of 13 July 1984, leading to the Schengen I agreement of
14 June 1985). The free movement of persons within the EU for migration
and asylum policy had implications that quickly became apparent, thus
leading to a multitude of intergovernmental working groups (Guild 1999:
317f) and the Schengen II and Dublin agreements in 1992 that explicitly
regulated asylum matters within the EU. The Treaty of Maastricht, signed
on 7 February 1992, summarised asylum and migration matters within the
‘third pillar’ – the intergovernmental level. Although article K.6 of the
treaty provided for a duty to inform the European Parliament, member
states’ ministries of interior effectively continued to exclude national and
European parliaments from their activities until 1995, a habit that was shar-
ply criticised (Tomei 1997: 47f). Until 1995, very little information was ac-
cessible concerning asylum policy within the EU. In 1992, the German
government could thus present the Schengen and Dublin agreements as al-
legedly requiring a change of German asylum legislation. This is an exam-
ple of a tendency described by De Lobkowicz (1996: 52): countries are
seen using their EU membership as a justification for introducing certain
executive measures to the European Parliament and the population.
Since the second half of the 1990s, asylum ceased being a topic of major
public debate in Germany. Quite a consensus for restrictive policies domi-
nated the political discourse. The Red-Green Coalition Agreement of 20
October 1998 mentioned only a few points of asylum matters under head-
ing IX ‘Security for all: Strengthen citizens’ rights’, point 6 (on common
European asylum and migration policy based on the Geneva Convention,
burden-sharing) and point 7 (on examination of the detention for
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expulsion’s duration, the appropriateness of the airport procedure, stay per-
mit regulation for long-term ‘tolerated’ foreigners and gender-specific asy-
lum claims) (cited in Pro Asyl 1998a). German human rights organisation
Pro Asyl published a highly critical analysis of this coalition agreement
(see Pro Asyl 1998b).
During the struggle for the new immigration law that came into force in
2005, several initiatives were launched to regulate the precarious situation
of about 250,000 foreign residents. These persons held toleration status,
Duldung, which usually must be renewed every three months, does not
grant access to the labour market and limits freedom of movement to the
local district. ‘Toleration’ is not a legal residence status, but a suspension
of deportation only due to humanitarian or impracticability reasons.
Though the new immigration law abolished its established denial of tem-
porary residence statuses while repeatedly issuing short-term tolerations
known as Kettenduldungen, the local foreign authorities continued this
practice. By applying such restrictive interpretations, they ignored the in-
tention of the legal amendments. Several attempts to find an agreement for
issuing legal residence status to long-term migrants who were in fact
already quite integrated failed; at meetings of the ongoing conference of re-
gional ministries of interior, no compromise could be found. In December
2005, a bill issuing permanent residence status for a share of the 200,000
‘tolerated’ refugees in Germany was supported by several NGOs, churches,
welfare organisations, unions, the SPD and the Green parties as well as
Federal Commissioner for Integration Maria Böhmer (CDU) and the
Länder of Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin. The bill died, how-
ever, due to opposition by the Länder of Bavaria, Saxony and Lower
Saxony, which were ruled by the conservative CDU-CSU.
A small albeit relevant abolishment of restrictive practices in asylum
policy was made. On the last day of the deadline for implementing the EU
Asylum Directive (see Bundesamt 2006), the BAMF issued administrative
regulations for the recognition of refugees. These regulations finally imple-
mented corrections to some very restrictive decision-making and court-
ruling practices frequently challenged in previous years. Presumably, the
conflict observed in German politics regarding these practices led to politi-
cal compromises behind the scenes, influencing the formulation of the EU
asylum directive.
The European context
Germany’s actions at the EU level towards Central European countries
pertain to three main areas. These are the harmonisation of asylum rights,
border control and readmission, and burden-sharing within the EU.
A notable step in Germany’s harmonisation of asylum rights was support
of the deviant interpretation of the Geneva Convention’s definition of ‘re-
fugee’, as stated by the EU Joint Position on 4 March 1996 (Guild 1999:
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331). In fact, the definition had already been applied by German courts be-
forehand (see Zimmer 1998). Harmonisation within the EU also refers to
cooperation between the national asylum authorities; in September 1994,
the German Bundesamt started meeting with French, Belgian and Dutch
authorities, which led to the regular interchange of staff members as con-
tact officials (Bartels 1996: 72f). Since 1996, such working-level coopera-
tion with other authorities has been also expanded to different Central and
South-Eastern European countries. Bulgaria, Lithuania, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Poland were pushed to set up asylum regimes that
would withstand the criteria for the application of the ‘third safe county’
rule (Lavenex 1999: 87ff, 156f).
Regarding readmission agreements and border control, Germany took a
leading role within Europe towards its Eastern neighbours. It supported
Central European countries’ tightening of border controls vis-à-vis their
Eastern neighbours and initiated the Budapest Process, which – although
dealing primarily with the prevention of illegal migration – also affected
the European asylum regime (ibid.: 102ff).
Institutional setting in the 1990s
Since Germany’s reunification, competences for migration and integration
policies have been reallocated several times.
The Ministry of Interior presently oversees various charges. These in-
clude the Foreigners Law and its implementation, border security via the
Federal Border Police and asylum and asylum procedure via the BAMF,
who cooperate with the Länder’s ministries of interior and a permanent
working group of their experts on asylum policy (ArgeFlü). The local for-
eign authorities are in charge of deciding the residence status of foreigners,
according to the Foreigners Law, and also process naturalisations; they are
governed by their regional Länder’s ministries of interior.
Until 2005, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was in charge of
the existing remnants of the guest worker programme. These included mea-
sures for unemployed foreign workers (e.g. language training, integration
courses) and labour migration (contract workers, seasonal workers and
those under the new guest worker programme were all exemptions to 1973’s
halt on recruitment issued by the Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung in
1991; and IT experts who came in on the green card programme of 2000).
The local offices of the Ministry of Labour were also in charge of checking
the requirements for a work permit that are examined in a process indepen-
dent of the residence status determined by the local foreign authorities.
The Federal Commissioner for Foreigners’ Issues, known as the
Bundesausländerbeauftragte, belonged to the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs. Up until 2005, counselling for former guest workers and
their families was financed 50 per cent by the Federal Ministry and 50 per
cent by the State Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, known as the
114 MAREN BORKERT & WOLFGANG BOSSWICK
Ausländersozialberatung. Several additional programmes for migrant inte-
gration were funded by other sources. In the course of the new Foreigners
Law, the ministry transferred several responsibilities in the field of integra-
tion policies to the new BAMF, which reports to the Ministry of Interior.
The Ministry of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) is in
charge of the integration of resident children and young people with a mi-
gratory background and/or foreign citizenship. This provision follows the
Kinder- und Jugendhilfegesetz, a federal law on the welfare of children
and young people that regulates the duties and obligations of public autho-
rities to support families and minors in general – though it is not specifi-
cally aimed at migrants, there are some singular exceptions of targeted pro-
jects for migrants. In 2002, the office of the Federal Commissioner for
Foreigners’ Issues was transferred to the BMFSFJ and renamed the Federal
Commissioner for Integration and Refugees. Under the new conservative-
Social Democratic coalition in 2005, the Commissioner for Foreigners’
Issues was transferred to the chancellor’s office and received secretary of
state status, a considerable expansion of its political weight. Having re-
placed the Green Party’s Marieluise Beck, the officer for Migration,
Refugees and Integration Böhmer appointed by the conservative-Social
Democratic coalition belongs to the CDU. This officer, however, had no
record of migration and integration policy experiences, having left imple-
mentation of these policies for a long time largely to the BAMF’s expan-
sion strategy in the domain of the Ministry of Interior.
Other ministries involved were the Ministry of Exterior, which issued vi-
sas for family reunion and ethnic Germans as well as produced reports on
the situation in refugee-generating countries. Competences in the field of
visa-issuing were limited by a requirement to consult the Ministry of
Interior under certain conditions, following a scandal regarding fraudulent
visa applications in the German embassy to the Ukraine.
The Ministry of Education and Research is, to a minor degree, involved
in issues concerning the support of pupils with a migratory background,
but its competences vis-à-vis the Länder policies on education are very
limited.
These rearrangements of competences on migration and integration poli-
cies at the national level – namely, the new BAMF for integration policies
in Germany – constitute a major change in implementation. This particu-
larly concerns integration measures, which until 2005 were largely up to
German welfare organisations and the local level, namely the cities.
Through its activities, the BAMF cooperates with institutions at the local
level, though one can expect its responsibility for coordinating integration
policies to have increasing effect at the national level. In the field of lan-
guage and integration courses, this process has already significantly
progressed. At the same time, many cities started initiatives to improve co-
ordination of integration measures by rearranging competences for
THE CASE OF GERMANY 115
integration-related policies at the local level. Similar to several other
European countries and the European Commission, Germany follows a
clear trend: shifting competences to the Ministry of Interior as well as em-
phasising traditional security policy approaches in dealing with migration
and integration. For integration policy, this may well be problematic, as the
main challenges seem to be located in family and education. For the latter,
competences remain at the state ministries of education or family and
youth (notably, integration measures at kindergartens), which have contin-
ued to resist major harmonisation initiatives for reforms at the national
level.
Civil society actors
As recent interviews conducted by the authors of this chapter revealed, the
direct impact of civil society organisations on migration policymaking in
Germany remains limited. This does not mean, however, that these
German organisations do not engage in open communication channels to
address national policy arenas. To the contrary, attending practitioner meet-
ings and hearings on migration- and integration-related issues in Berlin –
not always by invitation – has become a very relevant part of such organi-
sations’ activities. Almost each representative of the civil society organisa-
tions3 interviewed for this research stated that his or her organisation was
invited by the Süssmuth Commission or a single national political party to
give concrete input on migration law questions and related conceptual is-
sues. That most of these organisations have expanded their representation
in the German capital is an indicator of NGOs’ commitment to policymak-
ing in this field.4 Despite enjoying proximity to national policy arenas, the
power held by civil society organisations (including charities, churches and
trade unions) to influence recent migration policy developments shows cer-
tain limits. Throughout the ‘Germany is not a country of immigration’
mantra ruling national politics for almost 50 years, NGOs were in fact the
main actors responsible for integrating migrants into the ‘host society’.
Why is it, then, that German NGOs have not made a greater impact on pol-
icy formulation processes at the national level? Are their practical experi-
ence and thematic expertise simply denied? Are they ignored as highly rel-
evant actors?
This does not appear to be the case. As interviews with the organisations
revealed, civil society representatives were – and frequently are – invited
to national hearings on migration- and integration-related policy issues.
The Süssmuth Commission, in particular, is recognised as a parliamentary
group giving special attention to the professional proposals brought for-
ward by various civil society interlocutors. Interviewees themselves stated
that certain aspects of their own approaches towards a cohesive German
immigration society have been integrated into the commission’s recom-
mendations after they were submitted to then Minister of Interior Schily.
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And though expertise and strategies for a comprehensive migration and in-
tegration policy have been mobilised – to the point of entering the public
discourse – one can nevertheless observe a pertinent reluctance to incorpo-
rate effective diversity management tools in the national legislation. In ad-
dition, the seven years following 2000 show a shifting of integration mea-
sures from the welfare policy context to one of control. This was expressed
by substantial federal cuts in funding for Migrationssozialberatung, NGOs
providing social counselling for migrants, while the expanded language
training and integration course programmes controlled by the BAMF be-
came obligatory in many circumstances.
Not surprisingly, civil society representatives unanimously pointed to
one major actor responsible for this trend: the federal and state ministries
of interior, who were reluctant to dismantle the right of residence from
Sicherheits- und Ordnungsrecht, the German security and policy law. In ad-
dition, interviewed civil society representatives identified a general inclina-
tion to prevent further immigration into Germany and preferably repatriate
foreign nationals to their country of origin. Interestingly, this attitude of the
German Ministry of Interior towards migration seems to persist over time.
Neither changes by the ministers in charge nor innovative elements to
German migration law (like elements of jus soli introduced into the
Nationality Law in 1992 and 2000) seem to disturb this scheme or disrupt
the traditional policy trajectory. Instead, a relevant restoration took place
with the 2007 amendments to immigration law regarding naturalisation
(these amendments require command of German at a quite demanding le-
vel and they void exemptions for the naturalisation of people under age 23
with regard to welfare dependence). To a certain degree, the changes re-
voke the 2000 tendency to see naturalisation as an important step for the
integration process, and restore the notion of naturalisation as the final step
of successful integration.
As such, the NGO representatives who were interviewed for this re-
search said they saw the National Integration Summit, first held in 2006
with a follow-up event in 2007, as exceptions to the general trend. They
considered the positive messages sent out by these events to be counter-
acted by strong restrictive signals from the ministries of interior during the
same period. Introduced were language tests for foreign spouses pursuing
family reunion and for naturalisation, an integration course and test (on
knowledge of German history, politics and legal structures) for naturalisa-
tions not under the authorities’ discretion and sanctions resulting from
incomplete course attendance or failing a final test. Different from 2004’s
integration course programme, the new regulations of 2007 focused on the
second part of the often mentioned phrase fördern und fordern (‘supporting
and requiring’), thus demanding that long-term resident migrants adapt to
the nationally unified language training and integration course system, in-
cluding passing its final tests.
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A positive development in this field, civil society organisations de-
scribed German city and municipality governments as having responded to
the needs of integrating migrants long before the issue reached the national
political agenda. Local governments, it seems, have shown a more flexible
approach to matters of migration and integration. In terms of effectively
and accountably governing migration, they shifted from executing national
guidelines to actively formulating policy aims. New forms of diversity
management are thus rising at the local level, also being disseminated as
models to other local contexts through the Deutscher Staedte- und
Gemeindebund, a German federation of cities and towns. Another aim is to
address policy formulation at higher institutional levels, i.e. the Länder and
the federal government. These bottom-up initiatives are particularly wel-
comed by civil society organisations, concluding that a wide coalition is
necessary to trigger responses from the federal government. The
Federation of German Trade Unions, for example, has repeatedly collabo-
rated with employers associations as well as Caritas to promote cases re-
lated to migration and integration policy.
The need to support policy proposals with a broad basis of civil society
associations has led to coordinated action (and political clubbing). As one
interviewee pointed out, joint statements and positions of civil society as-
sociations working on migration and integration are negotiated and formu-
lated at meetings of the anti-racism organisation Forum Gegen Rassismus,
the human rights organisation Forum Menschenrechte and various bi-orga-
nisational group meetings. Together their goal is to enhance the effective-
ness of policy proposals. Cooperation is also seen in concrete exchanges,
such as Caritas and the Federation of German Trade Unions sharing coun-
selling documents for migrants. These joint efforts from civil society asso-
ciations also became visible in a common position paper that the Federal
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration signed on 28
October 2003 together with the BAGFW (see Bundesbeauftragte/BAGFW
2003), a reunion of top German welfare associations including the German
Workers’ Welfare Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt), Caritas Germany, the
German Paritetic Welfare Association (Paritaetischer Wohlfahrtsverband),
the German Red Cross, the German Protestant Church (Diakonisches
Werk) and the Central Welfare Department of the Jewish Community
(Zentrale Wohlfahrtsstelle der Juden). In this paper, the associations focus
on the challenges of a modern integration policy for Germany and formu-
late a common rights approach for integrating migrants. Equal opportu-
nities, social justice and civic participation, they state, are basic values of
society that should be applicable for all people permanently residing in
Germany.
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4 Conclusions
An implicit assumption of this chapter is that there has been consistent mi-
gration to Germany since after World War II. Throughout its migration tra-
dition, historical events and political provisions mark turning points in the
quantitative and qualitative development of migration and how politics has
handled related issues. Events and legal provisions have been influenced
by different systemic, cultural and political factors.
An influx of migrants after the end of World War II, as well as the im-
migration of refugees from the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, appear to
be systemic factors that affected migration policy development. Those in-
flows catalysed rapid changes in the populations at the time and exercised
pressure on local asylum shelters. In comparison, new challenges generated
by 9/11 have had sustained impact on German national politics, rather than
necessarily reflecting the de facto situation in the country. At the time of
this writing, Germany has not experienced terrorist acts like those befalling
the US, the United Kingdom and Spain, and potential confrontations be-
tween Germany’s Muslim and Christian populations have mainly appeared
non-violent thus far. Nevertheless, the supposed threat of Muslim funda-
mentalism has interfered in national policymaking. Minister of Interior
Schily’s proposal for a new foreigners’ law in 2001 was likely complicated
because of a general conflation of Muslim migrants with terrorism, some-
thing that eventually polarised political parties and individuals. In this rigid
situation, actors of a primarily non-political nature, such as economists and
civil society associations, seemed to be the trailblazers, forcing the German
political system to take concrete actions to reach a compromise.
Besides these systemic factors, further analysis points to cultural factors
constituted by Germany’s reunification in 1990, which led to a new con-
ceptualisation of the nation-state. Up until 1990, jus sanguinis characterised
German citizenship law, which, in turn, dated back to 1913 when it was
enforced to provide permanent citizenship for descendants of Germans
born in the colonies (Oberndörfer 1989: 7). The ethnic nation-state, a con-
cept stemming from the early nineteenth-century German Romantik –
being a deliberate dissociation from the French republican idea of the na-
tion during Napoleon’s occupation – had far-reaching consequences.
Germans in an ethnic sense, particularly German minorities in several
Eastern and Central European states, were entitled to German citizenship
when migrating to Germany. Meanwhile, inclusion into a nation – which
understands itself as a community of descent and culture – via naturalisa-
tion was defined as an exception to the rule, if not denied altogether
(Heckmann 2001: 16). After the Nazi experience and establishment of the
FRG, conception of the ethno-centric nation-state was replaced by the con-
cept of Verfassungspatriotismus – patriotism referring to the values and
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norms of the constitution – and ultimately amended by law in 1990
(Mommsen 1990: 272f).
Germany’s reunification impacted the profile of German politics signifi-
cantly. This was important for a country aiming to establish itself as a part-
ner with equal footing on the international platform. Another important turn
in migration policy occurred in 1998, when the change in government
seemed to mark the end of two decades of stagnating policy characterised
by the paradigm ‘Germany is not a country of immigration’. A generic party
change allowed a pro-immigrant lobby of economic associations and civil
society organisations to gain influence on national policy formulation. For
the first time ever, in 2000, the new German citizenship law introduced into
official policy the concept of naturalisation as an important step of the inte-
gration process.
Still missing from understanding how international factors have im-
pacted the policymaking process is a comprehensive analysis of how
European provisions are implemented into German national law. Still, the
influences of Europeanisation are clearly recognisable. In November 2006,
Chancellor Merkel (CDU) and Vice-Chancellor Franz Müntefering (SPD)
declared their favour of introducing obligatory German language courses
and tests for all children between four and five years old. Since publication
of the first PISA test results in 2000 – and notably, the PISA special study
on immigrant students from 2003 – poor educational performance of pupils
with a migration background has been a constant concern in Germany’s
public debates. Related discussions intensified in early summer 2006, when
teachers at Berlin’s Rütli School resigned, stating that their pupils’ aggres-
siveness and poor German language proficiency made teaching impossible.
Yet, political actions in response to these issues, such as the obligatory lan-
guage certificates formulated by Merkel and Müntefering, must be applied
to all pupils – not just those of a migratory background – to avoid contra-
dicting the anti-discrimination directive of the European Commission,
which Germany did ultimately ratify (Bullion & Ramelsberger 2006;
Kellner & Strunz 2006; Migration und Bevölkerung 2002, 2003, 2006b,
2006c; Özcan 2005).
In conclusion, one observation has yet to be discussed: national politics’
delayed reaction to local developments and the consequent needs urging
governments and associations to find innovative, often independent strate-
gies to tackle migration challenges. For 50 years, Germany’s migration his-
tory has been a paradox: a nation reluctant to consider itself a country of
immigration while, at the same time, being one that responds pragmatically
to migrant needs at the local level. The contradiction has caused frictions,
created dilemmas over competences and encouraged the formation of self-
referent domains of migration management within one country. The two
policy cycles (migration policies and integration policies) functioned in
parallel. Although the actors in these domains consulted each other, the
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situation as a whole resulted in a certain political inertia. Only after 1998’s
government change did Germany’s official migration and integration policy
seem to get mobilised.
For a long time indeed, migration policymaking was heavily influenced
by being used as an instrument for political mobilisation in election
campaigns, predominately by the conservative parties tending to pre-empt
positions otherwise exploited by right-wing parties. It seems this power
struggle has been exacerbated by the lack of official migrant policies over
several decades and a political discourse dominated by the asylum issue
and restrictive agendas. Events like 1998’s change of government and 9/
11, along with processes such as Europeanisation, changing demography
and ethnic diversification, have stimulated more and more political interest
in diversity matters. Once the topic reaches the official agenda, it is unli-
kely to disappear, though Germany’s struggle to implement an effective di-
versity policy has yet to begin. Still, on the scientific side of things, solid
empirical data is lacking to explain the manifold connections, interactions
and interferences between policy cycles and political actors.
It does seem that a half-century of post-war immigration history had to
pass before Germany’s first comprehensive migration law could come into
force. Though its migration and immigrant policy has always been con-
flict-prone, Germany has also long dealt with a strange mismatch between
its de facto challenges and political responses often amounting to policy
that is merely symbolic. This pattern cannot be only explained by referring
to the instrumentalisation of migration policy issues for the struggle among
political parties. To a certain degree, this debate has also been fuelled by
historical conflicts over the self-perception and self-identification of the re-
ceiving society itself. In the case of Germany, the struggle surrounding arti-
cle 16 of the GG can be interpreted as a projection of self-identification
questions (ethnic nation-state in opposition to republican constitutionalism)
onto specific subgroups of the resident population. That is, those with a
migratory background, who are excluded as non-member denizens. This
pattern obviously leads to dysfunction over time. The demand for integra-
tion emerged as a new, albeit only temporary consensus in German immi-
grant policy. Contemporary disputes on integration policy and naturalisa-
tion requirements, however, show complex conflict lines among the
various Länder, between national and Länder levels and across local gov-
ernments, especially in major cities with extensively developed inclusion
programmes, which tend to be counteracted by their respective Länder
policies The immigrant incorporation spectrum ranges from rigid assimila-
tion combined with threatening sanctions to revised pluralist approaches of
multiculturalism, such as diversity policy. Although some old conflict lines
re-emerge, the new dispute on migrant integration seems more closely re-
lated to everyday practices within the receiving society itself and strongly
linked to practical issues of policy implementation at the local level. Thus,
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Annex 1 Figure 1 Germany’s in migration and out migration, 1958-2010
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it could be considered a progressive problem shifting, from an ideological
sphere to a more pragmatic dimension. In this sense, valuing bottom-up in-
itiatives in the policy field may also contribute to the formation of a com-
mon European society.
Notes
1 In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was divided into four zones. In 1949,
the three western zones became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the
sole eastern zone became the German Democratic Republic (GDR).
2 These include Caritas, which is Catholic, Diakonie, which is Protestant, labourers’
association Arbeiterwohlfahrt and, later on, the independent NGO umbrella organi-
sation DPWV, the German Red Cross and the ZWST comprising Jewish
communities.
3 Among the German civil society organisations interviewed were Diakonie, Caritas,
AWO (a labourers organisation), Parita¨tischer Wohlfahrtsverband (an association of
charities) and the Federal Trade Union.
4 One interviewee saw the centralisation of policymaking in the German capital as
creating a bias in the decision-making processes. He stated that national politicians
tend to overlook positive integration trends that occur in smaller villages and rural
areas outside Berlin.
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1 Introduction
In the post-war period, the Netherlands regarded itself an ‘overpopulated’
country. Both public opinion and government documents explicitly stated
that the Netherlands was not – and should not become – an immigration
country (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid 1970). To the
contrary, emigration was openly encouraged through government policies
and, between 1946 and 1972, more than half a million Dutch citizens emi-
grated to countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Nevertheless, during that same period, the Netherlands did in fact become
an immigration country. Migration statistics show that from the beginning
of the 1960s, with the sole exception of the depression of 1967, the coun-
try’s net migration balance was consistently positive until 2004, with immi-
grants arriving in different periods and for various reasons.
This chapter begins with an overview of migration waves to the
Netherlands, provided more or less in chronological order. Following the
introduction, the second section describes the evolution of Dutch immigra-
tion and integration policies over the years. The third section reconstructs
the processes of immigration policymaking, while the fourth section deals
with integration policymaking. The analysis considers the different pro-
cesses, actors, levels and governance patterns that have influenced policies
in each of these domains. The chapter’s fifth section compares the
dynamics of the immigration and integration fields, evaluating their inter-
action and, in so doing, identifying two types of factors that shape their
dynamics. While the fourth section focuses on the internal mechanisms of
migration and integration, the sixth section emphasises the role of various
external factors such as the welfare state policies, the political framework
and the political climate. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of
the Dutch case’s most salient characteristics.
The first migrants to arrive to the Netherlands were so-called repatriates
who came from the Dutch East Indies, or what today are Indonesia and
New Guinea. Their arrival was a consequence of the decolonisation pro-
cess taking place in the former Dutch colonies. In total, this population
was estimated to comprise approximately 300,000 individuals in the years
spanning 1946 to 1962. Most repatriates were of mixed Indonesian-Dutch
descent, being entitled to settle in the Netherlands on the grounds of their
Dutch citizenship. In general, they were well educated and had strong so-
cio-cultural and national orientations towards the Netherlands. Their inte-
gration was helped by the active and assimilationist reception and settle-
ment policy that was transpiring under the expanding economy and labour
market conditions of the 1960s (Van Amersfoort 1982; Van Amersfoort &
Van Niekerk 2006).
In 1951, under pressure of political developments in Indonesia, a second
group of migrants arrived to the Netherlands. This group comprised
Moluccan soldiers from the former colonial armed forces and their family
members. Totalling 12,500 individuals, the migrants themselves and the
Dutch government both regarded their stay as temporary because, after all,
the Moluccans had intended to return to a free republic of the Moluccas.
As such, conditions for this group’s adjustment to Dutch society were very
unfavourable. Various contingencies included the government’s policy to
keep the group intact (in view of their anticipated return migration), the
group’s own seemingly firm intent to return to their native land, as well as
their dismissal from the army, low level of education and lack of Dutch
language skills (Bartels 1989). Since a free republic of the Moluccas never
came to exist, the migrants’ desired return did not materialise. In 1978,
after a series of violent occupations of buildings and hijackings of trains
by Moluccan youth, policy objectives were explicitly altered (Entzinger
1985; Penninx 1979). Social, cultural and political orientations among
Moluccans also changed (Bartels 1989; Steijlen 1996; Smeets & Steijlen
2006). Today, Moluccan immigrants and their descendants in the
Netherlands are an estimated population of 42,300 (CBS 2002: 15).
The post-colonial migrations described above were followed by de-
mand-driven labour migration from the late 1950s on. Already by the mid-
1950s, post-war reconstruction efforts started to produce labour shortages
in certain sectors and guest workers were recruited to fill vacancies. Most
were jobs for unskilled or low-skilled workers: first came Italians, followed
by Spaniards and Yugoslavs and, still later, Turks and North Africans. The
first oil crisis of 1973 led to a factual recruitment stop for workers, though
this did not mean a decrease in immigration. Although return migration for
Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Yugoslav migrants was quite high
during the 1970s, the Turkish and Moroccan response differed. From the
mid-1970s onwards, these workers brought their families to the
Netherlands. Meanwhile, from the mid-1980s onwards, other migrants
came as spouses for the young Turkish and Moroccan immigrants who had
settled in the Netherlands. By 1 January 2006, the number of residents of
Turkish background1 in the Netherlands was 364,300, 54 per cent of whom
were born in Turkey (these residents are thus considered first-generation
130 BRUQUETAS-CALLEJO, GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS, PENNINX & SCHOLTEN
migrants) and 46 per cent of whom had at least one parent who was born
in Turkey (thus being considered second-generation migrants). By 1
January 2006, Dutch residents of Moroccan background were counted at
323,200, 52 per cent of whom comprise first-generation migrants and 48
per cent, second-generation. The large majority of this population had also
acquired Dutch nationality.
The next newcomers to the Netherlands were Surinamese. Up until
1975, Surinam formed part of the Netherlands Kingdom and migration was
unregulated. Immigration from Surinam intensified from 1973 to 1975,
during the years before the country’s independence, and again from 1979
to 1980, prior to expiration of the transitional agreement on the settlement
of mutual subjects of Surinam and the Netherlands. The political turmoil in
Surinam in 1982 and the country’s political instability thereafter brought
new immigrants to the Netherlands, although at a lower rate than during
the aforementioned peak periods (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk 2006).
The population of Surinamese origin in the Netherlands, as of 1 January
2006, amounted to 331,900, 56 per cent of whom would be considered the
first generation and 44 per cent the second generation. A great majority of
present-day Surinamese residents have Dutch nationality.
Migration from the Dutch Antilles has not been hampered by regulations
because the islands are part of the Netherlands, and Antilleans therefore
hold Dutch nationality. Migration movements have long been rather fluid,
and return migration among the population is relatively high. As of 1
January 2006, the number of residents of Antillean origin in the
Netherlands totalled 129,700. This group’s relatively recent arrival is re-
flected in the high percentage comprising the first generation, at 62 per
cent, and a comparatively small percentage comprising the second genera-
tion, at 38 per cent.
Since the mid-1980s, admitted asylum seekers and other refugee popula-
tions have become an increasingly significant share of the Netherlands’ im-
migrant population. Such groups first began arriving from Vietnam, Sri
Lanka and the Horn of Africa, and later, from the Middle East and the
Balkans. As of 1 January 2006, admitted refugees and asylum applicants
to the Netherlands most frequently came from: Iraq (43,800), Afghanistan
(37,200), Iran (28,700), Somalia (19,900) and Ghana (19,500).
In addition to the above-mentioned categories of migrants, other immi-
grants continued to settle in the Netherlands. As of 1 January 2006, the to-
tal number of Dutch residents whose background would be considered one
of the EU-25 countries rose to 817,000. The number of residents with a
background in one of the so-called ‘Western’ countries (including those in
the EU) is 1.42 million, or 8.7 per cent of the total population. ‘Non-
Western allochthones’ numbered at 1.72 million, or 10.5 per cent of the to-
tal population.
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Despite the fact that since World War II the Netherlands has not re-
garded itself an immigration country, many immigrants have in fact settled
in the nation. In all, there are now 691,500 aliens (i.e. persons not having
Dutch nationality) living in the Netherlands (4.2 per cent of the country’s
total population). Of the total population, 1.6 million people (9 per cent)
were born outside the Netherlands; these individuals are considered ‘immi-
grants’ in the strict sense of the term. Meanwhile, 3.15 million (19.3 per
cent) are, in the broad definition of the word, allochthones (i.e. first- and
second-generation migrants). These newcomers to Dutch society are scat-
tered throughout the country’s geography. To illustrate, in 2000, 40 per
cent of all allochthones were living in one of the Netherlands’ four largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht). By contrast, only 13
per cent of the total Dutch population were recorded as residents of these
cities. In general, immigrants to the Netherlands have tended to settle in
larger cities, most notably, in the western conurbation of the Netherlands
(CBS 2001; Garssen 2006: 19).
2 The evolution of migration policies
The fact that the Netherlands did not see itself as an immigration country
is manifested in the various ways the nation went about naming factual im-
migrants. People from the Dutch East Indies were labelled ‘repatriates’;
from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles,2 ‘Kingdom fellows’ (rijksge-
noten in Dutch); and from Southern Europe, Morocco and Turkey, ‘guest
workers’. This same national self-perception was also expressed in the
noted absence of integration policies for alien newcomers throughout the
1960s and 1970s (Blok Commission 2004). Apart from repatriates from
the Dutch East Indies who were, after all, Dutch citizens, all other newco-
mers’ stays were seen as temporary, thereby deeming sufficient what were
merely ad hoc policies for accommodation and return.
However, the Netherlands’ reputation of not being an immigration coun-
try contradicted the undeniable fact that large immigrant groups were stay-
ing in the nation for long periods of time, if not permanently. This led to
mounting tensions in the mid-1970s (Entzinger 1975), and produced a gra-
dual shift in integration policies. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the pre-
sence of long-term factual immigrants began to be recognised and it there-
fore became a major political goal to integrate such individuals into Dutch
society. This led to designation and implementation of the first integration
policies in the Netherlands, collectively referred to as the Ethnic Minorities
(EM) Policy. During the 1980s, EM Policy started, much as it had in
Sweden, as a welfare state policy to stimulate equality and equity among a
society’s vulnerable groups. It was developed in a relatively depoliticised
political context and laid down in a number of governmental documents
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(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1980, 1981, 1983). In its implementa-
tion phase during the 1980s, this policy led to significant policy activity
across many domains.
Although the presence of large immigrant groups was recognised, immi-
gration was still seen as a historically unique event. It was, moreover, be-
lieved that further immigration should be restricted or prevented (Penninx,
Garcés-Mascareñas & Scholten 2005). The policy shift towards integration
thus did not imply that the current immigration was recognised any differ-
ently. Alongside the realisation of integration policies, the 1980s and
1990s implemented and enforced more restrictive immigration policies vis-
à-vis labour migration, and later on, family migration and asylum. Since
there was no discussion on whether the Netherlands should be an immigra-
tion country or not, throughout the two decades, increasingly restrictive im-
migration policies were formulated and applied in a rather de-politicised
context. In other words, compared to integration policies, new immigration
regulations were, until recently, passed with little political debate and rela-
tively low implication of different political and social actors.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the public and the political discourses
started to look critically at EM Policy. The policy was seen as having
failed in important areas of labour and education, while also being criti-
cised for its common concern (target groups and their emancipation) and
its ‘overemphasis on cultural aspects’. This resulted in the formulation of
integration policies throughout the 1990s. The new policy document
known as ‘Contourennota’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994) ac-
centuated the individual over the group, emphasised the socio-economic
aspects of integration over the cultural and/or religious ones and stressed,
more than before, the civic responsibilities of individuals in integration
processes. This led to new directions of policy implementation during the
1990s including, among others, a national policy of introductory courses
for newcomers in Dutch society and area-based policies (i.e. urban
policies).
The beginning of the new century prepared for another shift in policy or-
ientation that was by then embedded in full-fledged politicisation of the to-
pics of immigration and integration. That integration processes and policies
had fundamentally failed and that social cohesion of Dutch society had be-
come endangered became the dominant perception. National election cam-
paigns in 2002 framed these topics in advantageously exploitative lights
and thus reinforced politicisation of the themes. Only fanning the fire were
internationally and nationally scoped events, such as 9/11 and the 2004
murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh by a young Dutch-born radi-
cal Muslim in Amsterdam. With the formulation of Integration Policy New
Style (Ministerie van Justitie 2003), a series of proposals and measures
were developed to significantly bring down immigration figures (the
Netherlands had a negative net migration balance for the three consecutive
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years following 2004), and to introduce mandatory forms of integration for
newcomers and oldcomers alike. Some observers have called these prac-
tices neo-assimilationist.
3 Immigration policymaking
In contradistinction to integration policies in the Netherlands, immigration
policies have been neither comprehensive nor coordinated. This has been
due to the lack of a clear policymaking structure, which has thus led to the
formulation of labour, family and asylum migration policies by different
ministries, institutions and other political and social actors. Also at play
have been varying dynamics, all transpiring at distinct moments in time.
For instance, while the Ministry of Justice is responsible for general admis-
sion of foreigners and the granting of their residence permits, the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment is assigned to deal particularly with la-
bour migration, and the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work
has competency over reception of asylum seekers. Consequentially, any de-
scription of Dutch immigration policy must refer to three distinctly as-
signed processes: labour, family and asylum. Interactions between these
three processes have taken place over the course of time, but their interrela-
tions have neither been stable nor held within a unitary structure. The fol-
lowing sections outline these developments and detail their points of
convergence.
3.1 Labour migration
By the mid-1950s, the post-war reconstruction efforts of the Netherlands
had led to labour shortages in various sectors. This resulted in the recruit-
ment of foreign workers to fill these vacancies, which were mainly jobs for
unskilled or low-skilled workers. To this end, recruitment agreements were
signed with sending countries such as Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal
(1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969) and Yugoslavia
(1970). These arrangements were formulated in consensual agreement
among the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, employers’ organi-
sations and trade unions. As in other Western European countries, social
partners and the state generally accepted the fact that continuous economic
growth could only be achieved by relying on (presumably) temporary for-
eign labour.
Recruitment activities came to an end, however, upon onset of the eco-
nomic recession that followed the first oil crisis in 1973. This was more
the result of a lack of employers’ interest in new foreign workers than the
consequence of an explicit immigration policy (De Lange 2007). Unlike in
France and Germany, measures to force migrant workers to return home
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were never implemented in the Netherlands. The Dutch government’s pro-
posal to introduce a return bonus for those who would return voluntarily
was broadly rejected. And while, from 1973 onwards, the Netherlands pro-
claimed itself closed to labour migration, this declaration was more a mat-
ter of rhetoric than factual policy. Labour migration policies (the Labour of
Foreign Workers Act from 1979 to 1995, and the Labour of Aliens Act
from 1995 onwards) continued to channel the entrance of those workers
deemed beneficial to the Dutch labour market. In a new economic context
characterised by a loss of employment in industry and a parallel expansion
of the service sector, these policies were meant to restrict the entrance of
low-skilled foreign workers while channelling that of high-skilled immi-
grants, often from highly industrialised countries (Böcker & Clermonts
1995).
In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s when corporatist structures were fully
functioning, labour migration policies were formulated by the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment, with little cooperation from trade unions
and employers. For instance, the Labour of Foreign Workers Act was
passed in 1979 despite criticisms by both employers’ organisations and
trade unions. The weakening of the corporatist structure allowed
Parliament, and hence its vying political parties, to gain clout in labour mi-
gration policymaking. The parliamentary discussions on the Labour of
Foreign Workers Act of 1979 illustrate how labour immigration policies
were increasingly created by the government and discussed at length in
Parliament. Unlike previous measures, this new law was widely debated.
Left-wing parties, left-wing liberals and the liberal party were opposed to
the law, arguing that it would negatively affect the position of foreign
workers and institutionalise unequal treatment.
By the end of the 1980s, persistent labour shortages in particular eco-
nomic sectors forced the Dutch government to deal with the demand for
foreign labour in a more structured fashion. As a consequence of this, the
Dutch Employment Organisation, together with trade unions and employ-
ers, started to manage temporary labour migration through so-called ‘cove-
nants’. These tripartite agreements permitted workers in particular econom-
ic sectors to be temporarily admitted into the country, while also anticipat-
ing the availability of newly trained, qualified Dutch workers. Contrary to
what would be expected, however, these agreements did not always lead to
more liberal admission policy (De Lange 2004). In terms of policymaking,
these covenants reinstated the corporatist tripartite body.
Parallel to measures designed to control the admission of foreign work-
ers, the Dutch government has aimed to reduce irregular immigration since
the early 1990s. The Linkage Act (1998) became centrepiece to the princi-
ple of an ‘integrated immigration policy’ (Pluymen 2004: 76). This mea-
sure made all social security benefits contingent upon an immigrant’s legal
residence status, including rights and access to secondary or higher
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education, housing, rent subsidy, handicapped facilities and health care.
Driving this act was the assumption that exclusion of access to public ser-
vices would help push back irregular migration.
While previous measures to reduce irregular migration passed with little
public discussion, beyond Parliament, the Linkage Act generated wide-
spread protest from doctors, teachers, legal experts, prominent politicians
and representatives from a broad range of public, semi-private and private
organisations. Representatives of local governments also campaigned
against the new law and seemed to steer a course for non-enforcement. In
general terms, the new law was claimed to be unnecessary, immoral and
unworkable. This general opposition – in contrast to the ramifications of
creating other labour migration policies – produced a number of substantial
alterations to the bill. For instance, professionals were not forced to report
irregular immigrants to the Aliens Department; restrictions concerning edu-
cation for children were lifted; and whereas irregular immigrants would in-
itially have only been entitled to medical care in ‘acute and threatening si-
tuations’, this specification was eventually superseded by the prospect of
requiring ‘imperative medical treatment’.
Moreover, in its implementation, the Linkage Act led to the inclusion of
other actors. First of all, private actors became master-workers of its imple-
mentation, since it was they who were to control the access to social ser-
vices. Having private actors participate in migration management meant
they could simultaneously work to influence the actual process of imple-
mentation. For instance, various studies (Van der Leun 2003, 2006;
Pluymen 2004) have shown how workers in the domain of social assis-
tance and housing have displayed a much more accepting attitude towards
the Linkage Act than doctors and teachers who, in contrast, might tend to-
wards letting their professional ethics prevail over new regulations.
Secondly, the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from social services
led to the shift of new support activities downwards, both in the direction
of local authorities and out to churches and other support organisations. In
other words, local funds and churches, societal organisations and private
individuals came forward to support irregular immigrants in those services
no longer being covered by the Dutch state.
3.2 Family migration
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the assumption that labour migra-
tion in the Netherlands was temporary led to relatively strict regulations re-
garding family reunification. Although family immigration was not yet a
main preoccupation during the 1970s, when evoked in parliamentary
debates, the issue was discussed within a framework of highly moral dis-
course (Bonjour 2006: 4). In particular, Christian parties regularly empha-
sised the importance of taking into account the ‘human’ and the ‘social’
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aspects of labour migration, referring to the ‘forced’ separation of guest
workers from their families as ‘extremely painful’ and a source of ‘suffer-
ing’ (quoted in ibid.). Despite explicitly voiced concerns over family unity,
the government did not alter family migration regulations, arguing that cir-
cumstances unfortunately did not allow for less ‘strict policies’ (ibid.: 5).
In response to the first report of the Scientific Council for Government
Policy (1979),3 in 1983, the government published a memorandum on
minorities. Entitled ‘Minderhedennota’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse
Zaken 1983), this memorandum accepted the permanency of immigrants’
stay as a starting point for integration policies. Protecting the unity of the
immigrant family thus went unquestioned. In principle, this new approach
made the family part of the integration process. And in practice, family re-
unification (i.e. the bringing over of spouses and children of resident fa-
milies) peaked in the early 1980s. When in the same year the Ministry of
Justice decided to introduce restrictions to family formation (i.e. bringing
over new marriage partners), fierce resistance immediately came from
Dutch progressive parties (PvdA, GroenLinks, SP, D66), who argued that
the measure undermined the principle of equal treatment at the heart of the
new minorities policy. In this regard, liberal family migration policies were
part and parcel of EM Policy, particularly when it came to emphasising so-
cio-economic integration vis-à-vis migrants’ own cultural identity.
The shift in the early 1990s, however, from a group-oriented approach
to one focusing on individual integration, caused a turn away from the
principles of protecting family unity. This neglected the family’s key role
in the development of cultural identity and integration, for the sake of fos-
tering protective measures to promote social cohesion in society (Van
Walsum 2002: 143). In other words, family migration started to be seen as
a problem for the integration of individuals. This reasoning justified restric-
tive family migration policies. As presented in the media and stated in
many public debates, a broad majority within Parliament believed that, due
to a lack of knowledge and skills, those newcomers who immigrated with-
in the framework of family formation or reunification would, if not fail to
integrate, at least retard the integration process. A contrast to the early
1980s, in the 1990s and 2000s, more restrictive family migration measures
were thus introduced with little debate.
As family migration regulations became more and more restrictive, inter-
national treaty obligations, particularly article 8 of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR)’s European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Liberties, became an increasingly important counter refer-
ence. To prevent violations to the right of family life, a clause was intro-
duced in 1994 to the guidelines for police officers known as ‘Instructions
for the Aliens Police’. It stated that the government could – in cases of
‘compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature’ (cited in Bonjour 2006: 15)
– use its own discretion to grant admission to aspiring family members,
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even if predetermined conditions went unmet. As Bonjour observed, this
demonstrates how ECHR article 8 came to be considered an external con-
straint on national policy options. Not only was this a contrast to the ethi-
cal and ideological considerations presented by Dutch parliamentarians in
the 1970s (ibid.: 16), but it also introduced an important new, external ac-
tor in Dutch family migration policymaking.
The current dominant discourse that family migration is a potential
threat for integration is most clearly embodied in a new law passed in
2005. This law requires non-Dutch family members of residents who want
to immigrate to pass an exam that tests their basic knowledge of the Dutch
language as well as how well informed they are about Dutch society. The
exam must be taken in the country of origin and is a requirement for per-
mission to enter the Netherlands on the basis of family reunification.
However, a number of recent verdicts by the ECHR pose significant chal-
lenges to this requirement. In particular, the ECHR has emphasised the
notion that states must allow parents and children the freedom to live to-
gether. Moreover, a recent jurisprudence has stressed the need to respect
the right of both married and unmarried couples to continue cohabiting,
even when issues of immigration or public order are at stake (Van Walsum
2004). What can thus be concluded is that family migration policymaking
has gone beyond the scope of the Dutch political arena, bringing in the EU
and international human rights organisations as potentially important
actors.
3.3 Asylum migration
Asylum policies in the Netherlands have been developed, mainly on an ad
hoc basis, following the increase of asylum seekers during the 1980s and
1990s. From 1977 to 1987, annual quotas were established to determine
the number of refugees invited to resettle in the Netherlands. However, the
growing numbers of spontaneous asylum seekers, a housing shortage and
increased costs that municipalities had to pay for social and other benefits
led to 1987’s introduction of the Regulation on the Reception of Asylum
Seekers (ROA). The first aim of ROA was to curtail giving asylum seekers
access to independent housing and social benefits, and instead to offer
them central reception and modest sums of pocket money. Muus (1997)
observed that ROA, described as ‘austere but humane’, was not only in-
stated to relieve the growing housing and financial problems of the major
cities but also – and above all – to prevent the Netherlands from becoming
an attractive destination country. This shift made evident how reception po-
licies were in fact, and in perception, a significant component for managing
asylum flows.
Due to the growing number of newly arriving asylum seekers from 1989
onwards, ROA became a policy of providing minimal first accommodation,
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yet within a few years it became overburdened. In 1990, for example, the
Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture, which was in charge of the recep-
tion of asylum seekers, ‘tried to solve the problem by means of buying or
renting holiday bungalows and caravans and finding more municipalities
that were prepared to accommodate asylum seekers’ (Muus 1990: 47).
Consequently introduced in 1992 was the New Admission and Reception
Model for Asylum Seekers (NTOM). An important difference found in
NTOM was that asylum seekers would no longer be accommodated by de-
centralised ROA housing within municipalities, and municipalities would
henceforth only bear responsibility for the reception and integration of
those who had passed asylum procedures, namely status-holders and the
gedoogden (persons with a temporary expulsion waiver).
Moreover, in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Justice introduced several
measures to reduce the number of asylum requests. First and foremost, this
policy was manifested in measures taken to prevent asylum seekers from
even arriving in the Netherlands. For instance, the country’s increasing re-
fusal to grant visas – though not exclusive to asylum seekers – limited en-
trances and hence constrained applications for asylum in the Netherlands.
Secondly, introduced in 1994 was a temporary status referred to as a
Conditional Residence Permit (VVTV). This new status only carries with
it a relatively weak provisional residence title and provides hardly any
access to public facilities. Thirdly, measures were introduced to restrict ac-
cess to asylum proceedings. As other European countries have done so, in
1994, the Netherlands introduced procedures to expedite certain asylum
applications, such as ‘manifestly unfounded applications’, those that were
filed by people coming from safe countries of origin or safe transit coun-
tries where they could have applied for asylum, multiple applications and
other statuses. What’s more, people who had applied elsewhere were ex-
cluded. In the same vein, the new Aliens Act of 2000 introduced a single
temporary status for the first three years of stay in the country, a limit to
the right to appeal a negative decision and the duty of the rejected asylum
seeker to leave the Netherlands within a fixed period.
Analysing the process of policymaking that began in 1986 and which re-
sulted in ROA’s declaration, Puts (1991) observed that government is not a
monolithic actor but, rather, a fragmented organisation. The seeming frag-
mentation of the government may be explained by the fact that its various
ministries have different considerations and concerns. Such examples in-
clude the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture’s manageability of re-
ception, the Ministry of Interior’s defence of municipal interests and the
Ministry of Justice’s legal concerns over admission and deportation proce-
dures. But on top of such preoccupations, different dilemmas and ambiva-
lent positions within the ministries have also had to be negotiated. What’s
more, relations between party politics and ministries have wavered. These
differences were finally resolved through compromises, thanks to various
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formal and informal decision-making rules and as the consequence of parti-
cular triggering events.
Since asylum migration policies have been evidently ad hoc and based
on arguments of manageability, rather than on grounds of principles, the
general debate around their formulation and implementation has been
highly technocratic. In this context, the creation of asylum migration poli-
cies has mainly taken place within the government, while there has been
relatively little debate in Parliament. Opposition from lawyers and interest
groups has hardly been a successful means to prevent the introduction of a
series of restrictive measures. Neither cities nor local government have di-
rectly participated in asylum migration policymaking, although they have
been incorporated into the implementation of reception policies process.
As with labour and family migration, a lack of debate and the relatively
low impact of different political and social actors in policymaking led to a
subsiding politicisation of integration and immigration issues. In particular,
two sets of measures aroused concerns and rising responses from external
actors.
In the first place, there was progressive exclusion of failed asylum see-
kers from social benefits and the government’s insistence on their return to
countries of origin. This kind of measure was directly opposed by local
authorities who had to deal with these residents in day-to-day practice.
Notably, in February 2004, when the Tweede Kamer, Dutch Parliament’s
lower house, accepted the Minister for Immigration and Integration’s pro-
posal to expel up to 26,000 failed asylum seekers over the following three
years, many big cities opposed the policy, arguing for their settlement and
integration into Dutch society. Neither did front-line organisations such as
the Central Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) commonly comply with
the Minister’s rulings on this issue. Finally, church organisations and a
strong network of the approximately 10,000 volunteers of the Dutch
Refugee Council came to provide support for these failed asylum seekers.
This opposition by local authorities and grass-roots organisations illustrates
the tension between policy formation at the national level and the often
clashing effects that surface once policy is implemented.
The second set of measures was aimed at reducing the number of asy-
lum applications and the duration of asylum procedures. These measures
have aroused immediate concerns not only from refugee advocacy groups
and academics within the Netherlands, but also from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch
(HRW). One basic criticism was that the measures resulted in a ‘routine in-
fringement of asylum seekers’ most basic rights’ (HRW 2003). Other con-
crete disapproval was voiced over the erosion of the Convention Status,
the accelerated procedures and the limit on the right to appeal a negative
decision. This last measure is considered incompatible with ECHR case
law. According to the ECHR, an alien’s claim that his or her deportation
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would result in a violation of ECHR Convention’s article 3 must be rigor-
ously scrutinised by the domestic courts. The fact that in 2003 the Council
of State of the Netherlands replied to these concerns, by arguing that it
does apply the rigorous scrutiny required by the ECHR, again illustrates
how international and supranational institutions are becoming part of the
policymaking process at the national level.
4 Integration policymaking
In comparative perspective, integration policymaking in the Netherlands
followed different timing than that of most other European countries, ex-
cept Sweden. Earlier than elsewhere, the different experiences of immigra-
tion form former colonies and labour migration resulted in systematic ef-
forts to better accommodate newcomers whose stay was more permanent
than originally expected.
4.1 Policies of the 1970s and before
Because the Netherlands did not regard itself an immigration country, those
who happened to be there, such as the guest workers, were expected to re-
turn to their home countries (Scientific Council 2001). As a result, ad hoc
measures for accommodation were the rule, and reception facilities were
short-term-oriented and scarce (Penninx 1996). (The only exception to this
rule was the assimilation policy for repatriates from the former Dutch East
Indies who were seen and treated as compatriots.) Accordingly, the two
main policy goals concerned the remigration and accommodation of guest
workers to Dutch society for as long as they would stay in the
Netherlands. Maintaining migrants’ own identity was thus considered im-
portant, but in one and the same mind frame that viewed migrants as plan-
ning to return to their countries of origin.
In the 1970s, mainly within the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and
Social Work, a welfare policy was developed to respond to the needs of
some vulnerable groups. They included guest workers, asylum seekers, mi-
grants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, Moluccans and the itin-
erant Dutch people locally known as woonwagenbewoners, literally mean-
ing ‘caravan dwellers’. Within this policy, many private institutions were
initiated and henceforth subsidised to provide welfare services for each of
these groups (Molleman 2004; Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979).
Nonetheless, many guest workers’ facilities, such as housing, were sup-
posed to be offered by the companies employing them. Increasing family
reunions, along with the concentration of guest workers and their families
in specific urban areas, pushed local authorities to get involved. Often mu-
nicipalities took their own initiatives in the domains of housing, education,
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health care and welfare, thus pressuring the national authorities to recog-
nise – and to finance – these measures. One of the most notable measures
of the decade was the Mother Tongue and Culture Programme (1974),
which was explicitly aimed at the reintegration of migrant guest workers’
children in their societies of origin. But, contrary to all prognoses, many
guest workers did not return to their sending countries after the recruitment
stopped and the economic crisis that followed in the late 1970s. In fact, mi-
grant communities, particularly those from North Africa and Turkey, grew
significantly through family and asylum migration. The rising unemploy-
ment rates of migrant workers and the arrival of their families brought de-
mands for specific measures onto the political agenda. For instance,
schools with high numbers of immigrant students demanded funds for spe-
cific reception courses, creating the Landelijke Commissie Voortgezet
Onderwijs aan Anderstaligen, a national federation lobbying for the sec-
ondary education of non-native speakers of Dutch.
The administrative layout of the policies described above was proble-
matic. Different ministries were involved for individual target groups and
policy domains. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment, which was responsible for the labour market and work per-
mits, tended to hold onto the idea of the temporality of migration. The
Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, which oversaw matters
of general welfare, was directly confronted with the problems of reception,
while becoming more aware of the growing tensions between supposed
temporary stay and factual long-term settlement and thus pleaded for
change. There were consequent difficulties in coordinating the measures
among ministries and, what’s more, a certain rivalry existed (Hoppe 1987;
Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979; Scholten & Timmermans 2004).4
It was also during the 1970s that scientists started to get involved. As
one of the first to do so, Entzinger (1975) drew attention to the gap be-
tween de facto permanent settlement of immigrants in the country and the
policymaker’s view of temporary migration.5 Entzinger underscored the
risks of ignoring the problem. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation
and Social Work instated the Advisory Committee on Research on
Minorities, which united academics in this domain within a policy frame.
In sum, there had been a mixture of pressures for policy change coming
from public opinion, the media, local authorities, academics and civil ser-
vants. It was the Scientific Council for Government Policy’s report ‘Ethnic
Minorities’ (1979) that acted as a catalyst: it pleaded to fully recognise that
a number of immigrant groups had settled permanently in the Netherlands
and to start an active policy aimed at the integration of what it called ‘eth-
nic minorities’ in society. In a first reaction to the report (Ministerie van
Binnenlandse Zaken 1980), the government accepted the advice, decided
to develop an EM Policy and to install a strong coordinating structure for
such policy within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The new direction of
142 BRUQUETAS-CALLEJO, GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS, PENNINX & SCHOLTEN
policies gained full parliamentary support, which was symbolised in a gov-
ernment coalition whereby the Christian Democrats and the Liberals nomi-
nated oppositional Labour Party politician Henk Molleman as director of
the coordination department within the Ministry of Home Affairs.
4.2 Ethnic Minorities Policy in the 1980s
The basic rationale of EM Policy was that specific groups in Dutch society
that had low socio-economic status and were additionally perceived as eth-
nically and/or culturally different would run the risk of becoming perma-
nently marginal groups in society. Low-status immigrant groups thus be-
came target groups of this policy, as did some natives such as the woonwa-
genbewoners and the long-established gypsies. The main principles of the
new EM Policy can be summarised in three points:
1) The policy aimed to achieve equality of ethnic minorities in the socio-
economic domain; inclusion and participation in the political domain;
and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional
conditions.
2) The policy was targeted at specific groups regarded as being at risk of
becoming distinct minorities: guest workers, Moluccans, Surinamese
and Dutch Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and woonwagenbewoners.
3) The policy was to cover all relevant domains and ministries, while being
strongly anchored in the governmental organisation.
As a result, the Directie Coordinatie Integratiebeleid Minderheden, a de-
partment for the coordination of minorities policy, was created within the
general directorate of Home Policies, as opposed to within that of Security
and Order (Molleman 2004). The motivation for placing the coordinating
unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs was that it was a policy for new citi-
zens, and therefore the ministry responsible for cities and provinces should
be in charge.
Emancipation through socio-economic equality and cultural and reli-
gious equity was seen as an important means to prevent ethnic minority
formation among these groups. Thus, their participation in all spheres of
society, including the political, was to be encouraged. An important as-
sumption was that development of identity – both at the individual and
group level – would promote the minority’s emancipation within the com-
munity and would also have a positive influence on its integration in
broader society (Blok Commission 2004). The 1980s have come to be seen
as the heyday of EM Policy. Irrespective of how the outcomes are evalu-
ated, the range of policy initiatives is impressive, especially when com-
pared to other European countries during the same period.
In the legal-political domain, for example, the Netherlands’ full legisla-
tion was scrutinised for discriminatory elements on the basis of nationality,
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race and religion (Beune & Hessels 1983), and many changes were made.
Anti-discrimination legislation was reinforced, and a structure for discrimi-
nation-related reporting and consultation was established. What’s more, in
1985, active and passive voting rights for alien residents were introduced.
In 1986, Dutch nationality law was modified to include more elements of
jus soli, thus making it much easier for alien immigrants and their children
to become Dutch citizens. Over the course of time, a consultation structure
for all target groups of EM Policy was established to give people a voice in
matters regarding their position in society.6 Subsidising EM organisations,
both at national and local levels, and trying to engage them in integration
efforts became an important strategic aspect of policy implementation.
In the socio-economic domain, three themes were key: the labour mar-
ket/unemployment, education and housing. In EM Policy, several initia-
tives were taken to combat high unemployment rates, including a law
inspired by the Canadian Employment Equity Act and even affirmative
action by national and local governmental employers during the period
1986 through 1993. The effects of these measures, however, have proven
weak.
Measures in the domain of education were an important part of EM
Policy from the beginning. By far, most of the policy’s financial resources
were spent in this domain, predominantly on measures to compensate ar-
rears of immigrant children in the regular educational system. That was im-
plemented by a point system in which schools received significantly more
money for children of immigrant background than for standard middle-
class, native pupils. Immigrant and minority children were counted at a rate
of 1.9, while native children of low socio-economic background, at a rate
of 1.25 (the standard was 1). Apart from this general financial assistance to
schools, a relatively small part was also dedicated to specific measures, in-
cluding education in the native language and culture of immigrants.
As for housing, a fundamental change was introduced in 1981 that al-
lowed legally residing aliens full access to social housing, something that
had been previously denied. Given the fact that social housing comprises
the majority of all lodging in big cities in the Netherlands, this measure
had very positive consequences for the position of alien immigrants.
In the domain of culture, language and religion, EM Policy may be
called ‘multiculturally’ avant la lettre.7 The aim to develop migrants’ cul-
ture, in keeping with EM Policy philosophy, was left to the groups and
their organisations, and delimited by laws for general adherence in the
Netherlands. The role of the government was defined as that of facilitating,
i.e. creating opportunities for minorities, such as special media programmes
in immigrant languages.
When it came to faith, ‘new religions’ could legally claim facilities, such
as denominational schools and broadcasting resources, on the same
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conditions as established religions. The outcome was the relatively quick
institutionalisation of Islam (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk & Meijer 2001).
Throughout the late 1980s, disappointment in EM Policy was growing,
but it was only by the early 1990s that it became the topic of intense public
debate and surrounding criticisms. The first harsh critique of EM Policy
was formulated in a report by the Scientific Council for Government
Policy (1989). Briefly stated, its message was that too little progress was
being made in two crucial domains: labour market and education. This eva-
luation intimated another criticism: too much attention was being given to
issues of multiculturalism and the subsidisation of organisations. It was
feared that this imbalance of attention could result in hindering – rather
than enhancing – individual participation to better labour market and edu-
cational opportunities. The subsequent advice of the Scientific Council
(1989) was to make more effort in the key areas of labour and education,
and to do so with more compulsory measures. ‘Obligations of migrants
should be more balanced with the extended rights’ was the message; poli-
cies should focus less on cultural rights and facilities.
Other elements of criticism were later added. For one, Frits Bolkestein,
then Liberal Party leader and head of the political opposition in Dutch
Parliament, suggested in a public speech in 1991 that Islam formed a threat
to liberal democracy. He also intimated that it was a hindrance to the inte-
gration of immigrants, and that immigrant integration should be handled,
in Bolkestein’s words, ‘with more courage’.
4.3 Integration policy in the 1990s
Policy did not change immediately in response to the criticisms, but sown
were the seeds for a different conception to grow later. A first distinct
change in policy focus was found in the ‘Contourennota’ (Ministerie van
Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). In this new document, a renewed integration
policy with a more ‘republican’ character was adopted, focusing on ‘good
citizenship’ and responsibility for their own situation as guiding principles.
The argument was that citizenship entails not only rights but also duties,
and that each citizen must be active and responsible for himself or herself.
In accordance with advice from the 1989 report of the Scientific Council
for Government Policy, this new ‘integration policy’ reflected three main
deviations from EM Policy: 1) a shift away from target groups to indivi-
duals who are in a disadvantaged position; 2) a strong focus on the socio-
economic incorporation through labour market and education measures; 3)
a shift away from cultural and multicultural policies as well as from the
strong reliance on immigrant organisations.
The social-democrat victory in the national elections of 1994 led to the
so-called Purple Coalition: the Labour Party (PvdA) together with the con-
servative liberals (VVD) and left-wing liberals (D66). This meant that the
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cabinet chose to put ‘the delicate cultural dimension outside of the field
and to focus on the economic activation of individual migrants’ (Scholten
& Timmermans 2004). The focus on economic integration of individual
immigrants recommended by the 1989 Scientific Council report fit very
well with the general policy line of the government, whose motto was
‘work, work, and once again work’.8 Thus, measures specifically targeted
at ethnic minorities were abandoned. From 1997 until 2001, considerable
sums were invested in general schemes to fight unemployment. And
although these schemes were not specifically earmarked for ethnic minori-
ties (Blok Commission 2004), one hope was that they would promote their
participation nevertheless.
A new policy instrument apropos of the new philosophy was that of ci-
vic integration courses9 that aimed to facilitate the initial integration of
newcomers to the Netherlands. This instrument for integration was devel-
oped at the local level among a number of Dutch cities beginning in the
early 1990s. In these reception courses, newcomers were given a toolkit
consisting of Dutch-language training material and information about the
functioning of important institutions in Dutch society. Local policymakers
felt the urge to provide these toolkits to all newcomers, whom they be-
lieved needed them, and so the policy was systematically developed in
their respective cities. However, this instrument for integration was later
consumed by national politics, and through 1998’s Wet Inburgering
Nederland (WIN), the law became national reception policy.
Another way of transforming policies to keep consistent with the new
philosophy was by framing much of integration facilities in area-based po-
licies (rather than group-based ones). In 1994, the Ministry of Home
Affairs began to undertake a policy for deprived areas in major Dutch
cities. This practice could be understood as a replacement of integration
policies, for these targeted areas were largely comprised of ethnic minority
populations. Area was selected as a primary policy category instead of a
group singled out in society. In the mid-1990s emphasis thus shifted from
housing and urban renewal (known in Dutch as sociale vernieuwing) to
more holistic programmes that integrated measures on housing, economic
issues and socio-cultural dimensions (referred to as the grotestedenbeleid).
Reflecting the above-mentioned preoccupations of the Purple Coalition,
this multi-dimensional approach came to focus on socio-economic
development.
The change from group-based towards area-based policies was also insti-
tutionally reflected. In 1998, a new so-called Minister for Urban Policies
and Integration was nominated within the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Although such area-based policies had served as a way of quitting group-
oriented policies, group-specific policies still survived at the local level of
policy.
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A series of events around the turn of the millennium triggered a new
shift in the public and political discourses on immigration and integration
issues, which would prove to later cause a revision of policy towards as-
similationism. This swing brought the social and the cultural dimensions of
integration back onto the agenda, though in a different light than was ever
before shed on the matter. The search was no longer for ‘compatibilities’,
but more for ‘commonalities’ that would help preserve national norms and
values, thereby restoring and enhancing the social cohesion of society.
More and more, the integration issue came to be portrayed in what was
perceived to be a ‘clash of civilizations’.
One of the initial catalysts in this development was the new national de-
bate that was spurred on by the publication of a newspaper article by
Scheffer (2000). The article stated that multicultural society in the
Netherlands could be dismissed as a ‘tragedy’ or a ‘disaster’.10 Integration
policy was declared a failure and, moreover, a call was made for a more
assimilationist policy that would revive Dutch history, norms and values.
As in the first debate over national minorities that took place in 1992,
Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants were identified as being
especially problematic. International developments such as 9/11 reinvigo-
rated such beliefs. Fennema (2002) has shown how the terrorist attacks
triggered particularly fierce responses in the Dutch media, and led to sev-
eral local incidents of ethnic and religious violence.
In the meantime, the Dutch political arena witnessed the rise of the poli-
tician Pim Fortuyn. A true populist, Fortuyn built up his profile with harsh
statements on criminality, direct democracy, immigration and integration.
He pleaded for ‘zero migration’, argued that ‘the Netherlands was full’ and
called for ‘a cold war against Islam’.11 To these arguments – which were
not completely new – he added two elements: the accusation that the politi-
cal elite had enabled the failure of integration in the past; and the conten-
tion that the victim of all this was the common – and, at that, native –
Dutch voter.
Fortuyn’s populist campaign exploited his discourse very successfully.
Above all, his party won a great victory in March 2002’s local elections in
Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ second largest city. And although only a few
weeks later, Fortuyn was murdered – just before the national elections of
May 2002 – the newly established Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) won a land-
slide victory. In spite of (or perhaps thanks to) his death, the LPF party
gained 26 of the 150 parliamentary seats and thus entered Parliament as its
second-largest party. This success changed the political discourse on immi-
gration and integration radically. In fact, the aftermath of the Fortuyn vic-
tory compelled most other parties to adapt their own ways of speaking
about the issues (Penninx 2006).
Another sequence of notable events followed. It is uncertain as to
whether the events themselves had truly triggered attention to the issues of
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migration and integration, or the already high-alert status of these issues on
the political agenda gave these events the appearance of being trigger
events. First of all, a series of violent acts committed by immigrants drew
broad media attention. Secondly, several events emerged around the issues
of so-called fundamentalist mosques and radical imams. Finally, in 2004, a
major climax came when the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh was mur-
dered by a Dutch-Moroccan youngster who was affiliated to a radical
Islamist network in the Netherlands.
These events had two significant effects. First of all, they contributed to
a sense of policy failure. Parliament thus established a Parliamentary
Research Committee on the Integration Policy, comprising MPs of all par-
ties in Parliament, in order to examine ‘why policy had thus far resulted in
such limited successes.’ However, when the Committee concluded that in-
tegration had actually been relatively successful (Blok Commission 2004),
the statement was widely dismissed as being naive. This rejection made
some observers complain that a new ‘political correctness’ had emerged,
thus putting taboos on positive statements on the integration policy and
multiculturalism.12 Secondly, these events reinforced a new mode of policy
discourse, described by Prins (2002) as ‘hyperrealism’. This entailed a shift
from the 1990s ‘realist’ style of discourse – demanding a ‘tough’ approach
to integration so as to turn immigrants into full citizens – to a type of dis-
course in which ‘being tough’ became a goal in itself, regardless of its po-
tentially problematic amplifying effects. As such, it could be argued that
Fortuyn, and later, erstwhile Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration
Rita Verdonk, used the immigration and integration issue to flaunt their
‘tough’ approaches to the political establishment and, in so doing, to pro-
mote their own places in Dutch politics.
4.4 Integration Policy New Style since 2002
Thus, from 2002 onwards, the policy took another turn, as a new political
majority was in power.13 The renewed institutional setting foreshadowed
changes: the coordination of integration policies was moved from the
Ministry of Home Affairs (in which it had been located for 22 years) to the
Ministry of Justice under a new Minister for Aliens Affairs and
Integration. Integration Policy New Style, formulated in a letter by the
Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration (Ministerie van Justitie 2003),
closely follows the paradigm of the 1990s, as based on the leading con-
cepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’, though its emphasis was
much more on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. The
concept of integration policy was thus narrowed considerably. In addition,
integration policy had become clearly linked – instrumental even – to im-
migration policy as it facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted
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new flows, particularly those of asylum seekers, family reunion and mar-
riage migration.
The star measure in this new policy was the civic integration of new mi-
grants to the Netherlands, something which was reformulated to serve pur-
poses of both integration and migration control. Since 2006, newcomers
have been obliged to pass an exam that proves their Dutch language skills
and basic knowledge of Dutch culture and society before even entering the
country. Once admitted to the Netherlands, migrants must attend – and suc-
cessfully complete – civic integration courses in order to be granted both
temporary and permanent permit renewals.
The reception policy New Style thus has significant modifications when
held up to the former decade. To begin with, it newly distributes responsi-
bilities among the various partners involved, with the migrants’ own re-
sponsibility being the starting point. As of 2007, newcomers to the
Netherlands have been expected to find and fund the civic integration
courses themselves.14 Only if they pass the exam are they entitled to a re-
fund of up to 70 per cent of their training expenses. In this programme, the
responsibilities of local authorities have changed: although they still have
to monitor newcomers and their efforts to follow courses, their organisa-
tional and financial resources to promote such a process have been
minimised.
As Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration, Verdonk had aimed to
expand the target population of the new reception policy. In her first propo-
sal, the target group for mandatory civic integration courses included all
migrants between ages sixteen and 65, regardless of the amount of time
they had spent in the Netherlands and even if they had been naturalised as
Dutch. Deemed unacceptable by legal authorities and politicians, this pro-
posal was revised with a vision to extend the requirements to everyone
who had completed fewer than eight years of obligatory schooling in the
country. This target would include the so-called oldcomers – people of mi-
grant origin already living in the country – as well as naturalised immi-
grants and native Dutch who had been living abroad. Verdonk also specifi-
cally attempted to extend the requirement to immigrants from the
Netherlands Antilles, justified by the supposedly ‘problematic character’ of
this minority group. The particular proposal, however, was rejected by
Parliament who found it unconstitutional and discriminatory, since Dutch
Antilleans hold Dutch nationality to begin with. A final proposal was ulti-
mately passed at the very end of the cabinet’s legislative term, in July
2006, removing the new reception policy requirements for Dutch citizens –
native or naturalised – and postponed its actual implementation to the next
legislature.
A number of observations can be made regarding content, the policy-
making process and the governance of policy. The first observation is that
immigration and integration policies have been brought together on two
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levels: in terms of content across a number of policy measures; and in their
institutional arrangement within the Ministry of Justice, under the special
Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration.
The second observation is that the process of policymaking – in the con-
text of strong politicisation – is predominantly led, as well as set forth, by
the Minister and the political parties in Parliament. At the same time, this
policymaking process is rather selective in the topics it chooses: restrictive
admission of new immigrants, forced return of failed asylum seekers and
illegal immigrants, and mandatory civic integration courses. Undergoing a
major recentralisation, these new policies were spearheaded from a top-
down approach that was dominated by the Ministry and Parliament.
At the same time, as an observation among people interviewed at the lo-
cal level demonstrates, the majority of existing policies were left untouched
or changed only marginally. Ministries at the national level (such as those
for education, housing and labour market) and local authorities have both
carried on with most of their existing policies. This means that – contrary
to the widespread image – many of the earlier instruments that were devel-
oped through more than 25 years of integration policies are still in place.
Despite the predominant concordance that these policies have failed, they
have had – and still have – their effects (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008).
A fourth observation is that there is growing resistance to the new na-
tional policies, particularly at that local level, coming from both the local
government and civil society at large. Actors that were marginalised by
earlier welfare policies, such as churches and action groups, have become
actively in favour of immigrants, trying to protect them against govern-
mental action deemed unjust. Immigrants themselves – as citizens – are
also becoming important actors, although in a way different from ever be-
fore. The local elections of March 2006 showed that the migrant vote has
become an important instrument for redress, particularly in large Dutch ci-
ties (Van Heelsum & Tillie 2006). In Rotterdam, for example, migrants
have contributed significantly to the exit of the local LPF’s power by vot-
ing systematically for leftist parties and thus bringing the Labour Party
back in. And this has not gone unnoticed by political parties. What’s more,
on the national level, there are growing indications of resistance against
the tone and the content of migration and integration policies. One example
is April 2006’s manifesto of Één land, één samenleving (‘One country, one
society’), which was signed by former politicians from political parties
across the board; another illustration comes from October 2006 when six-
teen university chair-holders in migration and integration studies sent an
open letter to the Eerste Kamer, Dutch Parliament’s upper house, in protest
of the proposed revision of the WIN.
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5 The interaction between immigration and integration
policies
Thus far described have been the dynamics of policymaking in the do-
mains of Dutch immigration and integration policies. It was observed how,
although only gradually, the Netherlands’ identification as a country of de
facto immigration – and possibly even an immigration and/or multicultural
society – triggered responses in both policy fields. This section will look at
the dynamics of the interaction between these two fields. How do patterns
of internal dynamics of immigration and integration policy compare? And
to what extent has there been interaction between developments in these
two policy fields? Before turning to this analysis, some observations on
their differences and similarities will be drawn.
5.1 Patterns of convergence and divergence
Differences between immigration and integration policy fields are first and
foremost demonstrated by the way the subsystems are institutionalised
within the central government. Whereas integration policy has been charac-
terised by a comprehensive or strongly unitary and centralised policy coor-
dination structure, the institutional structure for the coordination of immi-
gration policies appears to have been less comprehensive. Since the early
1980s, integration policies had been assigned within the Ministry of Home
Affairs (until their reassignment to the Ministry of Justice in 2002). Within
this department, a strong – albeit fluctuating – structure was constructed
and maintained to coordinate policies horizontally, between ministries, and
vertically vis-à-vis local authorities, subsidised organisations, co-opted ex-
perts, ethnic elites and civil society actors. This system produced policy
documents, monitored implementation and had an explicit budget (separate
from funds supposed to come from the regular budgets of ministries, muni-
cipalities and other policy actors). In contrast, the institutional location of
immigration policies was (only until recently) far less clear. The Ministry
of Justice had always held formal responsibility over admission of aliens,
residence permits and possible expulsions, but the Ministry was not always
the body to decide on policies regarding admission. This was the case, for
example, with economic and asylum migrants, over whom other depart-
ments shared responsibility. As such, immigration policies were notably
less comprehensive and less unitarily coordinated than integration policies.
Immigration policies were, for a long time, subject to little debate, and ad
hoc policies were usually formulated in response to actual influxes of im-
migrants. Immigration policies thus have long been considered ‘quasi non-
policies’.
Another difference between the two policy fields has, since the 1990s,
become more manifest. While both policies had originated largely on the
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national level, as would be expected in view of the Dutch tradition of a
centralised consensus democracy, they came to develop in different direc-
tions of multilevel governance. Immigration policy has been shifting up-
wards (to the EU level), outwards (among private agencies) and down-
wards (in implementing the Linkage Act, for example). The shift upwards
to the European level has also served to provide new intergovernmental ve-
nues for strengthening national control, as opposed to handing over policy-
making competencies to the supranational level; within the European ‘in-
tergovernmental’ arena there would be less resistance to tightening migra-
tion control than within many national political arenas.
By contrast, a more pronounced trend of recentralisation can be ob-
served in the integration policy. This is especially apparent in terms of pol-
icy formulation and how issues are framed, as well as in the specific topics
that have spearheaded national policies and have been linked to other is-
sues on the national agenda. The 1990s’ trend towards decentralisation had
thus been halted and, to some extent, reversed after the turn of the millen-
nium. In the instance of civic integration courses, the shift outwards to pri-
vate agencies has coincided with the recentralisation of state control over
the courses, as in the case of the national integration exam. At the same
time, however, this top-down dynamics of recentralisation appears to be
limited: the institutional locus of many policy measures, such as in the do-
mains of labour and education, has remained with specific ministries and
local governments, all carrying out their own measures over these files.
This has led to the growing gap between national and local integration po-
licies, similar to the decoupling or ‘décalage’ that Schain (1995) observed
in France. There seems to be an increasing divergence between symbolic
politics at the national level and more pragmatic problem-coping at the lo-
cal level. Only in domains like anti-discrimination is a more significant
trend of Europeanisation apparent.
Similarities in internal policy dynamics between the two policy fields
have been evident as well. Perhaps the most significant convergence is the
politicisation of immigration and integration policymaking over the last
decade. Both have become the subject of intense political debate, often
framed in rather rhetorical and symbolical terms, and dominated by a nega-
tive tone. The attention implies that both policy subsystems have become
less isolated from macro-politics and, what’s more, that they are increas-
ingly vulnerable to external perturbations. Both have become top political
priorities, also in electoral politics, leading to a different logic of policy-
making processes. This has also led to similar patterns of resistance in both
subsystems. Local governments especially have attempted to countervail
the politicising tendencies in immigration and integration policies, calling
for a more positive and pragmatic approach.
Another similarity, related to this politicisation, concerns the growing
gap between policy discourse and policy practice. On the one hand, a
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strong variability in policymaking can be observed over the past decades,
with both domains characterised by episodes of relative stability and then
punctuated by strong changes in the framing of policy. Such fluctuations
make it difficult to evaluate policies, as the rules for measuring success or
failure have also been in constant flux. On the other hand, policy practice
has shown what appears to be a strong tendency towards path dependency.
Policy practices that were established in one policy episode have often pro-
ven very resilient in periods that follow. For instance, the Mother Tongue
and Culture Programme had a chameleon-like existence – with its multiva-
lent contributions to return migration in the 1970s, to multicultural society
in the 1980s and to acquisition of Dutch-as-second-language in the 1990s
– before being finally abandoned in 2001. Another example of policy resi-
lience is shown by the persistence of labour migration long after its official
termination in 1973 into the present day – despite all the discourse on
bringing it to an end. National politics’ tough rhetoric on illegal migration
notwithstanding, actual policy practices vis-à-vis illegal migrants seem
much more subtle. The growing gap between policy rhetoric and policy
practice emerges as the result of a general institutional path dependency, as
well as the diverging patterns of multi-level governance (albeit manifested
in distinctly unique ways in the immigration and integration policy
domains).
5.2 Interaction between immigration and integration policy fields
The early 1980s interpreted the arrivals of newcomers as historically un-
ique events. As such, there was demand for a minorities’ policy for these
groups as well as a restrictive immigration policy in order to prevent
further immigration. A restrictive immigration policy was then justified as
a necessary condition for a successful EM Policy: a constant influx of new
immigrants would create a constant demand for new policy efforts.
Such an understanding of the relation between immigration and integra-
tion policies changed in the 1990s. The 1989 report of the Scientific
Council for Government Policy called for more realistic recognition of the
permanent character of immigration. Not only would the presence of mino-
rities, but also of immigration itself, be responsible for creating a perma-
nent phenomenon in Dutch society. While the report supported a restrictive
immigration policy, it also suggested adaptations in the integration policy
so as to cope with the constant influx of newcomers. In this vein, it recom-
mended the development of civic integration programmes that would pro-
vide the link between the continuously arriving newcomers and their sub-
sequent integration in Dutch society.
This definition of the correlation between immigration and integration
was largely adopted by government of the early 1990s. It soon led the gov-
ernment to abandon the preceding decade’s relatively lenient policies on
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family migration, which came to be viewed as a growing problem for inte-
gration. But there were also ideas within governmental circles that took
some steps further. By the end of the 1980s, the Interdepartmental
Working Group on Immigration (IWI), which was chaired by the Justice
Department, argued that a realistic recognition of the nature of immigration
should generate more than mere efforts to optimally restrict immigration.
What needed to be accounted for was the ‘immigration effect’ that was en-
abled by the very facilities to which minorities had access under the inte-
gration policy. In short, immigration was not only to be restricted so as to
promote integration, but integration policy should also be less generous so
as not to encourage further immigration.
Since 2000, Dutch society has witnessed the development of a more sys-
temic connection between immigration and integration. Not only do policy
memoranda explicitly address the need to restrict immigration so as to not
endanger the ‘absorption capacity’ of Dutch society, but more stringent in-
tegration policies have increasingly become a tool for restricting immigra-
tion. The new reception programmes described above have become a way
for the Dutch government to promote the integration of newcomers, as well
as to discourage further immigration. In doing so, the programmes simulta-
neously function as a mechanism through which to select those migrants
who could prove beneficial for the Dutch economy.
6 External factors
Although it is useful to focus on internal mechanisms in the immigration
and integration policy fields, these observations are not unrelated to more
general characteristics of Dutch society and its development. Three major
developments, it seems, have had a particular influence on the process of
policymaking on migration and immigrant integration in the Netherlands.
They are the legacy of pillarisation, the Dutch welfare state and the politi-
cal culture of the Netherlands during the past decades.
6.1 The legacy of pillarisation
The legacy of pillarisation is an oft-raised explanation for Dutch exception-
alism in many domains (Hoppe 1987). Beginning in the mid-19th century,
the Netherlands had grown into a segmented society that was structured
around four ‘pillars’. The pillars comprised specific social, political or reli-
gious groups – Protestants, Catholics, Socialists, Liberals – and were
brought together only at the top where any inter-pillar conflict would be
‘pacified’ by elites of the pillars. This particular facet of Dutch history has
had pervasive effects on the country’s culture and the structure of its politi-
cal system as a ‘centralized consensus democracy’ (Lijphart 1968). Since
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the 1960s, secularisation and individualisation came to erode the social ba-
sis of Dutch society’s once pillarised structure. The role of religious institu-
tions in society gradually decreased, their relation to the nation-state was
loosened and a new notion of citizenship emerged to create a direct con-
nection between individuals and the nation-state.
These changes notwithstanding, pillarisation has had an important influ-
ence on immigrant integration policies in two basic ways. The first way re-
lates to how migrants themselves were ‘framed’. Whereas in other
European countries immigrants were defined on the basis of class, race or
colour, in the Netherlands, they were defined as ethno-cultural groups and
‘minorities’. Framing immigrants as minorities reflected the Dutch style of
an accommodating pluralism: defining immigrants as another minority
added to all those already existing. In addition, the pillarist tradition was
reflected in how immigration and integration issues were coped with. The
fragile coalition system of Dutch politics, a legacy in the history of pillar-
ism, demanded that politically sensitive issues, such as immigration and in-
tegration, be depoliticised so as to avoid centripetal forces. For example,
‘playing the race card’ for electoral gain could drive the political system
apart. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, these issues were systematically
depoliticised, accommodating conflict within relatively closed networks of
policymakers, experts and ethnic elites. Issues ‘too hot to handle’ for poli-
tics were resolved through technocratic compromise, creating a so-called
‘consensual style’ of applying expertise as an authoritative source to create
political consensus, rather than imposing such a consensus through open
political confrontation. But this style of policymaking started to break
down in the 1990s, giving way to a much more conflictive style after the
turn of the century.
The second way pillarisation has proven influential is in the institutiona-
lisation of laws and regulations. Steady secularisation of the Dutch popula-
tion and decreasing significance of pillar institutions and organisations not-
withstanding, laws and regulations have not changed that much. Although
ethnic minorities themselves never were as cohesive, sizeable and strong as
the traditional pillars of the Netherlands used to be, the institutional legacy
provided minorities with opportunities for the development of some of
their own institutions. Legal provisions of all kinds disseminated on an
equal basis, led, for instance, to the recognition and establishment of
Islamic institutions in the Netherlands. State-subsidised Islamic schools
and an Islamic broadcasting organisation are remarkable examples. It was
only from the 1990s onwards that such developments became politically
contested.
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6.2 Welfare state regime
Another factor that has had a significant impact on immigration and inte-
gration policymaking is the development of the Dutch welfare state over
the past decades. The Dutch welfare state regime has traditionally been
classified as conservative-corporatist. This type of state involves a rela-
tively high level of decommodification of citizens from market forces and
the strong involvement of state and civil society actors, such as churches,
labour unions and employers’ unions, in welfare state provisions. This
model does not encourage universal labour participation among indivi-
duals, but tends to preserve the prevailing socio-cultural structure of so-
ciety as expressed in family, class, status and, to some extent, also gender.
It was in the context of this welfare state regime that Dutch integration po-
licies began developing in the 1980s. This was reflected in a policy that
did not see immigrants exclusively as part of market forces, but also en-
couraged them to become emancipated and recognised cultural groups in
Dutch society.
The end of the 1980s reveals poor results vis-à-vis the socio-economic
aspect of EM Policy. There was a general, fact-supported consensus that
EM policies in the field of labour were ineffective throughout the 1980s,
as manifested in continued high unemployment and the low labour market
participation among immigrants. The position of constant weakness experi-
enced by minorities was due to the general restructuring of Dutch econo-
my, with its particular consequences on immigrants, as well as the result of
deficiencies in the Dutch welfare state. It was argued that the lenient
regime of access to benefits had turned minorities too much into ‘welfare
categories’ trapped in, and overly dependent on, state provisions. By then,
the welfare state’s viability had also become questionable for a number of
reasons. Thus, the issues of immigration and integration and the need for
welfare state retrenchment were brought together, producing a new per-
spective. The same Scientific Council pleaded in several reports for a more
proactive type of welfare state by a more liberal regime. For immigrants,
this meant encouraging them to ‘stand on their own feet’, as well as dis-
cussing their civic rights and duties as new citizens.
The rise of the 1990s Integration Policy was thus closely related to the
general reform of the welfare state at the time, particularly involving a re-
calibration of the responsibilities of citizen, state and market. State interfer-
ence vis-à-vis the socio-cultural position of immigrants gradually lost im-
portance. Immigrants came to be treated more as ‘citizens’ endowed with
specific civic responsibilities. Civic integration became a specific new in-
strument to ‘equip’ immigrants so they might live up to their civic respon-
sibilities for integrating into Dutch society. The relation between welfare
state reform and restrictive immigration policy was embodied in the
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Linkage Act, which excluded all illegal residents from facilities of the wel-
fare state.
Recent policy has witnessed the addition of a new element to the logic
of political discourse. Whereas the articulation of socio-cultural differences
has traditionally been perceived as a ‘corroding effect’ on social cohesion,
it may, in the same vein, be seen as undermining the type of social solidar-
ity necessary to maintain a viable welfare state (Entzinger 2006). As such,
the basic issue is no longer how to promote socio-economic participation
in order to keep the welfare state affordable, but rather, how to maintain
social cohesion and solidarity in order to generate sufficient support for the
welfare state.
6.3 The macro-political context
Finally, in the early 2000s, the style of politics shifted from conflict accom-
modation and de-politicisation towards primacy of politics and a more con-
frontational political culture. In this context, immigration and integration
policy have become the playing fields for this new political style. This
new style has had serious consequences for actors such as experts and eth-
nic elites. For example, 2004 witnessed the fierce contestation of the role
of experts in this policy domain. Politics and media criticism emerged con-
cerning how the development of policy ideas might in fact be in the hands
of ‘scientists who have multiculturalist biases’ (see Scholten 2011). The
technocratic relationship between science and politics characterising this
domain in earlier periods was now dismissed as undemocratic. As a conse-
quence, the consensual style of using expertise in policymaking and imple-
mentation was now replaced by a more selective ‘pick-and-choose’ strategy
aimed at scientific expertise.
Immigration and integration policies appear to have been as much a
cause – as an effect – of macro-political developments. Immigration and
integration were at the centre of the Fortuyn Revolt, whose leader
exploited such issues as a vehicle for political designs. As Dutch govern-
ment and democracy malfunctioned, the issues were subsequently turned
into scapegoats for broader popular dissent. For the 2002 and 2003 parlia-
mentary elections, immigration and integration became central electoral
issues unlike ever before. The failing integration policies and an alleged
ignorance towards public concerns about immigration and integration be-
came the greater symbols of a failing political system. In response, govern-
ment and politicians politicised the issues more than ever before, a phe-
nomenon that has recently been described as the ‘articulation function’. In
this light, politics is seen as naming and articulating the public’s sentiments
and problems. Integration is here interpreted as encompassing something
broader than mere immigrant integration: namely, the integration of immi-
grants and natives within a multicultural society.
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7 Conclusions
The Dutch case reveals a sequence in policymaking: from the 1970s’ ad
hoc policy responses to a technocratic type of policymaking throughout the
1980s and 1990s, and finally, to the more symbolic politics that began in
2002. In a certain respect, the Netherlands’ development differs from other
European countries. For instance, in the United Kingdom, immigration and
integration were politicised at a much earlier point in history and the model
of policymaking was bottom-up rather than top-down. The Netherlands
also proves different from Germany where, although politicisation was also
held off for considerable time, recently a pragmatic approach of coping
with integration problems has come to persist. Similarities, however, are
found in the way French policymaking has developed. As in the
Netherlands, a pragmatic approach to coping with problems was initially
exchanged for a form of technocratic governance, eventually to be replaced
by symbolic politics. Still, this development occurred at a much quicker
pace: the subsystem of technocratic governance was already emerging in
the 1970s with the politics of insertion, and a politicised form of symbolic
politics showed up by the early 1980s following the rise of the Le Pen
Movement.
The perceived Dutch exceptionalism in immigration and integration pol-
icymaking stems, in particular, from the combination of a persistent top-
down policy formulation and what was a relatively late politicisation of the
topics. More than elsewhere, immigration and integration policies have
been formulated mainly at the national level, within centralised and
strongly institutionalised structures involving the participation of a limited
number of actors. The scale of public debate was actively limited for a
considerable time, thus evading the politicisation of these sensitive issues.
This chapter has thereby put forward some explanations for the apparent
Dutch exceptionalism. First analysed, in terms of an internal dynamics,
was how specific patterns of governance could persist in the Netherlands
for such an extended period. Given the societal definitions that separated
immigration from integration – and thanks to the subsequent de-politicisa-
tion of the topics – specific policy coalitions could develop. When it came
to integration, iron triangles supported group-specific policies in the 1970s,
to be succeeded in the next decade by the strongly centralised technocratic
structure. As for immigration, the topic has long been implicitly defined as
a ‘non-issue’, thus resulting in ad hoc, reactionary policies. This was criti-
cised during the 1990s, though the system simultaneously showed a great
resistance to change. It was after the turn of the millennium, when this pat-
tern of governance disappeared, that the two policy topics became tied up
together as issues of high politics.
On an altogether different level, this chapter also explored external fac-
tors that could account for exceptionalism. First of all, the Dutch legacy of
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pillarisation, in the form of a political culture of conflict accommodation
and consensus-seeking, may explain why policymaking has for so long re-
mained behind closed doors in the Netherlands. This history of pillarisation
contributed to framing immigrants as ‘minorities’, as well as to the initial
development of a multicultural policy approach. It may also have contribu-
ted to a tendency to depoliticise issues, such as immigration and integra-
tion, that were ‘too hot to handle’ for politics. The Fortuyn Revolt led to
the emergence of a more confrontational political style, which may be in-
terpreted as much as a revolt against the legacy of pillarisation as against
specific immigration and integration policies.
Furthermore, changes in the Dutch welfare state – from a corporatist
model to a neo-liberal one – have been cited as catalysts for modifying
policy objectives and their target populations. As immigration and integra-
tion became issues of electoral politics, they came to merge with macro-po-
litical issues such as a collective unease with the Dutch political establish-
ment and concerns about national identity and social cohesion. As such,
the issues have become symbols for a ‘New Politics’ that tries to regain
popular legitimacy by articulating the voice of ‘the ordinary citizen’ and
adopting a neo-conservative line of tough policies.
Notes
1 In recent times, allochtoon – which refers to the Netherlands’ allochthonous popula-
tion, literally meaning ‘from foreign soil’ – has become the standard Dutch term
used in statistics and policy. Technically, an allochtoon is defined as a person born
outside the Netherlands (i.e. a ‘real’ immigrant) or a person with at least one parent
who was born outside the continental Dutch territory. Within the allochthonous po-
pulation, a further distinction is made between ‘Western allochthones’ (roughly refer-
ring to those coming from Europe and industrialised countries) and ‘non-Western
allochthones’.
2 Arrival of inhabitants from former and present Dutch colonies or parts of the
Netherlands Kingdom was not, by definition, seen as immigration. Its regulation
was based on recognition of an individual’s Dutch citizenship. In the case of repatri-
ates from Indonesia, this meant that only those who had natural or acquired Dutch
citizenship could ‘repatriate’. Repatriates as such included Dutch citizens who had
settled in the Dutch East Indies and those born of mixed relations who were ‘recog-
nised’ by the Dutch partner involved. Inhabitants of Surinam and the Netherlands
Antilles were citizens of the Netherlands Kingdom, according to the Treaty of 1954,
and were thus free to move. This changed for Surinam in November 1975, when the
country gained independence and thus created Surinamese citizenship. During the
transition period from 1975 to 1980, however, many Surinamese individuals suc-
cessfully claimed their Dutch citizenship.
3 The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) is an advisory body that gives
solicited and unsolicited advice to the national government on all kinds of policy
issues.
4 Such challenges among coordination efforts were brought to the political fore in a
1978 parliamentary motion (motion Molleman, PvdA) in which the Minister of
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Home Affairs was asked to take responsibility for coordinating policy pertaining to
all minorities. This idea was later realised in 1980 when the government decided to
work towards the general EM Policy.
5 Notably, Han Entzinger was working at the staff department of the Ministry of
Culture, Recreation and Social Work when he wrote the 1975 article referenced here.
6 In 1985, the National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) was established so as
to represent ethnic minorities through their own organisations. The LAO was to ad-
vise the government on issues of immigrant integration and to be consulted on ad-
ministrative issues vis-a`-vis integration policy. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the
National Consultation Body for Minorities (LOM), an institution with a weaker
mandate.
7 The policy documents of 1981 and 1983 do not employ the term ‘multiculturalism’.
Particularly by adversaries, referring to EM Policy as consisting of ‘multiculturalist’
policies is something that was only later introduced.
8 Top measures included those such as the subsidised Melkert jobs for the long-term
unemployed.
9 These courses are known in Dutch as inburgeringscursussen. The word ‘inburgering’
contains the word ‘burger’ (meaning ‘citizen’), but its denotation is not that of natur-
alisation (i.e. becoming a national citizen) as much as that of becoming a well-in-
formed, active participant in society. For the sake of clarity, the authors of this chap-
ter prefer the term ‘civic integration courses’ rather than ‘citizenship programmes’,
for the courses do not necessarily prepare people for national citizenship.
10 The meaning depends on one’s translation of the Dutch word ‘drama’ in the title of
the article ‘Het multiculturele drama’.
11 Interview published in the newspaper De Volkskrant 2 November 2001.
12 TK (Tweede Kamer), 6 April 2004, 63-4112.
13 Cabinet Balkenende I was a short-lived coalition of Christian Democrats, liberals
and the extreme-right LPF; it was followed in 2003 by Cabinet Balkenende II, a coa-
lition in which the LPF was substituted by the progressive liberals of D66.
14 Another element introduced – without much debate – since implementation of New
Style integration policy concerns financial implications: all costs of admission and
immigration for the state are to be borne by the immigrants themselves. This means
that immigrants have to pay sums of money for visas and residence permits, as well
the renewal of them – this was previously unheard of. The application for a tempor-
ary residence permit costs E 430 (its renewal E 285 per family member), and for a
permanent residence permit, E 890 (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland 2004).
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5 The case of Switzerland
Gianni D’Amato
1 Introduction
A small country located at the crossroads of Northern and Southern
Europe, Switzerland is renowned for its neutrality and peaceful attitudes,
its ethnic and linguistic diversity and a decentralised government that
makes most laws at the canton level.1 Yet there is good reason for control
and integration policies to figure large. This federalist country has been
challenged since its birth – in the aftermath of the successful liberal
Revolution of 1848 – by centrifugal forces at the religious, regional, politi-
cal, social and ideological levels. Certain foreign scholars, puzzled by
Switzerland’s apparent enduring stability (and overlooking a history of vio-
lent and disruptive conflicts from the civil war of 1847 until the social
unrest of the 1930s), identify the source of this solidarity in the clever
management of a multicultural country through its federal institutions
(Schnapper 1997). Some see Switzerland as a ‘paradigmatic case of politi-
cal integration’, the result of the state’s subsidiary structure that supports
both strong municipal autonomy and a comparatively high participation
rate of the (male) constituency in the polity (Deutsch 1976). Others see the
source of the country’s stability in the successful creation of a strong na-
tional identity, which helped overcome the social distrust that arose during
rapid industrialisation and was based on the country’s small size and the
idea that Switzerland was under permanent threat of powerful neighbouring
countries, i.e. Überfremdung (Kohler 1994; Tanner 1998).
The fear of being demographically and culturally overrun by foreigners
notwithstanding, Switzerland had one of the highest immigration rates on
the continent during the twentieth century. According to the 2000 census,
22.4 per cent of the 7.4 million people comprising the total population are
foreign born, and 20.5 percent, or nearly 1.5 million, are foreigners (de-
fined here as persons with a foreign nationality). In relative terms, the
number is twice as high as foreigners counted in the United States and con-
siderably higher than those in Canada, two classic countries of immigra-
tion. In contrast to its internal pluralistic character, however, Switzerland
does not consider itself as a country of immigration; it denied existence of
an immigrant policy at the federal level before the 1990s (Mahnig &
Wimmer 2003). This policy of prevention influenced the country’s decision
not to admit any Jewish refugees after 1933, and also affected the imple-
mentation of a guest worker rotation model after the oil crisis of 1973.2
Another paradox concerns the handling of admission and integration issues
at the political level. Just after World War II, Switzerland was a popular
destination for guest workers seeking employment in France, Germany and
Italy. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, it became a
home to Eastern European dissidents, Yugoslavian refugees and asylum
seekers from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In complete absence of
those social hardships encountered in its neighbouring countries (high un-
employment rates among migrants, ethnic and social segregation, social
unrest, etc.), the immigration issue has been a contentious topic since the
1960s, winning priority over the political agenda at certain points in time.
These inconsistencies can be explained through careful analysis of how
immigration and integration policies evolved in Switzerland. As such, sec-
tion two of this chapter describes the process of immigration and integra-
tion during the twentieth century by way of a brief historical overview and
demographic data. Section three highlights the importance of various stake-
holders who influence migration policies at the different cantonal levels.
This section also looks at external factors that may have affected the crea-
tion of this policy, showing how the political opportunity structures in
Switzerland – influenced by federalism, municipal autonomy and a consen-
sus-oriented political culture – impacted the formulation of immigration
policies as much as various external challenges (foreign governments, the
European Union) did. This chapter’s conclusion discusses the different fac-
tors that may have influenced the outcome of Switzerland’s particular im-
migration and integration policy.
2 Immigration and immigrant policies in historical
perspective
Switzerland’s reputation as an ideal place for exiles dates back to the six-
teenth century, when the Huguenots of France were welcome as religious
refugees and found their place among the cultural, political and entrepre-
neurial elite of Switzerland. But the modern transformation of Switzerland
into a country of immigration – as it is known today – took place during
its accelerated industrial take-off in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury (Holmes 1988; Romano 1996). In contrast to its rural image, the
Swiss Confederation is a European forerunner in various branches of mod-
ern mechanical and chemical industries, and has had an enormous need to
invest in knowledge and infrastructures. While many rural inhabitants were
leaving the country to make their living as peasants in the New World,
many German intellectuals fleeing from the failed liberal revolutions of
1848-1849 found their place at the local universities. Italian craftsmen and
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workers also were recruited at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, mainly in the construction business and the railroad sector.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the size of the
foreign population in Swiss cities increased: 41 per cent of people in
Geneva, 28 per cent in Basel, and 29 per cent in Zurich were born outside
Switzerland. Nationwide, Germans outnumbered the Italians and the
French (Efionayi-Mäder, Niederberger & Wanner 2005). Moreover, the
proportion of foreigners in the total population increased from 3 per cent
in 1850 to 14.7 per cent on the eve of World War I, mostly from neigh-
bouring countries. During the two world wars, however, the foreign popu-
lation decreased significantly. By 1941, Switzerland’s foreign population
had dropped to 5.2 per cent (Arlettaz 1985).
In the liberal period preceding World War I, immigration was largely the
responsibility of the cantons, whose laws had to conform to bilateral agree-
ments signed between Switzerland and other European states. Like other
agreements from this period concerning free circulation in Europe, the
Swiss agreements remained open to immigrants out of a need to ensure
Swiss citizens their also being easily able to emigrate to find work.
However, after a first campaign against the presence of aliens in
Switzerland during World War I, a new article to the Constitution appeared
in 1925. The article gave the federal government the power to address im-
migration issues at the national level, thus providing legal basis for the
existence of the federal alien’s police and the Law on Residence and
Settlement of Foreigners, which came into force in 1931 (Garrido 1990).
This law allowed the new police, the Fremdenpolizei, to implement the im-
migration policy at discretion, although at the time their aim was maintain-
ing national identity rather than regulating migration. Essentially, the
authorities had to factor into their decisions the country’s moral and eco-
nomic interests as well as of Grad der Überfremdung, or the ‘degree of
over-foreignisation’. Nationwide political consensus to ensure cultural pur-
ity in Switzerland prevented the drafting of any consistent immigrant pol-
icy until very recently. Foreigners, in principle, had to leave the country
and were not allowed to settle permanently.
2.1 Post-war labour migration
Shortly after World War II, the economic demands of neighbouring coun-
tries engaged in economic recovery stimulated rapid growth of the Swiss
economy. In the context of the post-war economic boom, Switzerland
signed a 1948 agreement with the Italian government in order to be able to
recruit Italian guest workers. The workers were mainly employed in the
construction sector but also in textile and machine factories. A steady flow
of foreign workers immigrated to Switzerland. Their numbers increased
from 285,000 in 1950 (6.1 per cent of the total population) to 585,000
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(10.8 per cent) in 1960 and to 1,080,000 (17.2 per cent) in 1970.
Predominantly Italian during the 1950s, the composition diversified in the
1960s. By 1970, though over 50 per cent were still Italian, about 20 per
cent were natives of Germany, France and Austria, while 10 per cent were
Spaniards and 4 per cent were Yugoslavs, Portuguese and Turks (Mahnig
& Piguet 2003). Initially, these immigrants with temporary seasonal per-
mits were entitled to stay for one year, though their contracts could be pro-
longed, which frequently happened. A similar agreement with Spain was
signed in 1961.
To ensure the workers did not settle permanently and could be sent
home, the period of residence required for obtaining a permanent residence
permit was increased from five to ten years and restrictive conditions on
family reunion were adopted. This policy was called the ‘rotation model’
because it meant that new workers could be brought in as others returned
home. While the economy boomed throughout the 1960s, the Swiss gov-
ernment’s guest worker system became less tightly controlled. As
Switzerland faced increasing pressure from Italy to introduce more gener-
ous family reunification laws, the number of Italian workers willing to
come to Switzerland decreased, while other destinations, such as Germany,
became more attractive after the signing of the Roman Treaty; also, the in-
ternal economic boom and development started a wave of internal migra-
tion, particularly to destinations in Northern Italy.
It was also at this time that the Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation (OEEC) introduced standards for family reunification. Other
international guiding bodies, such as the International Labour Organization
(ILO), also pressured the Swiss government into adopting more ‘humane’
family reunification policies. In response, the government began replacing
its rotation system with an integration-oriented scheme that facilitated fa-
mily reunification, made foreign workers more eligible for promotions and
attempted to end labour market segmentation (Niederberger 2004).
Following the 1973 oil crisis, many workers became superfluous, thus
having to leave the country because they lacked adequate unemployment
insurance. This allowed Switzerland to ‘export’ its unemployed guest
workers without renewing their resident permits (Katzenstein 1987). The
total percentage of the foreign population fell from 17.2 per cent in 1970
to 14.8 per cent in 1980. But as the economy recovered, new guest work-
ers arrived not only from Italy, but also from Spain, Portugal and Turkey.
Their part of the population increased from 14.8 per cent (945,000 persons)
in 1980 to 18.1 per cent (1,245,000 persons) in 1990 and 22.4 per cent in
2000 (nearly 1.5 million people) (Mahnig & Piguet 2003).
In the late 1970s, the government gave seasonal workers many of the
same rights as guest workers who had come on longer contracts, namely
the ability to transform their seasonal permits into permanent residency
and to bring their families. Since the number of seasonal permits issued
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did not decrease – they numbered at 130,000 per year on average between
1985 and 1995 – these permits became a gateway for permanent immigra-
tion and a means to supply cheap labour sectors of the economy, which
would otherwise not have been able to survive given Switzerland’s high
wages. A 1982 reform of the Alien’s Law was thought to regulate the
transformation of permits heuristically and give permanent residents a firm
hope to stay in the country. But the successful referendum of the Swiss
Democrats (SD), a radical right-wing fringe party accepted by a slight ma-
jority of the population, put an end to the reform of immigration and mi-
grant settlement laws. Seasonal permits were therefore still available until
2002.
By the time the worldwide recession of the early 1990s reached
Switzerland, the unskilled and aging guest workers suffered high rates of
unemployment and found it very difficult to find new jobs. This situation
led to an unprecedented level of structural unemployment and poverty, one
that Switzerland had not experienced in prior decades. Switzerland’s larger
cities, which, according to the subsidiary logic of the Swiss federal system,
had to organise the welfare and find solutions, urged the federal govern-
ment to act and support extended integration patterns towards immigrant
workers (D’Amato & Gerber 2005). A new admission policy was needed
to combine the evolving needs of a new economy with those of migration
control.
2.2 Asylum policy
After World War II, the Swiss government recognised that its authorities
had been responsible for denying admission to many Jewish refugees. The
government stressed its willingness to uphold the country’s humanitarian
tradition and, in 1955, signed the Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees of 1951. During the next two decades, the country
adopted a liberal policy, offering asylum to refugees from communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe. In 1956, 14,000 Hungarians were allowed to settle
permanently after their country’s uprising against Soviet troops and, in
1968, 12,000 Czechoslovakian nationals arrived in Switzerland (Efionayi-
Mäder 2003).
These people, who were often well educated, had little difficulty obtain-
ing refugee status. The government and the public gave them a warm wel-
come, which is not surprising given the strong anti-communist sentiments
at this time. In the mid-1970s, the arrival of a few hundred Chilean dissi-
dents who fled Pinochet’s regime ignited controversial debates about their
asylum eligibility. Between 1979 and 1982, Switzerland offered protection
to approximately 8,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian ‘boat people’,3 who
were accepted on the basis of yearly quotas. Their subsequent integration
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process was more difficult than that of any previous refugee group (Parini
& Gianni 1997, 2005).
All these events prompted the creation of a new federal asylum policy in
1981, which codified the country’s relatively generous practices. It defined
the rules of the refugee status determination procedure and gave the
Confederation policymaking power, while clearly giving the cantons the re-
sponsibility of implementing these policies. In domains such as welfare,
education and repatriation, the power of the cantons in making refugee-
related decisions was significant. As a result, there were major policy dif-
ferences between the cantons.
After 1981, two trends emerged. Firstly, the number of applications,
which had been steady at about 1,000 per year during the 1970s, increased
exponentially. Secondly, most of the refugees – except for a large number
from Poland in 1982 – came from other parts of the world: Turkey, Sri
Lanka, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Unlike the anti-communist dissi-
dents, they were not always professional or university-educated. Some
came from rural areas, some had not even finished primary school, while
others had university degrees unrecognised in Europe. In addition, a weak
economy made it difficult for these non-European refugees to find work.
As more people from outside Europe filed applications, in the mid-1980s,
asylum had become a sensitive subject. In public debates, refugees were
called ‘asylum seekers’ or the derogatory term ‘asylants’ to indicate they
did not deserve refugee status. Since the 1981 law’s subsequent revisions
created stricter procedures, the government gradually started accepting few-
er asylum requests, even from people fleeing civil wars and violence. As a
rough indicator of this trend, positive answers to applications averaged at
86 per cent between 1975 and 1979. This number dropped to an average
of 47 per cent between 1980 and 1984, and again to an average of 6 per
cent between 1985 and 1990 (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2005).
3 Immigration policies and policymaking
Since immigration and integration policies in Switzerland are intrinsically
bound, this section will first present the main actors of policymaking and
then discuss the recent changes in admission, asylum, integration and nat-
uralisation policies.
3.1 The actors of policymaking
Until 2005, two federal offices within the Federal Department of Justice
and Police dealt with ‘foreigners’ living in Switzerland: the Federal Office
for Refugees (FOR) and the Federal Office for Immigration, Integration
and Emigration (IMES). The first office was introduced in 1991 in reaction
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to the influx of asylum seekers since the 1980s. The second federal office
was founded in the year 2000, albeit with beginnings dating back to the
implementation of the Law on Residence and Settlement of Foreigners of
1931. Its main task was to prevent the ‘over-foreignisation’ of Switzerland
and to enforce insertion policies for foreigners. These two federal offices
became one entity, when merged into the Federal Office for Migration
(FOM) on 1 January 2005. One branch in the new FOM continues to be
responsible for implementation of Swiss asylum policy. Another picks up
where IMES left off, implementing the admission policy, which includes
the enforcement of laws regarding residence in Switzerland (immigration
and residence section) and assessing labour market needs (labour market
section). The changes within the organisational structure of the federal of-
fice reflect the will to implement a coherent policy on foreigners, compris-
ing admission, stay and integration (Efionayi-Mäder, Lavenex,
Niederberger, Wanner & Wichmann 2003).
The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which is a part of
the Federal Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), is the government
agency responsible for questions about economics and labour. SECO has
influenced Swiss labour migration policy since 1945 by determining the
qualitative and quantitative needs of the market.
At the federal level, there are three important permanent commissions,
namely the Federal Commission for Foreigners (FCF), the Federal
Commission against Racism (FCR) and the Federal Commission for
Refugees (CFR). The FCF was set up as an expert commission of the Swiss
Federal Council in 1970; it reports directly to the Federal Department of
Justice and Police.
The FCF’s central concern is the integration of foreigners. Since 2001,
funds have been available for projects promoting integration. At present,
the FCF comprises 28 members, two of whom hold observer status. The
members are representatives of various foreigners’ organisations, municipa-
lities, communities, cantons, employers and employees and churches, or
have a professional background in implementing integration policies. The
FCF assists in promoting the creation of educational and vocational oppor-
tunities for foreigners and in the recognition of professional training in
cooperation with the relevant cantonal authorities; it participates in the in-
ternational exchange of views and experience; it mediates between organi-
sations that are active in the field of cooperation and the federal authorities;
it publishes opinions and recommendations regarding general issues of mi-
gration; and, moreover, it is consulted on questions of migration during
legislative proceedings.
In 2008, the FCF and the CFR were merged into one commission, the
Federal Commission on Migration (FCM). Both the FCM and the FCR
hold meetings on a quarterly basis. They organise joint events, such as the
national conference on the revision of the law on naturalisation. The
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Federal Commission Against Racism is part of the Federal Department of
Home Affairs (DHA). Within the DHA, there is the Service de Lutte contre
le Racisme, an interlocutor that coordinates the activities of various actors
participating in the fight against racism. Amongst other activities, it admin-
isters a fund for anti-racism projects. The CFR is an advisory body to the
government and to the ministries working on refugee issues.
All these commissions form an important interest group in the consulta-
tion of new laws, insofar as Switzerland leaves a significant part of deci-
sion-making to institutions of direct democracy. In particular, in the area of
migration policy, political processes and policymaking are dominated by
pre-parliamentarian negotiations and direct democracy, while Parliament
plays a secondary role (Mahnig 1996). Significantly, the two levels of pol-
icymaking and political process are also characterised by different political
styles (Neidhart 1970). While in pre-parliamentarian negotiations the com-
promise is the final objective of the consultation process, in which expert
commissions can play a decisive role, the arena of direct democracy is
mainly determined by confrontational attitudes and divisive outcomes.
At the federal level, Switzerland’s most important political parties are the
‘centrist block’ composed of the Christian Democrats (CVP), the Swiss
People’s Party (SVP), the Liberal-Democratic Party (FDP) and the left-wing
parties, namely the Social Democrats (SPS) and the Green Party (GP).
With the exception of the GP, all parties are members of the government.
The SVP is an important stakeholder in the debates on migration and asy-
lum policy. Formerly the party of artisans and peasants, it changed into a
radical modern populist party once the charismatic lawyer and entrepreneur
Christoph Blocher took over its Zurich branch in the late 1970s. The SVP
supported a popular initiative aiming to reduce the number of residents il-
legally residing in Switzerland and was in charge of an initiative taken
against ‘asylum abuse’. In Zurich, the party launched an initiative demand-
ing that all requests for naturalisation be subject to popular referendum.
Trade unions and employer’s representatives also play a role in the for-
mulation of Swiss immigration policy. They exert their influence both in a
formal manner, via the consultation procedure, and informally, by deter-
mining the quota of foreigners allowed into Switzerland. Due to the state’s
federal structure, the cantons are very influential actors in the formulation
of governmental policies as well. The cantons’ sphere of authority, when it
comes to policies affecting foreigners, includes the alien’s police and is fo-
cused on determining the needs of the labour market. Furthermore, the can-
tons are responsible for the implementation of integration measures. As the
Confederation does not have a federal police, the cantons are responsible
for maintaining public order and enforcing decisions involving repatriation.
Thus, it is through their competence and experience in implementing mea-
sures concerning asylum seekers that the cantons contribute significantly to
the formulation of Swiss policy in this area. The Conference of Cantonal
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Ministers of Justice and Police (CCMJP) has become increasingly vocal on
its position on questions of interior security (e.g. concerning crimes com-
mitted by foreigners) and asylum.
Cooperation with the municipalities is important as the municipalities
are responsible for the accommodation of asylum seekers and refugees,
and must pay for costs associated with the social welfare of regular immi-
grants. Their point of view is that their concerns are not sufficiently taken
into consideration in the formulation and implementation of asylum and
immigration policies. Larger cities, notably Zurich, have recently launched
spontaneous initiatives on the asylum issue inciting major debate. Smaller
municipalities have also been in the headlines recently: one municipality
refused to accommodate the requested number of asylum seekers; others
have banned access to public areas such as schools, playgrounds and soc-
cer fields.
NGOs also play a role in implementing Swiss asylum policy. They offer
social counselling and legal advice to asylum seekers. The Swiss Refugee
Council (the Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe, known as the SFH) is an um-
brella organisation of Swiss asylum organisations that seeks to exert influ-
ence on political decision-making by publishing position papers on various
asylum-related questions.
Other NGOs in the asylum field include charity organisations Caritas
and Swiss Interchurch Aid (HEKS) and the Swiss Red Cross. March 2001
saw creation of the Forum pour l’Integration des Migrantes et des Migrants
(FIMM Suisse). Composed of 330 representatives, FIMM is the umbrella
organisation of all foreigners’ associations in Switzerland. It organises pub-
lic debates on issues concerning foreigners in Switzerland (e.g. Schengen
agreements), collaborates with the federal authorities (FOM, FCM) and
participates in the consultation procedure. It is partially financed by the
FCM.
3.2 Recent changes in immigration policies
The following paragraphs describe how the different interest groups con-
sult with the federal administration during the policymaking process in
Parliament and, not least of all, through the means provided by direct
democracy.
There have been two major changes in the last few years regarding regu-
lar immigration. First, June 2002 saw entry into force of the Bilateral
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the
EU member states. Second came an admission policy applicable to third-
country nationals that would prove more restrictive than the policy
Switzerland had pursued thus far, resulting in admitting ‘only urgently re-
quired qualified workers’ from outside the EU/EFTA area. At present,
work permits are only issued to executives, specialists and other highly
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qualified workers from outside the EU/EFTA area if no Swiss or EU na-
tional meets the requirements. When issuing residence permits, the authori-
ties further consider candidates’ professional qualifications, their ability to
adapt to professional requirements, language skills and age. If a person
meets the criteria established in these areas, he or she should, in theory, be
able to achieve sustainable integration into the Swiss labour market and
the social environment (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2003).
In 2005, the draft for a new Alien’s Law was under discussion in both
chambers of Parliament. At the end of 2006, it was passed despite a refer-
endum that wanted to prevent the introduction of a two-class admission
system between EU and non-EU immigrants. During the hearings, it be-
came evident that this bill would cause sharply polarised campaigns, not to
mention that the last attempt, in 1982, to reform the Alien’s Law had been
doomed to failure. At the time, the reform was only supported by the CVP
and the FDP, while the SVP did not want to introduce any improvement
for third-country nationals, denying them the opportunity of family reunifi-
cation. The political left – notably, the SPS, the GP and the unions – criti-
cised the discriminatory partitioning of foreigners into two categories,
which vividly evoked old initiatives that had been rejected by the popula-
tion. When finally presented in Parliament, the bill was challenged by left
and right parties for different reasons: the former beseeching equal treat-
ment of all foreigners; the latter seeking more effective combat of abuses
to foreigners’ laws and the abolishment of prospects for family
reunification.
A few representatives from the political right were particularly irritated
that the Swiss National Council (the Nationalrat, which represents the peo-
ple) had passed a special regulation concerning undocumented migrants
who had resided illegally in the country for over four years. The regulation
specified that these sans-papiers should, for humanitarian reasons, have the
opportunity to request their residence be legally authorised in the near fu-
ture. Curiously enough, no irritation was caused by a simultaneously pro-
posed, albeit unsuccessful, motion by an SVP MP promoting the hiring of
unqualified third-country nationals as seasonal workers in branches of the
economy such as the farming, tourism and construction industries. From
then on, the allocation of a residence permit would be contingent on at-
tending integration courses that were, against the SVP’s will, subsidised by
the federal government. The National Council also passed clauses against
migrants partaking in marriages of convenience, smugglers and illegal mi-
grants, and introduced carrier sanctions at Swiss airports on all airlines
transporting passengers without valid papers.
The Alien’s Law was ratified by the National Council with support from
the CVP and the FDP. The SPS also approved this bill, mostly not to hin-
der further negotiations and to prevent a more restrictive interpretation
from emerging. The GP and the SVP refused to support the law for
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opposite reasons: the former out of human rights concerns; the latter be-
cause the bill was not strict enough to fight abuses. In December 2003, the
new Federal Council thus elected a council member to be responsible for
migration issues, Minister of Justice Christoph Blocher (SVP) who would
present a more restrictive version of the bill in the Swiss Council of States.
The Council of States, Parliament’s second chamber representing the
cantons, voted for a more severe interpretation of the bill. Led by a CVP-
FDP majority, the Council of States cancelled all mandatory provisions in
the Alien’s Law. Persons with a residence permit would no longer be al-
lowed automatic family reunification; permission for this would remain at
the discretion of the cantons. A special regulation concerning sans papiers
was also abolished, as Blocher argued that, with the exception hardship
cases, all illegal immigrants should leave the country. Impeded thus were
both laws, that concerning family reunification and that pertaining to regu-
larising sans papiers. To facilitate the integration of young persons reunited
with their families, however, the age at which a permanent residence per-
mit could be claimed was lowered from fourteen to twelve.
In the second reading, the National Council joined in the interpretation
of the Council of States, also abolishing the article allowing a limited num-
ber of unqualified persons to enter the country. The SPS-GP parliamentary
party announced a referendum against this bill, which was supported by
migrant associations, notably the umbrella organisation FIMM. The erst-
while FCF published a report expressing concern about the severe interpre-
tation of integration measures. Together with the revised Asylum Law, the
bill was submitted to a referendum that was won by the government in
September 2006. The more restrictive law passed all procedures and took
effect in 2008.
In quantitative terms, the new bill – like the old law – paves a path for
authorities to pursue a more permissive or more restrictive admission pol-
icy as necessary. The decisive factors for determining Switzerland’s quotas
of admittees from outside the EU/EFTA are the current economic situation
and the need for labour in certain segments of the market. The authorities
will continue to be able to adopt a quota for third-country nationals
(Kontingentierung).
The policy’s basic principle is that admission must serve the interest of
the entire economy, not on the basis of particular interests. As such, profes-
sional qualifications and the ability to integrate should play decisive roles.
Moreover, admission must take Switzerland’s social and demographic
needs into account. In contrast to regulations present in the old Alien’s
Law, a controlled opening of the market to self-employed people is fore-
seen in the law if the activity is likely to stimulate competition. Increased
competition should promote the efficiency of the economy and, in the long
run, guarantee the international competitiveness of Swiss companies. When
labour market needs were reassessed in the 1990s, post-war migration
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policy was identified as one of the main reasons for reduced investments
and a decline of Swiss competitiveness in various new industrial branches
(Blattner & Sheldon 1989; Sheldon 1998).
On the one hand, the new Alien’s Law constitutes a higher barrier for
nationals of non-EU/EFTA states to enter Switzerland. On the other hand,
the situation for foreigners who lawfully and permanently reside in
Switzerland will be improved through better opportunities to change occu-
pations, jobs or cantons. The subsequent immigration of families of short-
term residents and students is also to be permitted, provided that residential
and financial requirements be satisfied. These measures facilitate integra-
tion, simplify procedures for the employers and authorities and ensure uni-
form application of the law. In the aforementioned areas, the law aims to
harmonise the rules applicable to third-country nationals with those appli-
cable to EU/EFTA nationals (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2003).
3.3 Recent changes in asylum policies
As elsewhere in Western Europe, asylum migration increasingly gained im-
portance during the 1980s. Labour migration seeped into the public dis-
course since its issues had manifold moral, political and judicial implica-
tions. Although asylum recognition rates decreased in the 1990s, many
asylum seekers were able to remain in Switzerland under subsidiary protec-
tion or for humanitarian reasons. While their rights were restricted during a
period of time that was regulated by the canton – their access to the labour
market and welfare were limited and family reunification was forbidden –
most of those granted protection were later able to settle permanently. In
the 1990s, war in the former Yugoslavia prompted a massive influx of asy-
lum seekers from Bosnia and Kosovo, many of whom had family ties in
Switzerland from labour migration that began in the 1960s. Between 1990
and 2002, Switzerland received 146,587 asylum applications from the war-
torn Balkans. According to the Swiss Federal Office for Migration, some
10,000 persons were granted asylum, and 62,000 received temporary or
subsidiary protection over the course of several years (Kaya 2005).
The Swiss public became concerned about the increasing number of asy-
lum applications, largely because the economy was in recession and unem-
ployment was on the rise. Thus, the federal government adopted adminis-
trative and legal measures to speed up the processing of applications and
the implementation of decisions. And after numerous partial revisions, a
completely revised Asylum Law came into force in 1999. Among the
many changes making it more restrictive, this law introduced new grounds
for non-admission to the regular asylum procedure. This meant that appli-
cants who stayed in the country illegally prior to their request or who did
not submit travel or identity documents would generally be refused asylum.
On the other hand – and as a concession to humanitarian arguments – the
176 GIANNI D’AMATO
law now allowed temporary collective protection of war refugees, giving
Kosovars and Bosnians temporary admission.
Most asylum seekers from Bosnia and Kosovo had to leave Switzerland
after the conflicts ended in 1995 and 1999, respectively. Those who re-
turned home, including some who waited several years to do so, benefited
from a return programme consisting of financial support, building materials
and assistance for their home communities. An estimated 40,000 to 60,000
persons from Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro returned home, either
with or without aid from the Swiss government, while approximately
10,000 with refugee status from the former Yugoslavia stayed. No reliable
figures are available for the number of asylum seekers from Bosnia and
Kosovo who remained in the country illegally (Efionayi-Mäder et al.
2005).
Despite the steady decrease in asylum requests – in 2003 the number of
requests fell nearly 20 per cent from the prior year, or 20,806 in absolute
numbers – the SVP continued to battle asylum inflows. Since their initia-
tive against asylum abuses did not pass the ballot in 2002 (they lost with
the narrowest result in Swiss history: 49.9 per cent), the party tried to de-
tect new fields of operation. As a moral winner, the SVP demanded a new
asylum initiative in June 2003, seeing as it did not expect any revolution-
ary improvements from the parliamentarian revision. This initiative by
SVP chairman Blocher, also still MP at the time, provoked the other par-
ties. They condemned SVP procedures as being a form of ‘blackmailing’,
not to mention pure election campaign strategy. The other parties re-
sponded with a revision of the Asylum Law, expressing the will to transfer
competences for asylum matters completely to the federal level. Another
idea was to exclude uncooperative and liable asylum seekers at the begin-
ning of the asylum procedure as well as those who stayed in the country il-
legally. They were to be punished with a prison sentence or expulsion
(NZZ 11 June 2003, 15 September 2003).4
In reaction to the unexpected success of the SVP’s initiative against
abuses, the Political Institutions Committee of the National Council
decided against revising the Alien’s Law first, and the Asylum Law sec-
ond, as had been originally intended. They wanted to take both revisions
to the vote simultaneously. Meanwhile, the SVP had plans to bring forward
a revision of the Asylum Law, though with no success (NZZ 10 January
2003).
The government realistically interpreted the population’s sceptical atti-
tude towards their asylum policy, yet the decreasing number of asylum re-
quests no longer supported this interpretation de facto. Support from the
people was to be regained by means of a new asylum law. Therefore, asy-
lum seekers whose request could not be accommodated in the future would
be treated as illegal foreigners without any rights to claim social welfare
benefits. They were transferred to the less attractive though constitutionally
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protected emergency aid, which is submitted to continuous administrative
controls. From this procedure, the government anticipated additional
annual savings of approximately 77 million CHF, as well as an increase in
the number of repatriations and Switzerland’s loss of attraction as a desti-
nation country. However, only a few years before had the cantons and ci-
ties refused to support a similar measure, fearing the impact it would have
on their housing costs (cantons and municipalities are responsible for emer-
gency aid) (NZZ 13 February 2003,14 February 2003, 5 April 2003). But
with the SVP’s electoral success, the mood in Parliament shifted, produ-
cing a more restrictive policy.
The National Council affirmed the third-country regulations with a
strong majority and support of the centre-right parties. Consequently,
Switzerland would stop accepting asylum requests in the future if an appli-
cant had already received a negative response in an EU or EES country. It
also approved the concept of humanitarian admission. Neither the SVP’s
proposal favouring stricter admission requirements nor those of the social
democrats and the ecologists that privileged more unconstraint measures,
however, were taken into account. Hence, the humanitarian admission pro-
gram would be granted only in cases where expulsion was not allowed for
humanitarian reasons and the person in question was in a state of serious
need. Further on, the admission programme foresaw the right to reunify
the families under certain conditions and also granted a facilitated access
to the labour market.
In the final vote, the National Council accepted the revision of the
Asylum Law with 98 to 49 votes and 30 abstentions. CVP and FDP fa-
voured the bill without any exception; the GP was just as opposed to it.
Two thirds of the SPS members in the National Council were also in fa-
vour of the revision. The majority of the SVP was against it; and most ab-
stentions also came from this party (NZZ 31 August 2004).
However, Blocher, at that time elected by Parliament as a new Federal
Councillor, was dissatisfied with approved changes of the National Council
and introduced modification requests concerning consultation of the
Council of States. The Minister of Justice pleaded for various measures
including: tightening the eviction order, expanding territorial bans, introdu-
cing short-term arrests, tightening decisions concerning sans-papiers, abol-
ishing humanitarian admission and collecting charges should asylum see-
kers request to revaluate admission procedures. When consulted, the can-
tons welcomed these innovations, with coercive measures encountering
especially wide consensus. Notably, the cantons agreed less with the finan-
cial consequences of a system change, particularly regarding humanitarian
assistance. While welfare organisations, the UNHCR, churches, the SPS,
the GP and five cantons voiced fundamental doubts about this revision, the
FDP and the CVP by and large supported the change, even if they had re-
servations about some paragraphs. The SVP supported Blocher’s
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suggestions unflinchingly, while wishing for stricter measures still. At the
end of August, the Federal Council had endorsed Blocher’s argumentation
in toto, but refused to support the expansion of eviction orders or the abol-
ishment of humanitarian admission (NZZ 1 July 2004, 21 July 2004 (argu-
mentation of the churches), 22 July 2004 (argumentation of local authori-
ties association), 28 July 2004 (argumentation of the UNHCR), 6 August
2004 (argumentation of cantons)).
The Council of States did not disappoint the Federal Council or the can-
tons when their turn came, speaking out for a sharper asylum law in the
spring 2005 debate (NZZ 18 March 2005). However, the fact that Blocher
had proposed his amendments in an accelerated proceeding caused resent-
ment to prevail. A rejection request from SPS member of the Council of
States Simonetta Sommaruga, asking for an examination of the amend-
ments’ conformity with requirements of the Constitution and international
law, did not stand a chance. In reaction, Blocher stated that none of his
suggestions so far were rejected by either the Federal Council or internal
experts on the charge that they contradicted international law. Finally, the
political institution committee’s decision corresponded to the cantons’
desire for stricter interpretation of the Asylum Law, asking for a coercive
detention, which could be expanded up to two years. Switzerland was the
only state in Europe to reject the new status of humanitarian admission be-
cause of the automatic family reunification programme originally included
in its proposal. For hardship cases, the Council of States wanted to apply
provisional admission. Thus, the cantons could grant labour market access
to persons whose return was inadmissible, unreasonable or impossible and,
moreover, who were socially integrated. However, if at the beginning of
the asylum process no passport or identity card could be submitted to the
authorities, but only a document such as a birth certificate or a driver’s li-
cense, any asylum requests by the applicant would no longer be consid-
ered. If persecution in the country of origin could be convincingly proven,
the asylum proceeding would remain open. This last point was criticised
by the political left and some members of central-right parties as being dis-
proportionate and unconstitutional. The left also resisted – in vain – the
freezing of social welfare assistance to rejected asylum seekers. The new
law foresaw only emergency support for this group, which anyway could
always be denied to uncooperative asylum seekers (NZZ 18 March 2005).
Federal Councillor Blocher’s argumentation passed the Council of States
and the second reading in the National Council with a large majority. Daily
newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) noted with astonishment how
unanimously all centre-right parties stood behind Bundesrat Blocher and
expressed surprise over the fact that no further suggestions were introduced
in the formulation of a future migration policy. This seemed to prove
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how much the mood had changed after Christoph Blocher had taken
over the justice department. Today bills are passed with large majo-
rities whereas a few years ago they would have caused even doubt
and refusal in the political centre-right camp. The left, the charitable
organizations and the churches have not reacted to these changes
and, furthermore, practically oppose all changes in the whole coun-
try instead of focusing on some really problematic reinforcement of
the law. (NZZ 28 September 2005, translated by the author)
Together with the Alien’s Law, the Asylum Law was submitted to a popu-
lar referendum and passed the ballot with a 3-to-1 vote in September 2006,
subsequently coming into operation 2008.
3.4 Recent changes in integration policies
When the Swiss government dropped its rotation policy in the early 1960s,
it recognised that the only alternative could be a policy of integration.
However, the belief – both then and now – is that integration takes place
naturally, on the labour market and at schools, as well as in associations,
labour unions, clubs, churches, neighbourhoods and through other informal
networks (Niederberger 2004). Since the 1970s, the Confederation’s main
integration policy has been aiming to improve the legal status of immi-
grants, reuniting families more quickly and granting immigrants a more
secure status. To facilitate the integration of foreigners and to respond to
the public’s concerns about them, in 1970, the government established the
Federal FCF, now known as the FCM (see section 3.1). Promoting the co-
existence of foreign and native populations, the commission brings
together municipalities, communities, cantons, foreigners’ organisations,
employers and employees and churches. The FCM cooperates with canto-
nal and communal authorities, immigrant services and immigration actors,
such as charities and economic associations. It also publishes opinions and
recommendations regarding general issues on migration and provides testi-
mony for political debates on migration-related policy.
After strong lobbying by cities during the economic crisis of the 1990s,
the Swiss alien policy adapted to the new reality, considering the integra-
tion of foreigners a prerequisite for achieving a politically and socially sus-
tainable immigration policy. ‘Integration’ here referred to the participation
of foreigners in economic, social and cultural life. The integration article in
the old Alien’s Law, passed in 1999, paved the way for a more proactive
federal integration policy; it also strengthened the former FCF’s role. Since
2001, the government has spent an annual 10-12 million CHF (E 6-E 7
million) to support integration projects, including language and integration
courses and training for integration leaders. Cantons and larger municipali-
ties also have their own integration and intercultural cooperation committees
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and offices, which offer language and integration courses. In many commu-
nities, foreigners participate on school boards and, in some cases, the mu-
nicipal government. With the support of consulates and the local education
department, larger communities offer courses in immigrant children’s na-
tive languages and cultures. While churches prove to be among the major
institutions promoting coexistence of the Swiss and the foreign population,
other non-governmental organisations have become more interested in the
process as well.
The aforementioned new Alien’s Law of 2008 foresees that candidates
for immigration fulfil certain criteria to facilitate their integration. This re-
strictive component corresponds in its content to the criterion of highly
qualified immigration. Level of education and professional qualifications
are thought to improve the integration of foreigners and guarantee their vo-
cational reintegration in cases of unemployment. The restriction aims to
avoid repeating past errors, e.g. granting temporary work permits to low-
qualified seasonal workers. In fact, the new Alien’s Law abolishes the sta-
tus of seasonal workers. Furthermore, it explicitly foresees that it is the
immigrant’s duty to make every effort necessary to facilitate his or her
own integration. Permanent residents and their families are required to inte-
grate on both professional and social levels (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2003).
The Swiss government has a budget available to fund projects that
promote integration. New instruments have been adopted to coordinate
measures at the federal and cantonal levels. Cantons have had to establish
integration offices and launch projects that promote linguistic, professional
and other forms of integration. A first round of projects to promote integra-
tion has already been implemented.
3.5 Recent changes in naturalisation policies
Persons who have resided in Switzerland for twelve years – those spent be-
tween the completed tenth and twentieth years are counted double for this
purpose – may apply for naturalisation. The Federal Office for Migration
examines whether applicants are integrated into ‘the Swiss way of life’, are
familiar with Swiss customs and traditions, comply with Swiss laws and
do not endanger Switzerland’s internal or external security. In particular,
this examination is based on cantonal and communal reports. If the require-
ments provided by the federal law are satisfied, applicants are entitled to
obtain a federal naturalisation permit from the Federal Office for Migration
(Wanner & D’Amato 2003).
Naturalisation proceeds in three stages. The federal naturalisation permit
is thus seen merely as the Confederation’s green light for acquisition of
Swiss nationality. The cantons and communities have their own, additional
residence requirements that applicants must satisfy once federal precondi-
tions are satisfied. Once the federal naturalisation permit is obtained, only
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those applicants naturalised by their communities and cantons acquire
Swiss citizenship. As a general rule, there is no legally protected right to
being naturalised by a community and a canton. The cantons’ criteria, as
well as the way in which they decide who gets citizenship, vary greatly.
For example, in Nidwalden, applicants must have spent the entire twelve-
year period in the canton. In Geneva, two years of residence are sufficient
and candidates having moved from other cantons fulfil the federal precon-
ditions. The requirements at the communal level can vary greatly as well.
In three referenda passed over the last twenty years (1983, 1994, 2004),
Swiss voters and the majority of the cantons rejected laws that would have
made it easier for the children of immigrants to become naturalised. The
law submitted to a referendum in 2004 would have allowed the Swiss-born
grandchild of a foreign resident to gain Swiss citizenship automatically at
birth. The main reason for this new provision was that automatic naturali-
sation would have eliminated the community’s decision-making role,
which many Swiss considered an important step in the political process.
Over the last 50 years, naturalisation rates have stayed lower than federal
authorities have desired probably because many immigrants decided to
return to their home countries after working in Switzerland. In 1992, dual
citizenship became permitted. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of nat-
uralisations increased from 8,757 to 37,070. Nationals from the former
Yugoslavia, mostly from Kosovo and Bosnia, were the quickest to natura-
lise, having little interest in returning to the unstable political situation in
their home country. Also, having Swiss citizenship would mean they could
never be forced to return. Yet, citizenship is not always necessary for vot-
ing in local elections. In several French-speaking cantons, foreigners who
have lived in the canton for many years have the right to vote at the muni-
cipal level and, in a few cantons, even on cantonal matters. The 2004 intro-
duction of this legal innovation led to hotly debated controversy on the sig-
nificance of citizenship.
As already mentioned, in 2002, Swiss Parliament debated the revision of
the citizenship law for a third time. In the detailed consultation process,
there were violent criticisms of suggestions presented by the Federal
Council and the CVP to shorten the minimum residence requirements. The
SPS and the GP claimed a reduction of six years, while the SVP and a ma-
jority of the FDP wanted to maintain the present twelve years. When it
came to regulations to facilitate naturalisation of the second generation, the
SVP demanded severer legislation. The party was of the opinion that only
those born in the country should profit from easier access to citizenship, as
opposed to young people who had only spent over half their school life in
Switzerland. The National Council rejected this proposal. Though the SVP
rejected it, the SPS, the liberal FDP, the CVP and the GP all supported the
Federal Council’s new regulation to introduce a facilitated naturalisation.
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When the discussion shifted to whether or not citizenship should auto-
matically be given to children of the third generation (introducing the prin-
ciple of jus soli), the debate became strongly polarised. Such a legal inno-
vation was categorically rejected by the SVP. On the other hand, the CVP
and the FDP were reluctant to limit the rights of parents in this manner.
The FDP thus wished to make the right to naturalise contingent to a re-
quest by both parents. In the end, the CVP’s proposal found much support
through the argument that parents could renounce their child’s citizenship
at birth, and that the child was free to revoke the decision upon reaching
the age of majority. Against the acrimonious resistance of the SVP, the
National Council also approved the right to protest for those whose request
was rejected in municipalities without reason. At the end of the consulta-
tions, the SVP announced their wish to initiate a referendum against this
revision (NZZ 17 September 2002).
Shortly after this debate, discussion about granting easier access to citi-
zenship was influenced by a Federal Tribunal decision in Lausanne. The
judges deemed the concession of citizenship for reasons of origin or reli-
gion unconstitutional because it violated the principal of non-discrimina-
tion and thereby ordered municipalities to adopt a procedure that did not
contradict the Constitution. In their written justification, the judges de-
clared that no immigrant had an automatic right to be naturalised, but that
in certain municipalities voting on applicants was an administrative func-
tion since the status of inhabitants was being decided upon. This type of
function would require authorities and the population, both, to respect the
prohibition of discrimination (NZZ 10 July 2003, 25 July 2003).
Many experts and the political left voiced support for this judgment.
The political centre expressed consternation about such a verdict only a
few weeks before the general elections. The SVP protested vociferously
against the limitation of sovereignty and municipal autonomy, which, in
their eyes, gave the impression of a partisan decision. This question be-
came a major topic in the 2003 election campaign, criticising all those
judges who act against the will of the people. A party convention held a
few days before the elections launched a political initiative demanding that
naturalisations be made at the discretion of the people. In the opinion of
the SVP, naturalisations were political, rather than administrative acts.
Both chambers of Parliament passed the bill with practically no altera-
tions. In the final round, only the SVP voted unanimously against the new
regulations, disapproving of easier access for the second generation, jus
soli for the third generation and the right to judicial complaints for rejec-
tees. The latter point was also supported by a large minority of the FDP.
On 26 September 2004, the referendum took place. Advocates of the
change, the CVP, the SPS and the liberal FDP offered only little propagan-
da, underestimating its importance in support of the SVP campaign.
Demoscopic analysis let them presume that they would win the
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referendum. And yet, the winds changed just days before voting day.
Support from employers’ associations and unions was not powerful en-
ough. Then newly elected Federal Councillor Blocher should have sup-
ported the bill since it came from his ministry, though he sabotaged it dur-
ing his campaign and imparted only technical information about the new
provisions to a restricted audience.
With a rather high referendum attendance (54 per cent voting rate), the
majority of the people and the cantons rejected the reform on the citizen-
ship law. The introduction of a facilitated naturalisation was refused by a
majority of 57 per cent, as was automatic naturalisation of the third genera-
tion at birth by 51.6 per cent. Interestingly, the rollback closely compared
to the referendum of 1994: with the exception of Basel-City, all other
Swiss-German cantons that had approved a more liberal application of the
naturalisation law ten years earlier had now switched camps (NZZ 27
September 2004). There are two explanations for this rollback: the parties
that had favoured this issue in Parliament (SPS, CVP, FDP) did not commit
themselves to defending facilitated access to citizenship during the voting
campaign. Spellbound by promising polls, they were surprised by how ea-
sily and successfully the SVP, in the last few weeks before voting, were
able to mobilise fear with the question of granting valued citizenship to
non-deserving young immigrants. They defined an automatic acquisition of
nationality as a devaluation of Swiss citizenship and objected to the weak-
ening of local popular sovereignty that it implied (Kaya 2005). And this
time, the reformed law was not backed by the responsible department and
its staff, which formerly had envisioned this change.
4 Analysis of the policymaking process
In order to understand the Swiss policymaking process, three distinct fea-
tures of the national polity must be taken into consideration: the federal
structure of the state; the financial and political autonomy of municipali-
ties; and a tool of intervention secured by the consociational negotiations
of interest groups and the participation of the people through direct
democracy.
4.1 Federalism
It is primarily through the institutions of federalism that Switzerland suc-
ceeded in accommodating its cultural and religious diversity. The country
is a confederation of 23 cantons, which have a large measure of autonomy
in regards to education policy, police and taxes. According to this princi-
ple, the Swiss Parliament functions on two levels: the National Council
and the Council of States. New laws must be passed by both chambers,
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but can be immediately vetoed by a popular referendum with 50,000
signatures.
The mechanisms of decision-making in Switzerland are complex. The
Swiss population does not directly elect the members of the government,
i.e. the Federal Council, as it does at the cantonal level; at the federal level,
election of the government is the prerogative of the Parliament. The seven
members of the Federal Council are elected for four years. In the Swiss po-
litical system, Parliament cannot give and withdraw a vote of confidence
to the Federal Council. This gives the government a certain amount of
autonomy with regard to the Parliament. However, the autonomy of the
government is restricted by the two instruments of Swiss direct democracy:
the referendum and the popular initiative. The popular initiative gives citi-
zens the right to seek a decision on an amendment they want integrated
into the Constitution. For such an initiative to be organised, the signatures
of 100,000 voters must be collected within eighteen months. Federal laws
are subject to an optional referendum: in this case, a popular ballot is cast
if 50,000 citizens request such an action. The signatures must be collected
within 100 days of a decree’s publication. The referendum is similar to a
veto. For such a plebiscite to pass, the majority of the population’s votes
and those of nine cantons is required. At the cantonal and municipal levels,
voters can also launch initiatives. Cantonal laws are subject to the optional
referendum.
When it comes to the admission and integration of migrants, federalism
plays an important role in many domains. They include, among others, the
field of education, which is presented here as a paradigmatic case (religious
matters or the quest for political rights would also have served this pur-
pose). Switzerland’s educational system is organised through the cantons,
which desire immigrants to adopt the dominant cantonal language and cul-
ture. During the 1970s, cantonal education systems had difficulty accom-
modating the differing social and cultural situations and thus could not
guarantee equal educational opportunities (Schuh 1987). A lot of discre-
pancy in the quality of curricula across schools continues to persist, even if
the federal education authorities, known as the Schweizerische Konferenz
der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren (EDK), regularly publish recommen-
dations for the better integration of immigrant children ( EDK 1972, 1976,
1982, 1985, 1991, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2003). Some cantons, more than
others, support immigrant children and promote their integration at school
by investing more resources in local schools and introducing institution-
wide changes such as team-teaching and intercultural programmes that fa-
vour the insertion of children with a migrant background (Truniger 2002b).
Not all cantons implement these recommendations and, in fact, several tend
towards discriminatory practices. Contrasting cantonal responses roughly
correspond to linguistic as well as political cleavages. In German-speaking
cantons one can generally observe a tendency to set up institutions
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specifically for immigrant children, with the exception of those urban
cantons possessing necessary tools to support their school bodies without
enforcing segregation (Truniger 2002a), whereas in French- and Italian-
speaking areas, the response has been to integrate all children into main-
stream institutions.
In this analysis, the cantonal level merits special attention, as
Switzerland’s highly federalised institutional system is characterised by
vertical segmentation and horizontal fragmentation that allows both institu-
tions and cantonal parties a high degree of organisational and political
autonomy. As witnessed with voting, cantons can use their autonomy to
experiment with various approaches in migrant-related political fields and
to try to influence decision-making at the federal level. The Council of
States makes it necessary for federal authorities to secure the loyalty of the
cantons and to make sure that strong cantonal political entrepreneurs do
not withdraw from the consensus. If the perception the cantons hold intern-
ally changes, the federal level must thus adapt. But only until recently,
when the general mood became anti-immigrant, the example of the autono-
mous educational system had made it clear that cantons have enough space
to manoeuvre and need not share a common approach to all fields related
to migrants.
4.2 Municipal autonomy
Strong trade and political fragmentation explain why Switzerland has a re-
latively robust urban network. Moreover, municipal autonomy is a key fac-
tor when it comes to questions of citizenship and, paradoxically, of nation-
hood. As already mentioned, there are three stages in the naturalisation
process: citizenship within the municipality, then the canton and finally at
the Swiss federal state.
There is great variety in naturalisation practices at the local level, parti-
cularly between the German- and French-speaking cantons. While the
French have more formalised procedures, many German cantons endorse
the romantic principle of adherence and political participation. The ques-
tion of who is allowed to acquire citizenship can easily be turned into a
question of preferential treatment and prejudice. Newspaper stories have
reported that in several small German-speaking towns, applicants recog-
nised as having Eastern European and Asian origins were prevented from
naturalising (Ehrenzeller & Good 2003; Leuthold & Aeberhard 2002). So
even if the country was founded on the idea of political contract, naturali-
sation is to a large extent based on local ethnicity.
Furthermore, since the decision by the Federal Tribunal5 on 9 July 2003
(reference 1P.228-2000), which declared public votes on naturalisation in
certain municipalities unconstitutional, a new debate has emerged on the
role of judicial authority. It is largely a debate between those who favour
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the rule of law and those who interpret access to citizenship as a political
and sovereign act of the citizenry. The Political Institution Committee of
the Council of States has supported the Federal Tribunal in their reaction
to the right of municipalities to submit the requests of candidates for natur-
alisation to the people in order to respect the autonomy of cantons and mu-
nicipalities, as recognised in the Federal Constitution. This judgement was
quite exceptional and can be read as an indicator of tension between
Federal Tribunal and Parliament, between the opportunities and limits of
the rule of law as much as those of people’s rights within a direct
democracy.
4.3 Consociationalism and direct democracy
Consociationalism and direct democracy are more important for under-
standing Switzerland’s integration politics than integration policies. But, as
Mahnig and Wimmer (2003) stated in their lucid article, these two charac-
teristics of the Swiss political system are responsible for the country’s in-
tense politicisation of migration issues and the exclusion of migrants from
political participation. Consociationalism refers to the proportional repre-
sentation of different minorities (e.g. linguistic, political, religious) in the
federal institutions and reaching compromise between political forces that
goes beyond the search for simple majorities (Linder 1998). All members
of the government as well as the higher administration are proportionately
chosen according to their party affiliation (based on a ‘magic formula’)
and their linguistic and regional origins. Swiss politics is characterised by
a permanent process of compromise-building between these groups.
Another important means to influence the political decision-making pro-
cess is the consultation procedure, the phase in legislative preparation
when draft acts by the Confederation are evaluated by the cantons, parties,
associations and sometimes also by other interested circles throughout
Switzerland, in order to ascertain the likelihood of their acceptance and im-
plementation. Persons not invited to take part in the consultation procedure
can also state their views on a proposal. All views and possible objections
are evaluated with a view to the vetoing power of those who reject a re-
form. The Federal Council then passes the main points of its proposal on
to Parliament, and debates the draft act in light of the outcomes of this
consultation.
Direct democracy gives social groups some opportunities to participate
directly in the political process through the aforementioned popular initia-
tive and referendum. These are operative at the federal as well as local le-
vels. According to some observers, the instruments of direct democracy
were what allowed the consociational system to emerge, because all laws
voted in Parliament can be submitted to a referendum and therefore need
the support of large alliances within the political elite (Neidhart 1970).
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These two main characteristics of the political system provoke major politi-
cisation of the migrant issue and the exclusion of immigrants from political
participation (Mahnig & Wimmer 2003). Because of the long negotiations
and decision-making process in a consociational democracy, this system in-
volved extended periods of indecision with regard to immigration issues.
Since interests in the political field of migration are so divergent, it is diffi-
cult for the parties to come to an agreement easily. Second, the instruments
of direct democracy have forced the political elite to negotiate the concept
of ‘over-foreignisation’ with populist challengers. Immigration policies that
had permitted the various actors to agree to accommodate the economic
needs of the country became one of the most contested and controversial
issues since the 1960s, when radical right-wing populist parties started to
gain public support claiming that Switzerland was becoming ‘over-foreign-
ised’ by ever-increasing immigrants. Using the tools of direct democracy,
these xenophobic movements succeeded in vetoing liberal government re-
forms and put their parties under pressure through the launching of eight
popular initiatives and several referenda to curb the presence of foreigners.
Although none of these initiatives passed, they have consistently influ-
enced the migration policy agenda and public opinion on immigration is-
sues urging the Swiss government to adopt more restrictive admission poli-
cies (Niederberger 2004).
Recently challenging the federal government is one political entrepre-
neur whose anti-immigrant agenda is built upon a political campaign fo-
cused on the costs of immigration, control, security and restriction. The
SVP, formerly a moderate peasants’ party that transformed in the early
1990s into a radical right-wing populist political organisation, won the big-
gest share of parliamentary votes in the 2003 general elections. This upset
the traditional consociational system that, since 1959, evenly distributed
power among what were then the four leading political parties and in
which the SVP before had only access to one seat. Following the elections
in December 2003, as leader of the SVP, Blocher gained for the first time
a second seat in the government and became Minister of Justice and
Police, which also put him in charge of migration and asylum. Thus far,
the government approved several of the Minister’s proposals to deal with
illegal migration, undocumented workers, asylum law abuses and unsatis-
factory international cooperation concerning the readmission of rejected
asylum seekers.
In the 2007 electoral campaign, immigrants were once again blamed for
social disorder, crime, youth violence and welfare abuses. World-wide at-
tention fell on the SVP posters accompanying the launch of their initiative
to deport criminal immigrants; they depicted a white sheep throwing a
black one out of country. The New York Times reported how the cam-
paign’s ‘subliminal message is that the influx of foreigners has somehow
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polluted Swiss society, straining the social welfare system and threatening
the very identity of the country’ (The New York Times 8 October 2007).
The end of the parliamentary election campaign was – unusual for
Switzerland – heavily focused on Blocher as a public figure. Usually,
members of the Federal Council tend to moderate themselves when it
comes to election. But Blocher was different: he wanted his position in the
Federal Council to be strengthened through a greater representation of the
SVP in Parliament. The strategy worked and the seasoned party’s cam-
paign focused on their charismatic leader’s success in the election on 21
October. The SVP won nearly 30 per cent of the votes, thus displacing the
SPS and the FDP to the second row.
A strengthened presence in the Federal Council since 2003 has put the
SVP in a win-win situation. The party can set the agenda for parliamentary
debate and, if they fail, launch a veto against any reform they oppose
through a referendum. The tools of direct democracy enable the party to
highlight issues in ways that Parliament cannot constrain. But even if wear-
ing both hats – i.e. the government and the opposition – was rewarded by
a large minority of the electorate, MPs increasingly came to oppose
Blocher’s dysfunctional role. Blocher refused to play the game of consen-
sus within a consociational government. His failure to integrate into the
federal government compelled Parliament to remove him and vote in mod-
erate SVP representative Evelyn Widmer-Schlumpf as a new member of
the Federal Council in December 2007. This was a clear demonstration of
disapproval of Blocher and his party’s populist, anti-parliamentarian strat-
egy and style.
The opportunities direct democracy offers for intervention within the po-
litical system make it quite likely that the SVP will enforce its oppositional
role in the future by exploiting migration policy as a major issue, seeing as
controversial questions can never be constrained to Parliament alone. Other
European countries may be able to adopt policies ‘behind closed doors’ to
extend political and social rights to migrants, but this is nearly impossible
in Switzerland (Guiraudon 2000). However, such a right-wing strategy, no
matter how determined its proponents, may not always find popular sup-
port. An important point of reference is the SVP’s defeat in the 1 June
2008 vote. This vote on ‘democratic naturalisations’ focused on the SVP’s
intention to, through popular initiative, abolish the rule of law in acquiring
Swiss citizenship, thus reinforcing the power of the municipalities to take
even arbitrary decisions. Ultimate failure here proved that even a strong,
resolute party cannot always gain support, especially if their arguments
threaten the sense of fair and equal access to rights.
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5 Concluding remarks
For a long time, from World War II until the late 1990s, the labour mar-
ket’s economic demands influenced Switzerland’s admission policy without
taking the quest for integration into account. Admission policies were fo-
cused on a rotation model that fuelled the economy with labour without ne-
cessarily introducing any integration provisions for migrants who came to
stay; after all, immigrants were not conceived as a potential part of the po-
pulation. This utilitarian policy seemed to fit best with proclaimed needs
that the country be free of foreign cultural influences, as was recorded, for
example, in the Alien’s Law of 1931 – a law that reflected the xenophobia
of the 1920s. Since the 1970s, migrants’ length of stay in Switzerland and
their own changing attitudes and expectations, along with the evolving
needs of the economy and the school system, have made shifting towards a
more inclusive migration policy inevitable. But the alliance between the
government and the regional economic and supranational human rights in-
terests who laboured to include a foreign workforce through legislative re-
forms were continuously forced to deal with a xenophobic radical move-
ment. While politically isolated, this movement could use opportunity
structures to leverage government decision-making through a referendum.
This policy was generally favoured by a minimal welfare state, particularly
one addressing immigrants who, up until the 1970s, had been excluded
from solidarity networks and were thus exposed to social risks upon return
‘home’.
The paradigm shift occurred in the 1980s after the oil crisis, where it be-
came clear that the migrants who did not return to their country of origin
would stay in Switzerland. The introduction of unemployment insurance
and the inauguration of a larger welfare system also protected labour mi-
grants and introduced them to social citizenship. But the 1980s were also
when asylum emerged as a metaphor for unwanted migration. The govern-
ment reacted to the new challenge with a two-tiered approach. First came
new severity on the asylum issue and enforcement of a policy that deterred
illegitimate immigration. Following that was the introduction of legislative-
level reforms that favoured integration for desired labour migration. This
debate seems to have ended with the new Alien’s and Asylum Law that
passed 2006 popular approval and come into force in 2008.
Federalism, municipal autonomy, consociationalism and direct democ-
racy offer a framework in which many actors and stakeholders attempt to
influence the decision-making process. This form of multi-level govern-
ance has long prevented Switzerland from matching its policy to inclusive
European standards of social rights (and to the new economic needs
Switzerland has had to compete with). Still, in recent years it nevertheless
permitted its guiding principles to converge with those of its important
European partners. Since the signing of the Bilateral Agreement, obvious
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points of convergence between Switzerland and the EU on issues concern-
ing immigration and migration policies will no doubt multiply in the fu-
ture. But the spectre of ‘over-foreignisation’ will probably prevent
Switzerland – at least at the federal level – to join a liberal citizenship pol-
icy shared by its European partners. Switzerland’s cultural inhibitions are
too strong to open its institutions of – at least symbolically – highly valued
citizenship to allegedly undeserving immigrants. But who’s to say that, in
the evolution of political processes, late runners can’t one day become
European forerunners, especially in a field as volatile as migration and citi-
zenship issues?
Notes
1 Migration and integration policies are matters of cantonal sovereignty to a certain
degree.
2 According to the rotation scheme, migrants entered the country for a period of one
to two years and were then supposed to return home to make room for other guest
workers.
3 ‘Boat people’ refers to the mass departure of Vietnamese and Cambodians in the
1970s who were escaping newly installed communist regimes and seeking refuge in
Western countries.
4 Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) is a high-quality newspaper based in Zurich.
5 The most supreme in Switzerland is the Federal Court.
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6 The case of the United Kingdom
Lucie Cerna and Almuth Wietholtz
1 Immigration to the United Kingdom since World War II1
Immigration and integration policymaking in the United Kingdom have un-
dergone a number of significant changes and paradigm shifts over the past
decades. Naturally, policies have been affected by broader economic and
social developments, such as the impact of globalisation on industries as
well as labour demand for particular skills, and economic cycles, e.g. ac-
celerating economic growth and increasing employment rates, followed by
a decline with 2008’s economic crisis. In addition, party politics and exter-
nal events have impacted policies, such as changes in government from
Conservative in the 1970s and the 1980s to Labour in the 1990s, the terror-
ist attacks of 9/11 in the United States and the 7 July 2005 bombings in
London.
What distinguishes the history of British immigration politics from other
cases is first and foremost the long-lasting attempt to regulate and reduce
the immigration not of ‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’, but of people from the
Empire, whose population of about 800 million had for all intents and
purposes been made British nationals. Yet, both the composition and the
origin of migration to the UK have visibly changed over the past few dec-
ades. The 1948 Nationality Act was the last moment at which a liberal set-
tlement was open to the Empire. The act, which created a legal status –
Citizenship of the UK and Colonies – included Britons and colonial
British subjects under a single definition of British citizenship and estab-
lished their right to enter the UK (Hansen 1999: 65). The act thus also tried
to assert Britain’s role as leader of the Commonwealth (Somerville,
Sriskandarajah & Latorre 2009).
A liberal immigration policy allowed unrestricted access from the colo-
nies and the Commonwealth until 1962. At the time, the immigration of
non-British subjects was already controlled, even though the government
recruited ‘aliens’ to fill labour shortages through schemes such as the
European Volunteer Workers (EVW) Programme. Since the UK was losing
large numbers of its own citizens to North America, Australia and other
Commonwealth countries, the government also encouraged different types
of immigration. This situation paved the way for immigration first from
Ireland in the 1940s and 1950s and, later, the English-speaking Caribbean
and the Indian subcontinent (Layton-Henry 2004).
As Figure 6.1 below shows, 1961 saw a particularly massive increase in
immigration numbers. A political campaign against non-white immigration
consequently emerged first within the public, then among opposition mem-
bers in Parliament and finally in the Ministry of Labour (Hansen 2001).
The campaign was ultimately able to stop the open policy in 1962 with the
first Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which had been introduced by
Conservative Home Secretary Richard Butler (Joppke 1999). The act ruled
that Commonwealth immigrants could enter the UK only via a voucher
scheme unless they were born in the UK, held a British passport or were
included on such a passport. Due to continued New Commonwealth immi-
gration, further restrictions were introduced by the Labour government in
1965, which took the form of an annual quota of 8,500 New
Commonwealth workers and abolished the scheme’s Category C2 (Layton-
Henry 2004).
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act disjoined the basic association
between nationality and the rights of citizenship so that until 1981, a
British passport no longer guaranteed its holder British citizenship rights
(Hansen 2001). Even though the goal of the act has been to limit
Commonwealth immigration, it did not stop family and student
Figure 6.1 Estimated net immigration to the UK from the New Commonwealth
Source: Layton-Henry (1992: 13)
Note: Figure for 1962 reflects first six months up to introduction of first controls.
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immigration, and the restrictive terms of employment vouchers were not
strictly followed in actuality (Spencer 1997). Succeeding governments
therefore continued to cut immigration links with the New Commonwealth
as far as possible.
The Conservatives’ election promise to stop large-scale immigration into
the UK was consolidated into the 1971 Immigration Act. This act marked
a turning point in British history insofar as citizens of independent
Commonwealth countries and British subjects without any close connec-
tion to the UK were now treated as aliens. Immigration policy turned to ca-
tegories of birth and ancestry to define which people belonged to Britain
and which did not (Joppke 1999). The act employed the notion of patrial-
ity3 to determine who had the ‘right of abode’, for which it was strongly
criticized on the grounds of racism (Hansen 2000). Yet Home Secretary at
the time Reginald Maudling defended this clause, claiming that patriality
recognised the ‘family connection’ with the British diaspora abroad, rather
than being a racial concept (Joppke 1999: 111). Furthermore, a strict work
permit system replaced the employment vouchers, the state received greater
powers of deportation and the process from temporary to permanent immi-
gration was made more difficult (Joppke 1999).
When Margaret Thatcher was elected Leader of the Opposition in
September 1975, the Conservative Party went on to adopt even more re-
strictive policies that would limit New Commonwealth immigration.
During the 1978 election campaign, Thatcher famously expressed her con-
cern that the UK was being ‘rather swamped by people with a different
culture’ (cited in Layton-Henry 1992: 184).
While the government had already proposed several restrictions on fa-
mily migration in the 1977 White Paper, it was the 1981 British
Nationality Act that finally ‘marked a crucial break with Britain’s imperial
past’ (Layton-Henry 2004: 306). The 1971 act had already deprived
Commonwealth immigrants of certain rights and equated them with aliens,
but the 1981 act divided ‘citizenship of the UK and Colonies’ into three
separate categories: British Citizenship, British Dependent Territory
Citizenship (BDTC) and British Overseas Citizenship (BOC).4 As a result,
the act abolished jus soli and only granted the ‘right of abode’, while other
rights were granted by the common law (Joppke 1999). The act’s goal was
thus to close the division between immigration and citizenship law and to
approximate UK legislation to that of other countries (Hansen 2001).
Despite all legislative restrictions, immigration flows started to expand
rapidly in the late 1980s, a trend that even increased in the late 1990s.
Inflows of New Commonwealth citizens remained stable until the late
1980s, and then again continued to rise until 1999. Old Commonwealth
migration was fairly steady until the late 1990s, when it began to rise sig-
nificantly. Immigration of citizens from other countries increased particu-
larly in 1998-1999. Finally, freedom of movement within the European
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Community and, later, the European Union contributed to a higher inflow
of EU citizens. Overall, citizens from Ireland, India and the US have con-
stituted the three major groups of all immigrants to the UK (Ford 1994). In
fact, Irish nationals have been the most significant group for over 100
years.
Figure 6.2 shows how the origin of migrants entering the UK changed
over the course of two decades.
Another central change in the composition and origin of migration flows
has occurred since the first round of EU enlargements in 2004. Many re-
cent immigrants have come from the new EU countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. Since May 2004, around 1.3 million workers from A-85
countries have come to the UK (Sumption & Somerville 2010: 9). This
dramatic increase has been made possible by the non-restriction of the
British labour market – indeed, the UK was the only country besides
Ireland and Sweden that opened its labour market to workers from the new
EU countries. However, estimates calculate that more than half of A-8 mi-
grants have returned home as only about 700,000 were left in the third
quarter of 2009. Polish nationals make up around two thirds of A-8 immi-
gration (ibid.: 13).
Figure 6.2 Settlement by origin
Source: Hansen (2000: 267)
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1.1 The evolution of migration policies
While the Immigration Acts of the 1970s and 1980s were predominantly
concerned with citizenship and Commonwealth immigration, the 1990s
were largely characterised by concerns of asylum seekers coming to the
UK. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act deserves particular
attention as it was the first separate asylum law in British migration his-
tory.6 After family migration was drastically reduced in the mid-1980s,
asylum became a new way for potential immigrants to enter the UK. In an-
ticipation of a European Court of Human Rights indictment, the act granted
in-country right of appeal to all asylum seekers, emphasising the UK’s con-
flation of asylum and immigration policy. Yet at the same time, the act also
countered this liberalisation with two restrictive measures: removal of the
right to appeal for refused short-term visitors and students and introduction
of a ‘fast-track’ procedure for ‘bogus’ asylum applications (Joppke 1999).
The act thus demonstrates a trademark of British migration policy, namely
that the liberalisation of some measures is often countered with restrictive-
ness towards other aspects in one and the same act.
We have seen that immigration flows began to expand rapidly in the late
1980s and that this trend continued until the late 1990s (Layton-Henry
2004). However, between 1997 and 2008 a change in the government’s
preferences over types of immigration has become visible (see Figure 6.3).
That time period has once again witnessed an increase in labour migration
(of highly skilled migrants, in particular), as well as (mostly temporary)
student immigration (52 per cent of the total). In fact, between 1995 and
1999, the country gained some 100,000 highly educated and managerial
migrants as opposed to around 50,000 manual and clerical workers. In gen-
eral, workers from abroad tend to work in financial services, the IT sector,
manufacturing, transport and communications, hotels and catering, health
care and education (ibid.).
1.2 Immigration policymaking since the 1990s
Over the last decades, the UK has undergone a profound shift from a ‘zero
immigration country’ to one that adheres to the paradigm of ‘managed mi-
gration’ (Layton-Henry 1994, 2004).7 Since the 1990s, British immigration
policy has been characterised as restrictive towards asylum seekers and il-
legal migrants but welcoming towards skilled and highly skilled migrants.
To this end, UK governments have passed several major pieces of legisla-
tion on immigration and asylum, namely, in 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002,
2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009.8 All have aimed to manage the increasingly
large and complex inflows of people. As Spencer (2002: 10) writes:
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recognition that migration will be a central feature of the global
economy and that it brings economic benefits has led to a shift in
the Government’s approach from that of immigration control to
management in the UK’s interests.
The 1998 White Paper ‘Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern Approach to
Immigration and Asylum’ set the tone by stating that the UK would take a
‘firm but fair’ approach to immigration and asylum. These principles were
reaffirmed by the 2002 White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven:
Diversity in Modern Britain’, which preceded the 2002 Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act. In the 2002 paper, Home Secretary David
Blunkett set out a new paradigm of ‘managed migration’, which has been
called ‘a radical concept’ because it accepts ‘the progressive character of
migration in the context of a global economy’ (Flynn 2003: 9). It meant
that the UK would open up labour migration that was beneficial for the
economy, comprising both highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants.
Increasing the channels particularly for highly skilled immigrants and
keeping the number of other immigrants and asylum seekers down have
become priorities. In 2000, Immigration Minister Barbara Roche confirmed
research findings that many sectors of the economy (IT, health,
Figure 6.3 Grants of settlement by category (excluding EEA nationals and
Switzerland)
Sources: Home Office, Control of Immigration Statistics (1997, 2001, 2003, 2006b, 2009b) 
Note: EAA includes EU countries, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
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engineering, education and financial services) would have to depend on
skilled labour if they wished to retain their competitiveness (Flynn 2003).
Yet, channels for low-skilled migration were also deemed important for re-
ducing illegal migration.
Due to pressures from sectoral labour market shortages in both low- and
high-skilled sectors, the New Labour government has somewhat relaxed la-
bour immigration restrictions over the past years. At the same time, the
UK has been competing both within the EU and worldwide for skilled pro-
fessionals. On the other hand, public pressure and tabloid press hostility
have also compelled stricter controls on illegal immigrants and asylum see-
kers. Under the ‘security’ label, the government has dealt with everyone
from terrorists, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants to criminals, and has
called for stricter border controls. In fact, through the Terrorism Act 2000,
British government had inserted ‘war on terror’ measures into immigration
policies even prior to 9/11. Additional legislation followed with the
Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which linked immigration to
a discourse on security and terrorism (Flynn 2003).
For several decades prior to this, only a few people had identified race
and immigration as important issues in MORI9 (2005a, 2005b) polls,
though these numbers increased dramatically in 1999-2000, indicating a
stark shift in public opinion. By 2001, immigration had become one of the
most important political issues in the UK, frequently covered in the media
and in Parliament. By 2005, immigration and asylum had become salient
campaign issues in the general election. This went so far that the
Conservatives declared they would, if elected, withdraw the UK from the
Geneva Convention on Refugees (Geddes 2005). In February 2005, 40 per
cent of all people polled placed race and immigration ahead of any other
public policy issue for the first time; more than 60 per cent of the popula-
tion felt that too many immigrants lived in the UK (Sriskandarajah &
Hopwood Road 2005). Several surveys (YouGov 2005) yielded the finding
that the British public seems concerned about high numbers of immigrants
and has low confidence in the immigration system. The topic of asylum
migration frequently appears in the media, and the escape of asylum see-
kers from detention centres in December 2006 demonstrated not only the
politicisation of migration and asylum but also the harsh measures with
which denied applicants are confronted. Yet the causality between immi-
gration and public opinion is not a straightforward one even though the
government likes to portray public concern as a consequence of immigra-
tion. Critics such as Don Flynn from the Migrant Rights Network instead
see the overall concern with immigration and asylum as the population’s
reaction to a discourse driven by politicians and the media. The govern-
ment reacted to the population’s apparent preferences for the asylum-re-
strictive/skilled-open policy with the 2005 ‘Five year strategy’. It clarified
three main immigration priorities for Britain: ‘1) to ensure the UK benefits
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from migration which adds to its prosperity, 2) to enforce strict controls to
eliminate abuse of the immigration system, and 3) to uphold an immigra-
tion system responsive to public concerns’ (Ensor & Shah 2005: 1).
The government further introduced the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and
Immigration Act, which received Royal Assent on 21 July 2009. In addi-
tion, it published a draft Immigration Bill (the so-called Simplification
Bill) on 12 November 2009, showing the continuing progress made by
simplifying the twelve immigration laws since the 1971 act (UKBA
2009b). It also takes into consideration immigration law and does not in-
clude nationality law, in contrast to the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and
Immigration Act. The Simplification Bill was not considered in Parliament
before the 2010 general election.
Finally, the UK’s focus on maintaining border controls is also apparent
in the country’s opting out of provisions for a common policy on free
movement, immigration and asylum in the EU Treaty of Amsterdam
(Geddes 2005). The UK participates in common measures on asylum and
illegal immigration, but does not take part in those for legal migration.
Nevertheless, the EU has exerted some liberalising influence on the UK’s
immigration by questioning the basis of the country’s migration policy –
tight border controls and executive decision over the fate of immigrants
(Joppke 1999), topics to which we now turn.
1.3 Governance patterns and actors in policymaking
Influences on immigration policymaking can be found on the macro-,
meso- and micro-levels (Somerville 2007). On the macro-level, we identify
three significant structural factors, namely globalisation, international and
national law and the European Union – each with varying degrees of influ-
ence on British migration policy, depending on the area. For labour migra-
tion, globalisation has played a far larger role than for asylum, where inter-
national human rights norms prevail. EU impact has increased since 1997
insofar as the union has promoted globalisation and free markets, which
has had an effect on labour migration policy. The EU has also played a
part in changing asylum policy (ibid.).
Becoming more and more evident on the meso-level is the significance
of networks, interest groups, politics and the personal traits of policy-
makers, popular attitudes and the media. According to Somerville (ibid.:
153), the proliferation of actors, such as lobby groups, makes networks
especially useful in explaining the recent years’ changes in the liberalisa-
tion of labour migration policy. Among these actors, the Prime Minister
and the Home Secretary can be identified as the main agenda-setters and
leaders in immigration policymaking. In addition, inter-party conflict has
led to restrictive policies in certain areas, mainly for asylum and security.
As discussed in the previous section, negative attitudes in the public and
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the media play a role in policymaking. Their influence is very complex,
though they have a notably more significant impact on asylum policy than
on labour migration (ibid.: 154).
On the micro-level, policy implementation by officials and institutions
are clearly important, especially at critical junctures. This level influences
the movement from policy content to actual policy delivery and implemen-
tation (Somerville 2007). Figure 6.4 summarises the three policy levels and
contents.
Until the New Labour government introduced a new style of policymak-
ing to the field of immigration, UK immigration policies were reactive
rather than proactive. That is, the government usually implemented restric-
tions as a response to external events. Many acts had been passed in re-
sponse to large-scale immigration from certain parts of the world or a sig-
nificant number of asylum applications during a specific time period, thus
linking immigrant numbers with immigration control policy (Meyers 2004:
79). These restrictive immigration policies were possible due to the UK’s
institutional framework. Hansen (2000: 237) states that ‘four factors […]
distinguish the Westminster model from Continental Europe: a powerful
executive, a weak legislature, a timid judiciary and an absence of a bill of
rights’. In general, the executive power remains strong in the UK. The
government can implement policy changes (e.g. increased financial alloca-
tions for immigration control), and does not need to go through
Parliament.
Figure 6.4 Policy development process
Source: Somerville (2007: 156)
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The legislature was able to achieve only small changes to British migra-
tion legislation. In other cases, the executive was able to push through its
proposals. As Hansen wrote (ibid.: 238): ‘free entry ended in 1962, Asians
with British passports were excluded in 1968. Commonwealth citizens lost
their privileged place in migration law in 1971 and Britons and settled per-
sons lost the right to bring family members to the UK in 1988.’
In addition, immigration rules, which are easier to pass than immigration
bills, have constituted many important mechanisms (Hansen 2000). Unlike
other countries, the Constitution and courts have played a minimal role in
protecting the rights of immigrants to the UK. Nonetheless, since 2000, the
European Court of Human Rights has gained considerable influence as the
UK now has to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights. As
non-legislated ‘rules of practice’, immigration regulations do not even bind
the Home Secretary and his executive machinery, thus epitomising the
reign of absolute state discretion in British immigration policy.
Immigration rules have therefore been perfectly flexible and adaptable
tools for the ‘loophole-closing’ and ‘fine-tuning’ that characterised British
immigration policy in its post-statutory phase (Joppke 1999: 115).
Nevertheless, Statham and Geddes (2006) point to several cases where
courts rejected restrictive immigration legislation that the government had
proposed. An example would be the government’s 2003 attempt to take
away welfare benefits from asylum applicants. However, the Court of
Appeal supported the ruling of the High Court that it was ‘inhumane and
contrary to law’ (ibid.: 255).
Since New Labour came into power in 1997, British policy process and
policy style have changed considerably. More specifically, rather than the
Westminster model that Hansen (2000) proposed, Somerville (2007) has
convincingly argued for a more plural and fragmented policymaking envir-
onment in UK’s immigration. He concludes that the importance of institu-
tions for policy development is only limited. While the government can
still implement immigration policies with relative autonomy, it now consid-
ers other factors such as ‘challenges from political party opponents, but
also the blocking potential of the judiciary, and to a lesser extent pressures
from lobby groups’ (Statham & Geddes 2006: 258). One of the main
changes that New Labour implemented was the ‘emphasis on joined-up
government, or better horizontal and vertical co-ordination across services,
in all its policies. This also applies to institutions delivering migration pol-
icy’ (Somerville 2007: 77).
True to New Labour governance style, the Home Office has invited sta-
keholders to join advisory panels more and more over the last years. These
panels have also been engaged through formal consultation on policy de-
velopments. However, the consultation system has its limits as the govern-
ment retains the power in the interest of political expediency. So far, there
has been no formal structure for consultation, leaving it an ad hoc process.
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Nevertheless, the government is in the process of changing this approach
and employing an expert body to provide advice (Home Office 2006d;
IND 2007b, 2007d, 2007f; UKBA 2009c). On the other hand, employers’
associations, trade unions and NGOs are more directly engaged in the mi-
gration discussion through the dissemination of press releases, reports,
campaigns and formal mechanisms, e.g. having input on parliamentary
committees (Ensor & Shah 2005). The government has also started to en-
gage in close consultations with the Confederation of British Industries
(CBI) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to optimise migration policy
concerning economic needs. Overall, unions and employers have displayed
a comparatively open policy position for labour migration.
According to one anonymous interviewee, another part of New Labour’s
trademark was the shift in governance towards the devolution of regions.
As far as immigration is concerned, little change can be seen in this policy
area. Local government still has little say in policymaking, and local autho-
rities are frustrated with not being part of the decision-making process.
Devolved regions have not gained autonomy as the Home Office provides
the terms of policies in a UK-wide immigration system. For instance,
Scotland has engaged in pursuit of the authorities call ‘fresh talent’ as the
region desperately seeks highly skilled immigrants. However, Scottish
authorities can only go through the UK-wide system to encourage immi-
grants to come to Scotland. Nevertheless, they have obtained some
discretion.
These days, the main actors involved in policymaking are the govern-
ment and the Home Office. Among politicians, the Prime Minister and the
Home Secretary are at the forefront, but others turn out to be important for
particular policies. In general, all main political parties agree on labour mi-
gration policies, but there is more disagreement and a greater ‘race to the
bottom’10 on asylum policy (Somerville 2007: 126). The Prime Minister
can overrule the Home Secretary – a pivotal actor otherwise – by putting
the latter under pressure mostly on politically controversial issues. For ex-
ample, former Prime Minister Tony Blair was generally concerned about
curbing asylum numbers and displayed more public presence following
certain events such as 9/11 and 7/7. The role of civil service has shifted
from policy formulation and advice to policy management and service de-
livery (Dorey 2005). Increasingly, special advisers have come to provide
the main ministers with advice on practicable policy options and have been
involved in developing immigration policies.
Even though institutions have played a greater role in policy’s imple-
mentation than its development, the Home Office has been the most impor-
tant institution for immigration policy (Somerville 2007). In May 2001, it
took over the responsibility for labour migration from the Employment
Department. It has also been responsible for asylum policy since the
Aliens Restriction Acts of 1914 and 1919 (Macdonald & Blake 1991).
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More specifically, the Home Office’s Immigration and Nationality
Directorate (IND) had become the main body for immigration policymak-
ing and was an executive agency. The IND was supported by the Home
Office’s so-called Aim 6 intended to manage migration in the interests of
Britain’s security, economic growth and social stability (IND 2007f). It
was committed to including in the consultation process stakeholders such
as community groups, voluntary sector organisations, local authorities,
legal organisations and the police.
In April 2008, however, the IND was replaced by the UK Border
Agency (UKBA) – first launched as a shadow agency of the Home Office
and then awarded full status in 2009. The agency brings together work
previously carried out by the Border and Immigration Agency, customs de-
tection work at the border from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and
UK Visa Services from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (UKBA
2009b). It is divided into five unified operations: borders, international, im-
migration, intelligence, criminality and detention. The agency promises
various solutions including a better focus on delivery, meeting the public’s
expectations in terms of secure borders and illegal immigration, greater ac-
countability, greater operational freedom to respond to challenges, ability
to reinvest savings, opportunity to achieve new ways of working and a
new identity branding for bringing staff together (ibid.). In addition, Aim 6
is to be upheld.
As Somerville (2007) has noted, UK policymaking styles differ accord-
ing to the type of immigration at stake. Thus, for labour migration, we
observe different actors than for asylum policy. In the case of labour migra-
tion, five groups of actors in the policy community are relevant. First, indi-
vidual businesses and employers’ associations lobby for an open labour
migration policy. Second, the legal profession directs the voices and inter-
ests of its major clients, i.e. major businesses. Third, members-only groups
and committees, informal and formal, advise or lobby the government.
Fourth, think tanks and research organisations provide the government with
influential research. Fifth, the government plays the most important role in
policymaking. It not only includes the Home Office, but also the Treasury,
the Department of Work and Pensions, the Department for Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, the Department for Innovation,
Universities and Skills (both previously under the Department for Trade
and Industry) and the Bank of England. The Treasury is considered the
most powerful player and is closely connected with the Department of
Work and Pensions. Other departments also have some interest in particular
policies (Ensor & Shah 2005; Somerville 2007).
To give an example, the Home Office has cooperated with the
Department for International Development (DfID) in the ongoing debate
about brain drain and the question of whether it is the receiving country’s
responsibility to design policies to limit the outflow of highly skilled
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workers (e.g. doctors or nurses) from developing countries. Even though
the Home Office is ultimately responsible for immigration policy, the DfID
has been the main locus for the brain drain debate, being the office en-
gaged in writing reports on the issue and responding on behalf of the gov-
ernment. The former Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Treasury are
concerned particularly about highly skilled immigration (Ensor & Shah
2005). All actors are likely to agree on a labour migration policy since they
share the same (pro-market) ideology and consider labour migration bene-
ficial to the UK’s economy.
On the other hand, asylum policy has developed in a different manner
because actors lack resources and stability and do not share the same ideol-
ogy (Somerville 2007). Three scattered actors can be pointed out. First, the
refugee charity sector is often represented by organisations such as
Refugee Council, Refugee Action and Amnesty International. Second is
the legal profession (e.g. Refugee Legal Centre, the Immigration Law
Practitioner’s Association’s asylum sub-committee and the Joint Council
for the Welfare of Immigrants). Third are children’s charities (major ones
often being grouped under Refugee Children’s Consortia). All three groups
are good at campaigning, cooperating and establishing formal networks
with the government. Contrary to most groups interested in asylum, these
three do have some influence, though they have been under pressure in re-
cent years. Rather than a policy community, asylum policy forms an issue
network because no common ideology exists among the groups
(Somerville 2007). The government is an especially powerful actor. In con-
trast to the considerable number of departments involved in labour migra-
tion policy, only the Home Office and the Department for Constitutional
Affairs have an interest in asylum policy. Nonetheless, the Home Office
dominates policymaking due to its budget, size and political influence
(ibid.). In the next sections, we will turn to more detailed analysis of differ-
ent migration policies in the UK.
1.4 Labour migration
With the exception of the European Volunteer Workers Programme of
1945, the UK has recruited labour mostly from Commonwealth countries
since the end of World War II. However, the UK’s recent labour migration
policies betray certain shifts in nationality preferences; several legislative
acts have restricted immigration from the Commonwealth, while Europe
has become the favourite labour source for Britain (Ensor & Shah 2005).
Yet ever since the appearance of labour market shortages in the mid-1990s,
the UK has also begun to recruit non-EU workers. Nonetheless, after being
the single largest group in the UK for over a century, Irish nationals only
recently became number two with the arrival of many Polish foreign na-
tionals beginning in 2004.
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Shifts in political discourse and policy have mostly been due to favour-
able economic and political circumstances. They include a booming econo-
my, labour shortages and the CBI’s lobbying for increased immigration
(Layton-Henry 2004). In addition, as the Labour party was elected both in
1997 and 2001 with a significant majority, the government enjoyed a lee-
way as well as public support for implementing new immigration policies.
In recent years, the government enacted several new policies and specific
programmes as part of its strategy of focusing on beneficial labour migra-
tion. While citizens from EU countries do not require a special visa to
work in the UK, several schemes exist for other nationals. Temporary al-
beit renewable work permits are the ‘longest-running and most important
of these schemes’ (Sriskandarajah & Hopwood Road 2005).
Labour shortages in the information technology (IT) sector, especially,
have prompted the government to open up immigration at the highly
skilled end (Meyers 2004). In 2000, procedures for the admission of for-
eign professionals in both IT and the health care sector were simplified as
then Home Office Immigration Minister Roche called for more flexibility
in order to attract ‘the best and brightest’ to the UK. Along the same lines,
in 2001, Home Secretary Blunkett declared that entry for professionals
would be eased by way of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme
(HSMP), which came into effect in January 2002. For the first time, certain
immigrants could now enter the UK without having secured a job in ad-
vance. HSMP immigrants also had the right to apply for permanent resi-
dence (‘indefinite leave to remain’) after five years of residence in the UK.
In 2003, the government introduced the Sectors Based Scheme (SBS)
(whose quota amounted to 20,000 in 2003-2004), aimed at facilitating the
limited temporary employment of non-EU workers in hospitality’s and
food processing’s low-skilled sectors (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly & Spencer
2006). At the same time, Blunkett stated that he could see ‘no obvious
upper limit’ to labour migration, making clear the general preference for a
market-driven approach and an aversion to quotas or targets. Finally, the
Working Holidaymaker Scheme (WHMS), which has now been in place
for more than ten years, allows Commonwealth citizens between the ages
of seventeen and 30 to work for one year in the UK and live in the country
for two years. According to Somerville (2007: 147), the WHMS ‘was
aimed at young people, working in low-skill, often seasonal work, and tra-
velling around the UK and Europe on the proceeds’.
Considered an economic migration route, the scheme was liberalised to
provide for a flexible labour force between 2003 and 2005. Yet the govern-
ment restricted the WHMS again in 2005, suspecting abuse of the system
(Ensor & Shah 2005). For example, visa-holders were often found to be
working for the full 24 months they could live in the country, rather than
the twelve working months specified in the terms (Somerville 2007: 147).
Mostly officials organised the pushback of the visa. As Somerville (ibid.)
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describes the process, ‘policy objectives were not only frustrated but re-
drawn in order to accommodate officials’ concerns’.11
WHMS restrictions were also the result of the government’s perception
that an enlarged EU could provide the low-skilled labour force currently
needed in Britain. In fact, the immigration of workers from the ten states
(comprising 75 million people) that joined the EU in May 2004 has been a
key debate over the past years. The media had predicted uncontrolled flows
of unskilled or low-skilled workers who would be ‘flooding’ the UK to
claim welfare benefits and exploit social services. The government conse-
quently decided to open up the borders to immigrants from the new mem-
ber states, with the caveat that they had to register upon arrival and were
limited in their ability to claim benefits (Sriskandarajah & Hopwood Road
2005). To this end, a special Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) was set
up in February 2004 for people coming from accession countries who
started employment after May 2004. The WRS requires workers to register
with the Home Office within one month of employment. It is estimated
that of the 345,000 EU member state workers who registered for employ-
ment between May 2004 and December 2005, up to 30 per cent may had
already been in the UK prior to May 2004 (Anderson et al. 2006). A
majority of them are working in sectors such as hospitality and catering,
administration and construction.
According to Anderson et al. (2006: 8), ‘labour immigration – and in-
deed immigration more generally – is one of the most discussed and con-
tested public policy issues in the UK’. As we have seen, the government
has recently introduced a wealth of immigration legislation and regulations
leading to a complicated situation. For example, in May 2004, more than
80 different routes of entry existed. To counter the complexity of the sys-
tem, 2006 saw the introduction of a radical overhaul of immigration policy.
A five-year strategy for immigration and asylum included the Labour gov-
ernment’s proposal to move on to an Australian-style points system. The
plan was also to close the quota system to low-skilled immigrants because
the government expected – and in fact preferred – to fill such labour
shortages in the course of 2004’s EU enlargement. The UK thus estab-
lished independent commission the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC)
to determine labour market demands and shortages and what is deemed an
optimal number of migrants.
A points system was proposed for five tiers that corresponded to a grad-
ing of skills (Home Office 2006e). Each tier would require the immigrant
to score a certain number to gain entry clearance or leave to remain (i.e.
permanent residence) in the UK. In all tiers, points would be awarded for
criteria indicating that the individual would be likely to comply with immi-
gration requirements. In Tiers 1 and 2, applicants receive points for criteria
such as age, previous salary or prospective salary and qualifications (a sys-
tem similar to the existing HSMP). Tier 2 incorporates the main body of
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the work permit system, with advice on shortage occupations given by the
MAC. All immigrants applying under Tiers 2-5 need to have sponsorship
from a licensed sponsor (e.g. an employer). The certificate of sponsorship
ensures that the immigrant is able to perform the particular job. Highly
skilled Tier 1 immigrants do not require a job offer and thus no sponsor-
ship. Dependants are allowed to come to the UK with the main applicant
and work in the country (ibid.). Tier 4 includes students, whereas Tier 5 ap-
plies to, for example, working holidaymaker schemes. The scheme seeks to
simplify policies on the regulation of skilled and highly skilled non-EEA
workers and to limit low-skilled immigration from non-EU countries (Tier
3 remains closed). As a consequence, the government reviewed the SBS in
2005 and closed the scheme for the hospitality sector, both out of a concern
for misuse in this sector and anticipating these labour market shortages
would be filled by new EU member workers (Ruhs 2006). Since 2008, the
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) has only applied to
Bulgarian and Romanian workers. The remaining low-skilled immigration
is ‘quota-based, operator-led and time-limited’ (Anderson et al. 2006: 9).
1.5 Family migration
The earlier shift from mostly unskilled to skilled labour migration has also
influenced the composition of the UK’s family migration. The British
Nationality Act 1965 made a provision for women married to British sub-
jects without citizenship to acquire British subject status by registration.
But from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, when family migration became
a major concern, regulations for spouses and fiancés underwent five
changes (Joppke 1999). Family migration includes spouses and dependent
children under the age of eighteen. The traditional way of entry is through
marriage and only a few countries (the UK among them) allow cohabiting
couples to enter (Kofman 2004).
Family migration policy is made under executive closure and has been
shaped with the aim of reducing ‘bogus’ immigration. There is no legal
protection for family rights, and Parliament has the discretion to grant or
withdraw rights from immigrants. The 1988 Immigration Act abolished the
previous right of New Commonwealth immigrants to bring their spouses
and children to the UK (Joppke 1999). Besides the lack of legal constraints
on decisions taken by the government, UK legislation demonstrates only
weak moral obligations towards immigrants and their families, making it
very restrictive. Yet when Labour came into power in 1997, it revised sev-
eral immigration control policies implemented by the Conservatives. One
of the main changes was elimination of the Primary Purpose rules, under
which British nationals marrying non-EU citizens had to prove that their
marriage was not a sham (Meyers 2004). In addition, family migration re-
striction has been further circumvented to a certain degree through EU
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legislation (and incorporation of the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic legislation), which loosened the UK’s harsh immigra-
tion law (Hansen 2000).
In 2005, family reunion was once more restricted on the grounds of con-
cern about sham marriages. Only those entering or living together as
fiancés or marriage visitors could marry after notifying a registry office of
their intention to wed (Ensor & Shah 2005). The ‘Five-year strategy’ just
about eradicates any immigration routes into the UK via family reunion.
The Home Office ‘Controlling Borders’ publication states that the UK
plans to ‘end chain migration – with no immediate or automatic right for
relatives to bring in more relatives’ (2005: 9). The report specifies that
only immigrants with five-year residency in the UK or citizenship will be
allowed to bring in relatives immediately for settlement. The government
is clearly interested in preventing system abuse in the area of family migra-
tion, as is the case for asylum migration.
Nevertheless, there have been changes in human rights provisions con-
cerning family migration in recent years. As of February 2005, any non-
EU migrant with a short-term visa had to seek permission from the Home
Office to get married. However, in April 2006, a High Court judgment
found this to be in breach of human rights (Article 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights concerning the right to marry) and discrimi-
natory on grounds of religion (i.e. that those marrying in the Church of
England would be regarded more favourably) and nationality. The chal-
lenge was brought forward by an undocumented Muslim Algerian migrant
and his fiancée, a Polish Roman Catholic migrant, who had entered the
UK following EU enlargement and had been refused permission to marry
in February 2005 under the UK regulations (Kofman & Meetoo 2008:
161).
In September 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) overturned the
UKBA’s position on the rights of non-EEA third-country nationals. In the
case of Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform, which originated in the Republic of Ireland, nine other
EEA countries joined in supporting the position taken by the Irish govern-
ment. It stipulated that EEA law requires third-country national family
members to have resided lawfully in another member state with the EU na-
tional or to comply with the national immigration rules on family reunifica-
tion before getting an EEA family permit (i.e. visa for third-country na-
tional family members of EU nationals) (Talk Visa 2008).
The ECJ had two main findings to overturn the argument of the govern-
ments. First, EEA family permits had to be issued to third-country national
family members of EU citizens for the purpose of accompanying or joining
the EU citizen to the host state (e.g. the UK) irrespective of whether the fa-
mily member was, before arriving, lawfully resident (if at all resident) in
another member state. Second, the right to family reunification in the host
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state does not depend on where or when the family life was established
(Talk Visa 2008).
The ECJ judgments affect several UK family reunification provisions.
To take spouse applications as an example, the UKBA can no longer re-
quire EU nationals to fulfil the immigration rules’ support and accommoda-
tion requirements to obtain an EEA family permit for the admission of
their spouses; the same applies in respect to relatives in the ascending (e.g.
parents, grandparents) and descending lines (e.g. children, grandchildren).
The UKBA now must decide any pending applications on the basis of the
Metock decision (Talk Visa 2008).
Some scholars even classify the UK as the most liberal of the EU mem-
ber states, in allowing spouses of students, work permit holders and those
undertaking training to enter with the right to work. With the increased de-
mand for skilled labour (especially in the IT and welfare sectors, such as
education and health) and acceptance of long-term migration for this
group, family migration is likely to become more prevalent (Kofman &
Meetoo 2008: 156).
1.6 Asylum seekers and refugees
According to Joppke (1999: 128), ‘a key characteristic of British asylum
policy is its rhetorical and structural conflation with immigration policy’.
Due to the lack of legislative separation, the tight border control objective
for immigration was also applied to asylum. Indeed, until the passing of
the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act in 1993, the UK had no separate
asylum law. Instead, up until then, the 1971 Immigration Act and non-
statutory Immigration Rules had dealt with asylum (Macdonald & Blake
1991). Since 1985, the UK’s policy has focused on limiting immigration of
asylum seekers and illegal immigrants – these groups creating the most
controversial immigration issue (Layton-Henry 2004; Meyers 2004).
Joppke (1999: 129) aptly summarises asylum policy as follows: ‘One is
struck by its inclination to make maximal fuss over minimal numbers’.
Higher numbers of asylum applications were countered by tough responses
such as visa requirements on certain countries of origin, the imposition of
carriers’ liability on airlines and boats for improperly documented mi-
grants. This was meant to reassure the public that the government had
everything under control and that the UK did not have a ‘soft touch’ on re-
fugees (Layton-Henry 2004). Once inside the country, asylum seekers are
often confronted with the reality of detention centres, fast-track procedures,
white lists of countries and fingerprinting.
In fact, a tenfold increase in asylum applicants from the developing
world since 1988 led to the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act of
1993, the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act, the 1999 Immigration and
Asylum Act and further restrictive regulations (Meyers 2004: 79). More
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specifically, the 1993 act introduced two features: the right to appeal for re-
fused asylum seekers and a fast-track procedure for ‘manifestly unfounded’
asylum claims (Joppke 1999: 133). As could be expected, the rate of re-
fused asylum applications in the UK increased therewith from 16 per cent
in 1993 to 75 per cent in 1994. Furthermore, the number of detained per-
sons doubled from 300 in 1993 to over 600 in 1994 (ibid.). However, the
number of applications rose again between 1994 and 1995 and produced ‘a
backlog of applications awaiting decision and allegations that many of the
applications are bogus’ (Meyers 2004: 75).
Further restrictions were introduced with the 1996 Asylum and
Immigration Act that denied welfare benefits to asylum seekers who had
not applied for asylum in the UK upon arrival (Meyers 2004). It also lim-
ited council housing for asylum seekers, and some immigrant categories
were prevented from working for six months. With the government’s shift
from Conservative to Labour, restrictions were eased, such as not enforcing
the 1997 employer sanction laws. Furthermore, the government increased
funding available for local councils to take care of asylum seekers who
had no means of support.
A new Immigration and Asylum Act was passed in 1999 to further
streamline the asylum system and to reduce costs and abuse. The act estab-
lished the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), which offers two dif-
ferent types of support: a cash-only weekly allowance if the individual
stays with friends or relatives or a support package that includes furnished
accommodations and an allowance (Sriskandarajah & Hopwood Road
2005). Genuine refugees continue to be welcomed into the UK thanks to
the country’s international obligations, but refugees are only better treated
once their asylum application has been accepted, rather than when they ar-
rive on UK soil (Ensor & Shah 2005). The current Labour government
continues to use a harsh rhetoric and to implement drastic policies on asy-
lum (Hampshire 2005).
Tabloid newspapers such as The Sun and The Daily Mail have exploited
the supposedly high numbers of asylum applications from the late 1990s.
They reinforced ‘the view that Britain is a besieged society and that unless
the government takes “tough” measures it will be inundated with malin-
gerers, criminals and carriers of disease’ (Hampshire 2005: 184). As a
measure of its success in asylum control, the government has thus pointed
to, as Figure 6.5 shows, the recent years’ drop in applications. In the fig-
ure, we see a major increase in the early 2000s, with a peak in 2002. Not
counting dependents, the UK received ‘15.2 percent of the worldwide total
of 555,310 asylum applications in 2002, more than any other country, ac-
cording to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’
(Somerville et al. 2009).
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Figure 6.5 Number of asylum applications received
Sources: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics (2001, 2003, 2006b, 2009b)
Asylum applications clearly fell beginning in 2002. Due to a mounting
public pressure to limit the number of asylum seekers, the government im-
plemented the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act in 2002. This was
meant to reduce the high application numbers and extended the use of the
‘safe country’ list. Applicants from these countries could have their appli-
cations certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ and would therefore have no
in-country right of appeal. The act also reintroduced a distinction between
applicants at port versus in-country. NASS support, in terms of both sub-
sistence and accommodation, could be refused for individuals who do not
apply ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’. The 2002 act restricted asylum
applicants from working or undertaking vocational training until they re-
ceived a positive reply (Sriskandarajah & Hopwood Road 2005). The
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act of 2004
strengthened the government’s power to process applications, as well as to
detain and remove asylum seekers. The legislative changes are a sign of
the Home Office’s focus on improving both the speed of processing and
the quality of decision-making (ibid.). Further, the 2006 Immigration,
Asylum and Nationality Act required asylum to be refused to anyone who
had carried out – or had encouraged others to commit, prepare or instigate
– terrorism. It also allowed the Home Secretary to exclude any person from
protection under the convention relating to refugees if believed to be a ter-
rorist or major criminal.
Besides the aforementioned acts, the government implemented other pol-
icy measures, such as:
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tougher visa regimes; financial penalties on air and truck carriers;
juxtaposed controls at various European ports (e.g., when British
border guards are physically stationed in Calais, with immigration
powers, and vice versa); and British immigration liaison officers
posted abroad. (Somerville et al. 2009)
Additional policy moves aimed to reduce access of asylum seekers to ben-
efits and the labour market, increasing surveillance and detention and for-
cing relocation outside London (i.e. dispersal). There has also been a
significant increase in detained asylum seekers – with an average of 1,453
detentions per year. While the number of asylum seekers has been reduced,
this has come at a high social cost. Different groups and some NGOs are
particularly concerned with the treatment of asylum seekers (ibid.).
1.7 Student migration
As already mentioned, British migration policy over the past few years has
also emphasised student migration. Students were among the first encour-
aged to come to the UK, a shift in policy that was mostly driven by
economic needs. In June 1999, the Prime Minister initiated a three-year
strategy called the Initiative for International Education (PMI1). It was
intended to attract more students to the UK so as to increase the higher
education market share from 17 to 25 per cent and to double the number
of new students. This measure was eventually supposed to boost the UK’s
export earnings by £700 million.
In addition to a £5 million marketing campaign, immigration rules were
relaxed to give
automatic permission for students to work part-time and to make it
easier for would-be students to obtain a visa. (Spencer 2002: 8)
A result of the government’s strategy, the number of students increased
from 272,000 in 1999 to 312,000 in 2000 (by 15 per cent), as Table 6.1 in-
dicates. Numbers continued to rise until 2003, then decreased, then peaked
again in 2007. Since 2007, they have been declining.
Table 6.1 Student migration (in thousands)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
278 266 272 312 339 369 319 294 284 309 358 227
Sources: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics (2003, 2006b, 2009b)
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Launched in April 2006, the second Prime Minister’s Initiative for
International Education (PMI2) was a five-year strategy to strengthen inter-
national education. The government noted that around 319,000 students
from EU/EEA countries had come to the UK in 2003, adding £5 billion
per year to the economy. According to the strategy, ‘they [the students] are
a factor in the economic sustainability of many of our educational institu-
tions, and enable bright young people from abroad to develop lifelong ties
with the UK which are of long-term benefit to the country’ (Home Office
2005a: 15). The rules had already been relaxed in 2001 to allow post-
graduate students to obtain a work permit after finishing their studies, in
hopes that this step would encourage students to keep ties with the UK
and contribute to the British economy. However, with the introduction of
the points-based system, students fall under the Tier 4 category. They are
subject to tight approval processes and strict controls installed to reduce
abuse of the system, namely needing to be sponsored by a university and
having sufficient funding for their studies.
In 2010, the British government yet again announced tougher student
visa regulations to stop abuse of the system. Under the new rules, appli-
cants must speak English near General Certificate of Secondary Education
(CGSE) level and those following short-term courses cannot bring depen-
dents (BBC 2010). This change is the government’s response to criticism
that it had allowed suspected terrorists and other would-be immigrants into
the UK who would stay on despite their temporary visas (ibid.). While the
UK is a very popular location for academic migrants, the country has come
to fear foreign-student-turned-terrorists after Christmas 2009’s attempted
airplane bombing by University College London graduate Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab.
1.8 Recent developments in immigration policymaking
The UK has recently undergone a number of policy changes. The prior
mentioned tier system has been implemented since January 2008, starting
with Tier 1. Tiers 2, 4 and 5 have followed. However, the country still lim-
its low-skilled immigration to EU workers; Tier 3 remains suspended. The
points-based system does not apply to the intra-EU migration that remains
a large part of immigration overall. Immigrants have come to the UK in
large numbers due to the country’s economic growth, its high demands for
labour and favourable exchange rates along with restrictions faced in other
parts of Europe and high unemployment at home (Somerville et al. 2009).
Between May 2004 and May 2009, some 1.3 million persons from A-8
countries arrived in the UK. By the end of 2008, Polish nationals had be-
come the UK’s largest group of foreign nationals (ibid.). In 2008, only 12
per cent of these immigrants worked in high-skilled occupations. Estimates
suggest that half of the new EU workers had left by May 2009 (ibid.).
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The economic crisis first befalling the UK in 2008 has played a major
role. In autumn of that year, Prime Minister Gordon Brown proclaimed
‘British workers for British jobs’. Borders and Immigration Minister Phil
Woolas stated: ‘Migration only works if it benefits the British people, and
we are determined to make sure that is what happens’ (UC Davis 2009).
The government wanted to reassure the public that protection of native
workers was its priority and immigration was to be beneficial for the
society. Since British unemployment reached two million in 2009, the gov-
ernment tightened regulations on employers wanting to hire non-EU mi-
grant workers. Unions complained that many employers’ checks for local
workers before hiring non-EU foreigners were inadequate. Beginning in
January 2009, employers were obligated to post job openings via the gov-
ernment’s Jobcenter Plus (i.e. Labour Employment Agency) before adver-
tising vacancies in non-EU countries. In 2008, an estimated 80,000 British
jobs were advertised abroad, albeit ineffectively in the UK. Some 140,000
work permits were issued to non-EU foreigners in 2007, and 151,000 in
the first eleven months of 2008. In an effort to raise an annual £15 million
to help local communities cover migrant-associated costs, in March 2009,
the government introduced a £50 fee on non-EU migrant workers and stu-
dents (ibid.).
Further changes, it was believed, would significantly decrease the num-
ber of highly skilled immigrants. As a letter from the Home Office stated:
‘During these economic times when people are losing jobs it is crucial that
British workers and people already here have the first crack of the whip at
getting back in to work’ (cited in Contractor 2009). Former Home
Secretary Jacqui Smith announced plans that would forbid non-EU mi-
grants to ‘take a skilled job in the UK unless it has been advertised to
British workers first’ (BBC 2009). This was the government’s response to
the current economic circumstances. Migrants needed to have at least a
Master’s degree and a prior salary equivalent to at least £20,000 (ibid.),
and in the end, the government passed a new act that included two further
measures (Home Office 2009a). 1) Migrants who were not citizens or per-
manent residents of the UK could not have access to full services benefits
or social housing. 2) Migrants would have to pay a levy towards schools,
hospitals and other local services so that that new flows of British immi-
grants would not tax the community (Plaza 2009).
Even though such policy restrictions on EU workers are outlawed, a
considerable number have returned to their home countries and new entries
have been limited by the decreased labour demand. While the economic
crisis’ full effect on economic migration from new EU member states will
take time before becoming fully evident, some preliminary trends are pre-
sent. For one, there has been a significant decrease in applications from the
WRS. In the first quarter of 2009, the number of approved applications
was at its lowest since EU enlargement in 2004, thus constituting a 53 per
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cent decrease from the first quarter of 2008. It appears that immigrants
from A-8 countries and immigrants coming under Tier 2 (with a job offer)
will be hit the hardest. In fact, the inflow of A-8 nationals might not fully
recover (Somerville et al. 2009).
Forecasts for net immigration into the UK have been lowered due to the
economic crisis, but analysts still expect a continued high net immigration.
The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill 2009 will likely become a
law in the current parliamentary session. If so, it will increase the length of
time (and costs) associated with becoming a British citizen by introducing
a ‘provisional citizenship’ stage in the process (ibid.). Immigration was on
the political agenda of the 2010 general election. The Conservative party
proposed the establishment of quotas, an overhaul of the whole points-
based system and the implementation of new restrictions on immigrants.
After many years of a quite liberal immigration policy (especially towards
the highly skilled), immigration control is here to stay. Since the
Conservatives have come to power, they have already introduced an inter-
im quota on Tier 1 and 2 applicants. The number of most high-skilled mi-
grants will be capped until April 2011 at 5,400 (same as in 2009). The
points threshold for Tier 1 has been raised by 5 points to 80. Nevertheless,
investors, entrepreneurs and students staying on after graduation from a
British university are exempt from this limit. The temporary cap for Tier 2
will be 18,700 (5 per cent lower than 2009 numbers) (Travis 2010). Even
though these caps are currently tried out on temporary basis, they are ex-
pected to remain permanently.
2 Immigrant and ethnic minority policymaking
Having sketched out developments in immigration trends and influences
on immigration policymaking, we now turn to policymaking that concerns
immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and ethnic minorities in Britain. As
described earlier, the immediate post-war period in Britain was charac-
terised by an unusually liberal arrangement that endowed all newcomers
from the Commonwealth with the same citizenship rights and welfare enti-
tlements that British nationals enjoyed. This policy was narrowed down in
1971 by the Immigration Act and terminated by the passing of the 1981
British Nationality Act. It was this initially very straightforward naturalisa-
tion practice that laid the foundation for the idiosyncratically British
separation of ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’ and ‘ethnic minorities’ in terms of
political discourse, institutional responsibilities and policy measures. This
distinction is still adhered to today. Along the same lines, clear distinctions
are made within diversity-accommodating policies concerning work in race
relations (as part of equality and human rights issues), social cohesion, citi-
zenship and refugee integration. Building on the historical developments
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underlying these trends, the following passages will illuminate current
practices and paradigms through the lens of policymaking and institutional
responsibilities.
2.1 The evolution of diversity-accommodating policies under the race
relations paradigm
Regardless of the extent to which immigrants were endowed with formal
citizenship rights, by the late 1950s, it was clear that the early assimilation-
ist demands initially imposed were largely ineffective as far as integration
into British society. Similar to the situation in many other Western coun-
tries, labour market segmentation, residential segregation and lower educa-
tional performance of ethnic minority pupils as an aggregate persisted in
the UK (see Daniel 1968; Smith 1976; Brown 1984; Modood, Berthoud,
Lakey, Nazroo, Smith, Virdee & Beishon 1997). Moreover, first occur-
rences of ‘race riots’ in 1958 and early right-wing mobilisation (Moore &
Rex 1967) contributed to turning both public and elite opinions against
further immigration. It also led British governments to successively intro-
duce tougher immigration laws, as described above. Politically, these
restrictions were justified as far as a need to manage race relations, integra-
tion problems, growing unemployment and changing demographics
(Fitzgerald 1993). As the rationale was summed up in a famous statement
by Labour Minister Roy Hattersley: ‘without integration, limitation is inex-
cusable, without limitation, integration is impossible’ (cited in Rose 1969:
229).
Traditionally more influenced by developments in the US than
Continental Europe, British governments soon adapted the American para-
digm of ‘race relations’. This was a somewhat slanted policy transfer, as it
applied to a different societal group in the UK than it did in the US. Nor
did it carry the historical connotations of the slave trade. The ‘integration’
of newcomers was officially defined as being what Home Secretary Roy
Jenkins’ oft-quoted 1966 speech called not ‘a flattening process of unifor-
mity but as cultural diversity coupled with equal opportunity in an atmo-
sphere of mutual tolerance’ (cited in Rex 1995: 248). The 1960s thus over-
saw the groundwork for what would come to be characteristically British
ways of dealing with diversity and ‘integration’. First of all, minority eth-
nic groups were defined – and their educational and labour market perfor-
mance monitored and evaluated – on the basis of categories of ethnicity or
‘race’ (rather than religion or country of origin).12 Accordingly, indicators
for employment, educational performance and housing were measured and
monitored on this basis. Secondly, an ever-increasing institutionalisation of
policies and laws came to prevent racial discrimination (Schierup 2006).
Around the same time, a long-lasting consensus evolved in the UK that
openly racist remarks and ‘playing the race card’ in political campaigns
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would be unacceptable. This acknowledgment was exemplified by a high-
profile incidence in 1968, when British politician Enoch Powell was
sacked by conservative Leader of the Opposition Edward Heath’s shadow
cabinet the day after Powell gave his ‘Rivers of blood’ speech. In it,
Powell had vehemently warned against the introduction of anti-discrimina-
tion legislation (a Race Relations Bill proposed by the Labour government)
that would criminalise the display of racial prejudice in certain areas of
British life, particularly in housing (Schönwälder 2001).
Interestingly, at the same time race relations policies emerged, UK gov-
ernments went to lengths not only to avoid the stigmatisation and aliena-
tion of ethnic minority groups, but also to circumvent any policies that
could be seen as favouring some groups over others. As a result, policy
measures in Britain have traditionally been characterised by ‘racial inexpli-
citness’. Rarely have programmes been officially labelled as designed to
support particular ethnic groups. Hence, for example, the ambitious hous-
ing regeneration scheme Urban Programme from the late 1960s. Clearly
aimed at ethnic minority neighbourhoods, this was conceived of as an
area-based programme rather than a people-specific one. A notable excep-
tion to this rule was the so-called Section 11 funding introduced by the
Local Government Act of 1966. It provided local educational authorities
with additional funds that could, for example, be used to employ additional
language teachers for pupils whose mother tongue was not English (Leung
& Franson 2001).13
2.2 The Race Relations Acts and anti-discrimination legislation
The basis for the long-lasting and continuously expanded policy frame of
anti-discrimination legislation was laid with the 1965, 1968 and 1976 Race
Relations Acts. Constant development of these acts whenever – albeit only
when – Labour governments were in power illustrates the characteristically
British incremental, evidence-based policymaking in the area of integration
and diversity accommodation.14 By the mid-1960s, a number of politically
influential NGOs, such as the Runnymede Trust, had begun to monitor
whether equal opportunities existed de facto, and were expressing concern
about both social inequality and the indirect and direct discrimination
against ethnic minorities. Four particular surveys by the left-leaning inde-
pendent Policy Studies Institute (formerly Political and Economic
Planning, a non-governmental think tank funded by corporations) proved
to be particularly influential for passing successive Race Relations Acts
(Brown 1982; Daniel 1966; Modood et al. 1997; Smith 1974). The find-
ings of these surveys served both to lever public pressure and prompt prac-
tical suggestions for countering existing inequalities.
The first Race Relations Act of 1965 had made discrimination on
grounds of race, ethnicity, colour or national origin illegal and encouraged
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conciliation through a newly established Race Relations Board (Geddes
2003). Only two years later, a report by Political and Economic Planning
(PEP) was able to point to persistent racial discrimination (PEP 1967), thus
paving the way for the Race Relations Act of 1968. Six years later, find-
ings from the study Racial Disadvantage in Employment by David J.
Smith (1974) furthered the Race Relations Act of 1976, which was once
more intended to remedy the deficiencies of previous legislation. The act,
the passing of which was pre-empted by cross-party group visit to the US,
introduced the concept of ‘indirect discrimination’, i.e. the imposition of a
requirement that members of one racial group are less likely to be to be
able to satisfy than others. It made racial and gender discrimination in pub-
lic places, employment and housing illegal, and even permitted a certain
degree of affirmative action. The last act also merged previously estab-
lished race relations commissions into the Commission for Racial Equality
(CRE), a non-departmental government body comprising fifteen commis-
sioners appointed by the Home Secretary. Until its merger into the
Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2004, the CRE was in charge
of carrying out discrimination and equality policy campaigns, and was a
vocal central actor in British policymaking ever since (Rex 2003).
Finally in 1999, ‘The Macpherson report’ was published. The result of a
government inquiry set up by Home Secretary Jack Straw, it criticised the
faulty police investigation into the murder of black teenager Stephen
Lawrence, and publicly declared that the British police force had exhibited
institutional racism (Macpherson 1999). The report paved the way for the
passing of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act in 2000, which extended
the Act of 1976 to the whole of the public sector and schools, obliging
them to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and promote equal oppor-
tunities and good race relations. The act gave all public authorities and pri-
vate bodies that carry out public tasks a new statutory duty to actively pro-
duce and publish a racial equality scheme or policy explaining how they
would meet the duties under section 71(1) of the Race Relations Act. Very
significantly, while previous legislation had been concerned with promot-
ing access and equal opportunity, this watershed act obliged public bodies
to be proactive. They were expected to scrutinise their outcomes in terms
of ethnic minority employment and representation (Hansen 2007).15
2.3 The influence of inquiries and reports on policymaking
Reports likes those cited above, which are often commissioned by the gov-
ernment in reaction to incidents such as race riots or public authority fail-
ure, do more than thoroughly inform politicians and the public about the
events corresponding commissions were set up to investigate. Frequently,
they also set the tone for the official discourses on ethnic and race rela-
tions, community relations and social cohesion.
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Salient characteristics of the integration policies described above –
namely, an acknowledgment of the existence of societal racism and a reluc-
tance to single out ethnic minorities as ‘problem populations’ – were mir-
rored in the most prominent government report concerning the education
of minority ethnic pupils. That is, ‘The Swann report’ (1985), tellingly en-
titled ‘Education for all’. Guided by its recommendations, many local edu-
cational authorities subsequently introduced an enhanced multicultural cur-
riculum, if not an explicitly anti-racist stance in their teaching. Yet many of
the other progressive moves described above were either altered or aban-
doned during the Thatcher years. Wishing to reduce state intervention to a
minimum, Conservative governments of the 1980s used their executive
power to introduce competitive quasi-market mechanisms into most areas
of public policy, including the education sector. Critics complained that pu-
pils from ethnic and religious minorities were placed at a disadvantage by
various measures, particularly the Education Reform Act of 1988, which
installed competitive league tables for schools and a national curriculum
and called for school assemblies to assume a ‘broadly Christian character’
(e.g. Mabud 1992).16
In the first half of the 1980s, inner-city riots erupted again, this time in
Brixton (1981) and Toxteth (1981, 1985), influencing political decisions
once more. The subsequent government inquiry headed by Lord Scarman
pointed to complex political, social and economic factors that had created
a disposition towards violent protest. It stated that Afro-Caribbean and
Asian youths particularly were becoming more and more disillusioned by
police racism manifested in, for example, stop-and-search methods and ra-
cial profiling. ‘The Scarman report’ recommended greater efforts be made
to recruit more ethnic minorities into the police force as well as changes in
training and law enforcement (Scarman 1981).
Highly visible political moves aimed at creating trust and better ‘race re-
lations’, like the commissioning of such reports, were important. Yet,
critics complained that they often glossed over the true underlying causes
of ethnic minority discontent: racism and economic disadvantage
(Kundnani 2001). Others bemoaned the ‘benevolent paternalism’ long sur-
rounding British race relations. For example, in their early stages boards of
the specially created Community Relations Councils were frequently com-
posed of local public personae from the establishment rather than members
of the minority ethnic groups (Crowley 1993).
2.4 Immigrant- and diversity-accommodating policies from 1997 onwards
When New Labour came into power in 1997, Blair proclaimed a new
phase in policymaking that would be ‘evidence-based’, i.e. pragmatic and
non-ideological, thus retaining many Conservative strategies generated un-
der their ‘what works’ approach. Ever since, social inclusion, educational
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advancement and labour market inclusion for disadvantaged groups have
been high on the New Labour government’s agenda (Home Office 2001).
Accordingly, a wealth of strategies has been introduced in education, the
labour market, health, housing and the police force. Typically, they are
concerned with legal frameworks such as anti-discrimination and equality,
with mainstream programmes also benefitting ethnic minorities or with tar-
geted programmes for disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities.
Having declared that his three priorities in office would be ‘education, edu-
cation and education’, Blair initiated concerted efforts to raise educational
standards, thus making the British economy more competitive. Carrying on
with the long-standing mainstreaming approach and the convention of not
stigmatising particular groups, ethnic minority pupils’ accomplishment was
now firmly embedded in ‘whole school achievement’ and a general raising
of standards. Any differential funding was once more allocated through
area-based programmes such as Sure Start, Education Action Zones and
Excellence in Cities, thereby covering 70 per cent of all minority ethnic
pupils in England.17 At the same time, the educational attainment of ethnic
minority pupils was also actively supported through programmes such as
Aiming High and the widening of Section 11 funding into an Ethnic
Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG) (DfES 2003 & 2005). Employment
strategies for ethnic minorities included, among others, the New Deal
workfare programmes (Moody 2000; Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam 2002), the
introduction of Employment Zones in 2000, the Ethnic Minority Outreach
(EMO) scheme and the establishment of a cross-sector Ethnic Minority
Employment Task Force in 2004 (Barnes, Hudson, Parry, Sahin-Dikmen &
Taylor Wilkinson 2005; Cangiano 2006).
2.5 From multiculturalism to community relations and social cohesion
Until a turning point in 2001, Blair’s diversity policies were characterised
by a celebration of multiculturalism. This was mirrored in a report written
by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, a body compris-
ing independent experts that had been created in response to several inves-
tigations carried out by the Runnymede Trust. For the Home Secretary in
2000, the commission produced ‘The Parekh report’, which emphasised
the need for shared values and greater equity but spoke of the UK as a
‘community of communities’ (Parekh 2000). Chairman of the commission
Bhikhu Parekh proposed an explicitly proactive form of multiculturalism
that would not only tolerate but welcome and celebrate diversity and
difference.
The year 2001 is widely regarded as a turning point in British diversity
policies. The longstanding multicultural consensus was severely shaken,
and the ‘race relations’ framework transformed into a ‘community rela-
tions’ paradigm. It underlined the need for social cohesion in a society
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segregated along socio-economic, ethnic and religious lines. If inquiries
and reports had previously emphasised the state’s responsibility to enforce
anti-discrimination legislation and improve police practice, the new line of
thinking was complemented by a more assertive approach demanding
greater commitment and allegiance to British citizenship from minority eth-
nic groups.
Prime reasons for this change of heart were 2001’s riots in Oldham,
Burnley, Leeds, Bradford and other towns in northern England. The riots
erupted as a result of increased tension between the established white ma-
jority and growing ethnic minority communities, and involved a confronta-
tion between the National Front and the Anti-Nazi League. In response to
the unrest, the Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council commissioned the
independent Community Cohesion Review Team. Chaired by Ted Cantle,
the group was to inquire into Oldham’s progress in terms of community
cohesion and racial harmony. The result was ‘The Cantle report’ (2001).
Entitled ‘Community cohesion’, it expressed concern that some commu-
nities were so segregated they were living ‘parallel lives’. As one of four
such reports, the account hit a nerve, appearing as it did in a climate of
fear. The public was faced with terrorism – notably 9/11 – and the conflict
in Iraq along with seemingly unmanageable migration flows and a peak in
asylum claims. Frequently, the American-style segregation was now cited
as a deterrent example (Ousely, Phillips & Harman cited in The Guardian
2005), even though Britain’s ethnic super-diversity had never produced de
facto the kind of mono-ethnic inner-city ‘ghettos’ existing in the US.
In the same year, Home Secretary Jack Straw, who had focused on hu-
man rights in his policies, moved on to become Foreign Secretary. Straw
was succeeded by former Secretary of State for Education and
Employment David Blunkett, whose emphasis on ‘community cohesion’
was more in line with Blair’s thinking. Both Blunkett and Trevor Phillips,
then CRE chairman, ushered in a return to integrationist policymaking and
openly criticised the ‘self-segregation’ of ethnic communities in Britain. In
line with the new thinking, Blunkett took the opportunity to introduce
compulsory citizenship lessons in schools, an oath of allegiance for newco-
mers and English language tests for immigrants. Blunkett also called for
the definition of common ‘core values’ to counter what many perceived as
cultural and moral arbitrariness (The Guardian 2001). The overarching
sense was that the UK had celebrated diversity but not encouraged people
to come together and emphasise what united rather than divided them. The
new line of thinking was mirrored in statements such as ‘multiculturalism
is dead’ and that Britain is ‘sleepwalking [...] to segregation’ (Phillips cited
in The Guardian 2005).
It is unclear whether the change in discourse has really had any direct
practical implications, apart from cuts in single-issue initiatives.18
However, the fact that multiculturalism was now rebalanced through the
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government’s social cohesion agenda led many to feel that the latter was
about fostering assimilation rather than respecting diversity. To their critics,
both Cantle’s and Blunkett’s communitarianism-inspired thinking was pro-
vocative – a case of blaming the victim by interpreting racism as an out-
come of cultural segregation, not its cause (Kundnani 2002). The launch of
a cross-government race and cohesion strategy entitled ‘Improving oppor-
tunity, strengthening society’ in January 2005 (Home Office 2005b) illu-
strated a new approach that explicitly linked racial equality with commu-
nity cohesion. This new direction in policymaking has also been reflected
by a subsequent reshuffling of government departments, as will be de-
scribed in the next section.
2.6 Institutional responsibilities under the new policy paradigm
A good share of the influences on British immigration policymaking on
the macro-, meso- and micro-levels described in the first section of this
chapter also applies to integration and race relations policymaking. Still,
on the macro-level, the influence of EU legislation on national policies is
less significant than it is on immigration. The most notable case of EU im-
pact occurred with the passing of the Human Rights Act in 1998, which
entrenched the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in UK
law. The act strengthens all migrants’ rights regarding deportation and ex-
tradition, particularly when returnees are at risk of becoming subject to tor-
ture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment (Human Rights Act
1998). Similarly, the Equality Act of 2006 was driven by the European
Commission’s Employment Directive of 2000, which obliged member
states to outlaw discrimination in employment on grounds of age, disability
sexual orientation and religion and belief (Spencer 2008: 7).
Influences on the meso-level are more difficult to identify, as the distinct
strands –‘refugee integration’, ‘immigrant integration’, ‘ethnic minority
and race relations’ and ‘community cohesion’ – are dealt with by various
different departments and government units. These include, among others,
the Home Office, the Department for Children, Schools and Families, the
Department for Communities and Local Government and the Department
for Work and Pensions.19
On the micro-level, responsibility for administration and implementation
of race relations policies and the integration of migrants devolved to the lo-
cal level early on, as will be described in the next passages. This means
that the management of intergroup relations – and therefore the bulk of the
challenge of integration – is guided less by central government than it is
worked out by bureaucracies, the police and local authorities (Schierup
2006). The government’s role is to allocate funding to local-level initiatives
on the basis of competitive bidding by local authorities.
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2.7 Institutional splits: The Home Office and the Department for
Communities and Local Government (CLG)
The institutional structures and recent reassignment of responsibilities for
immigration, integration and minority ethnic relations in the UK govern-
ment mirror both a tradition of idiosyncratic ideas and current government
policy. Most strikingly, a peculiar separation now exists between the
UKBA (formerly the IND, which was replaced by the Border and
Immigration Agency in April 2007 and itself subsumed into the UKBA in
2008 under Home Secretary John Reid) and the newly founded
Department for Communities and Local Government (in short,
Communities and Local Government (CLG), formerly Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister) (see also Spencer 2010). As will be explained in
the following sections, this institutional separation comes as the manifesta-
tion of the convention of not linking policies regarding immigrants, refu-
gees and settled British ethnic minorities to one another.
Traditionally, all matters concerning immigration, integration, race rela-
tions and communities had been clustered in the Home Office in
Whitehall. The accumulation of responsibilities for immigration, prisons
and the police force had, however, always been problematic for the Home
Office’s image (Schierup 2006). In the course of major responsibility re-
shuffling among government departments in May 2006 under Reid, several
units previously responsible for race and social cohesion were moved from
the Home Office to the newly founded CLG, then headed by Ruth Kelly.
The CLG has since unified responsibility for a comprehensive equality pol-
icy, including policies on race, faith, gender and sexual orientation – tasks
previously split between several government departments. It was also given
the community policy function of the Home Office, which means that the
CLG’s other responsibilities entail housing, local government, urban policy
and neighbourhood renewal. Significantly, this arrangement means that is-
sues concerning race relations have now been institutionally subsumed into
matters of human rights, discrimination, equality and ‘community rela-
tions’. The most visible manifestation of this development was establish-
ment of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) as a single
equality body in 2007.
2.8 Race relations within a single equality body: The creation of the
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)
The EHRC is a permanent non-departmental – and thus government-inde-
pendent – public body. After a decade of negotiation, it was established by
the Equality Act of 2006 as a response to the European Commission’s
Employment Directive 2000, which obliged member states to outlaw dis-
crimination in employment on grounds of age, disability, sexual orientation
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and religion and belief (Spencer 2008: 7). Founded in 2007, the EHRC
now houses the CRE, the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) and the
Disability Rights Commission (DRC), and is the single equality body of
the government. The EHRC’s additional responsibilities include overseeing
rights in relation to age, sexual orientation, religion and belief in order to
promote good ‘community relations’.
The EHRC was the result of long bargaining, lobbying by national
NGOs, parliamentarians, trade unions, think tanks and a few determined
officials (see Spencer 2008). The CRE as the oldest, largest and best-
funded equality body with a strong mandate only reluctantly agreed to be
included in the EHRC. Not only did it fear that the race relations cause
could be diluted by the single body approach, but that funding for local
racial equality councils would be cut (ibid.). Eventually though, former di-
rector of CRE Trevor Phillips was appointed chair of the EHRC, and the
CRE also secured as a concession an independent Equalities Review to in-
quire into the causes of persistent inequality. The final report on the
Equalities Review of 2007 – together with the Discrimination Law Review
– contributed in part to the Equalities Bill, intended to modernise equality
legislation. The bill brings the duty to promote racial equality under a more
general duty to promote equality. This is exceptionally innovative com-
pared with other EU countries because it imposes statutory duty on all pub-
lic bodies, including libraries, museums, etc.20
2.9 Bringing migration onto the cohesion agenda: The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion (CiC)
The CiC was announced by Kelly in June 2006 as a temporary commission
of inquiry. It was set up as a response to the suicide bombings in the
London public transport system in July 2005, which had been carried out
by four British Muslims of Pakistani and Jamaican descent. Headed by
Darra Singh, the CiC’s purpose was to produce practical proposals for
furthering integration and cohesion, and to prevent extremism at the local
level. The commission’s final report, entitled ‘Our shared future’ (CiC
2007), was published on 14 June 2007, after an extensive consultation pro-
cess, endeavouring to clarify what caused tensions, segregation and conflict
in British communities. The CiC recommended the creation of more oppor-
tunities for shared experiences and the use of English as a common lan-
guage. Interestingly, the CiC concluded that the government’s perception
of the cohesion agenda had been too narrow, insofar as challenges to cohe-
sion were not only about riots in northern towns involving second-genera-
tion ethnic minorities. Rather, among the issues possibly causing cohesion
problems was the occurrence of rapid new migration in certain areas with
little prior migration experience. Advocating that the government broaden
its cohesion plan to include migration-related cohesion problems, the CiC
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was crucial for getting migration onto the cohesion agenda. It also sug-
gested that a national body, sponsored by the CLG, be established to man-
age the integration of new migrants (ibid.: 68). In response to the report,
the government pointed to the migration directorate within the CLG,
declaring its would consider the case for a national integration body and a
national strategy for migrant integration. To sum up, it was not until the
CiC’s establishment that ministers voiced their belief that the time was ripe
for including migrants in the local level’s cohesion strategy (Spencer
2007).
2.10 Migrant integration: Neither national strategy nor national body
In response to the CiC’s recommendation, the migration directorate located
at the CLG wrote a review on migrant integration – albeit without a con-
sultation process – that was published a year later in 2008. According to
one interviewee, the members of the directorate, with a rather meagre num-
ber of staff and lacking resources, saw the review as their chance to grow
institutionally. Accordingly, in their review they concluded that there was
no need for establishing either a national integration strategy or a national
integration body. Instead, they argued that much was being done already in
terms of migrant integration, and any additional tasks could be taken on by
the existing directorate if better funded (CLG 2008a). The review was sup-
ported by the respective select committee’s report on the CLG in 2008,
which agreed that there should be neither a national integration strategy
nor a national integration body, as this would detract from what was hap-
pening at the local level. However, having thus successfully argued that
there was no need for another body, the independence and status of the di-
rectorate was subsequently played down, and the directorate was merged
into the cohesion directorate. As one interviewee assessed the situation:
‘there wasn’t the appetite from ministers or politicians for a new body.
Also, they are a bit unclear about whether they want to invest into the inte-
gration of migrants.’ Another added that there was a hesitation on the gov-
ernment’s part to do anything ‘that looks like you are doing things for
migrants.’
Thus, rather than devising an integration strategy for migrants, the CLG
has been following an approach that ‘manages the impact’ of migrants on
local communities. This was manifested in a succession of reports that as-
sess the impact that migration is having locally. As a result, in 2008 the
Migration Impact Fund was established. Comprising £35 million in the fol-
lowing year, the moneys were distributed among local authorities to help
alleviate the pressure their communities were feeling from recent migra-
tion. The fund comprises the additional fees charged to non-EU migrants
and students coming to the UK (CLG 2009).
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To summarise, in line with the thinking that migrants, having come by
choice, are more likely to be able – and are rather obliged – to look out for
themselves, no explicit national integration strategy exists in present-day
Britain. In addition, the correlation between migrant cohesion and integra-
tion is rather ambiguous. Within the cohesion framework, the government
supports action on the local level in order to promote better relations and a
stronger sense of belonging; however, the extent to which migrants are in-
cluded in this is unclear. In the course of this approach, the CLG has rede-
fined migrant integration to be a (rather narrow) part of the cohesion agen-
da. As Spencer (2007: 359) states:
The failure to develop a strategy to address the needs of the 1,500
migrants who arrive in the UK each day and their impact on local
communities was a surprising omission that left local authorities in
a policy vacuum from which they have yet to emerge.
The Home Office has not developed an integration strategy for migrant po-
pulations either. The only exception has been a document entitled ‘Multi-
annual programme for the European Fund for the Integration of Third-
Country Nationals for the period 2007-2013 as part of the general pro-
gramme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’”. According to
one interviewee, the report was produced purely to administer the UK’s
share of the EU Integration Fund, and most of it is spent on ESOL lan-
guage tuition. A notable development was the establishment of the small,
independent Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration (ABNI),
comprising leading experts in the fields of English language testing, citi-
zenship training, employment of migrants, community development and in-
tegration. When the UK introduced a citizenship and English language test
for those seeking British citizenship with the Nationality, Immigration &
Asylum Act 2002, ABNI was charged with developing support services to
this end. Most visibly, in December 2004, the board published the hand-
book Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship, which has be-
come a prime preparation source for the citizenship tests (Home Office
2005b). ABNI was wound up after its last report in 2008, and suggestions
to merge it into the recommended new integration body (see CLC 2007)
were dropped since the government was opposed to its formation.
2.11 Refugee integration: A national strategy for those who have not come
by choice
Quite peculiarly, the integration of refugees into British society does not
fall under CLG responsibility. It is dealt with by the UKBA, which is part
of the Home Office and located offsite in Croydon. Conversely, the UKBA
oversees the integration of refugees though not of regular immigrants, as
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no national integration policy so far exists for them in Britain, as described
in the preceding section.
With rising numbers of asylum seekers during the 1990s, asylum and re-
fugee questions came to dominate much of the British political agenda.
They also played an important role in government elections, particularly in
2005, as already mentioned. Compared to other European countries, the
development of asylum and refugee policy occurred at a relatively late
stage in the UK, and specific integration programmes for refugees are only
now beginning to emerge. The long-standing dual tradition of keeping as
many newcomers out as possible while fostering the integration of those
already settled has also become manifest in British refugee integration poli-
cies. The Home Office’s approach to refugee integration follows the estab-
lished race relations and multiculturalism paradigms, though new, strategic
approaches and additional funding have enhanced their implementation.
In 2000, the Home Office launched a programme entitled Full and
Equal Citizens: A Strategy to Integrate Refugees into the United Kingdom
(Home Office 2000). With some amendments, it has served as the basis for
the government’s approach up until the present-day. In 2005, it was revised
and renamed Integration Matters: The National Integration Strategy for
Refugees (IND 2005), which, in turn was buttressed by Working to
Rebuild Lives (DWP 2005), an employment strategy devised in the
Department for Work and Pensions. Both strategies aim to provide refu-
gees with support in finding accommodation and employment. Notably, in-
tegration policies for refugees are characterised less by the provision of fi-
nancial support than by personalised services that foster the employability
of newcomers. Furthermore, the policies exhibit typical features of New
Labour policy delivery, such as partnership models of decentralised imple-
mentation and the incorporation of stakeholder groups in the processes
(Maile & Hoggett 2001). Other features of the strategy – mirroring New
Labour’s communitarian ideals – include so-called Personal Integration
Plans and the Integration and Employment Service of 2005 (formerly the
Sunrise programme), which provide one-on-one consultation and mentor-
ing services to enable refugees to become economically active as soon as
possible.
Initially, the voluntary sector was heavily relied upon to take up the fran-
chised work of providing services to refugees. Accordingly, a large number
of NGOs, refugee community organisations (RCOs), employer organisa-
tions, trade unions and bodies from the voluntary sector play an important
role in reception and induction processes, as the following section will de-
scribe. Until 2006, these stakeholders were linked and contacted through
‘user panels’ and formal consultations by the National Refugee Integration
Forum (NRIF). The NRIF was established by the Home Office in 2001 to
implement, monitor and develop the government’s ‘Full and Equal
Citizens’ strategy (Home Office 2000) which assists the integration into
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the UK of those granted leave to remain. Whether user panels have really
impacted on government policy via parliamentary committees, campaigns,
reports and press releases is, however, doubtful (Ensor & Shah 2005), and
the Home Office announced in 2006 that the NRIF would be wound up in
the same year (Ryan 2006). Meanwhile, in 2005, the outsourcing of refu-
gee integration was reconsidered. Because provision was felt to be uneven,
the government decided to set up the Refugee Integration and Employment
Service (RIES). Contracted out to twelve regions, the RIES provides ad-
vice and support for a twelve-month period to each recognised refugee.
According to the Home Office website, by the end of the period RIES con-
tractors can expect to see – a whopping – at least 30 per cent of their refu-
gee clients in employment.
Again, the rather exceptional fact that the Home Office has set up a
comprehensive integration strategy for refugees but not for migrants mir-
rors a particular line of thinking. That is, regular immigrants are likely to
be higher skilled and thus both willing and able to ‘integrate’ – while, at
the same time, there is no moral obligation for the state to support those
who have come by choice.
2.12 Policy delivery: The role of voluntary sector organisations and the
local level
A New Labour trademark has been to grant the third sector a key role in
delivering integration and welfare services to newcomers. The situation has
been described as resembling a ‘shadow state’ (Findlay & Fyfe 2006; see
also Somerville 2007: 79), where voluntary organisations not only depend
on government funding but are simultaneously subject to tight government
regulation. This dependency was exemplified in Blair’s (2006) suggestion
to ‘assess bids from groups of any ethnicity or any religious denomination,
also against a test, where appropriate, of promoting community cohesion
and integration’.
Naturally, most of the actual refugee integration work that is set out in
the national strategy is delivered on the local level, particularly in larger ci-
ties such as Birmingham, Manchester and London. London has for a long
time been a hub of immigration, and is the single most important destina-
tion for newcomers to Britain. According to 2001 estimates by the Greater
London Authority (GLA), London hosted 85 per cent of all refugees and
asylum seekers in the nation, which made 5 per cent of all Londoners refu-
gees or asylum seekers who had arrived within fifteen years prior to the es-
timate (GLA 2001). By far, most of the city’s integration efforts focus di-
rectly on enhancing the employability of refugees, though this endeavour
encompasses a range of services. These include education and training,
English language support – English as a Second or Other Language
(ESOL) or English as an Additional Language (EAL) – promoting the
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recognition of qualifications gained abroad, fostering acculturation to
British society and the specific labour market demands, mentoring, en-
couraging and supporting entrepreneurship, building social and community
capital, and signposting refugees, i.e. referring them to further agencies
(Green 2005).
A complex patchwork of national, regional and local agencies dealing
with integration issues has developed in London to meet these demands,
albeit in a piecemeal fashion. This intricate web of organisations includes
government bodies, voluntary agencies, NGOs and RCOs. On a local level,
RCOs provide training and counsel for refugees who fall outside main-
stream provision and negotiate with employers for work placements. As
low-threshold institutions that are in direct contact with refugees and asy-
lum seekers, they also play an important role in fostering social capital and
community networks. However, the fact that RCOs must compete for fund-
ing means not only that they invest a considerable amount of energy into
ensuring resources, but also that their work is often hampered by the short-
termism this arrangement brings about (ibid.). The work of local RCOs is
complemented and coordinated by meso-level agencies such as Renewal in
West London, Refugee Education and Training Advisory Services
(RETAS) and Partnership for Refugee Employment (PRESTO). Yet as
pointed out before, the incalculability of funding streams from both the
government and the European Social Fund. Moreover, the fragmentation of
the public sector creates a general instability in the institutional framework
of such organisations. Critics have also pointed out how the complexity of
the system makes it hard to have an overview for refugees and employees
alike, and prohibits efficient best-practice sharing and evaluation (ibid.).
These weaknesses led to the creation of city-wide coordinating agencies,
most notably the London Refugee Economic Action (LORECA) as the
pan-London authoritative body on employment, enterprise and training for
refugees and asylum seekers. LORECA speaks with the government, em-
ployer bodies, funding organisations and training providers on behalf of re-
fugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, successive mayors of London
have taken over city-wide strategic responsibility for refugee integration
and created coordinating structures (e.g. Mayor of London 2005, 2006a,
2006b, 2009).
Local-level integration illustrates how the local and the national levels
can work together, but also how points of conflict can arise between the
two. Successful cooperation is exemplified by the fact that the national le-
vel – the Home Office – and the local level – the Mayor of London –
equally strive to improve the public image of refugees and asylum seekers.
To this end, the national ‘Integration Matters’ framework emphasises refu-
gees’ positive contributions to the British economy and cultural life (IND
2005). A point of conflict between the cities and the national level, how-
ever, is that national legislation distinguishes between the phases before
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and after a potential refugee’s reception, as far as their integration is con-
cerned. That is, there is a clear legal distinction between asylum seekers
and recognised refugees, which has undeniable consequences for their
rights and treatment. National law prohibits asylum seekers from taking up
paid employment; yet, cities and local-level agencies have been arguing
that the reception phase – the period between the person’s arrival and their
actual recognition as a refugee – has crucial bearing on their later experi-
ence. Cities would much prefer asylum seekers in the reception phase be
allowed to work. This would improve their living and housing conditions
and enhance their ability to integrate later on, thus relieving local authori-
ties from the high costs accompanying this situation (City Statement
2003).
2.13 The focus on Islam and violent extremism
As Somerville (2007) has remarked, since its 1997 election, the Labour
government has engaged with Muslim communities in a notable way.
Created a half-year after the election was the government-supported
Muslim Council for Britain (MCB). Following the 7 July 2005 London
bombings, however, policymaking has been overshadowed by fears of
‘home-grown terrorism’. In its aftermath, the government embarked on a
dual strategy of ascertaining rights regarding faith and religion (such as
passing the Religious Hatred Act in 2006, for which Muslim communities
had long lobbied) and attempting to prevent violent extremism. This meant
that within its community relations approach, the government endeavoured
to build and improve its dealings with moderate Muslim groups and orga-
nisations. Working groups comprising Muslim opinion leaders and experts
on Islam dealt with questions such as how to recruit more Muslim police
officers and how to go about educating imams in the UK. Forums, groups
and bodies of influential Muslim scholars were encouraged to engage in
outreach programmes to counter violent religious extremism among young
Muslims (e.g. CLG 2007). The political discourse was characterised by a
renewed emphasis on what were perceived to be the core values of
‘Britishness’. Among the most heated debates in this regard were those
concerning government funding for faith schools and veil-wearing – mat-
ters that are in fact still debated (BBC 2007).
3 Conclusion
Comparing British immigration and integration policymaking to that of
other European nations, we may establish several features that distinguish
the UK’s case. As previously noted, British immigration politics began dif-
ferently from those of other economies. Rather than recruiting guest
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workers21 on a large scale after World War II, successive British govern-
ments were forced by both popular and elite opinions to continually restrict
immigration from the Commonwealth by regularly refining the legal con-
cept of belonging.
A further distinction between the UK and other European countries is
visible in Britain’s institutional policymaking. Whereas the UK and, for ex-
ample, Germany were ‘the most determined to avoid the appellation of
“immigration countries”’ (Freeman 2006: 238) despite the fact that both re-
ceived high numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers, Britain has proven
much more determined to realise its goal of control; overall, the British
state has shown an exceptionally strong hand in restrictive immigration
policymaking. In contrast to Continental Europe, British courts have not
functioned as effective opponents to the executive power because of parlia-
mentary sovereignty and common law restraints, at least until the passing
of the 2000 Human Rights Act. Parliament has leeway to formulate immi-
gration policy according to restrictionist public opinion, whereas the execu-
tive power more or less locks in the implemented policy (Joppke 1999).
As a result, the Home Office is fully in charge of immigration policy, and
the Home Secretary reigns with absolute authority. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment and the Home Office are increasingly willing to consult with a
wider audience over proposed legislation, especially with trade unions,
business organisations, NGOs and academic researchers. At least in theory,
stakeholders are offered the opportunity to influence political decision-
making. Within this arrangement, the Prime Minister carries little more
than a representative function and usually only voices his opinion in public
if highly politicised issues are at stake. For example, in December 2006,
Blair announced that radical Muslims had a ‘duty to integrate’ into British
society and warned that they would not be allowed to override what he de-
scribed as the country’s core values of democracy, tolerance and respect
for the law.
We have further noted how British legislation concerning immigration
and ‘integration’ – the latter hardly ever even referred to as such – have
mutually justified each other ever since the 1960s’ first implementation of
immigration restrictions. Significantly, however, the policies were both ter-
minologically and institutionally separated from each another, being la-
belled ‘immigration’ and ‘race relations’. Indeed, in stark contrast to some
other European countries, it became unacceptable very early on in the UK
to refer to settled ethnic minorities as ‘immigrants’. This taboo was paral-
leled both by a hesitation to speak about the integration of minority ethnic
groups and the sharp focus on social class rather than ethnic background
as the main factor for explaining differential achievement in the education
system or on the labour market. As early as the 1950s, it became clear that
the newcomers were there to stay and needed to be given a fair chance to
succeed in British society. Yet the integration policy was also officially
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defined early on as explicitly non-assimilationist. Quite the opposite, ethnic
minorities were encouraged to adhere to any cultural traits they might wish
to retain. At the same time, they were functionally integrated into the la-
bour market and politics, frequently on the local level (Favell 1998).
Immigrant and ethnic minorities were thus ‘nationalised’ as actors into so-
cial and political institutions (Geddes 2003) in an idiosyncratically British
manner.
At the same time, the UK has been a forerunner in terms of equal oppor-
tunity policy, anti-discrimination legislation and anti-racism campaigns.
The unusually early and comprehensive pieces of anti-discrimination legis-
lation – the most far-reaching in the EU – illustrate British governments’
penchant for incremental and pragmatic integration policymaking. The
loopholes in existing legislation were frequently amended on the basis of
highly visible reports that were commissioned by the government or non-
governmental bodies. Furthermore, the Race Relations Acts embody the
UK’s remarkable commitment to anti-discrimination and creating condi-
tions of equal opportunity. A general sense of fairness dictated that, once
admitted, immigrants were not to be treated as second-class citizens, and
the same sense of fairness also ruled out affirmative action as it would
grant certain groups preferential treatment over others. British policy-
makers have always been extremely careful not to separate minority ethnic
groups from the mainstream along racial or linguistic lines, fearing both
the stigmatisation of particular groups and the public backlash against pre-
ferential treatment.
Both the race relations paradigm and the commitment to multicultural-
ism have proven stable and resilient, even if the concepts became contested
near the beginning of the twenty-first century. Debates about the public
display of ethnic or religious symbols have typically been handled in a
pragmatic way rather than as a matter of principle in Britain, and they
never assumed the ideological tone or dimension seen in France and
Germany. To name two most prominent examples, in the UK, Sikhs are al-
lowed to wear turbans instead of safety helmets on a construction site
though are held liable for any injuries that would not have been sustained
if they had been wearing a helmet (paragraph 11 of the Employment Act
1989). Similarly, Muslim girls are generally allowed to wear headscarves
and veils (though not a full-face niqab) at school as long as they display
the school colours. In Britain, such controversies have usually been solved
on the level of individual schools rather than by politicians or even na-
tional law. Much of the flexibility and lenience in such matters, as well as
the multicultural paradigm and the institutionalisation of race relations have
been inspired by the American example rather than by Continental
European legislation. This includes the current pervasiveness of ‘politically
correct’ speech. For example, government documents refer to ‘minority
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ethnic’ rather than ‘ethnic minority’ communities, acknowledging that all
citizens belong to one ethnicity or another.
Representing a liberal welfare state in which commitment to redistribu-
tion and the acceptance of decommodification are comparatively low,
British politicians openly phrase both immigration and integration in terms
of the country’s economic benefit. Immigrants who are potentially able to
fill labour market shortages have always been given preference, and inte-
gration efforts for refugees have aimed at enabling them to become eco-
nomically active as soon as possible. Accordingly, British governments
have engaged in policy transfers and obviously learned from policy in
countries following similar economic rationales such as the US, Canada
and Australia. By contrast, the UK’s opt-outs from the Schengen agree-
ment and other EU directives (e.g. the Blue Card) that were perceived as
potentially harmful clearly demonstrate British ambivalence towards EU
regulation. Thus, the UK has embraced efforts to harmonise legislation on
asylum and illegal migration, but has not agreed to a common policy on
border abolition.
Some observers claim that the recent shift in discourse and policies from
‘race relations’ towards ‘community relations’, ‘social cohesion’ and the
definition of ‘core values’ has indeed been influenced by Continental
European developments and fears. The tensions that arose between an ex-
plicitly non-assimilationist multiculturalism and persistent problems – of
racism, labour market problems, educational underachievement and hous-
ing segregation – coupled with terrorist attacks and heightened security
needs, have paved the way for a change in government thinking that in
many ways mirrors developments in Continental European countries.
There ‘too much diversity’ had been sooner suspected of fostering segrega-
tion. During the British economy’s boom, which lasted for a number of
years, politicians emphasised the economic benefit that immigrants brought
into the country. Yet after the 2008 economic crisis, the government has re-
turned to more restrictive policies and has focused on limiting abuses of
the system. It is still uncertain whether the consensus on immigration can
endure the tough present economic conditions. And it also remains to be
seen how British governments will respond to the new challenges we de-
scribed in this chapter.
Notes
1 The authors would like to thank Martin Ruhs, Will Somerville and Sarah Spencer
for providing information and advice on the chapter as well as the three anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments.
2 Labour vouchers are specified as follows:
Category A: for those promised a specific job by a specific employer, Category B: for
individuals with training, skill or education useful to the British economy and
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Category C: for unskilled workers without a specific job in the UK (combined quota
for A and B: 20,800; quota for C: 10,000 per year) (Hansen 2001: 77).
3 Patrials ‘were all citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies born in or with an an-
cestral connection to the UK, citizens who had settled for at least five years, and –
this was a novelty – any Commonwealth citizen with a parent or grandparent in the
UK’ (Joppke 1999: 111).
4 British Citizenship was specified for those with close ties, i.e. patrials. BDTC was
granted to persons in dependent territories, including Hong Kong, Bermuda, the
British Virgin Islands and Gibraltar. BOC was granted to all citizens of the UK and
its colonies – mostly stateless persons living in the independent member countries
of the Commonwealth, mainly East African Asians and Malaysians (Geddes 2003;
Hansen 2001).
5 A-8 countries comprise Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
6 The 1971 Immigration Act and non-statutory Immigration Rules dealt with asylum
to that point (Macdonald & Blake 1991).
7 Layton-Henry characterises the UK as a ‘zero immigration country’, a paradoxical
term since the country was admitting a large number of immigrants through differ-
ent schemes.
8 Though the government published a draft partial Immigration and Citizenship Act
in July 2008 to consolidate immigration, it decided that it was not ready to intro-
duce such an act in the current session and postponed plans to see it through.
Parliament was presented with the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act. It be-
came the eleventh immigration act on the statute book when it received Royal
Assent in July 2009 (Symonds 2009).
9 MORI is the second largest research company in the UK.
10 The idea is that even political parties advocating more stringent regulations for asy-
lum protection will present more lax policies in order not to lose out in the competi-
tion with other parties.
11 For a detailed analysis of WHMS and subsequent changes, see Somerville (2007:
ch. 15).
12 This practice has taken a different direction since London’s 2005 terrorist bombings,
which were carried out by British citizens of Muslim faith. It was mirrored by the
passing of the Religious Hatred Act in 2006 and increasing attempts to measure
disadvantages along religious rather than ethnic lines (see e.g. Khattab 2009).
13 Yet, in contrast to many other European countries, British educational policy for eth-
nic minority pupils was soon concerned with more than the language question.
British policymakers and educationalists went extraordinarily far in their attempts to
analyse and remedy the lower differential educational attainment of certain ethnic
minority groups. In this ongoing process, various factors that could potentially con-
tribute to academic disadvantage – ranging from socio-economic background, tea-
chers’ racism, low expectations, the ‘school effect’ and family ethos to mono-cultural
curricula – were scrutinised and taken into account (see e.g. Coard 1971; Mortimore,
Sammons, Stoll, Lewis, & Ecob 1988; Smith & Tomlinson 1989; Gillborn & Gipps
1996).
14 As Somerville (2007: 18) has pointed out, scholars disagree on where pressures for
a liberal race relations policy came from. Joppke (1999) favours an interpretation of
top-down, rather paternalistic elite policies, while Sivanandan (2006) sees bottom-
up, worker-led activism as its source.
15 The Equality Bill introduced to Parliament in 2010 may be considered the most re-
cent element in this strand of proactive legislation. However, the aforementioned po-
licies and their subsequent equality and social cohesion strategies focused mainly
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on ethnic minorities of the second and third generations rather than on recent im-
migrants and refugees.
16 As early as the 1960s, quantitative research conducted by the Policy Studies
Institute (formerly PEP) pointed out the disadvantages ethnic minority newcomers,
particularly black Carribeans, Indians and Pakistanis, were experiencing in the la-
bour market (Daniel 1968; Prandy 1979; Chiswick 1980; McNabb & Psacharopoulos
1981; Heath & Ridge 1983; Stewart 1983). While the first generation of immigrants
was concentrated in manual work, findings concur that over the 1970s and 1980s,
ethnic minorities as a whole made considerable progress in the British labour mar-
ket, and that many minority groups had largely caught up with whites in terms of
occupational attainment. Indian men occupied professional, managerial and other
non-manual work at levels close to whites, while this percentage was significantly
lower for West Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Iganski & Payne 1996). This
positive trend came to a halt in the 1990s, even though the labour market improved
in these years as the British economy overcame the recession and unemployment
fell from 8.6 per cent to 5 per cent between the 1991 and 2001 censuses (Clark &
Drinkwater 2007). Today’s situation is particularly concerning for black Carribeans,
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, whose unemployment rates double that of whites,
while Indians and Chinese have been able to narrow the gap. In general, ethnic
minorities find it difficult to obtain high-ranking executive positions (ibid.).
17 As of 2006, about half of the ethnic minority population resident in Britain was
born in the UK (Simpson, Purdam, Tajar, Fieldhouse, Gavalas, Tranmer, Pritchard &
Dorling 2006). Significantly, since British official statistics rarely ever distinguish
between ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘immigrants’, it is difficult to provide attainment sta-
tistics that only apply to settled minorities and exclude recent arrivals.
18 This issue was tabled by the CiC in its 2007 report entitled ‘Our shared future’.
19 A number of cross-departmental strategies and influences exist. For example, with
the Education and Inspections Act of 2006, the government obliged schools to ‘pro-
mote community cohesion’ from 2007 on, including monitoring their performance
in this realm in Ofsted inspections.
20 The EHRC was not given an overt mandate for migration-related issues, though has
chosen to take a greater interest in migration than the CRE had done. In practical
terms, this means working with colleagues from the Migration Policy Institute
(MPI) in Washington, D.C., and writing a number of reports for them under the
community relations mandate of the commission. Still, according to one intervie-
wee, the commission is not leading on migrant integration though has redefined
the issue as being about good relations between people.
21 The mere lack of labour restrictions on countries that joined the EU in 2004 can be
regarded as a labour recruitment scheme.
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PART II
MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION COUNTRIES

7 The case of Italy
Giovanna Zincone
1 Introduction1
1.1 Inflow trends and contradictory approaches to management
In the European context, Italy became a country of immigration relatively
late. The first positive balance between emigration and immigration (return
immigration included) dates to 1973. Inflows started after the oil crisis of
1973, when the United Kingdom, Germany2 and, in particular, neighbour-
ing France closed their borders to immigrants. Flows were partially di-
verted towards Southern Europe not only because more attractive receiving
countries had introduced zero immigration policies, but also because dur-
ing the late 1970s and early 1980s, regions of low productivity in Southern
European countries started to face a labour shortage (King, Fielding &
Black 1997: 13; Morén-Alegret & Ruiz 2007). Furthermore, the previous
Italian economic boom, which had reduced the per capita income gap with
other European countries, rendered many jobs unattractive for Italian na-
tionals. Lastly, low fertility rates led to an aging population, which, com-
bined with scant social services devoted to elderly care, attracted caregivers
from emigration countries (Einaudi 2007). In the mid-1970s, however,
Italy was not yet a country of immigration and did not perceive itself as
such. Though the 1981 Census revealed an unexpectedly ‘high’ number of
foreign residents (210,937), the first big flows occurred later, between
1984 and 1989, when approximately 700,000-800,000 people entered the
country. Of these, it is estimated that 300,000-350,000 entered or remained
in Italy without a valid residence permit (Mauri & Micheli 1992).
We can thus begin to single out three significant features of immigration
in Italy: rapid inflow, substantial volume and a high proportion of undocu-
mented immigrants. These features are also shared by Spain (González
Enríquez 2009) and, as far as the high proportion of undocumented immi-
grants goes, by other Southern European countries as well. Such patterns
can be attributed not only to these nations’ economic structure or geogra-
phical location, but also to their immigration policies. A discrepancy be-
tween planned legal inflows and the society’s actual needs (Finotelli &
Sciortino 2009; González Enríquez 2009; Triandafyllidou 2009; Peixoto,
Sabrino & Abreu 2009) caused Spain to resort to regularisation on an indi-
vidual basis. Meanwhile, in addition to Italy, Spain and Portugal have also
passed frequent regularisations, indicating that illegal back entry is a viable
alternative.
Minor regularisations were initially introduced in 1977 and 1982, though
the major ones started in 1986. The largest regularisation – of more than
600,000 persons – was passed in 2002 by a centre-right government. It
was followed in 2009 by a mass regularisation covering some 300,000 ap-
plications, though the measure was limited to caregivers and domestic
workers, many of whom used to be Romanian immigrants exempted after
2007 from holding a stay permit (see Table 7.1).
Since 1986, Italy had adopted a policy of planned inflows meant, in
principle, to manage immigration. However, many inflow decrees were in-
troduced and sometimes intentionally increased in order to regularise im-
migrants already present in the country. This was particularly the case of
the supplementary flow decree of 26 October 2006, by which Romano
Prodi’s centre-left government actually regularised 350,000 migrants, ex-
ceeding the 170,000-person quota established by the previous centre-right
government’s annual inflow decree of 15 February 2006. The following
year, the centre-left government voted for a 170,000-person decree, insuffi-
cient to cover all the applications, but the government was too shaky to
pass a new integrative decree, as this would alarm Italy’s public opinion.
In 2007, Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right government voted for an identical
170,000-person decree, but more than 750,000 applications were received.
In 2008, due to the worsening economic crisis, the government decided to
reduce the planned quota to 150,000. But the ‘new’ 150,000 immigrants to
Figure 7.1  Residence permits on 1 January, 1992-2008  
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be admitted were selected from the previous year’s excess applications. As
such, an intent to use the inflow decree to regularise immigrant workers al-
ready present in the country had become very clear.
Here there emerges a first important feature in Italian decision-making:
an inevitable partial convergence between centre-right and centre-left poli-
cies due to policymaking persistently being pulled in two directions.
Decision-makers in Italy have had to find a middle ground, striking a bal-
ance between the public demand for control over illegal immigration and
reduced inflows, on the one hand, and employers’ pressure to regularise
undocumented immigrants and open the borders to immigrant labour, on
the other. Different inputs produce these contradictory outputs.
Insufficiently controlled or hyper-regulated inflows encourage further irre-
gular inflows. Repeated amnesties aimed to remedy the large strata of irre-
gular, albeit employed, immigrants are a magnet for further irregular
inflows. A large informal economic sector allows immigrants to enter the
country as clandestine or, more often, on a tourist visa, possibly to overstay
until they find a job on the black market.
The rapid increase of Italy’s immigrant population is the result of regular
and, more often, regularised entries. Between 2000 and 2010 (see Table
7.2), some 300,000 persons registered in the country each year.3 Italian im-
migration is also quite fragmented, though less so than it used to be. On 1
January 2001, the top three nationalities (Moroccans, Albanians and
Romanians) made up 26.7 per cent of total immigration to the country. By
1 January 2010, the same top three (with Romanians coming in first) had
already come to comprise 43.4 per cent. Although less fragmented than in
the past, immigrant communities are still highly diversified, which makes
tailored policies difficult to conceive. As so happens in other countries, the
distribution of immigrants is uneven (Table 7.3). Immigrants tend to con-
centrate in northern regions – Lombardy alone is home to nearly 25 per
cent of all immigrants. They are concentrated in big cities like Milan and
Rome, but they represent the highest percentages of immigrants within the
Table 7.1  Regularisation measures in Italy, 1986-2009
Year People regularised
1986 105,000 
1990 222,000 
1995 246,000 
1998 215,000 
2002 634,728 
2009* 300,000
 Source: Ministry of Interior (2009)
* Data only pertains to care givers and domestic workers.
THE CASE OF ITALY 249
resident population in medium-sized cities like Brescia and Pisa as well. In
Italy, as elsewhere, the concentration and subsequent higher visibility of
immigrants is being met with resistance, as such countries are unfamiliar
with consistent settlement by foreigners. In turn, anti-immigrant backlashes
induce more severe attitudes within the political elite – generally irrespec-
tive of the politicians being, at least in principle, progressive.
Table 7.2  Foreign residents on 1 January, 2000-2010
Year Foreign residents
2000 1,271,000
2001 1,334,889
2002 1,356,590
2003 1,549,373
2004 1,990,159
2005 2,402,157
2006 2,670,514
2007 2,938,922
2008 3,432,651
2009 3,891,295
2010 4,279,000*
Source:  Italian National Institute of Statistics (2010)
* Estimated
Table 7. 3  Top ten immigrant minorities, 1 January 2010
Resident foreigners 2009 Resident foreigners 2010*
Country of 
nationality
Number of 
people
Country of 
nationality
Number of 
people
1 Romania 796,477 1 Romania 953,000
2 Albania 441,396 2 Albania 472,000
3 Morocco 403,592 3 Morocco 433,000
4 China 170,265 4 China 181,000
5 Ukraine 153,998 5 Ukraine 172,000
6 Philippines 113,686 6 Philippines 120,000
7 Tunisia 100,112 7 Moldavia 109,000
8 Poland 99,389 8 Poland 107,000
9 India 91,855 9 Tunisia 105,000
10 Moldavia 89,066 10 India 105,000
Source:  Italian National Institute of Statistics (2010)
*Estimated
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1.2 Challenges and policies
Since Italian immigration did not reach any level of consistency or visibi-
lity until the beginning of the 1980s, it is not surprising that relevant poli-
cies only began a few years later. At first, the main aims were to prevent
displacement of Italian workers and to fight illegal entries (Act no. 943, 30
December 1986). The latter was also a requirement for admission to the
Schengen Area in 1997. As time went on, increasing integration problems
became more evident, as did the need to repress trafficking and to cope
with a disquieting increase in crime perpetrated by immigrants. These pro-
blems were key factors in motivating various measures of both centre-left
and centre-right governments.
By contrast, origins of legislation on the acquisition and loss of national-
ity, which can be considered a relevant aspect of the legal treatment of
aliens, date back to the period immediately following unification of the
country (i.e. 1861). And until very recently, this legislation had been
shaped by the consistent will of lawmakers to recognise and reward the
Italian Diaspora. This chapter will endeavour to reconstruct the evolution
of nationality laws4 as well as of immigration and immigrant integration
policies – the topics being addressed in different sections. In Italian legisla-
tion, measures concerning immigration and those defining immigrants’
rights are usually included in the same provisions, whereas nationality is
dealt with apart. Only recently were both nationality and immigration and
partial provisions for immigrants scattered in pieces of legislation concern-
ing public security. It is nevertheless more convenient to treat the two sets
of measures separately in this analysis. As for asylum policies, they do not
play a crucial role in Italian policymaking; asylum is not frequently used
by undocumented immigrants as a back door, due to another opportunity:
entering the side door of overstaying.5 Its related policies are often dealt
with under immigration policy and, furthermore, they often represent a
mere – though not always faithful – reception of EU directives.
A parallel analysis of nationality laws and immigration and integration
policies should enable the main characteristics of the Italian policymaking
process to be singled out, along with its continuity and changes.
Up until the centre-right’s return to power in 2008, most of the regula-
tions concerning nationality, immigrants’ rights and immigration flows in
Italy were the result of three main acts: the 1992 Nationality Law (no. 91,
5 February), the 1998 Law on the Regulation of Immigration and the
Legal Status of Foreigners in Italy (no. 40, 6 March; then Consolidated
Act no. 286, 25 July) and the 2002 centre-right reform entitled Norms
Concerning Immigration and Asylum (no.189, 30 July). The centre-left’s
brief return to government, which lasted from May 2006 to May 2008,
produced important bills that were ultimately not passed by Parliament.
Under the new Berlusconi government, measures concerning immigration
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and nationality were included both in bills and acts concerning public se-
curity (Acts no. 125, 24 July 2008; no. 94, 15 July 2009). The positioning
of the last measures is an indicator of the current government’s prevailing
security-oriented attitudes.
But before devoting more attention to the contents and making of the
main acts and the political processes and public measures connected to
them, it would be useful to trace their social and cultural roots.
2 A genesis of nationality law and immigration and
immigrant policies: The legacy of the Great Migration
To explain the evolution of immigration policies in Italy, we need to look
at the legacy of the so-called Great Migration, which began in the mid-
nineteenth century and exploded between 1890 and World War I.6 The key
relevance of emigration in modern Italian history is reflected in the devel-
opment of nationality law and, even if to a lesser extent, in the very first
immigration and immigrant policies. To facilitate an understanding of how
policymaking evolved in Italy, this chapter first considers the nationality
laws that were shaped by emigration. It then looks at immigration and
immigrant policies that were subsequently influenced, largely by other fac-
tors. Emphasised here are nationality’s very peculiar decision-making fea-
tures: continual delays in reforms, the issues not being debated up until
quite recently and then, by contrast, the topic’s becoming a hot, divisive is-
sue within the centre-right majority and eventually a cause for its split.
2.1 Nationality and citizenship
Even before mass emigration, jus sanguinis was the main mode of acquir-
ing citizenship for people living in the country. The relatively late Italian
state-building process took place in the context of liberal-nationalist ideolo-
gies and movements that spread throughout Europe in the nineteenth cen-
tury. These movements asserted the ethnic dimension of the state and a
belonging to the nation by descent. Furthermore, the 1804 Napoleonic
Code adopted jus sanguinis as a main criterion, and this principle was pro-
pagated throughout Continental Europe. Jus sanguinis was also a principle
of Roman law that Italian legislators and scholars once studied and so ad-
mired (Grosso 1997). Accordingly, jus sanguinis was introduced in the first
Italian Civil Code of 1865.7 The criterion was reinforced over time by the
increasing adoption of measures favouring the retention and reacquisition
of nationality for expatriates and their descendants, sometimes giving for-
eigners of Italian origin rights that were usually reserved to citizens.
The present Italian co-ethnic approach is a long-lasting consequence of
large-scale Italian emigration. Maintaining close links with communities of
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Italian descent was judged to be useful for a set of reasons. It was sug-
gested that Italians abroad acted as a vital vehicle for the country’s econom-
ic and strategic interests in the international arena (Vianello-Chiodo 1910),
being a lobby for the country of origin in the receiving country (Luconi
2000; Luconi & Tintori 2004; Tintori 2006). To allow expatriates to main-
tain Italian nationality was seen as a way of maintaining these desirable
ties. The main obstacle to this strategy was the acquisition of a foreign na-
tionality, which legally implied the loss of Italian citizenship. The main des-
tination countries of Italian migrants applied jus soli, and even automatic
naturalisation of residents,8 while the Italian Civil Code of 1865 (article 11,
paragraph 2) did not permit dual nationality. The 1912 Nationality Law no.
555 reaffirmed the principle of jus sanguinis as the main criterion for access
to nationality, complementing it with the principle of jus soli upon reaching
majority, in partial imitation of the French model at the time. Dual national-
ity was allowed for minors holding a foreign nationality. They were asked
to choose between the two nationalities upon reaching majority, though the
urgency to make a choice was not clearly expressed. Italian Parliament ac-
cepted a de facto toleration of dual nationality in exchange for keeping
strong ties with the Italian descent abroad (article 7). For many emigrants,
Italian citizenship became a sort of dubious latent nationality, or a cittadi-
nanza di riserva (‘spare nationality’) that could be appealed when needed
(Quadri 1959: 323). The co-ethnic approach gave way to ethnic nationalism
and eventually to racist and anti-Semitic legislation under the Fascist re-
gime, which also deprived expatriate dissenters of nationality.
The fall of the authoritarian regime in Italy, as in other European states
then and afterwards, was followed by the introduction of a new democratic
constitution. It was written as a strong antithesis to the racist and politically
repressive norms that had characterised Fascism. It forbade any kind of po-
litical, gender-based, religious or racial discrimination (article 3), and made
it illegal to deprive a person of citizenship for political reasons (article 22).
Nevertheless, the same ‘non-discriminating’ Constitution still included a
co-ethnic preferential principle: ‘as far as admission to public offices and
elected positions is concerned, the law can equate Italians not belonging to
the Republic with citizens’ (article 51, paragraph 2). The Republican
Constitution went into effect in 1948.
2.2 Immigration and immigrants’ rights
Passports were first introduced in Italy under Napoleonic Code. Being es-
sentially an emigration country, Italy was not concerned with immigration
in its early post-unified history. Procedures to enter and reside in Italy were
initially borrowed, along with a great deal of the legal system, from the
Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia, the pre-unitary state that had con-
quered and unified the peninsula. Severity in the admission of aliens to the
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country, as in other European states, was inversely related to the social sta-
tus of the foreigners (Einaudi 2007). Surveillance and repression were
applied to the potentially rebellious working class and to subversive politi-
cal activists, but others were quite welcome. The 1865 Civil Code gave
foreign residents the same civil rights enjoyed by citizens, going beyond
the reciprocity principle. Since Italy was a liberal regime, religious plural-
ism was established. And even though the Catholic religion was ‘the reli-
gion of the State’ (article 1 of the Constitution at the time9), freedom was
guaranteed to other denominations. This freedom was addressed to auto-
chthonous Jewish and Protestant minorities, rather than to immigrant
groups who were yet to arrive.
Generally speaking, legislation was quite tolerant and liberal until the
rise of Fascism. As in other European countries with a similar institutional
fate, this was when a considerable clampdown on border controls took
place, due to the assumption that foreigners could be potential fomenters
of internal dissent. According to the 1926 Public Security Consolidated
Act, foreigners had to register at police stations within three days of arrival
(article 143); employers had to notify the authorities within five days of
hiring a foreigner and within 24 hours of firing one (article 146).
Foreigners could be expelled if convicted of a crime or for disturbing pub-
lic order (article 151). The Centralized National Register of Foreigners was
established in 1929 and, as of 1930, visas started being required for some
countries. The security-oriented slant of Fascist legislation still persists in
the Italian democratic republic. A persisting orientation towards security is
due both to the relative continuity of the legal system, despite the downfall
of the regime, and to recurrent fears of antidemocratic autochthonous ter-
rorism with possible international links.10 The current threat of transna-
tional terrorism and high immigrant crime rates have given severe provi-
sions a new lease on life.
After the fall of the Fascist regime, it was not until the mid-1980s that
approval came of new relevant pieces of legislation on the treatment of for-
eigners as immigrants.
3 Nationality policies and policymaking from 1948 to the
present
3.1 From the 1948 Constitution to the 1990s: Between gender equality
and the myth of the Italian Diaspora
In post-war democratic Italy, two factors shaped nationality policies: the
enforcement of gender equality, introduced by the Republican Constitution
(article 3), and the myth of the diaspora abroad – L’altra Italia (‘the Other
Italy’). The latter, by far the more dominant ethos, concealed a sort of ‘dis-
creet nationalism’, an ethnocentric orientation, the only kind of nationalism
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legitimated before the rise to power of openly xenophobic parties and poli-
ticians in the 1990s.
The principle of gender equality embodied in the Constitution did not
have an immediate effect as far as nationality was concerned. But it was
‘user-ready’ for the magistracy in the 1970s, when equal rights principles
took hold of the Italian legal system in the wake of the feminist movement.
In 1975, women married to a citizen of another country were granted the
right to retain their nationality within the general Family Reform Act (no.
151, 19 May). This change was not brought about – as might be expected
– by the need to comply with international law, but through following the
Constitutional Court’s ruling (no. 87 of 9 April 1975), which had stated
that loss of nationality for married women contravened the gender equality
principle embodied in article 3 of the Constitution.
In 1983, following a new Constitutional Court ruling (no. 30, 9
February), a new act (no. 123, 21 April) established the right for married
women to transfer their nationality both to their children and to their for-
eign husband. The commentary on the acts made explicit reference to the
court’s judgment and to the constitutional principle of gender equality.
Constitutional norms and constitutional review, more than international
treaties,11 seem to have played a crucial role in supporting nationality re-
forms. In Italian decision-making, Joppke’s thesis (1999) emphasising the
Constitutional Court’s role seems to work better than Soysal’s focus on in-
ternational law (1994), though both underestimate the role of civil society
and movements in activating otherwise dormant pieces of national and in-
ternational legislation.
The 1983 act confirmed the prohibition of dual nationality as a general
principle, making an exception only for spouses. Children of parents of dif-
ferent nationalities were required to opt for one nationality within a year of
turning eighteen.12 Nonetheless, a subsequent act in 1986 decreed that the
deadline for this option was no longer one’s eighteenth birthday, but was
to be postponed until approval of the forthcoming Nationality Reform Act
(which was planned to include dual nationality). Summing up, dual nation-
ality has been allowed since 1986 without restrictions, but the principle
was not clearly established until the 1992 act (article 11).13 It was estab-
lished not only by the need to comply with the principle of gender equality,
but also to formally allow expatriates and their descendants to couple their
Italian nationality with that of the immigration country.
The more relevant element influencing Italian nationality policies in the
post-war era is the myth of the Other Italy, a belief that the ‘Diaspora’14 of
emigrant descendants mostly includes people who are still culturally close
to their homeland.15 This deeply rooted and largely shared belief inspired
the first attempt to reform the 1912 Nationality Law, i.e. Senate Bill no.
991 of 24 February 1960. As the next section shows, the law of 1992 was
essentially drawn upon this bill.
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3.2 The 1992 Nationality Law: Untimely reinforcement of jus sanguinis
When the most important reform of nationality law was passed in 1992,
Italy had already become a country of immigration. Two years before,
Italian Parliament had passed a fairly progressive law concerning the rights
of non-EU immigrants. In spite of this situation, Act no. 91/1992 and the
following measures reinforced jus sanguinis, in continuity with the tradi-
tional co-ethnic principle. The 1992 act seems like a great leap backwards,
especially if compared to the 1912 act. According to the law of 1912, all
foreign residents had to wait five years to apply for naturalisation (article
4). The only exceptions were the first and second generations of Italians
abroad who had lost Italian citizenship and were coming back to Italy, for
whom only two years of residence were required (article 9, paragraph 3).
By contrast, the 1992 law required ten years of residence for foreigners
from non-EU countries, reduced to four for EU countries and five for refu-
gees (article 9). Foreigners of Italian origin (not just the first generation
and their children, but also the third generation) could count on a special
discount; for them, three years of residence would suffice (article 9, para-
graph a), and only two if the period of residence occurs when the co-ethnic
foreigner is still a minor (article 4, paragraph c).16 Last but not least, not
only did the new law clearly establish dual nationality but also, following
the 1912 law, confirmed the very loose requirements in regard to acquisi-
tion of nationality by marriage (article 5).
The act of 1992 introduced a programme allowing people who had lost
their Italian nationality (for instance, by voluntarily opting for another na-
tionality) to reacquire Italian citizenship. The window was due to stay open
until 1994, but the deadline was extended to 1995, and then to 1997. The
Italian Foreign Office reports that 163,756 persons have reacquired Italian
nationality by taking advantage of this very easy procedure. This measure
was extended (statute no. 379, 14 December 2000) to aliens of Italian des-
cent living in territories that belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire be-
fore the end of World War I17 and then became part of the former
Yugoslavia after World War II. This provision allowed people to acquire
Italian citizenship by means of a simple declaration, even if they were liv-
ing in a country other than Italy. This second window of opportunity was
due to stay open for five years. Under a new provision (no. 124, 8 March
2006), it was reopened without a time limit, though the requirement of
knowing the Italian language and maintaining ties with Italian culture was
introduced.18 By contrast, up until now, no requirement has been intro-
duced for the transmission of nationality by descent abroad. According to
2008 data, the number of Italians presently listed in the Register of Italians
Resident Abroad (Anagrafe degli Italiani Residenti all’Estero, AIRE) is
3,734,428.19 However, it is important not to overlook the number of ‘latent
Italians’. The oriundi, as they are known, are people of Italian origin
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currently estimated to be some 60 million. Between 1998 and 2007 alone,
nearly 800,000 persons ‘remembered’ to be Italian, thus requesting an
Italian passport even if mainly in order to travel visa-free from South
America to Europe and North America.
Exploring the reasons behind this ‘great leap backward’ will enable us
to identify some general features of the Italian decision-making process
that affect immigration and immigrant integration policies, together with
some specific features of the nationality policies sub-sector.
The 1992 law was in fact a delayed-action provision. As anticipated, the
first reform project was presented in 1960, in a completely different con-
text, but did not get passed until 1992. Even though approved unani-
mously, it was already considered out of date by many progressive mem-
bers of Parliament because it did not take into account the fact that Italy
had become a country of immigration. The instability of Italian govern-
ments is one of the reasons for the delay. Between the first bill’s presenta-
tion in 1960 and the approval of the law in 1992, Italy went through 32
governments, with long intervals in between due to the difficulties in form-
ing them. With economic crises and political tensions, reform of the
nationality law was not high on the parliamentary agenda. Governmental
instability and priorities linked to a persistent state of political and econom-
ic emergency help explain the delayed action of this legislation.
Another general feature of the Italian decision-making system in the past
can help us understand the large consensus achieved by the reform. At that
time, the highly fragmented, polarised party system (Sartori 1976) was
counterbalanced by a consensual style of decision-making (Graziano
2002). Many provisions were passed by large parliamentary majorities, i.e.
with the consent of the left-wing opposition (Cazzola 1974). The unani-
mous vote for the 1992 provision was no striking exception.
The consensual measure of 1992 thus arose from the Italian party system
at the time. However, it was primarily the consequence of a specific cultur-
al framework concerning Italian expatriates: namely, a persisting myth des-
tined to last (albeit in attenuated forms) through to the present day, not
least abetted by pressure from associations of people of Italian origin.
3.3 Developments up until 2010
The second part of 2009 presented an important novelty: a bipartisan liber-
al proposal for reform (Sarubbi-Granata Bill, document no. 2670, Chamber
of Deputies) and the opening of an incandescent debate on the issue.
Though in some European countries, restrictive measures concerning
nationality were passed by centre-left parties in government, no liberal
measures were proposed or, for that matter, backed by any right-wing com-
ponent in defiance of their party or party coalition, as had occurred in
Italy. Until then, Italian nationality reform bills showed the classic divide
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between a more generous centre-left and a more severe centre-right –
although both of them still displayed unanimous consensus in favour of
foreigners of Italian origins.
An overview of the bills presented during the fifteenth and sixteenth leg-
islatures of the Italian Republic highlights two different approaches to the
issue of citizenship by the centre-left (in power during the fifteenth) and by
the centre-right one (in power during the sixteenth).
The centre-left coalition pursued a ‘balanced policy’. On the one hand,
it aimed to reduce to five years the length-of-residence requirement for
non-EU immigrants to acquire citizenship and to simplify the acquisition
of nationality for minors born and/or educated in Italy. On the other hand,
it intended to strengthen the requirements concerning civic and social inte-
gration and loyalty, very much in tune with Europe’s present reform trend.
The bill that then Minister of Interior Giuliano Amato presented in August
2006 was based on a comparative document prepared by an expert. The
formal consolidated draft of the law, prepared by the Commission of
Constitutional Affairs, which was responsible for discussing a possible re-
form, virtually reproduced the Amato Bill. That bill, in turn, reproduced to
a large extent a proposal elaborated in 1999 by erstwhile centre-left
Minister of Social Affairs Livia Turco. This, too, was the result of com-
parative analysis by experts and the legal office of the department. Visible
here is a general tendency by centre-left policymakers to rely on indepen-
dent experts and top-level civil servants, while centre-right politicians tend
to rely more on party staff.
The Amato Bill incorporated measures that should have attracted the
support of parts of the centre-right opposition, such as requirements regard-
ing language competence and sharing common values. Nonetheless, much
of the opposition used refusal of the Amato Bill as a way to increase popu-
lar consensus and to reinforce the strategic alliance between Berlusconi’s
Forward Italy Party and Bossi’s anti-immigrant Northern League. The only
identical measure shared by the two coalitions was aimed at discouraging
marriages of convenience by increasing the requisite number of years of
marriage to apply for nationality (from six months to two years if resident
in Italy). This restriction on acquisition through marriage was eventually
included in the 2009 centre-right Act (no. 94, 15 July 2009) on Public
Security.
Unlike the ‘balanced policy’ pursued by the centre-left coalition, none
of the bills presented by the centre-right coalition in the Sixteenth
Legislature allowed for reduction of the residence requirement. They all
maintained ten years for non-EU citizens, as did the consolidated draft of a
law, which all-encompassingly embraced a severe stance, for instance, by
making integration course attendance compulsory. As already alluded to,
this Parliament presented a striking novelty. Gianfranco Fini, the influential
leader and co-founder of the centre-right People of Freedom Party (Popolo
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della Libertà, PdL),20 which had expressed pro-immigrant proposals in the
past, accentuated this attitude as part of his greater strategy to come across
as a moderate. Fini’s ways have aggregated and reoriented a section of the
centre-right ruling coalition to allow a reformist bipartisan alignment. This
section eventually produced a bill identical to the previous centre-left con-
solidated draft alongside an even more generous evaluation of the requisite
time: five years, which also counted time granted by stay permits rather
than just formal residence.
Fini’s move demonstrates that the issues of immigration and immigrant
rights can be used to reposition parties and their leaders not just in a more
conservative direction, as is happening to many European leftist parties,
but also in a more moderate one. Furthermore, they can be used not just to
increase electoral chances, but also to strengthen present or future coali-
tional potential. By the end of 2009, the Fini tactic had transformed nation-
ality into a very hot political issue, albeit forcing the discussion to be
shelved until after the 2010 regional election. The logic was that this
would allow parties – and, particularly, party factions within the centre-
right – to reach an agreement, or at least to avoid revealing open divisions
during the electoral campaign. By the end of 2010, deep divergences be-
tween Berlusconi’s and Fini’s faction resulted in a breakdown of the old
centre-right coalition and possibly put a halt to bipartisan liberal reform.
It is important to underscore how co-ethnic-oriented acts no. 91 from
1992 and no. 379 from 2000 were, by contrast, passed by a centre-left gov-
ernment. Moreover, the 2001 and 2006 provisions, voted on under centre-
right governments and also inspired by co-ethnic attitudes, were all passed
unanimously. Parliament could easily pass the constitutional reforms allow-
ing Italians abroad to elect their own representatives to the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies.21 While it is not particularly surprising to find a co-
ethnic attitude within a centre-right coalition, it is slightly more surprising
to find acceptance of this principle by a centre-left majority. Nevertheless,
because past Italian emigrants were and are viewed as deserving poor
workers, left-wing sympathies for them are less surprising. The same syn-
drome is shared by Spanish leftist parties.
It is more complex to explain the fact that the centre-left cooled down
over citizenship rights for non-EU immigrants during its time in power. To
try to understand this behaviour, we need to illustrate another very relevant
specific feature of Italian immigration and immigrant-related policymaking.
Among the informal actors taking part in the decision-making process con-
cerning immigration and immigrants’ rights, a crucial role has been played
by the advocacy coalition in favour of immigrants (Zincone 2006b, 2010;
Basili & Zincone 2009, 2010). The coalition is made up of various associa-
tions, Catholic organisations being prominent among them.22 This ‘strong
lobby for the weaker strata’ mainly focuses its attention on the sectors of
immigrants in the most disadvantaged conditions – i.e. undocumented
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immigrants – and on claiming basic rights for these people (amnesties and
access to the national health service and public education). Commitment to
political and citizenship rights for long-term residents is less tenacious.
This lobby, together with another powerful one – that of employers’ asso-
ciations – also pushes for another goal: the expansion of legal immigrant
flows. Both aims support even more than granting immigrants the right to
vote locally or to facilitate their access to nationality. The power of these
two lobbies, especially before the economic crisis beginning in the late
2000s, was reinforced by the objective need for manpower, due to the stag-
nant Italian demography, its aging population and the reluctance of Italian
workers to accept unattractive jobs. In addition, the lack of social services
for the elderly attracted private caregivers and positioned Italian families in
favour of expanding inflows and regularising undocumented domestic
help.
As demonstrated in several polls (Ispo-Commissione per le politiche di
integrazione degli immigrati 1999, 2000), Italian public opinion was in fa-
vour of reducing new entries or stopping them altogether, but combined
pressure from the objective demands of the labour market and powerful
actors made these demands impossible to fulfil. Other insistences by the
public, such as the prevention of illegal immigration and the expulsion of
foreign lawbreakers, have been very difficult to accommodate. Requests of
this kind are hard to comply with in any country, though particularly in
Italy.23 The centre-right’s hostility towards liberalising nationality law and
the centre-left’s option not to insist on pursuing citizenship rights for immi-
grants (i.e. nationality and local vote) can be interpreted as a sort of surro-
gate response to the impossibility of fulfilling the public’s demands, which
remained visible in the period leading up to the 2000-2001 elections. This
was due to the well-known ‘electoral panic’, the politicians’ proclivity to
give up measures deemed risky simply because they are unpalatable to vo-
ters. Since the requisite anti-immigrant measures were not easily enforce-
able, any pro-immigrant proposal also had to be dismissed by centre-left
contenders.
Nonetheless, electoral panic is not a chronic disease. During the 2005 re-
gional campaign and 2006 general election campaign, the centre-left – then
in the opposition – promised to reform nationality law and to grant local
voting rights, since it was nurturing the hope of enjoying a fairly large
advantage over the centre-right. Electoral panic and a consequent relin-
quishing of traditional party values are less likely to occur when parties or
cartels expect a comfortable victory. The results of the 2006 national elec-
tions largely frustrated such an expectation, since the centre-left cartel won
with a very slim margin. The centre-left came up with a nationality reform
project based on the aforementioned Amato Bill that became known as the
Bressa Text, named after the erstwhile rapporteur. Nonetheless, after losing
a large share of public support, the coalition seemed tempted to abandon
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the project. On the eve of a partial local election in May 2007, the presi-
dent of the Constitutional Affairs Commission in the Chamber of Deputies
announced the decision to suspend the transfer of the draft law to the floor,
in order to better understand the costs involved. In the same way, the par-
liamentary passage was suspended in order to discuss the 2007 Financial
Law. Once again, the fear of engaging a fragile majority in a tough parlia-
mentary battle produced a false substitute: to please a public that was fear-
ful of excessive inflows and immigrant criminality, the centre-left aban-
doned the nationality reform that, if properly explained, would probably
have been accepted. The dramatic campaign pegged many members of the
present centre-right majority against immigrant rights. Their vocal refusal
of the bipartisan proposal may have negatively impacted Italian society,
once very concerned about immigration though not hostile enough to deny
immigrant rights. Surveys from 2008-2009 have confirmed a particularly
strong concern in Italian public discourse, compared with other EU coun-
tries. The reasons for concern are the quantity of inflows and the fact that
they are irregular, together with a deep fear of criminality arising from im-
migrant origins (Transatlantic Trends Immigration 2008, 2009). Recent sur-
veys concerning nationality produce contradictory answers. Some results
show reluctance towards a liberal reform (IPR 2009), except concerning
minors – such public sympathy may lead to a partial reform benefiting
minors.
Public opinion is a relevant actor in policymaking indeed. But surveys
are not always accurate reflections: results change depending on how ques-
tions are formulated. For example, in surveys regarding nationality re-
forms, favourable results emerged when immigrants were defined as being
documented and taxpaying (Demos 2007). Meanwhile, people’s reluctance
to reduce requisite residence time was expressed when the present ten-year
requirement was mentioned (IPR 2009). Polls are not just instruments for
surveying public opinion; they are also used by the political elite to influ-
ence the electorate, to present a false consensus that can actually be made
real by evincing a ‘jumping on the bandwagon’ mentality. Thus, even
when surveys do not reflect real opinions because they are steered by parti-
san polls agencies, they remain capable of playing a role in policymaking.
4 Immigration and immigrants’ rights: An ongoing
policymaking process
4.1 Immigration policies begin: Italy’s first relevant immigration law in
1986 and the Martelli Law of the 1990s
Policymakers’ prevailing conceptualisation of Italian emigrants as people
leaving their country in search of work (Colombo & Sciortino 2004c)
influenced the initial measures concerning legal treatment of immigrants.
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The first relevant law (no. 943, 30 December 1986) addressed immigrants
as foreign workers, starting with its very title: ‘Norms in the matter of pla-
cement and treatment of non-EU workers and against clandestine immigra-
tion’. Important responsibilities were therefore assigned to the Ministries of
Labour and of Foreign Affairs. The latter set up a committee aimed at reg-
ulating flows, controlling illegal immigration and combating trafficking.
The committee was composed of representatives of the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, of Labour and of Interior, as well as unions and employ-
ers’ associations. The role assigned to the social partners reflected the gen-
eral neo-corporatist model that characterised Italian decision-making in the
field of labour at that time. Decision-making regarding immigration and
immigrant rights appears embedded in the general decision-making struc-
ture and style of political systems – Italy’s included – and it reflects the
changes occurring within it.
The Ministry of Labour also hosted a consultative committee that
included representatives of immigrants’ associations together with repre-
sentatives of unions, employers’ organisations and local administrations.
The attempt to stay in favour with immigrant organisations resulted in too
many immigrants’ representatives being included. As a result, the commit-
tee grew to an unmanageable size and ended up being disbanded three
years later. Like other bodies intending to represent immigrants, this com-
mittee proved to be irrelevant in the actual decision-making process
(Zincone 1998). It was the aforementioned advocacy coalition comprising
Catholic and lay associations – from unions often in accord with employers
– that acted on behalf of immigrant interests, effectively playing the role of
their indirect representative (Zincone 2000).
Because immigrants were thought of as workers, the political goal of
avoiding competition with the Italian workforce was pursued through var-
ious means. Priority in employment was openly given to Italian and EU
workers (article 8), and immigrant flows were, in principle, limited and
planned (article 5). Non-EU workers were given the same rights as na-
tionals as far as most welfare entitlements were concerned (article 1). The
cost of social security contributions for non-EU workers (article 13) was
made 0.5 per cent higher than that of national workers – this in order to
provide resources for repatriation in case of dismissal. Making social secur-
ity contributions for immigrant workers more expensive than for native
ones was also a device to make foreign labour economically less attractive
and competitive. Granting equality in terms of social rights, the 1986 law
not only acted in line with a 1975 ILO Convention (no. 143) that Italy had
ratified in 1981 (Nascimbene 1991), but tried to avoid a downward compe-
tition that would be detrimental for Italian labour.
Overall, the 1986 legislation looked extremely generous, liberal and in
tune with international law. In theory, immigrants were not only made vir-
tually equal to Italians as far as welfare provisions were concerned, but
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were also given special opportunities to learn Italian while letting second
generations preserve their country of origin’s culture and language (article
9). In practice, no national public funds were devoted to non-contributory
welfare and integration measures, and the burden of implementing these
rights mainly rebounded on the already overstretched resources of regional
and city councils. At that time, Italian regions still had very limited fiscal
autonomy and financial resources.
The scarcity of planned inflows, the higher costs and, to an even greater
degree, the complexity of the procedures were real deterrents for employers
who intended to hire non-EU workers legally. It was easier to hire illegal
immigrants informally, without registering them. Thus, the 1986 law actu-
ally reinforced the factors that gave rise to undocumented residence. At the
same time, it introduced the first consistent amnesty for undocumented im-
migrant workers. Many others would follow. These measures can be better
understood when observed as being embedded in a general policy style:
amnesties for unauthorised building, tax evasion and unregistered labour –
and even general pardons – are far too frequent in Italy.
Since this specific regularisation was made dependent on the require-
ment of being a registered employee, it was an out-and-out flop.24 The fail-
ure and its subsequent negative feedback produced a sort of vicious learn-
ing cycle: the low numbers of the 1986 regularisation influenced the law
that followed in 1990 (no. 39, 28 February). The amnesty accompanying
that 1990 law was based on extremely loose criteria and was followed by
an even looser implementation. Generally speaking, negative feedback
from past policies is a recurrent factor motivating policy reforms in the
field of immigration control and integration. We could call into question
the very possibility of fully successful integration strategies and fully suc-
cessful policies aimed at controlling the inflows. A sort of inevitable nega-
tive feedback would explain the unending process of policy reforms in this
field – not only in Italy.
Another recurrent driving factor of public policies is the ‘emergency’:
the presence of events that are difficult to forecast and manage, thus being
perceived and presented as emergencies. By the end of the 1980s, the
growing settlement of immigrants began to produce social tensions, espe-
cially in large cities and southern agricultural areas. Lack of accommoda-
tion led to uncontrolled squatting and, in turn, protests by residents in sur-
rounding areas and even acts of aggression by right-wing youngsters. This
difficult situation peaked when a black labourer named Jerry Essan Masslo
was murdered in October 1989 in Villa Literno, a tomato-farming area near
Naples. The 1990 law followed immediately after the Masslo murder.
Italian lawmaking in the field of immigration and the treatment of immi-
grants has too often been characterised by an ‘emergency response’ atti-
tude, erroneously suggesting that Italian immigration was neither a stable
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nor inevitable process (Bolaffi 1996).25 In the Masslo case, a shocking
event was used as an opportunity to propose positive reforms.
The Martelli Law of 1990, named after erstwhile Vice-President of the
Council of Ministers, confirmed equal access to social rights though, like
the 1986 law, allocated little money for this aim. The financial burden for
immigrants’ welfare was still borne by local shoulders. One important ex-
ception was temporary accommodation, for which resources were given
top-down from the central government to the regions, which, in turn, trans-
ferred them to local administrations. Even before the assignment of specific
resources, some efficient local administrations had started temporary ac-
commodation programmes (Ponzo 2005). Here, we see how solutions often
move bottom-up – from the periphery, where the problems must be faced,
to the centre, which is often more concerned with public rhetoric and gen-
eral policy lines. In theory, the 1990 law paved the way for further planned
immigration by making annual flow decrees mandatory and imposing 30
October as a deadline for issuing the decree (article 2). In practice, the de-
crees were issued at the end of the years whose inflows they were sup-
posed to regulate up until 1998, and a large quota of the planned flows
were taken up by de facto amnesties, family reunions and permits for hu-
manitarian reasons. Again, this shows a case of discrepancy between the
letter of the law and its actual implementation. As a key interviewee stated,
the discrepancy should not be despised; it helps manage the system by al-
lowing legislation to adjust to actual needs.
The 1990 law assigned the responsibility of coordinating planned annual
inflows to the Ministry of Interior, together with the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, of Budget and of Economic Planning, Labour and Social Security.
These ministries were also supposed to consult others involved, such as
the Ministries of Public Health and of Education, as well as the main un-
ions, the National Council of Economy and Labour and the Conference of
the Regions. The system was more or less the same as provided by the
1986 law, with slightly more influence given to the regions. Another char-
acteristic of Italian decision-making emerges here: too many actors in-
volved in too many acts requiring excessive transfers of paperwork, back
and forth from one ministry or department to another. Once again, this
leads to another discrepancy between the letter of the law and what is put
into practice. Decisions are actually made by a far more limited number of
actors and, as a consequence, the formal actors excluded by the real deci-
sion-making process take offence.
The Communist Party, then the main component of the opposition, voted
in favour of the 1990 law. By contrast, a small party belonging to the
Republican majority coalition and its secretary Giorgio La Malfa were
highly critical (Ciccarelli 2006). They eventually voted against the law, to-
gether with Parliament’s right wing comprising the National Alliance and
the Northern League. As far as immigrants and immigration lawmaking
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were concerned, this pattern persisted up until the current government. The
majority could be split, while part of the opposition could converge with
the majority. Though the 1990 act divided the parties in government, it
was approved by a huge majority (over 90 per cent of MPs). Nonetheless,
that kind of virtual unanimity was not destined to last. In the latter half of
the 1990s, immigration and immigrant rights became – far before national-
ity matters – a highly politicised, conflict-ridden matter.
4.2 The 1990s: Towards the Turco-Napolitano Law of 1998
The political crisis in Albania and the consequently massive inflows of
Albanian refugees to Italy presented another emergency situation.
Combined with a general need to improve coordination in policymaking, it
motivated Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to introduce a Ministry for
Italians Abroad and Immigration during his seventh government (April
1991-April 1992). The decision on this group in the ministry was made
with an eye to domestic politics – to avoid the impression of giving immi-
grants ‘too much’, as was reported by erstwhile Italians Abroad Minister
Margherita Boniver. As the former president of the Chamber of Deputies’
Commission for Human Rights and founder of the Italian branch of
Amnesty International, Boniver was deeply concerned about the rights of
immigrants. The decision to introduce a Ministry of Immigration was also
the result of ‘a policy transfer from abroad’ conveyed by experts and civil
servants (Zincone 2006b). This again is a recurrent practice, not confined
to immigration matters. Guido Bolaffi was a long-time top civil servant
working in the field of immigration, and he played an important role in the
institutional building of the ministry. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Italians
Abroad and Immigration had no portfolio and was always overwhelmed by
more powerful competing ministries and their departments, so this ad hoc
ministry ended up not being very successful.
Various other attempts to coordinate and clarify the institutional attribu-
tion of responsibilities failed, and eventually, in 1993 (Law no. 107, 13
April), a special autonomous Department of Social Affairs within the
Presidency of the Council (again a ministry without a portfolio) took con-
trol of this policy sector. At the time, the appointed minister was Fernanda
Contri, again assisted by Bolaffi. A special General Direction on
Immigration was then established in the department. Under this minister, a
first draft of the major reform of the legal status of immigrants in Italy was
prepared with the help of a commission including experts and top-level
civil servants from the main ministries. The cases of Boniver, Contri and,
later, Turco confirm the hypothesis that newly appointed ministers are
more likely to resort to the help of top-level civil servants and experts
(Penninx, Garcés-Mascareñas & Scholten 2004; Widgren & Hammar
2004). Even an experienced politician like Giorgio Napolitano (2006: 294)
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writes in his memoirs that when he became Minister of the Interior in
1996, he brought with him ‘a trustworthy expert in international relations
and immigration’ – namely, Carlo Guelfi.
After the first Berlusconi government’s brief centre-right governance
during 1994-1995, part of the proposals of 1994’s so-called Contri Draft
were included in a decree (no. 489/95) named after erstwhile Prime
Minister Lamberto Dini. Besides allowing another amnesty, the so-called
Dini Decree granted most public health services (article 13) to undocumen-
ted immigrants. Extending public health to undocumented immigrants had
previously come from the benevolent illegal practices of hospital directors
and doctors, who were able to administer medical attention to immigrants
by disguising hospital visits as emergency treatments for which everyone
is eligible, no questions asked.
In a way, the Dini provision was forced by the 1992 General Reform of
Public Health (government decree under Parliament delegation 502, 30
December), which introduced tight budget constraints and a business-or-
iented approach, making it difficult to conceal and cover expenses for users
who were not entitled. Another measure provided for in the Immigration
Law of 1998 originated from illegal local initiatives: the inclusion of undo-
cumented minors in public schools. Under pressure from the advocacy coa-
lition at both the local and national levels, the practice was first embodied
in local memoranda, then in ministerial memoranda and eventually in the
Turco-Napolitano Law.
Here, it is evident that legislative initiative can be taken bottom-up from
the periphery to the centre, from informal to formal actors, from civil so-
ciety to the public arena. It can shift from illegal practices to soft law, from
soft law to decrees and eventually to laws (Zincone 2006b). Although a
law textbook would never include the concept of practices in opposition to
the law, such practices are not uncommon and quite effective.
The 1998 law can be considered the first reform regarding immigration
and immigrants’ rights that was not conceived under emergency condi-
tions. It intended to treat immigration as a permanent phenomenon and reg-
ulate the subject with a comprehensive act. New Minister of Social Affairs
Livia Turco and new Minister of Interior Giorgio Napolitano used the
1994 Contri Draft as their starting-off point and relied upon more or less
the same team of experts and civil servants. Although the draft was radi-
cally transformed, the prevailing attitude of solidarity combined with legal-
ity-oriented measures did not change.
Even though amended by centre-right governments in 2002 and 2008,
the Turco-Napolitano Act (no. 40, then Consolidated Act no. 286/1998) is,
to date, the main piece of legislation concerning the status of immigrants
in Italy. The law addressed legal immigrants as individuals and potential
citizens, not just workers, and made them nearly equal to nationals as far
as all social rights were concerned (article 41). This virtual equalisation of
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rights was not a novelty. At last, valuable financial resources were com-
mitted to this set of policies, with the establishment of the National Fund
for Migration Policies (Fondo Nazionale per le Politiche Migratorie) (arti-
cle 45). Furthermore, as already mentioned, the law definitively opened up
public education (article 38, paragraph 1) and a large part of public health
care to undocumented immigrants (article 35, paragraph 3). This set of so-
lidarity-oriented measures, already introduced in part by the 1995 Dini
Decree, was mainly the outcome of ongoing pressure from the pro-immi-
grant advocacy coalition. Thanks to this primarily Catholic coalition, as
well as the work of experts and top-level civil servants called upon by
newly appointed Minister Turco, a residence permit for job-seeking immi-
grants was also introduced (article 23).
Nonetheless, while the 1998 law was strongly influenced by the advo-
cacy coalition’s solidarity-oriented attitudes, it also introduced new repres-
sive measures. In order to be admitted to the Schengen Area, the Italian
government had promised not only to adopt the Schengen Information
System (SIS), but also to reinforce border controls against illegal immigra-
tion. The repressive measures introduced in 1998 were mostly motivated
by a necessity to respond to the international constraints of Schengen and
explicit pressures from EU member states. The need to comply with EU re-
quirements was keenly felt by Minister of Interior Napolitano. This promi-
nent figure in the former Italian Communist Party, a convinced pro-
European and a reformist, was highly concerned with the duties connected
to his new appointment. To have Italy accepted as part of the Schengen
Area, the minister had to trump strong resistance from his German collea-
gue, while counting on the support of his Spanish counterpart.26
Furthermore, repression of illegal entries served as a bargaining tool that
could be used to convince the opposition to avoid filibustering, particularly
feared since the centre-left could only count on a narrow majority. The
most significant repressive measures consisted of the possibility of holding
undocumented immigrants in special ‘temporary detention centres’ for up
to 30 days (article 14) in order to identify and possibly repatriate them.
Various forms of forced expulsion were also introduced as an administra-
tive measure (article 13) for reasons of public order and by court decision
as an alternative (article 16) or subsidiary penalty (article 15). These re-
pressive measures were disputed by the left wing of the majority (Basili
2005a; Zincone 2006b), and somehow balanced the Council of Ministers’
approval of more timely and generous inflow decrees.27 On the eve of the
regional election of 2000 and the political election of 2001, the centre-left
government became afflicted by the electoral panic syndrome surrounding
the discussion on nationality law. The government thus decided to limit a
number of social rights to long-term resident immigrants only,28 while
making the acquisition of a permanent permit more difficult29 (Zincone
2006b).
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More than other previous public decisions, the process leading to the
1998 law highlighted the fact that immigrants and immigration policies are
divisive issues, not only between party coalitions, but also within coalitions
and even the same party.
4.3 After 1998: Reforms of the reform embedded in an evolving political
system
By late 1999, once again many different ministries were involved in pol-
icymaking on immigration-related issues. To simplify the procedure and
coordinate the various offices and ministries, a permanent roundtable was
set up, hosted by the Presidency of the Council. This can be considered a
specific institutional innovation. Nevertheless, the formal structure of im-
migrant and immigration policymaking was to be affected by more signifi-
cant changes: general reforms concerning the introduction of a spoils-
system approach in public administration, the transfer of responsibilities
from the central government to local government, new electoral laws and
the increased power of the government vis-à-vis Parliament.
The status of very top-level public managers was affected by a series of
public administration reforms. In particular, after the acts of 2001 and
2002, their contracts were no longer permanent and their employment be-
came dependent on the will of the minister. The introduction of this kind
of moderate spoils system reduced the role of civil servants in policymak-
ing, albeit to a lesser extent than one would have expected. Newly ap-
pointed ministers, at least in strong, traditional departments such as the
Ministries of Interior and of Foreign Affairs, still tended to rely on the ex-
isting staff instead of employing their own personnel.
General reforms to restructure public administration, most of which
passed in 1999 (Law no. 300), also set in motion a process of functional
reorganisation and gave rise to many changes both within the ministries
and between them, eventually reducing their number. In 1999, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs took this opportunity to replace the General Department
for Emigration and Social Affairs with a new Department for Policies and
Italians Abroad, though it did not go into effect until 2002. In 2001, an ad-
ministrative reform was also implemented in the Ministry of Interior.
Responsibilities for immigration and immigrants previously shared be-
tween the Ministry of Interior and the two General Divisions for Police
and Civil Rights (the latter addressing only asylum seekers) were brought
together in the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration.
The 1999 reform of public administration also merged various ministries
when it was implemented in 2001. The Ministry of Labour and Social
Security incorporated the Department of Social Affairs and became the
Ministry of Welfare, which inherited the Special Immigration Division.
Nonetheless, Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni, a member of the
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Northern League, feared being involved in the integration of immigrants.
Because at that time his more moderate personal opinions were at risk of
conflicting with those of his party, he allowed a shift of responsibilities
from the Ministry of Welfare to Interior, also in matters previously dealt
with by Social Affairs.30 Under the third Berlusconi government,31 thanks
to the appointment of Giuseppe Pisanu, the Ministry of Interior took the
lead not only in combating illegal entry and crime, but also in the field of
integration policies. Since these were highly controversial issues, Pisanu
was sometimes opposed by fellow coalition members disagreeing with his
sensible attitude towards immigration and immigrants’ rights. Individuals
do matter, and Pisanu’s role increased during his mandate, above all due to
the personal prestige the minister enjoyed within the cabinet. Prestige and
competence, however, did not prevent Pisanu’s exclusion from the govern-
ment when Berlusconi came back to power in 2008. Maroni was then ap-
pointed Minister of Interior, his policy attitudes becoming increasingly em-
bedded in the anti-immigrant line of his party.
As already observed, the creation and form that immigration-related po-
licies take are influenced by the general shape of the country’s institutions
and their reform. These remarks apply not only to public administration,
but also to other sets of reforms – and their actual capacity to achieve the
aim for which they were conceived.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, various reforms of electoral laws at
different levels32 have attempted to produce more stable governmental ma-
jorities and grant more power to the executive.33 Up until the results of the
2008 elections, though the average duration of Italian governments had
lengthened, the number of parties had not diminished. Part of the seats are
still assigned through the proportional method, enabling small parties to
survive if they succeed in passing a threshold of 4 per cent on the national
level (Chamber of Deputies) and 8 per cent on the regional level (Senate).
Without the need to reach a minimum threshold, the winning coalitions re-
ceive a majority reward at the two respective levels. What is more relevant
when it comes to accounting for Italian immigration and immigrant poli-
cies is the way in which this sort of system actually operates. Parties form
cartels that designate common premier candidates. In the Chamber of
Deputies, the party list system operates. In both houses, candidates of par-
ties and party factions are given ‘safer’ constituencies according to the
electoral strength and coalition potential of their groups (the latter depend-
ing on how pivotal they are in enabling the coalition to win). Up until
2008, the system was not able to discourage the proliferation of parties
but, since it rewarded electoral coalitions, forced parties to form often het-
erogeneous electoral cartels. As a consequence, ideological conflict within
party coalitions increased. This syndrome, already present during the mak-
ing of the 1998 law, grew more acute during the preparation and approval
of the 2002 ‘reform of the reform’.
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The 2002 centre-right reform was a sort of electoral bill of exchange that
centre-right parties were obliged to honour. While the centre-right was still
in the opposition, it had presented two main bills that provided the political
basis for the laws to be voted on once it came to power. The first was the
Bossi-Berlusconi Bill, named for the leader of the Northern League and
the centre-right candidate premier. The reform project took the form of a
people’s bill, which to be accepted needs 50,000 signatures – these were
collected on the eve of the 2000 regional elections. The cultural framework
of the bill was utilitarian and functionalist. It considered immigrants as
guest workers, a flexible production factor rather than a potential part of
the permanent population. The most relevant features of the bill were the
increase to a three-year legal residence requirement before being entitled to
family reunification and preservation of the ten-year period of residence
before non-EU citizens could apply for naturalisation.
A ‘law and order’ approach characterised the other major bill, which
was promoted by the National Alliance, another centre-right party. This bill
introduced the crime of clandestine immigration for illegal immigrants,
thus implying immediate arrest, a summary trial and escort to the border.
In contrast to centre-left policymakers who tend to rely on experts and civil
servants, at least during preparation of the aforementioned bills and the
2002 reform, centre-right policymakers made use mainly of their parties’
staff to keep a stronghold on consensus-driven policy strategy. However,
some of the more radical changes called for by both bills, conceived when
the centre-right was in the opposition, were toned down during the bargain-
ing that preceded official presentation of the 2002 reform, when the coali-
tion came to power. In the actual Bossi-Fini Bill, no crime of clandestine
immigration or restrictive reform of nationality law was introduced, and fa-
mily reunion stayed immediate for holders of renewable residence permits
of at least one year. This more moderate approach was the consequence of
a strong opposition made by the centrist Catholic component of the major-
ity. Nonetheless, the clash between government and opposition was much
fiercer than when the centre-left reform was debated (Basili 2005a).
Comparative analysis of parliamentary proceedings during the formation
of the two main laws voted by the centre-left in 1998 and the centre-right
in 2002 clearly shows not only rhetorical and ideological conflicts between
centre-left and centre-right, but also vast political conflicts within both coa-
litions (Basili 2005a; Zincone 2006b; Zincone 2002; Zincone & Di
Gregorio 2002) – the conflict within the centre-right being even deeper.
Both provisions were the result of compromises that took place mainly
between government and its opposition in 1998, and mainly within the
majority in 2002. The centre-right could rely upon a large majority, which
allowed it to withhold from making any concessions to the opposition.
Nevertheless, a heterogeneous majority must find a compromise among its
different components if no alternative partners are available. The radical
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Northern League was forced to make major concessions to its Catholic
partners.
The 2002 Bossi-Fini reform did not encroach on any social rights given
by the centre-left to documented or undocumented immigrants. In fact, as
far as social rights were concerned, the centre-right reform (Law 189/2002)
altered the centre-left policies far less than expected. The only real welfare
change introduced by the new law concerned pensions, which was unsub-
stantial.34 Moreover, the 2002 law included another amnesty addressing
domestic workers and caregivers (article 33). The coalition’s right wing
had to accept this measure because of pressure from families35 as well as
from small entrepreneurs who were, in principle, hostile to irregular immi-
gration and subsequent amnesties, though strongly in favour of regularising
their own undocumented employees. The law was immediately followed
by another amnesty provision (Decree 195/2002) that included all immi-
grant workers, for which employers (largely centre-right voters) were suc-
cessful in lobbying. The cumulative outcome of the two amnesties pro-
duced the largest regularisation to have ever occurred in Europe up until
that time (634,728 individuals).
Parties and factions within the same coalition that were characterised by
opposing attitudes inevitably produced a patchwork legislation. The pre-
sence of the same social actors and lobbies, the ubiquitous positioning of
Catholic pro-immigrant parties in both majorities and the persistence of si-
milar problems reduced potential divergences between centre-right and
centre-left coalitions, even in such a divisive policy sector. The longer the
new centre-right government stayed in power, the more it was forced to
converge with the previous centre-left majority. While planned flows were
considerably reduced at the beginning of the centre-right’s mandate,36 they
increased enormously in the following years. This culminated in the Prime
Minister’s Decree of 15 February 2006, when 170,000 non-EU workers
and another 170,000 workers from new EU member states (for which Italy
applied a two-plus-three-year moratorium) were allowed to enter.37
The opposing coalitions’ policies converged but did not overlap. The
2002 reform introduced more restrictive provisions on immigration policy.
The link between residence permit and employment was tightened. The
new law introduced a staying contract for the purpose of employment, the
Contratto di Soggiorno-Lavoro (article 6 of 189/2002 Act). Subsequently,
it abolished the jobseekers’ stay permit (article 19, paragraph 1) and re-
duced the period of tolerated unemployment from twelve to six months (ar-
ticle 18, paragraph 11). It required more frequent renewal of residence per-
mits and reduced the length of the permit for temporary jobs (article 5,
paragraph 1).38 The 2002 centre-right reform also introduced two repres-
sive norms that proved to be legally debatable: with the first (article 13,
paragraph 5bis), undocumented immigrants could be forcibly escorted to
the border and expelled; with the second offence (article 14, paragraph
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5ter), if stopped a second time without a stay permit, illegal immigrants
could be submitted to mandatory imprisonment (from six to twelve months
in the case of a second violation of the entry and stay laws; from one to
four years in the case of a third violation).
These residual but still significant differences between centre-left and
centre-right policies were partially eroded by two factors: the actions of
various courts and the Constitutional Court, which blocked repressive mea-
sures or obliged the government to amend them, and the practical difficul-
ties caused by frequent renewal rules and short-term permits.
The Italian legal system is characterised by a rigid Constitution and con-
stitutional review by a Constitutional Court. Rulings by the Supreme Court
have to be initiated by law courts or appeal courts during specific trials.
Over a thousand constitutional objections were submitted to the Supreme
Court against the repressive measures of 2002, leading to two rulings that
eliminated parts of the Bossi-Fini Law. The two judgments (222 and 223,
15 July 2004) ruled that mandatory preventive imprisonment of a person
who fails to comply with an order to leave the country after being found
without a residence permit or with an expired permit is unconstitutional,
since a person cannot be deprived of his freedom for a mere administrative
offence, for which, in case of conviction, a short prison term is provided.
Arrest and immediate escort to the border by means of a simple endorse-
ment by a judge, without any hearing and opportunity for defence, were
ruled unconstitutional as well.
While the repressive side of the law was partially eroded by the action
of the magistracy, the functionalist side was partially amended because it
proved to be dysfunctional. The complicated procedure of the labour-resi-
dence contract and too frequent renewals caused blockages, huge delays
and various other problems for immigrants and their employers. Making
use of innovative practices initiated at a local level (Caponio 2006: 278) –
within the framework of a general Ministry of Interior directive (18
February 2005) aimed at improving the quality of public services – at-
tempts were made to redistribute the burden and outsource responsibility
for dealing with the paperwork. Decentralisation to local bodies, civil so-
ciety associations and, ultimately, post offices39 can be attributed to the im-
age of efficiency being propagated by the centre-right government.
Nevertheless, this attempt to delegate and decentralise caused considerable
confusion over the responsibility of issuing and renewing permits, making
the situation even more chaotic. The subsequent centre-left government
opted for an online procedure, but this solution did not prove successful
either – the ‘circuits got overloaded’, resulting in the entire system being
jammed up. Attempts to delegate outside the public administration and
simplify part of the procedures have, up until now, proven ineffective. This
is due to the huge number of applications involved and their concentration
within a short timeframe. In the autumn of 2008, the main Italian union
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CGIL denounced the fact that more than a million old permits still needed
to be renewed and part of the 2007 permits had yet to be assigned,40 as
well as the fact that renewal procedures can take up to one year, meaning
the ‘renewed’ permit often arrives already expired. The Questure, the
police headquarters mainly responsible for the renewals, are often under-
staffed in Northern Italy, precisely where there is an overload of applica-
tions. Yet, an uneven, often irrational distribution of administrative
resources, which is typical of the Italian system, explains discrepancies and
inefficiencies not just when immigrant rights are involved.
As in other countries, local authorities in Italy have always had a consid-
erable say in the everyday management of immigrant policies (Zincone &
Caponio 2006). Starting in 1990, a decisive set of reforms gave an even
more relevant role to local authorities in immigrant policymaking. Pressure
from the Northern League created a new impulse for the constitutional re-
vision of the ‘Form of State’ (Title V of the Italian Constitution), which
had begun with the introduction of regions in 1970. A reform process to-
wards a more federal, decentralised structure of the state has been taking
place since 1999. It has already involved a profound redistribution of re-
sponsibilities between the central government and the regions, including
matters concerning immigrants. Regions were assigned legislative responsi-
bility for public health, housing and large parts of education. Since the first
budget law of the 2001 Berlusconi government, the National Fund for
Migration Policies and other social funds (including the Fund for
Childhood Policies) were merged into a single general Social Fund.
Regions became responsible for deciding on the allocation of these re-
sources to the sub-regional local authorities. This decision-making reform
was accompanied by a sizable cut to the fund itself, resulting in local gov-
ernments having to carry a heavier burden for integration.
Developments following the 2006 elections and the return to power of
Prodi’s centre-left government confirmed the relevance of the policy cycle
already observed in the case of the 2001 Berlusconi government. The col-
our of the party majority is more relevant at the beginning of the mandate,
when the ideological framework is stronger. Newly appointed ministers in-
tend to underline discontinuity by keeping the electoral promises. The
Prodi government started by accepting all the pending applications for resi-
dence and work permits (460,000 non-seasonal and 58,000 seasonal work-
ers) by upping the number of quotas already planned. This move was
denounced by the opposition as a surreptitious amnesty, since the applica-
tions were submitted by workers who were already illegally residing in
Italy. In fact, the use of planned inflows to regularise undocumented immi-
grants is a common practice under many Italian governments. The centre-
left government abolished the moratorium on immigrants coming from
new EU member states. The government presented a proposal (Chamber of
Deputies Act no. 2976, the so-called Amato-Ferrero Bill) to reintroduce
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the sponsor system in an innovative form and to simplify procedures and
requirements related to the residence permit and its renewal. The bill also
considered the possibility of increasing, in cases of extraordinary labour
needs, the quota of entries for wage earners (domestic workers and care-
givers, in particular). It planned to extend the residence permit to all vic-
tims of new slavery, a measure that was originally introduced in 1998 to
help women who were forced into prostitution. Other relevant innovations
conceived by the Amato-Ferrero Bill concerned irregular immigrants.
Temporary detention centres were to be reorganised in order to separate
simple clandestine immigrants and overstayers from presumed criminals,
and detainees were to receive more freedom and legal assistance.
Regularisation was to take place on an individual basis for irregular immi-
grants who had a work permit for at least eighteen months, but were un-
able to renew it because of temporary unemployment. All these measures
can be considered counter-reform moves aimed at both re-establishing the
old Turco-Napolitano Law adding some innovative features to it. Together
with the reform of nationality law, these proposals were blocked by a stale-
mate in parliamentary activity of the Prodi government. They eventually
expired when the government fell.
After the centre-left government collapsed on 24 January 2008, the cen-
tre-right coalition came back to power with a large majority. The coalition
no longer included the small Catholic Party (UDC). Generally speaking, it
had a far less relevant presence of Catholic members and a reinforced
Northern League contingency. Since anti-immigrant sentiment was one of
the reasons for the centre-right coalition’s electoral success, it is not sur-
prising that the first measures on immigration were included in the two
Acts on Public Security (125/2008 and 94/2009). Though the government
could count in theory on a more homogeneous, large majority, some of its
initial, more radical proposals were contested by members of its coalition
and even defeated in Parliament. As a result, policymaking was doomed to
continuous overhaul, and every step forward was followed by a step back.
For instance, the project to carry out a census of Roma camps and take
their children’s fingerprints was abandoned, and the census followed a
more traditional path.41 Nonetheless, the question of fingerprints resurfaced
in the Ministry of Interior’s Directive for the Management of
Unaccompanied Romanian Minors (20 January 2009) with the official aim
of identifying minors, understandably in order not to lose trace of them.
The recurrent rightist proposal to make illegal residence a crime followed a
zigzagging path, as well. It was aired, yet then diminished to illegal entry
in the draft law presented to the Senate. According to the draft, perpetrators
would have been submitted to immediate arrest and from one to four years
of imprisonment followed by expulsion. During parliamentary debate, un-
documented residence was changed back into a crime, but the fear of over-
loading already overcrowded prisons made it punishable only by a fine
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(from E 5,000 to E 10,000). Downgrading the punishment and making it
clear that that the removal of an EU citizen must be conducted in confor-
mity with Directive 2004/38/EC42 were also consequences of the Ministry
of Interior’s request for advice from the European Commission. In fact, the
European Commission had discouraged the Italian government from
widening the cases in point to expel EU citizens other than those foreseen
by Directive 2004/38/EC, i.e. individuals who represent a threat to public
health and security.
Even more imposing than EU constraints was pressure from the advo-
cacy coalition and human rights organisations. Because of it, the proposal
to expel asylum seekers whose application was rejected and who had filed
an appeal was modified, and expulsion was confined to cases that were re-
jected because they were patently ungrounded (in 159/2008, Legislative
Decree on Political Asylum). On the other hand, the EU directive approved
on 18 June 2008 fixed the maximum time of detention to identify and
repatriate undocumented immigrants to six months and, in specific excep-
tional cases, to eighteen months. In so doing, it offered the Italian govern-
ment the opportunity to propose one of its more contested measures:
increasing the time of detention from two to eighteen months. This mea-
sure and the legalisation of voluntary associations of citizens who would
patrol the territory were rejected by secret ballot in the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies. The proposal to increase the time of detention for
the identification of illegal immigrants was reintroduced in another Public
Security Decree (Opposition to Sexual Violence and Stalking, no. 11, 23
February 2009), but this time upped only to six months instead of eighteen.
Both this and the voluntary patrolling proposal were rejected once again.
When the Security Bill was discussed in the Chamber of Deputies, volun-
tary patrolling associations and increased time of detention were again re-
introduced in the text. In order to get them approved, another anti-immi-
grant measure was deleted: that according to which doctors were no longer
prohibited from denouncing illegal immigrants. This last proposal had pro-
voked strong bipartisan protests by Italian doctors and the Catholic Church.
The Security Bill also introducing legal residence as a requirement to ac-
cess public services and to register marriages, births and deaths would have
implied the impossibility for children of undocumented immigrants to at-
tend public schools, and could have possibly compelled teachers to report
illegal parents. Pressures from the advocacy coalition and from within the
majority managed to secure the right of undocumented children to public
education, but if illegal residence was to become a crime, political and legal
interpretation suggested that ‘spy doctors’ and ‘spy teachers’ were inevita-
ble. Even after this huge bargaining process and extensive reworking of the
original project in order to pass the increased time of detention, voluntary
patrolling and undocumented stay as a crime, the government asked for a
vote of confidence for the Security Bill, thus avoiding another defeat in
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Parliament. Even the large, relatively more homogeneous centre-right ma-
jority was forced to come to terms with internal dissenters and civil society
pressures, and to take into consideration legal and political constraints de-
riving from Italy’s membership in the EU and international organisations.
The Italian Constitution requires that the President of the Republic eval-
uate all new laws in order to ensure their constitutionality. The President
very rarely rejects bills and decrees unless they overtly contradict the
Constitution, leaving the task of controversial cases to the Supreme Court.
However, he exercises a remarkable power of moral suasion that can pre-
vent legislators from passing laws that go against the Constitution. Italian
presidents – current President Giorgio Napolitano, in particular – have ex-
ercised moral suasion in matters of immigrant rights as well, asking the
government not to resort to law decrees that restrict individual liberties.
President of the Chamber of Deputies Fini, a prominent leader of the cen-
tre-right coalition and the recently born PdL, did not only promote extend-
ing citizenship rights to long-term resident immigrants (such as the local
vote and easier access to nationality for them and their children), but also
played an important role in combating radical anti-immigrant measures,
particularly those aimed at depriving undocumented immigrants of funda-
mental rights such as public health and education for minors. These atti-
tudes were among the factors that marginalised Fini’s Future and Liberty
Party (Futuro e Libertà, FL) faction and caused its eventual secession from
Berlusconi’s PdL.
Though often forced to revise its projects, the centre-right government
had nevertheless managed to increase the severity of immigration and im-
migrant policies. This was sometimes in tune with the policy trends pre-
vailing in other EU countries. The government reduced the number of
family members entitled to reunification, which does not contradict the
European Directive (Legislative Decree on Family Reunification, 160/
2008). As already mentioned, it included a measure in the Security Bill to
combat marriages of convenience, which is in tune with other European
laws and the guidelines of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum
(13440/2008). The same bill also calls for taxes to renew residence permits
and to apply for naturalisation: in other words, the late 2000s’ financial cri-
sis, combined with anti-immigrant sentiment, meant it was time to get
money from legal immigrants. Once again, these measures do not conflict
with prevailing European policy trends. The same remark can be made
about the Security Bill requirement of accepting shared basic social values
as a condition for receiving and renewing a residence permit and posses-
sing knowledge of the Italian language in order to receive long-term resi-
dent status. The fourth Berlusconi government also introduced the
so-called Accordo di integrazione. This ‘integration agreement’ takes after
the French Contrat d’Accueil et d’Integration and the British points-based
system. The agreement foresees acceptance of a list of common basic
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principles as a precondition to being granted a stay permit that is renew-
able every two years. These conditions include the obligation to learn some
level of Italian language, history, the Constitution and how social services
work and to behave in conformity with Italian laws and civic customs.
Initial points can be lost and new points acquired, which can keep immi-
grants on standby, remedy their losses, lead to expulsion in cases of defini-
tive failure or grant full achievement of long-term residence.
A motion during the debate on the School Reform Project (Law 1/
2009), which called for introducing separate preparatory insertion classes
for immigrant students who arrive in Italy with linguistic or other cognitive
deficits, is also no exception in the European context, though the leftist
public deemed it a scandalous form of segregation. The same consideration
applies to reserving certain more costly or more socially and politically re-
levant rights for citizens or long-term resident aliens. The 2008 planned in-
flow decree entitled only immigrants holding permanent permits to apply
as employers. Some of the restrictive measures were also included in the
2009 Finance Bill, such as the exclusion of immigrants from the ‘social
card’ that entitles the poor to receive E 40 per month (Law 133/2008, an-
ticipating the Finance Bill a year later); access to social housing was re-
served for immigrants resident at least ten years in Italy and at least five
years in the region of application.
The immigration policy of Berlusconi’s fourth government was not a
striking exception in the context of the EU, but the strongly anti-immigrant
public rhetoric of some of its members is indeed exceptional. Upon greet-
ing a representative of new Italian citizens of immigrant origin on 13
November 2008, President Napolitano said that ‘such an inflow of new en-
ergies, coming from all over the world and taking root in our country, is an
element of freshness and strength for the Italian nation.’ To this, Umberto
Bossi, the Northern League leader and Berlusconi’s main political partner,
responded with the following: ‘In my mind, immigrants represent only a
negative resource.’
We do not know what kind of new measures the Northern League will
manage to produce. Until now, its radical anti-immigrant stance has been
mitigated by an array of actors and factors, with Berlusconi needing to pass
measures capable of rescuing him from the many trials he is standing. As
the bond between Bossi and Berlusconi has grown stronger and stronger,
the Northern League’s xenophobic attitudes have found more space. The
centre-right’s poor results in the 2011 local elections and referenda may
change this scenario in future.
Berlusconi had already come to take a severe anti-immigrant stance. In
May 2009, he declared that he did not want Italy to become a multi-ethnic
country. In June 2009, he said that Milan looked like ‘an African city’. The
persistence of centre-right anti-immigrants rhetoric will depend on
Berlusconi’s ability to keep strict command of his party and on the electoral
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outcomes of the alliance with the Northern League. We also do not know
what influence the ongoing economic crisis will have. Could it, for instance,
suggest a renewal of measures to protect national labour? Nonetheless, cur-
rent EU rules will make it difficult to prevent the circulation of workers
from other EU countries once the moratorium period has expired. In Italy,
Romanians are already the number-one immigrant nationality.
5 Conclusions
Like other Southern European countries, Italy has been thrown off by its
objective needs for foreign manpower and a fear of alarming the public by
allowing adequate legal inflows. Also as in other Southern European coun-
tries – Spain, in particular – the ‘remedy’ of frequent mass amnesties, to-
gether with a flourishing hidden economy and difficult-to-control borders,
have produced consistent illegal inflows. The ongoing economic crisis and
rising unemployment rates have suggested only a temporary stop in 2009
to planned inflows. A persisting economic crisis will likely influence immi-
gration policy, suggesting more restrictive measures as far as legal immi-
gration is concerned.
Already, and especially under the present centre-right government, se-
vere measures have been introduced to combat illegal immigration. They
would have been even more severe if initial plans were not softened, as
they were by actions not only from the centre-left opposition, but also from
part of the majority and the vocal civil society. In Italy, as in other
European countries, a set of factors, which is illustrated in the conclusion
chapter of this book, have moved and are moving immigrant and immigra-
tion policies in neo-assimilationist, neo-functionalist, security-oriented di-
rections. In Italy, these common trends are, more often than elsewhere, on
a zigzagging path. On the one hand, the public’s peculiarly strong anti-im-
migration backlash and the increasingly influential presence in government
of the xenophobic Northern League accelerated the trend – to the point that
the Italian government has been the object of frequent admonitions by
international organisations. On the other hand, there is a persistent humani-
tarian pressure by the Catholic Church. Moreover, requests to regularise
and protect immigrant workers come not only from unions, but also em-
ployers and families who, in Italy as in Spain, make great use of domestic
labour. Together, such groups aim at softening severe ways. And they can
find a sympathetic ear even in the centre-right majority. However, up until
now, pro-immigrant counter-pressure has always given priority to the pro-
tection of basic rights over broadening long-term residents’ citizenship
rights.
The Italian case presents features similar to other political systems,
which, because of mass emigration, colonisation or redefining borders still
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perceive having part of their co-ethnic population abroad, even though
bonds with the ancestor land have dissolved in many cases. These legal
systems give preferential treatment to co-ethnic persons not only concern-
ing entry and residence in the country, but also allowing the transmission
of jus sanguinis abroad without strict requirements. This attitude may con-
flict with changing international scenarios and stringent economic reasons
that compel a revision of the policy, as so happened in Germany and
Poland. Up until now, Italy, like other Southern European countries, has
reinforced the co-ethnic principle. By contrast, rights concerning easier ac-
cess to nationality and local voting for legal non-EU long-term resident
immigrants were often proposed, though never passed. Contributing to the
changing scene has been Fini, an eminent centre-right figure whose own
cultural evolution – his eternal movement towards the centre of the politi-
cal spectrum – has also involved being in favour of legal immigrant rights.
Fini’s followers, in alliance with some majority members and the whole
opposition, had again launched proposals to reform nationality and grant
local voting. Though it proved unsuccessful, this move shows that the is-
sues of immigration and immigrant rights are used not only by many cen-
tre-left parties. To favourably reposition themselves, out of fear of losing
electoral consent, the issues can also be used in an opposite direction, by
rightist leaders and parties seeking to increase their coalitional potential.
This, it seems, is rather an Italian idiosyncrasy, at least in the present
European context.
On the other hand, Italian decision-making follows not just general
trends, but also some general rules. Immigration and immigrant policies
are pieces of a larger puzzle. They are embedded in the institutional, eco-
nomic and international contexts in which they are conceived and recon-
ceived. They can be part of economic strategies, they can be inserted into
securities provisions and they can be adopted with the aim of reinforcing
national identity. Like other policies, they can include internally contradict-
ing measures and conflict with other policies born of the same period. The
international context can discipline and correct the more radical political at-
titudes, unless of course radicalism also prevails in the democratic EU.
Policies are continuously moulded by a combination of factors and by the
action of very different agents, many of them located outside formal law-
making processes. This is why politics always matters, but does not always
lead the race.
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Notes
1 This chapter reports on a number of outcomes of activities by IMISCOE Cluster C9,
a working group focused on the multilevel governance of migration, and a study en-
titled ‘Policymaking: Between periphery and centre, between member states and the
EU, between formal and informal actors’, which was financed by the Italian
Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR). Some results have already
been presented by the author in Arena, Nascimbene & Zincone (2006) and Zincone
(2006b). For more information on the evolution of Italian immigration, as well as
its specific political and statistical features, see Italy’s country profile at http://www.
fieri.it. The empirical research is based on an analysis of documents and legal pro-
ceedings and interviews with privileged observers, a list of whom is available at the
end of the chapter. I will not quote the key informants I interviewed by name since
I preferred the off-record mode, which allowed for more candid answers.
2 The UK’s and Germany’s traditional flows did not head to Italy, though migrants
from the Maghreb (especially from Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia) became
a significant component of Italian immigration.
3 Billari and Dalla Zuanna (2008) have also underscored the peculiarity of Italy’s in-
flows between 1999 and 2004.
4 In August 2006, the centre-left government presented the Amato Bill, which was in-
tended to modify the Nationality Law framework. This bill led to the drafting of a
law, but the fall of the government prevented it from being passed. This will be dis-
cussed more in depth later in the chapter.
5 In the year 2009, only 17,603 asylum requests were addressed in Italy, while 2008
addressed 30,492. Sending back ‘boat people’ without giving them the opportunity
to request asylum may have affected the fall in numbers. The practice was criticised
by the European Community and the UN Commissioner for Human Rights.
6 Outflows were as follows: 1,210,400 (1861-1870); 1,175,960 (1871-1880); 1,879,200
(1881-1890); 2,834,739 (1891-1900); 6,026,690 (1901-1910).
7 This was a way of conceiving nationality as belonging to an ethnic group, a cultural
frame doomed to persist. This long-lasting attitude is quite similar to the one
Brubaker attributed to Germany (1992).
8 Brazil included in its 1891 Constitution (article 69) automatic naturalisation for all
persons resident on 15 November 1889, the day on which the Republic was pro-
claimed. Citizenship could be legally relinquished within six months, but this was
strongly discouraged by the public authorities (Rosoli 1986; Lahalle 1990; Pastore
2004b).
9 Between 1860 and 1943, the Italian Constitution was the so-called Statuto Albertino,
formerly the 1848 Constitution of Piedmont-Sardinia, a liberal charter accorded by
the monarch Carlo Alberto.
10 Article 147 of Royal Decree no. 773/1931 (regarding public security) was updated in
2000 and 2002 (Ministerial Decree, 11 December). It requires notifying the police
of foreign guest workers’ personal details within 24 hours. Law 189/2002 extended
this obligation to anybody hosting foreign guests for any reason (article 7).
Nevertheless, breaches to this obligation are no longer a crime, and since 1994 have
only been punishable with a fine (Government Decree under Parliamentary
Delegation no. 480).
11 The principle was declared in the UN Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women, which was approved on 20 February 1957 and went into effect on 11
August 1958. On 24 November 1977, a resolution adopted by the Council of
Ministers of the Council of Europe (which went into effect on 1 May 1983) suggested
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that married women would not only be allowed to keep their original nationality,
but to transfer it to their spouses and children as well.
12 Law no. 39, 8 March 1975 reduced the majority age from 21 to eighteen.
13 Before 1986, the Italian government had not only allowed, but also regulated, dual
citizenship through bilateral agreements. Even in 1992, dual nationality was mainly
due to ‘family reasons’: 1) to make the Italian Nationality Act compatible with mar-
riage to foreign partners and 2) to facilitate the reacquisition of Italian citizenship
by foreigners who had lost it.
14 It is debatable whether this theoretically dense concept can be applied to descen-
dants of Italian emigrants. It is used in this context simply to reflect a current use
in the Italian discussion on these themes.
15 This myth partially conflicts with the empirical evidence of studies on the Italian
diaspora (Bolzman, Fibbi & Vial 2003; Devoto 2005; Sollors 2005; Vegliante 2005),
which show a prevailing low political identification with the Italian Republic. See
also doubts expressed by Fini, leader of the National Alliance nationalist party, even
before the results of the 2006 elections came in (cited in Tintori 2006).
16 Due to the complexity of procedures and the inefficiency of Italian public adminis-
tration, one must consider not only the years of residence, but also the time needed
to deal with bureaucracy. The average wait for obtaining Italian nationality was 2.9
years in 2003, 3.2 in 2004 and 3.8 in 2005 (data courtesy of the Italian Citizenship
and Statistics Department). Note that the applicatory rules for enforcement of Law
91/1992 had introduced a maximum wait of 730 days (Decree of the President of
the Republic, no. 362, 18 April 1994).
17 In 1919, at the Conference of Paris, the regions of Trentino and Alto Adige (includ-
ing Trieste) and Istria were incorporated into Italian territory.
18 It is worth noting, though, that statute no. 73 of 21 March 2001 had allocated special
funds to promote the study of Italian language and culture among Italian minorities
in Croatia and Slovenia.
19 Fifty-nine per cent are first-generation migrants, 35 per cent are second-generation
descendants and the rest are presumably reunified children.
20 The PdL’s formation was announced at the end of 2007, though the party was offi-
cially founded on 29 March 2009. Its main constituents are Berlusconi’s Forward
Italy (Forza Italia) and Fini’s National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), along with
many small parties that then entered into the new party.
21 1Act no. 1 of 17 January 2000 and Act no. 1 of 23 January 2001. Italians abroad, who
were divided into four continental constituencies, were assigned six representatives
in the Senate and twelve in the Chamber of Deputies.
22 The pro-immigrant role of the Catholic Church appears very important in Portugal
as well (Peixoto, Sabrino & Abreu 2009).
23 This is due to the country’s geographical position and the extent of its black econo-
my, in which undocumented migrants can find a job, pay back what they owe for
getting smuggled into the country or for their fake tourist visas, live on their own
salaries and possibly send money back home. The country also hosts strong criminal
organisations that can use illegal immigrants as labourers.
24 To conceal the failure, the application deadline was delayed three times by a subse-
quent decree in 1987, and a special law was voted on in 1988 for the purpose of al-
lowing more persons to apply (Adinolfi 1992; Sabatino 2004). Nonetheless, no more
than 20 per cent of the potential applicants were regularised (Macioti & Pugliese
1991).
25 1This was the case of Law 30/2007, allowing the expulsion of Romanian citizens for
reasons of pubic order and public security after the assassination of a woman named
Giovanna Reggiani by a Romanian Roma in Rome. Generally speaking,
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immigration and immigrant-related policies appear in reaction to dramatic events
rather than as the planned strategies the issues would merit (Penninx 2004).
26 Napolitano (2006: 301-302) remembers a challenging relationship with German
Minister of Interior Manfred Kanter and his good personal relations with conserva-
tives like Spain’s Minister of Interior Jaime Mayor Oreja.
27 By means of planned inflows, 58,000 immigrants legally entered the country in
1998 and 1999, 83,000 in 2000 and 89,400 in 2001.
28 The centre-left government repudiated the National Institute of Social Security
(INPS) Memorandum, which stated that immigrants were entitled to poverty bene-
fits, while the law in favour of maternity (no. 53, 8 March 2000) that granted bene-
fits to single mothers, as well as for the third child, restricted those rights to immi-
grants holding a permanent residence permit.
29 Minister of Interior Bianco issued a Ministry of Interior Memorandum (no. 300, 4
April 2000) that made it more difficult to obtain a permanent residence permit. In
addition to the five years of legal residence required by law, the immigrant had to al-
ways have held a work permit renewable for an indefinite period.
30 The Ministry of Interior has always played a prominent role in immigration and im-
migrant-related policies. An empirical survey of parliamentary questions to the gov-
ernment indicated this minister as the main recipient for such questions (Fedele
1999).
31 The first Berlusconi government began after the May 1994 electoral victory and fell
in January 1995. The second government began after the June 2001 election and
was replaced by a third in April 2005, which lasted until the installation of the cen-
tre-left government in May 2006.
32 The first electoral reform in 1993 concerned the direct election of city mayors (Law
no. 81/1993). The reform process reached its peak with the 1993 referendum, which
sanctioned the shift to a majority system for the election of the Senate. Two laws fol-
lowed, the first one definitively reforming the Senate electoral system (Law no. 276/
1994) and the second amending the Chamber of Deputies electoral system (Law no.
277/1994). Lastly, in 1995, the regional electoral system was also reformed (Law no.
43/1995).
33 Fast-track anti-filibustering measures were introduced with the 1997 and 1999 re-
forms of the parliamentary rules, and other proposals have been made more
recently.
34 Under the Bossi-Fini Law, foreigners who return to their countries of origin without
having satisfied the minimum requirements to receive benefits (twenty years of con-
tributions and a minimum age of 65) lose all their contributions unless their retire-
ment scheme is based solely on their own contributions, in which case they only get
what they themselves have paid in. By contrast, the previous system included a spe-
cial fund at the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) for the return of these
contributions plus 5 per cent interest.
35 Italy is one of the EU countries with the highest use of domestic labour (Sarti
2006).
36 Planned flows were 79,500 in 2002, 2003 and 2004. In 2005, there were 79,500
entrances from new member states and 79,500 from non-EU countries. In 2006,
there were 170,000 from new member states and 170,000 from non-EU countries.
37 Even in the 2006 decree (issued by the President of the Council of Ministers on 15
February), the disproportion in favour of seasonal workers was maintained. The de-
cree allowed for 88,000 seasonal employed workers, 78,500 non-seasonal contract
workers and 3,000 highly qualified self-employed workers. The entry of 500 non-
seasonal employed workers or self-employed workers of Italian descent was also
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planned to comply with a co-ethnic principle that the centre-right had espoused
since its first flow decree.
38 The ‘unified contract of employment and residence’ was introduced. This involved
hiring a worker from abroad, with an obligation for the employer to guarantee ac-
commodation and cover the cost of return to the country of origin in the event of
dismissal. Residence permits became renewable only for the same period of time
for which they were issued (previously, they could be renewed for twice as long),
and in any event for no more than two years (no more than nine months for seaso-
nal workers, one year for temporary workers and two years for workers with perma-
nent contracts); applications for renewal had to be presented much further in ad-
vance of the expiry date (90 days for workers with permanent contracts, 60 days for
temporary workers and 30 days for the others; under the Turco-Napolitano Act, it
was 30 days for all cases).
39 See the Convention of April 2005 between the Ministry of Interior and the National
Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI), Caritas and the Italian Christian
Labour Association (ACLI), which called for the involvement of patronages to enable
immigrants to get the necessary documentation for the issue or renewal of their re-
sidence permits in three municipalities (Pavia, Cuneo and Modena). On 16 February
2006, another convention between the Ministry of Interior and ANCI set the basis
for the simplification of bureaucratic procedures in permit renewal (see Caponio
2006). In May 2006, however, a memorandum delegated the handling of renewal
procedures to the post office and a E 70 charge was introduced.
40 L’Espresso 23 September 2008.
41 These two different approaches derived from the different guidelines, given in oral
form, by Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni and by the Prefect of Rome concerning
implementation of the 3676, 3677 and 3678 Ordinances of the Prime Minister ‘on
urgent civil defence dispositions in order to cope with the emergency state due to
the Roma settlements’, 30 May 2008.
42 Directive 2004/38/EC is entitled ‘On the right of citizens of the Union and their fa-
mily members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’.
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1 Introduction
Foreign migration to Spain is relatively recent and so, consequently, are
policies related to both immigration1 and the integration of immigrants.
The first law dealing with these issues was the Ley de Extranjería, a law
on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain (from herein simply re-
ferred to as the Foreigners Law) that was enacted in 1985, just a year be-
fore Spain joined the European Communities. At that time, there were
merely 250,000 legal foreign residents in the country (Watts 1998: 661).
During the last two decades, however, immigration flows have swelled sig-
nificantly to produce a completely new demographic situation. Today the
nation hosts more than 4.5 million foreign residents, which represents
about 10 per cent of the total population.2 This makes Spain one of the
European Union’s leading immigration countries. Spain’s percentage of im-
migrants in relation to its total population has reached a level comparable
to that of other North-Western European countries. Growth has been espe-
cially visible in certain regions such as Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia,
Murcia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands. This particu-
lar background makes the Spanish case an interesting one to contrast with
other North-Western and Central European countries. A long-standing tra-
dition of emigration that lasted up until just recently and the increasing
momentum that immigration has gathered in two decades have geared
Spanish policymaking to a starting point distinct from those that came be-
fore it.
Studying Spanish policymaking in these fields is not easy. Although
there is a fast-growing body of scientific literature on Spanish immigration
and the social processes of newcomers’ integration into Spanish society, lit-
tle research has been systematically undertaken to examine the processes
of how policies in these fields are made (Agrela Romero & Gil Araujo
2005; Carrillo & Delgado 1998; Casey 1998c; Lopez Sala 2005b; Morén-
Alegret 2005b; Ramos, Bazaga, Delgado & Del Pino 1998; Ramos &
Bazaga 2002; Ruiz Vieytez 2003; Tamayo & Delgado 1998; Tamayo &
Carrillo 2002; Zapata-Barrero 2002, 2003a; Kreienbrink 2008). Most litera-
ture on policy deals with the content of policies. Even works that specifi-
cally focus on the making of policies do not offer a comprehensive view:
focus falls either solely on immigration or integration; merely one aspect
of either field is analysed; or only a static description is given of relations
between actors at a given moment in time.
For background, we will first outline the principal characteristics of im-
migration in Spain. Next will come a bird’s-eye view of the evolution of
migration and integration policies. In the following sections, we will zoom
in on immigration policies and integration policies. We will delve not only
into their formal content as laid down in official documents, but also
explore their implementation, thereby describing wherever possible which
actors are involved. On the basis of previously scattered information, our
endeavour is to produce a basic description of the process of policymaking
in the fields of Spanish immigration and integration.
2 Background and characteristics of immigration in Spain
For most of the twentieth century, internal migration and international emi-
gration were key factors determining the distribution of Spain’s population
at a given time. Both flows were mainly rural-urban ones. Catalonia, the
Madrid Metropolitan Area and the Basque Country (the three regions
where most industry was concentrated) were the nation’s main areas of
destination, while Andalusia, Extremadura and Galicia experienced the
most emigration. Spain’s international emigrants departed for urban areas
in European countries such as Germany and France, as well as some Latin
American countries. This resulted in an unequal distribution of the popula-
tion never before paralleled.
It was only in the mid-1980s that the country experienced a visible re-
versal of migration patterns. Explaining why countries such as Spain, Italy,
Portugal and Greece became immigration destinations during the 1980s
and 1990s, King, Fielding and Black (1997) point to internal migration
patterns and the demand for labour. Their model highlights three specific
trends from the 1950s to the 1990s: the coexistence of high- and low-
productivity sectors; the rapid transfer of indigenous workers from low- to
high-productivity sectors through short- or long-distance migration; and the
rapid decline of an available supply of indigenous labour in rural areas.
The late 1980s and 1990s ushered in a new phase for Spain altogether, as
a reduced rate of investment was combined with economic restructuring,
recession and high unemployment. Since low wages were the only means
for businesses to retain a competitive edge, employers turned to immigrant
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workers. Labour immigration to Southern Europe was thus not only a mat-
ter of supply, but also a particular response to employers’ demands for
cheap labour (Calavita 2005: 68). As shown in Table 8.1, immigration rose
to unprecedented levels, notably beginning in 2000. This rapid growth was
linked to a booming Spanish economy driven by expansion of the housing
market (and subsequent construction industry) as well as Spain’s strong
foothold in the tourist industry. These economic developments went hand
in hand with the government’s rather lenient immigration policy.
The present-day immigrant population – with its more than four million
people registered in local censuses, which also includes undocumented im-
migrants – presents very diverse origins. As shown in Table 8.2, the largest
groups are Moroccans and Ecuadorians, each comprising a total of ap-
proximately half a million. Romanians, Colombians and British nationals
each comprise over one quarter of a million. Many other nationalities are
represented in another two million foreigners. As the table also shows,
there is a sizeable immigrant population from the EU-25, of which a signif-
icant part corresponds to the migration of pensioners of North-Western
Europe (mostly from the United Kingdom and Germany). Moreover, there
is a sizeable new immigration of economic migrants from Central and
Table 8.1 Annual inflow of foreigners in Spain, 1998 – 2006
Annual inflow
of foreigners
Year
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
57,195 330,881 443,085 645,844 802,971
Source: Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales, National Institute of Statistics (INE 2007)
Table 8.2 Foreign population according to local register, 1 January 2006
Origin Foreign population
Europe 1,609,856
EU-25 918,886
UK 274,722
Rest Europe 690,970
Romania 407,159
Africa 785,279
Morocco 563,012
The Americas 1,528,077
Ecuador 461,310
Asia 217,918
China 104,681
Oceania 2,363
Australia 1,633
Total 4,144,166
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2006)
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Eastern Europe, namely Romania and Bulgaria. Latin Americans account
for another important share of immigrants, their high percentages being a
reflection of preferential treatment in legislation as well as the effects of re-
viving old social networks.
In terms of economic sectors, the majority of migrant workers from out-
side the EU are concentrated in services (58.1 per cent), construction (24.6
per cent), industry (11.1 per cent) and agriculture (6.2 per cent) (Pajares
2007: 52). If we analyse these figures according to gender, we find that
42.3 per cent of the total of male foreign workers have jobs in construction
while 89.7 per cent of the total of female foreign workers are in the service
sector – more than half of them in domestic employment and nearly less
than half in commerce (Pajares 2007: 52). In terms of concentration by ori-
gin, the rotation or displacement of certain collectives in specific sectors or
provinces should be remarked upon. For example, in 2002, Moroccans
were displaced by Ecuadorians in the countryside of Murcia and by women
workers from Poland and Romania who came to pick strawberries in
Huelva (Cachón 2003: 264). Increased immigration from Latin America
has also meant there are more women domestic workers from Ecuador,
Bolivia and Peru. Finally, the position of immigrants in the labour market
also depends on the time of legal residence: while newcomers or recently
regularised immigrants represent the majority in sectors like agriculture or
domestic service, after an initial period of legal residence, migrant workers
tend to move into sectors like construction as well as, in the case of wo-
men, other services (Pajares 2007: 51).
3 Legal framework and the evolution of migration and
integration policies
From a legal perspective, the evolution of Spanish immigration and inte-
gration policies can be divided into four different phases, each correspond-
ing to major legislative events. Running from the mid-1980s until the early
1990s, the initial period produced a first generation of laws on immigra-
tion, including the first Foreigners Law. Spanning most of the 1990s, the
second phase witnessed the birth of the next generation of immigration
laws and the simultaneous adoption of the first policies on immigrant so-
cial integration. Thirdly, 1999 onwards marks a phase that brought about
significant changes to the Foreigners Law, as well as ushered in a new turn
in integration policies. Finally, 2009 has seen again significant changes in
the basic legislative framework concerning immigration and asylum.
Taking chronological stock of policies on immigration and integration
within a four-generational framework allows us to contextualise them with-
in different historical and political lights. However, grouping policies in
phases for the sake of theoretical comparison does not deny the continuity
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that runs throughout the core of the legal system, particularly in immigra-
tion policies. Although political majorities of every era have inspired either
more progressive or more conservative tendencies, the main guiding princi-
ples of immigration legislation have remained pretty near to those promul-
gated by first regulations. Yet, the number of regulations and the sheer vo-
lume of the main legal texts have increased. Such substantial continuity
cannot be presumed, however, in the field of integration policies. These
emerged only in what we above defined as the second phase of national
policies, and they changed significantly in later phases. Thus, the first gen-
eral trend to be noted is that immigration policies in which central state in-
stitutions are almost exclusive actors show much more continuity than inte-
gration policies whose design and development is influenced by many
more actors and stakeholders at different levels of society.
To reiterate, Spain had primarily been an emigration country and only in
the mid-1980s did its reversal of migration patterns became visible. In
1986, the number of Spanish returnees from abroad was for the first time
higher than the number of Spanish emigrants. In that same year, the num-
ber of foreign immigrants was still growing, though it remained low, at a
level just below 300,000 (Watts 1998: 658, 661). Just the year before, in
1985, the first Foreigners Law3 was passed in the central parliament. The
way these events unfolded indicates that Spain’s full incorporation into the
European Communities in 1986 played a more important role for introdu-
cing the law than any immigration statistics.
Although the main aim of this first substantial regulation was to build a
framework for legal support and to specify conditions of stay for foreigners
in Spain, it also introduced opportunities to restrict entrance. Moreover,
granting residence permits on a one-year basis encouraged the notion of
temporariness to predominate in policies. In view of the earlier absence of
a comprehensive immigration and integration policy at Spain’s central le-
vel, the law was a relative novelty. This marked the birth of the first gen-
eration of legislation.
The 1985 Foreigners Law, however, was not the first regulation to be
born to this generation. In fact, it was preceded by other related pieces of
legislation that were developed in unison and had a bearing on Spain’s
inclusion in the European Community. Thus, the Law on Asylum4 was
passed in 1984 and its implementing regulation5 in 1985. The Foreigners
Law would also be developed through the corresponding developing
regulation in 1986.6 In addition, the Royal Decree of 19867 regulated the
situation of European Economic Community state citizens (‘European’ citi-
zenship, per se, did not exist at that time). To get a complete view on the
legal framework of immigration policies, two important Constitutional
Court rules must be cited. The first is judgement number 107/1984.8 This
ruling, issued prior to the approval of the Foreigners Law, had already clar-
ified the basic rights that would or would not be enjoyed by foreigners,
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according to the new constitutional system. As such, the Constitutional
Court established three different groups of rights, with the recognition that
foreigners could be entitled to enjoy two of them under different
conditions.
According to the court, a first set of fundamental rights had to be
equally recognised for everybody, including foreigners regardless of their
legal situation in the country. These included basic rights such as rights to
life, freedom of expression and judicial guarantees. By contrast, most so-
called political rights (e.g. to vote or to participate directly in public affairs
and responsibilities) were not applicable to foreigners. Article 13.2 of
Spain’s Constitution prohibits such possibilities (the only exception being
the right to vote in local elections if there is a reciprocity agreement with a
foreign resident’s home country). The remaining rights recognised in Title
I of the Spanish Constitution may be extended to foreigners depending on
their legal situation in Spain, and according to what has been established
in the Foreigners Law. The conditionality also applies to differences in
how legislation can regulate the concrete implementation of these rights in
cases concerning foreign inhabitants. This early Constitutional Court ruling
of 1984 would later have an obvious influence on the drafting of the afore-
mentioned legislation.
The second important Constitutional Court judgement is classified as
number 115/1987.9 It was provoked by the national ombudsman, finding
that some articles of the 1985 Foreigners Law, such as those regarding the
right to form associations and to demonstrate,10 did not conform with the
1978 Spanish Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled partially in fa-
vour of the ombudsman’s position and, as a result, some specific para-
graphs of the law were declared void.
As for Spanish nationality law, many of the country’s constitutions in-
cluded the basic regulations of naturalisation during the nineteenth century.
From the twentieth century up until the present-day, however, the main
bulk of this legislation has been incorporated into the civil code. Reflecting
the legacy of emigration tradition in Spanish society, the criterion for
nationality assignation is more an jus sanguinis model than an jus soli one.
Moreover, in Spanish legal tradition, the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizen-
ship’ are mostly synonymous. According to the regulation in force, for-
eigners can acquire Spanish nationality by residing legally in the country
for a continuous period of ten years. This being a general rule, some ex-
ceptions are also accommodated. For example, only a two-year legal resi-
dence is required to acquire Spanish nationality by nationals from Brazil,
Andorra, Portugal and former Spanish colonies (apart from the Western
Sahara and Morocco), as well as descendents of Spanish Sephardic Jews.
A significant number of immigrants who arrived in Spain within the last
ten to fifteen years have become Spanish nationals; those of Latin
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American origin are among the highest-ranking numbers. This practice
works to minimise the total number of foreigners reflected in the statistics.
As a whole, this bundle of first-generation legislation puts clear-cut em-
phasis on the control of immigration flows and the regulation of formal re-
quirements for foreigners to enter and stay in Spain. After 1985, most for-
eigners were obliged to conform to new, concrete legal stipulations, and
therefore many immigrants would sooner or later fall into an illegal admin-
istrative situation for the first time. Beyond this general rule, both
European Community citizens and asylum seekers enjoyed a privileged
status provided for in specific pieces of legislation. The privileges of asy-
lum provoked a flow of applications from certain groups of immigrants.
However, within a few years, the restrictive interpretation of the asylum
regulations followed by national authorities curbed this tendency.
A significant shift in migration policies is identifiable around 1990. On
26 June of this year, the United Left (IU)11 parliamentary group submitted
a motion to the Congress of Deputies asking for regularisation of those un-
documented foreigners who had resided and worked in Spain for some per-
iod of time. This motion pleaded the right for families to reunite and re-
quested preparation of a draft immigration bill to help realise the right. It
also urged the government to prepare a report on the situation of foreign
immigrants in Spain. The ensuing political discussion thus introduced sig-
nificant elements of integration policies into the discussion. In office at the
time, the Socialist Party (PSOE)12 responded by conveying a communica-
tion to Parliament regarding the situation of foreigners and supplying basic
policy guidelines. On 13 March 1991, almost all parliamentary groups
agreed on a resolution urging the government to organise a regularisation
process and to adopt more legislative and/or administrative integration
measures that would complement the existing framework. The conse-
quence of this resolution was an extraordinary regularisation procedure,
which was instated the following summer. With enthusiastic collaboration
by most relevant social actors, the government received approximately
120,000 applications of undocumented immigrants. Most of these applica-
tions led to residence permits.
After the EU treaty entered into force in 1994, the Law on Asylum was
substantially modified13 and, in 1995, its implementing regulation was also
adapted to the new demands of European inter-governmental agreements
in the field.14 A restrictive view of asylum was thus instated and, since
then, foreign immigrants have hardly used asylum to enter Spain. This
wave of changes did not alter the 1985 Foreigners Law, though it did sig-
nificantly change its developing regulation, which was derogated and sub-
stituted by a new text in 1996.15 Following the main concerns expressed in
previous years both in Parliament and in the public debate, the new 1996
Royal Decree focused on the social integration of immigrants. Indeed, it in-
cluded more specific regulations about family reunification procedures,
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unaccompanied minor immigrants and some basic social rights.
Furthermore, the new developing regulation permitted another regularisa-
tion process for undocumented foreigners.
All such changes were nevertheless still part of a legislation that basi-
cally aimed at immigration control and management. The introduction of
an annual quota or contingent system from 1993 onwards testifies to this.
In practice, however, a very specific relation developed in this period be-
tween regularisations, on the one hand, and the annual quota, on the other;
the regularisations seemed to fill the largest part of the quota.
What did change in this period was the very fact that integration had
arisen as an issue in legislation and policy. Apart from the social aspects
that were introduced in 1996’s new developing regulation of the
Foreigners Law, as mentioned above, three major steps were taken in this
respect. First, the central government started to look at immigration as
more than a mere trans-border flow. As such, integration policies were for
the first time considered and, in 1994, a national strategy was drafted. This
was known as the Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants. With the ben-
efit of hindsight, the document can hardly be considered influential; how-
ever, it was still an important hallmark of the new field of integration pol-
icy. Parallel to this plan, two instruments were created to assist the devel-
opment of social integration policies: the Foro para la Integración Social
de los Inmigrantes, a forum on the social integration of immigrants (from
herein simply referred to as the Forum) and the Observatorio Permanente
de la Inmigración (OPI), the permanent observatory on immigration. The
Forum16 is the supreme government’s consulting body on immigration and
integration policies. It comprises representatives of the public sector and
social organisations involved in the field as well as immigrant associations.
Though in the beginning the Forum lacked ministerial support – besides
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs – its position was subsequently
consolidated to ensure participation by all relevant ministries and institu-
tions in its functioning. OPI was developed as a tool to monitor immigra-
tion and integration and, on the basis of such analysis, suggest policies.
The introduction of integration policies in this period added to the com-
plexity of relations between the different levels of governance in Spain.
Immigration policies remained the exclusive competence of the central in-
stitutions. This decision was made in accordance with Article 149.1.2 of
the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which stated that all legislative and execu-
tive powers related to immigration, asylum, nationality, passports, borders
and aliens are the sole responsibility of the national parliament and govern-
ment. On the flipside, the system generated by the autonomous commu-
nities established a distribution of responsibilities in which the regional
governments were responsible for all key policy vis-à-vis the accommoda-
tion of immigrants.17 This came as the result of transferring responsibilities
from central to regional administrations.18 Thus, autonomous communities
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and municipalities had begun endeavouring to manage immigrant integra-
tion through their own policies in matters such as social welfare, education,
health and housing. Later on, they began to formulate ‘immigration plans’,
referring mainly to certain aspects of integration. As the fifth section in this
chapter shows, in various places such bottom-up initiatives had a range of
contents and forms.
The third phase in the development of legislative initiatives dealing with
immigration started in 1999. The beginning of this period was marked by
political turmoil and changes in government. What emerged was a long so-
cial debate and resounding consensus among political parties that the 1985
Foreigners Law needed to be adapted in view of Spain’s increasing rate of
immigration. A second Foreigners Law, passed by Parliament at the end of
1999,19 was seen by many as a positive turning point. Although it did not
contain very substantial modifications, it intended to change how the quota
functioned in order to effect its instrumentation for labour market policy
and new entry, rather than regularisations. From the social perspective, the
new law recognised a significant number of immigrant rights, including
clear provisions favouring individuals in an illegal situation. Thus, basic
social aspects such as access to education, public health, social benefits
and assistance were guaranteed to all those foreigners residing de facto in
any municipality. Furthermore, legal residents enjoyed a substantial num-
ber of additional rights. This second Foreigners Law entered into force in
2000.
Nevertheless, the political consensus on this new law was not shared by
the conservative People’s Party (PP).20 They argued that this new legisla-
tion provided few possibilities to fight undocumented immigration to Spain
and conceded too many rights to undocumented foreigners. Thus, after the
PP had won the national 2000 elections in an absolute majority and again
came into power,21 its recently elected conservative government showed
no intention of drafting the developing regulation of the new 1999 law. In
fact, it came with a significantly modified law that was accepted with the
help of the PP’s overwhelming majority in December 2000.22 This new
law took three divergent directions. Firstly, legal provisions became more
restrictive, and many fundamental rights were denied for immigrants with-
out a residence permit. Granting resident permits to undocumented immi-
grants already residing in Spain was strongly restricted. Secondly, the
whole regime of issuing sanctions against undocumented foreigners – or
people collaborating with them – became much harsher both on paper and
in procedure. Finally, the discretionary competence given to the govern-
ment to develop the law’s actual content was enormously expanded. On
this basis, the government proceeded to pass an extensive reform of the de-
veloping regulation in 2001.23
In 2000, the government approved a plan for integrating foreign immi-
grants called the Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la
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Inmigración en España, or the global programme of immigration regulation
and coordination in Spain (GRECO).24 This plan was primarily aligned
with the restrictive policy reflected in the PP’s Law of 2000. Having been
based largely on the conception of temporary migration, it thus strongly
emphasised return.
Legislative reforms on immigration under the conservative government
continued with November 2003’s approval of a new set of modifications to
the Foreigners Law.25 The new set contained concrete rules on sanctions,
extended the scope of visa requirements and regulated – and widened – the
opportunity to detain undocumented foreigners in specific centres. Both
the legal reform of December 2000 and the November 2003 Foreigners
Law were challenged before the Constitutional Court for possible viola-
tions of fundamental immigrant rights. These appeals were instigated by
several regional parliaments and governments. While the second appeal
against the November 2003 Foreigners Law is still pending, in November
2007, the Constitutional Court decided that some of the legal reform of
December 2000 articles did indeed violate the fundamental rights of
foreigners.26
The general elections of 2004 ushered in a left-wing parliamentary ma-
jority, a PSOE government and, overall, a new climate with a different
configuration of actors in the field. A new developing regulation of the
Foreigners Law was adopted in December 2004.27
The above-mentioned regional appeals bring to bare something that was
less visible in the earlier Spanish legislative periods. Coming into focus in
the third period was regional authorities’ insistence on influencing policies
at the national level. On the one hand, these initiatives expressed resistance
by some autonomous communities against the restrictive policy implemen-
ted by the central government, especially during the years of the PP gov-
ernment (1996-2004). On the other hand, on the basis of their own policy
initiatives in the field of integration within various regions (Catalonia,
Valencia, Andalusia, Madrid, Navarra and the Basque Country), Catalonia
and other regions claimed more executive powers. But it took until 2006,
upon approval of a new version of Catalonia’s statute of autonomy, to ad-
mit formal participation of the autonomous community in the immigration
process. The Catalonian track was subsequently followed by the amended
Statute of Andalusia. Still, it should be noted that other autonomous com-
munities have shown much less interest in sharing these powers with the
state when amending their statutes (Santolaya 2007).
To a certain extent, this last trend has resulted in the latest generation of
regulations on immigration issues. This very recent phase has primarily en-
tailed a parallel modification of the two main legal instruments in the field,
which were amended in the last quarter of 2009. To begin with, in
October, the Act on Asylum was abrogated and the new Act 12/2009 was
adopted. This legislative change was catalysed by the need to adapt
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Spanish legislation to EU directives, something basically affecting proce-
dural issues. In December, the Foreigners Law was subsequently modified.
The new law incorporates not only some recently issued European direc-
tives on the matter, but also aligns the new act with important decisions
adopted by the Constitutional Court in 2007. The new law seeks to facili-
tate some degree of decentralisation in the implementation of issuing work-
ing permits. In this respect – following what was foreseen in the Statutes
of Catalonia and Andalusia – autonomous communities are given a voice.
This is probably the most significant shift within the fourth generation of
immigration and integration legislation. Nonetheless, this does not mean
that the Foreigners Act fully takes on a pro-integration stance. In essence,
it remains a legal instrument for regulating immigration.
Immigration and integration policies in Spain thus follow relatively di-
vergent ways. The competences of national, regional and local authorities
are different, as are the ranges of actors involved and the subsequent devel-
opment of policies over time. For this reason, it is productive to separately
analyse the policies and their respective developments. In distinct sections
below, we will nonetheless endeavour to indicate where the policy fields
may touch upon – and influence – each other.
4 Immigration policies and policymaking
As stated above, the first generation of regulations dealing with immigra-
tion came about in the mid-1980s. Their emergence had more to do with
Spain’s imminent accession to the European Community than with immi-
gration itself, which was at that time still at a low level. Basically, these
laws and regulations introduced much of the instrumentation for regulation
and control that was earlier developed in European Community countries
in order to satisfy the European bodies. The background and timing of the
immigration policy’s institutionalisation explain how the first Foreigners
Law (1985) was passed without amendment and with virtual unanimity.
These factors also explain why there was hardly any involvement of social,
civic or economic actors in the drafting of these immigration regulations,
nor any significant reaction at the local or regional levels. In terms of pol-
icy effects, the Europeanisation of the first generation of migration regula-
tions produced a permanent conflict between an externally induced restric-
tive policy and the economic situation in Spain, which was characterised in
the 1990s and especially in the 2000s by an increasing demand for un-
skilled labour (Moreno Fuentes 2005: 110).
Despite many changes in the law (in 1985, twice in 2000, in 2001 and
in 2003) and the development of subsequent regulations (in 1986, 1991,
1996, 2001 and 2004), Spain has never resolved the mismatch between its
very restrictive entry policies and simultaneous labour demands. This has
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resulted in the emergence of an irregular immigration model (Izquierdo
2001) and the implementation of frequent regularisation measures endea-
vouring to surface ever-growing stocks of irregular migrants. Moreover,
very short-term residence permits – and the fact that their prolongation is
contingent on a formal work contract – have led many regularised immi-
grants to fall back into irregularity.
A crucial question that must be answered to understand the significance
of immigration regulations and, particularly, their frequent changes is how
these regulations have actually worked. To this end, we will focus not only
on the formulation of measures, but specifically on their implementation
and effects. Inasmuch as immigration policies remain the exclusive compe-
tence of the central government, analysing the formulation and implemen-
tation of entry and regularisation policies enables us to distinguish two
important nuances. First of all, in contrast to entry policies, regularisation
programmes – which, in practice, have been the primary avenue for confer-
ring legal status – have come as the result of bottom-up pressures exerted
in great measure by social actors as well as by regional and local govern-
ments. In this regard, as we will see in the following section, their policy-
making more closely resembles that of integration policies. Secondly, in
terms of implementation, we have observed increasing participation, ever
since 2000, by social actors (particularly employer organisations and trade
unions) and a gradual decentralisation of administrative functions to regio-
nal and local governments. In the following paragraphs, we will analyse
these two key elements of immigration policies.
4.1 Entry
The Foreigners Law of 1985 (in force until 2000) maintained the previous
policy’s practice of submitting each labour migrant entry to administrative
control. Employment of non-EU workers was only permitted if employers
could demonstrate that they were unable to hire any otherwise suitable citi-
zen or resident of the country. In terms of policymaking, this implied that
the evaluation of labour needs was administrative rather than political.
Since this evaluation was undertaken by local public employment offices,
permission for the employment of foreign workers depended on discretion-
ary interpretations and practices of labour market tests. The absence of a
political decision further implied that there was no judicial control on the
implementation of entry policies. In terms of policy implementation and ef-
fects, this work permit policy (referred to as the ‘general regime’) ob-
structed legal entry. This occurred in the following ways: 1) labour market
tests were often conducted in a very restrictive manner; 2) there were no
clear, objective criteria for admission, which meant employers were faced
with excessive uncertainty when it came time to hire; 3) there were insuffi-
cient mechanisms to match labour demand with supply; and 4) even when
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work permit applications were approved, it took months before securing
the actual document.
In order to create new avenues for legal entry, in 1993 the Spanish gov-
ernment launched a quota system. The idea behind this second work permit
system was to create a direct way to enter regularly into Spain without sub-
mitting individual applications to a test of the labour market. This was only
possible in particular economic sectors determined annually by the govern-
ment, and for a maximum number of applications. In contrast to the gener-
al regime, the quota system thus introduced a political evaluation of labour
needs. However, in practice, this system functioned as a regularisation pro-
gramme, as most applications were filed by irregular migrants already in
the country. Once applications were approved, foreign workers went back
to their country of origin (or to a Spanish consulate in Southern France),
applied for a visa and then re-entered into Spain as regular migrants. In
contrast to a regularisation programme proper, prior residence was not
needed, economic sectors were determined by the state and there was a
limited number of annual applications.
From 2000 to 2004, the right-wing government closed off the possibility
of entry through the general regime. Although several court judgements
deemed this illegal – therefore letting entry remain formally open – in
practice, the general regime was no longer an option as labour market tests
were done in a very restrictive manner. In these four years, the government
endeavoured to channel regular migration exclusively through the quota
system. For this purpose, the quota system was modified in two ways.
First, in order to avoid the regularisation of irregular migrants through the
quota system, job offers could only be made through anonymous recruit-
ment. By signing bilateral agreements with countries such as Colombia,
Morocco, Poland, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Romania, the se-
lection process became the responsibility of the individual countries’ gov-
ernments. Second, in order to adapt the annual quota to the requirements
of the labour market, included in the process were regional governments,
employer organisations and trade unions who could help determine the
number and type of workers to be covered under this system. In particular,
employer organisations’ and trade unions’ estimations were evaluated at
the provincial level by regional governments and then proposed for accep-
tance to the Ministry of Labour. In turn, the Ministry was responsible for
the final decision after consultation with the Higher Council on
Immigration Policy.
At this point, it is important to note that the inclusion of regional gov-
ernments in defining the annual quota indicated recognition of their role in
the immigration policymaking process. In practice, however, regional gov-
ernments had rather limited influence. In many cases, regional govern-
ments chose for a zero quota or a very limited one (Catalonia was an ex-
ception), thereby requiring the central government to re-evaluate its
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estimations (Roig Molés 2007: 292). By contrast, employer organisations
and trade unions had a fundamental role. While trade unions took rather re-
strictive positions, employer organisations defended higher quotas.
However, annual quotas have been rather low. To explain this outcome,
Roig Molés refers to the fact that many Spanish employers do not follow
in a tradition of accounting for their future labour needs. Moreover, in
many provinces, employer organisations do not represent the medium and
small companies that have the highest demands for foreign workers (ibid.).
Although proffered by subsequent governments as Spain’s main channel
for legal entry, the quota system offered no more than 20,000 to 40,000
jobs per year. While the annual quota had always been rather limited, the
number of employer applications registered through this system was even
lower. The outcomes may be explained by the rigidities imposed by the an-
nual quota (as established by economic sector, job speciality and province),
the limitations of the recruitment process (managed by the governments of
countries of origin), and once again, excessively long administrative
procedures.
Given the limitations of the quota system, in 2004, with the PSOE again
in power, the general regime was restored. The idea behind this decision
was that those employers who wanted to hire a foreign worker in particular
or who had not anticipated their labour needs in time to be accounted for
in the quota system would still have the opportunity to undertake nomina-
tive employment of foreign workers. From this point onwards, in order to
facilitate procedures in those sectors with huge staff shortages, the Spanish
government has issued a quarterly list of occupations in which nominative
employment of foreign workers is permitted without first having to conduct
a labour market test. The national employment office disseminates this list
to the regional governments, where it is discussed at the regional level with
employer organisations and trade unions. Ultimately, the list is approved in
the Tripartite Labour Commission, which features representation by the
Ministry of Labour, Spain’s largest employer organisation (CEOE) and the
two largest trade unions (CCOO, UGT).
Since 2004, the general regime has become the mechanism par excel-
lence for entry into the country. Between June 2004 and June 2007,
352,307 authorisations were processed under this system. Consolidation of
the general regime as the main form of entry should be explained firstly by
the fact that it was not limited by an annual ceiling and secondly by the ex-
istence of significant social networks among immigrants already in the
country as well as those yet to come. In other words, these networks have
been used to contract new migrants in countries of origin. As such, immi-
grant social networks have come to fulfil the function of mediation, some-
thing which the state has not yet been able to achieve.
After more than twenty years of entry rules and regulations, Spanish pol-
icymaking has had its own distinct development. Parallel to the gradual
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deployment of a more comprehensive set of policies, there has been a shift
from a policy based on discretionary, administrative evaluations of labour
needs to a policy based on political decision-making. Such decisions were
first made by the Spanish government alone and, from 2000 onwards, by
the Spanish government along with regional governments, employer orga-
nisations and trade unions. Our first analysis of the attitudes of the differ-
ent partners involved reveals that regional governments have not always
been in favour of open-entry policies. Secondly, while employer organisa-
tions have commonly claimed less restrictive policies, their position has
varied according to region and depending on whether medium and small
companies were represented. Finally, trade unions have often been reluc-
tant to an open-labour migration policy. While they have pushed for the le-
galisation of irregular migrants who are already present in the country,
trade unions have had a much more restrictive position regarding the en-
trance of new migrants.
4.2 Regularisation
In view of how entrance has actually been controlled, it is no wonder that
regularisations have constituted the primary avenue for conferring legal sta-
tus in Spain. Concretely speaking, the easiest and most common way to
obtain a legal status had been to enter with a tourist visa, work illegally for
a while and then get regularised in one of the frequent regularisation pro-
grammes. Between 1985 and 2005, six exceptional regularisation processes
were implemented (in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005).28
Moreover, the general regime and, in particular, the quota system have of-
ten functioned as regularisation programmes. Since 2004, individual regu-
larisation (referred to as arraigo – ‘rooting’ in English) has been possible
once a migrant has lived in Spain for two years and has established a work
relationship of at least one year (arraigo laboral) or three years and the
prospect of entering into a work contract (arraigo social).
The Spanish government has given different reasons for implementing
extraordinary regularisation programmes. For one, the government
launched different regularisation programmes to reduce the stocks of irre-
gular migrants that had been generated through previous procedures before
introducing a new immigration law or regulation (in 1986, 1991, 1996,
2000 and 2005). Regularisation programmes also emerged in reaction to
pressure by migrants and their supporters (e.g. protests in churches in
2001). Moreover, the manifestation of particular events, as selected and
amplified by the media, spurred on regularisation programmes. These
events, such as 2001’s fatal accident involving Ecuadorian workers, often
called attention to the precarious life of irregular migrants.29 Finally, the
government also argued, most remarkably in 2005, that regularisation pro-
grammes were necessary in order to reduce the underground economy and
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therefore benefit both migrants (by improving their working and living
conditions) and Spanish society (through more taxes and social security
contributions).
Most regularisations required conditions of residency and work to be
fulfilled. While residence was normally demonstrated through registration
in the municipality (known as Padrón Municipal de Habitantes), in 2000
and 2001, passport entry stamps, boarding tickets, utility bills and other si-
milar documents could also be used for this purpose. In 2005, following a
number of demonstrations in Barcelona and Madrid, seven other docu-
ments (e.g. official health cards, expulsion orders, rejected registration
applications, asylum applications) were also deemed applicable for regis-
tration ‘by omission’. Exceptionally, a special programme was launched in
1996 to regularise those migrants who had fallen back into irregularity. In
this case, potential regularised migrants had to prove that they had been in
possession of an earlier residence or work permit. Finally, labour require-
ments were also instated through some regularisation programmes (in
1986, 1991 and 2005), which, in practice, meant that only workers in the
formal economy got regularised. Most noticeably, in the regularisation of
2005, eligibility was dependent on the prospect of a bona fide work con-
tract of at least six months.
Although making immigration policies has always been the sole compe-
tence of the national authorities, regularisations may to a great extent be
considered the product of bottom-up pressures. Concerned by the difficult
situation of many irregular immigrants living in Spain, numerous NGOs,
trade unions and other social activists have compelled governments to en-
force such regularisations by, for example, exerting political pressure in
Parliament. The underlying motivation for such petitions was to promote
amnesty in the name of justice, though there was not always consensus on
the ultimate goals at stake. In this regard, regularisations have often di-
vided social movements. Depending on their expectations, immigrants
themselves have cultivated a range of stances: from more moderate, colla-
boratively oriented positions to the more oppositional and radically
defined.
Employers have generally taken a favourable position vis-à-vis regulari-
sation processes. Among smaller companies especially, employers have
been grateful for the opportunity to regularise the situation of many of their
already employed irregular immigrants. Following the trend throughout
Europe, Spanish trade unions have expressed worry about the possible ne-
gative impact immigrant workers might have on wages and employment
opportunities for native workers, but they – much more than other actors –
have demonstrated a positive attitude towards immigration and immigrants
(Watts 1998; Calavita 2003; Cachon & Valles 2003). Trade unions have
extended their services to immigrant workers, basically regarding them as
potential new members through which to reinforce their social presence.
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This stance may have something to do with the fact that Spain’s dominant
trade unions have traditionally had a left-wing political orientation. At the
same time, it is also plausible that the remarkable expansion of the Spanish
economy during the last decade and the importance of the country’s black
economy have encouraged the positive attitude among trade unions.
Finally, although some autonomous communities and municipalities
have asked the central government to examine the prospect of opening reg-
ularisation processes, the role of regional and local authorities has been
modest. Any participation on their part has mainly been motivated by the
development of specific programmes for the social integration of immi-
grants, or as a result of pressure by social movements. Since 2000, autono-
mous communities have been key actors in the implementation of regulari-
sation programmes. While the gradual decentralisation of regularisation
programmes increased the state’s administrative response capacity, it also
introduced important regional differences in the evaluation of applications
(Ramos Gallarín & Bazaga Fernández 2002).
5 Integration policies and policymaking
Telling the diffuse story of integration policymaking in Spain and the con-
sequent involvement of different actors presents more challenges than de-
scribing immigration’s well-centralised policies. Giving due attention to the
various dimensions at stake in this analysis, we will first make some gener-
al remarks on the policymaking process and then outline its mechanisms.
These mechanisms will be examined on three levels: the national; the local
and regional; and from the perspective of non-governmental actors in-
volved in both national and local policies.
As already discussed, up until to 2004, policymaking efforts at the na-
tional level primarily focused on the immigration field. The elaboration of
integration policies mostly occurred on the regional and local levels for
three reasons. Firstly, until 2004, Spain’s management of migration in
many ways resembled the guest-worker policies of Northern European
states during the 1960s. Specifically, this means that a labour approach pre-
vailed and the state’s main preoccupation was immigration control and reg-
ulation, thereby relegating integration to second place. At the national
level, policymaking in formal governmental and parliamentary arenas had
basically taken shape in negotiations of the Foreigners Law.
Secondly, the sub-national level became the locus of integration policy-
making as a consequence of the division of tasks between levels that the
established system of autonomous communities. As we described in the
third section of this chapter, while the national government manages immi-
gration, sub-national governments have competence for promoting the ac-
commodation of immigrants: regional and local governments are thus
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responsible for the policy measures involved in integration (health care,
education, social assistance, labour and housing).30 The national policies
for integration GRECO (2000) and PECI (2006) would later institutionalise
de facto distribution of responsibilities territorial tiers. This division of
work no doubt had consequences for policymaking: namely, the difficult
coordination between administrations and the heterogeneity of policies and
processes.
More than anything else, this distribution of tasks in the elaboration of
policies implies extreme separation between the policy fields of immigra-
tion and integration, and their respective networks and policymaking logics
(Tamayo & Carrillo 2002). The two separate spheres follow divergent lo-
gics: the national government endeavours to restrict the entrance of mi-
grants, while the autonomous communities and municipalities seek to make
irregular migrants visible so as to develop policies that improve their living
situation. Although the policy areas operate separately from one other, de-
velopments in the sphere of integration are hierarchically determined by
those in migration. This helps explain how the three national plans for inte-
gration developed.
Parliamentary debates over the Foreigners Law have gradually come to
deal with the negative ramifications it had for migrants’ integration into
society. In such debates, the ‘integration of migrants’ has become an ideo-
logical position in and of itself, eventually coming to oppose restrictive
positions on migration (Moreno Fuentes 2004). This stance is harnessed by
the view that integration policies embody ‘the protection of human rights’
or ‘the defence of equal opportunities’ – beliefs that have been promoted
largely by social organisations.
Thirdly, integration policymaking in Spain has shifted out of the political
arena and downwards to the sub-national levels. One important explanation
for this shift is that Spanish political elites at the national level have shown
little inclination to negotiate, while at the same time they are increasingly
dependent on such negotiations between political forces to reach governing
coalitions (Gomà & Subirats 1998; Gallego, Gomà & Subirats 2003). This
tendency has been propelled ever since the polarisation of Spain’s two ma-
jor political parties in 2004, leading up to the present-day’s political cli-
mate marked by division and great hostility. As such, policymaking at
Spain’s national level is complicated. When it comes to integration issues,
the political agenda has become narrower in scope, while simultaneously
undergoing shifts downwards, to the regional level, and outwards, to the
administrative sphere.31
5.1 National developments
Although the principal activities of integration policymaking transpire at
sub-national levels, the national level has witnessed three benchmarks in
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policymaking: the Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants (1994),
GRECO (2000) and PECI (2006). These national policy initiatives have
been triggered by bottom-up pressure exerted by sub-national public
administrations (i.e. regions and municipalities) and civil society organisa-
tions. A significant amount of emulation has also taken place whereby pol-
icy concepts and models are patterned after the regional and local levels.
As demonstrated in this chapter’s third section, the first generation of
legislative initiatives in the 1980s dealt almost exclusively with the regula-
tion of immigration itself, something that had been foremost defined as a
temporary phenomenon. Spain’s main motive for developing these initia-
tives was to secure imminent access to the European Economic
Community, as opposed to any urgency, per se, of migration developments
in the country. This explains the relative absence of societal actors in the
process of creating these first-generation laws and regulations. Within such
a framework, developing policy measures to facilitate immigrant settlement
and the process of becoming a multicultural society could not be given po-
litical priority.32 The situation changed, however, in the 1990s. During this
decade, more and more actors in Spanish society, particularly at the regio-
nal and the local levels, could face the consequences of a steadily growing
immigrant population as well as the implications of its management. From
the very start of the decade, societal action and political mobilisation
pressed for immigration regulations that would create a better basis for in-
tegration at the local level (e.g. regularisations and rights for family reunifi-
cation and for minors). This did, in fact, lead to a number of changes dur-
ing the mid-1990s, and it also pressured the government to formulate an
explicit integration policy. A crucial event was the signing of the
Declaration of Girona by a number of civil society organisations in 1992.
This document backed the statement that public administrations should de-
velop a comprehensive integration policy, beyond a mere contention of
problems. It also acknowledged the need for giving specialised attention to
immigrants.
This societal insistence led to the Plan for Social Integration of
Immigrants, as launched in 1994 by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Despite
being a response to pressure from the grass-roots level, the plan was pro-
duced in Spain’s administrative arena without any political or social de-
bate. Furthermore, several authors suggest that this plan was inspired by –
if not patterned upon – the 1993 Catalonian Plan (Cais 2004; Zapata-
Barrero 2002). Following in Catalonia’s footsteps, the national plan
showed striking similarities to the former plan in its institutional structure,
particularly in terms of instruments promoting interdepartmental coopera-
tion and social participation (e.g. the Forum).
In the formal sense, integration policies were introduced at the national
level, a novel development. But, in practice, the importance of the 1994
plan was something more symbolic, acknowledging for the first time that
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‘integration’ was a policy goal (Pajares 2004). The plan, however, led to
meagre results, which were not only due to the scarcity of allocated re-
sources, but also difficulties in coordinating the multiplicities of institutions
involved. As evaluation by the Ministry of Labour and Social Issues
(IMSERSO 1998) concluded, Spain’s first attempt to promote its integra-
tion of immigrants was little more than a rhetorical effort; there were
mismatches between the plan’s intended goals and the economic, adminis-
trative and human resources actually available. Moreover, the various insti-
tutions involved held contradictory opinions on the issue. The clashing
views of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs are a case in point (Gil Araujo 2002).
The new national regulation known as GRECO was launched in 2000.
Once again, the plan was designed by civil servants behind closed doors in
the Ministry of Interior. GRECO focused mostly on border control, with
only one of its four guidelines dealing with integration. The plan’s argu-
ments follow that good management of migration in Spain means restrict-
ing the number of labour migrants so that national labour offers match
demands for foreign work. Two key measures for accomplishing this are
the strict control of flows and the promotion of migrants’ return to their
country of origin. The plan did not establish concrete measures or guide-
lines for sub-national actors, and neither was it backed by any specific
allocation of financial resources (Pajares 2004). GRECO emerged in an ex-
tremely thorny historical context. The period was benchmarked by the pro-
gressive Foreigners Law 4/2000’s reformation into its more restrictive
8/2000 version, 2001’s regularisation process, national and regional elec-
tions and several mobilisations among citizens from both pro-migrant and
anti-migrant sides. Transferring the immigration portfolio to the Ministry
of Interior was another sign of the paradigm shift brought about by the PP
government. Integration was not their first priority, and this was reflected
not only in the policy’s two main rationales but also in the actual expenses
reflected in the annual reports (Delegación de Gobierno para la Extranjería
y la Inmigración 2002).33 It is not farfetched to conclude thus that, in this
case, integration was a political goal only to the extent that it contributed
to immigrants’ return to their home countries. And, moreover, it helped
maintain the status quo of a restrictive immigration policy.
Finally, 2004 saw production of the first real national framework policy
for the promotion of integration. Increasing social pressures and the topic’s
gradual politicisation upped integration policy on a national political agen-
da being developed by the new social-democratic government. Promoting
equality of immigrants nationwide was the main goal of the ambitious
PECI 2006. For the first time, these national guidelines were backed by fi-
nancial commitment – an allotted budget in which E 2,005 million were
set for 2007-2010. The funding was to be proportionately distributed
among the regions according to their immigrant population percentages as
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well as among the municipalities, for the first time thus recognising the im-
portant role of local authorities. In addition, the national integration budget
sanctioned those regional policies that complied with national guidelines,
although autonomous communities could still cultivate their own
integration policy.
There are notable differences in these consecutive national plans and the
actors who subsequently participated in their elaborations. While all three
plans share a technocratic policymaking style that lacks much parliamen-
tary discussion between parties, PECI stands out for having a relatively
pro-participation nature. PECI was drafted by independently operating spe-
cialists who had also considered recommendations produced by several ex-
pert seminars. Although regional and local authorities and civil society
were not included in the discussions leading to its drafting, the plan was
subsequently subjected to widespread consultation.
5.2 Regional and local developments
The description thus far detailing the evolution of integration policies at
the national level can sometimes overshadow some of the earliest develop-
ments that took place at the regional and the local levels. But policy initia-
tives and negotiations among their different actors had been taking place in
this realm since the mid-1990s (FEMP 1995; Maluquer 1997; Nadal,
Oliveres & Alegre 2003). The region of Catalonia, in particular, was a pio-
neer, having developed the first regional plan for integration in 1993.
Other regions launched their own policies more recently, in 2000 or 2001.
They include Madrid, Andalucía, Baleares, Canarias, Navarra and Aragón,
all of which have high migrant percentages. Already in the mid-1990s, a
number of municipalities were launching policies, only to become more
widespread at the turn of the millennium. In addition, some municipalities
and social organisations such as NGOs, trade unions and migrant associa-
tions came to proactively promote the issue on the national political agenda
(Casey 1998b; Agrela Romero & Gil Araujo 2005).
In the absence of a guiding national policy, regional and local authorities
regularly took initiatives to develop integration plans. This has resulted in
great variety in the form, content, involvement of relevant actors and im-
plementation of local and regional policies. Above all, diversity in policy-
making processes has led to considerable inequalities across regions and ci-
ties (Diez Bueso 2003), particularly since more empowered autonomous
communities tend to develop their own policies while others do not. As a
result, an immigrant’s place of residence has a direct bearing on his or her
access to welfare services (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). It is commonly
assumed that this only exacerbates the uneven geographical distribution of
immigration, for populations tend to move to regions and localities that
will offer more favourable conditions.34 The inconsistencies may also
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create tensions between administrations concerning who has to foot the bill
for the integration. The Catalonian Plan, for instance, lacked a clear finan-
cial budget because according to Catalonian policymakers, the central state
was responsible for funding integration policies (Pajares 2004).
Despite the differences, regional and local policymaking processes also
show important similarities. Firstly, when it comes to actual policy content,
there are striking resemblances among regional plans’ general principles
and goals (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). Basic principles framing regio-
nal policies are equal rights and opportunities for migrants, normalisation
(or the tendency to resort to general policies), transversality, gender equal-
ity, decentralisation and social participation (Pajares 2004). An important
feature shared by both regional and local levels is that they seldom distin-
guish between regular and irregular migrants. If and when they do, how-
ever, the distinction tends to vanish upon policy implementation.35 This
has had implications for the policymaking process, particularly because not
distinguishing between legal and illegal36 immigrants in fact promotes the
registration of irregular migrants in municipal registers. This identification
works as the onset of a sort of partial regularisation process.37 Sub-national
governments ‘survive’ by making irregular migrants visible; this allows
them to develop policies and services for migrants and to negotiate fiscal
compensations with the central government (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002).
Still, despite this general tendency, the legal status of migrants implies dif-
ferent levels of access to social-protection schemes depending on region or
municipality. In some regions, undocumented migrants are often chan-
nelled towards special charity programmes supplied by private agencies
and NGOs, although de jure they should have access to the general social
schemes as long as they are listed in the municipal register (Agrela
Romero & Gil Araujo 2005).
Secondly, we find similarities regarding decision-making styles.
Regional and local plans have tended to be reactive in nature, focusing on
preventing serious problems (marginality, violence, insecurity, exploitation,
etc.). Analysis of the type of integration instruments developed shows how
such actions have mainly taken place in first reception services and the so-
cial services sector (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002; Bruquetas-Callejo 2007;
Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). These priorities can be explained by the
fact that sub-national actors have little influence over the growth of immi-
grant populations in their territory. Sub-national governments experience
the direct consequences of this growth, yet they lack the resources and
technical capacity to handle them. Inaction by some regional governments
overloads the local authorities with responsibility.
Regional and local policies can generally be characterised as techno-
cratic in their development, being designed behind closed doors by civil
servants and internal experts. As such, there is little political discussion
and negotiation between actors. A minority of regions (e.g. Navarra) has
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managed to cultivate greater interaction among independent experts,38 civil
society actors and immigrants themselves. The dominance of policymaking
in the administrative arena has led to plans often contradicting the political
intentions and goals of the political elites in power. For example, the
Catalonia Plan (1993, 1998), wove a symbolic banner for multiculturalism
and yet still deployed instruments promoting the importance of the
Catalonian language and culture vis-à-vis immigrant integration (Cais
2004).
Despite the predominance of civil servants as actors, regions reflect a
great diversity of policy actors involved in the decision-making network.
Zapata-Barrero (2003a) has made a quantitative effort to describe different
networks operating per region. He found that, while in some regions public
administration clearly dominates the process (e.g. Andalusia), in others,
pressure groups play the most important role, followed by NGOs and im-
migrant organisations (e.g. Catalonia, where public administration mod-
estly figures at third place). Under the category of ‘interest groups’,
Zapata-Barrero includes trade unions, religious organisations, employer or-
ganisations, federations and foundations.
Thirdly, within the dimension of implementation, the networks of actors
involved varies not only per locality, but also policy sector. Whereas in
some sectors (e.g. education) there is an obvious predominance of public
actors and residual participation by private and social actors, other sectors
(e.g. social services) have management networks largely linking the regio-
nal administration and the civil society actors. At the other end of the spec-
trum are examples of bottom-up experiences at the regional and local le-
vels. For instance, Catalonia has had cases of self-organisation among citi-
zens that have produced compelling policymaking initiatives and networks
(Pascual 1997; Morén-Alegret 2002a, 2002b).
However, there is evidently a dominant national pattern in which a ma-
jority of autonomous communities have made first reception a top priority
and thus assigned integration management to the Social Services
Department (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). These autonomous commu-
nities transfer part of their responsibilities for first reception to NGOs and
other social actors, who function as subsidised policy implementers. In
their study on the Community of Madrid, Tamayo and Carrillo (2002) de-
scribed such a network of actors – comprising the regional administration
and non-governmental actors – whose relations are based on two basic
instruments: the system of conditioned subventions and the contracts for
service delivery. The Centros de Atención Social a Inmigrantes (CASI) net-
work in Madrid and the Service for Attention to Immigrants and Refugees
(SAEIR) in Barcelona are illustrations of how the management of social is-
sues was transferred from the regional government to NGOs and private
companies (Gil Araújo 2004; Bruquetas-Callejo 2007).
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5.3 Civil society
Actors from Spanish civil society39 have had a remarkable presence in the
domain of integration policies. First of all, they have been the frontline
providers of basic services for immigrants since the very beginning of their
settlement in Spain, during the mid-1980s. Beyond purely implementing
regional or local policies, social organisations formulate their own projects
and seek the subsidies of public authorities. These actors have delivered a
broad array of services, including juridical support, reception facilities, lan-
guage training, employment services, health care, child after-school pro-
grammes, adult education and home rental intermediation. In addition, as
mentioned earlier, these actors have actually tried to influence policymak-
ing by explicitly demanding that public administrations develop integration
schemes. Their efforts have had at least two visible results: placing immi-
grant integration on the political agenda (Girona Report, CAONGCG
1992) and swaying public opinion to favour migrants and support the
granting of equal rights to foreigners on grounds of residence (in particular,
the right to benefit from welfare state provisions). In a noticeable way, this
has framed the issue of integration in terms of human rights and equal op-
portunities for migrants.
Nonetheless, civil society organisations have not had a substantial influ-
ence on the decision-making processes of integration policies in formal
arenas. Casey (1998a, 1998c) concludes that, until the mid-1990s, Spanish
NGOs had not yet been able to establish themselves as strong, independent
actors in policy processes related to immigration and integration. Yet, their
indirect role was crucial for pushing the issue on the political agenda and
influencing how a particular problem might be defined. Public authorities
also came to recognise the legitimacy that social actors had in the policy
domain because of their access to migrant groups. While public measures
primarily apply general schemes, authorities have found it useful to arrange
special measures for immigrants through social organisations (Agrela
Romero & Gil Araujo 2005; Dietz 2000).
There are three main factors that explain why participation by social or-
ganisations has merely remained indirect and variable, not reaching a more
structured position in the decision-making process. We identify the ineffi-
ciency of the instruments developed for the participation of social actors
(e.g. the Forum), the strong financial dependence social organisations have
on public administration and the lack of coordination among social organi-
sations. As mentioned above, social actors such as NGOs and immigrant
associations have often been given specific tasks (and budgets) to imple-
ment integration policies at the local and regional levels. This delegation
changed the position of such partners vis-à-vis administrative and political
authorities and, to a certain extent, may have altered their very nature.
Many organisations that initially consisted almost exclusively of volunteers
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now have a significant percentage of contracted personnel in order to pro-
vide services that are subcontracted or promoted by public administration.
In many cases, this has meant that both the voluntary nature and ideologi-
cal impetus of NGOs take a backseat. Moreover, such organisations have
become very economically dependent on public administration.40
6 Conclusions
Spanish policymaking in the fields of immigration and integration presents
several salient features. Fundamental is a separation of the policymaking
system into the two distinct subsystems of immigration and integration.
Although in other countries one policymaking model predominates (at least
for certain periods of time), in Spain, a bipolar model prevails. Pressure to
link these two fields has been mounting since the mid-1990s. One sign of
this is the demand some autonomous communities make for obtaining
competence in migration. The demand has been backed by the argument
that, without such responsibilities, regions cannot produce effective integra-
tion policies. However, the path towards greater interdependence between
the two fields has not evolved into a single, unique model. As such, the
immigration and integration policy subsystems still function highly inde-
pendently. Each field has its own predominating operational logic and ac-
companying set of actors that participate in decision-making processes.
The distribution of responsibilities within the autonomous community
system means that in each field distinct actors and different levels of
authority take responsibility for formulating policies. This governance pat-
tern thus entails dissimilar policymaking strategies. As for immigration, the
national government has had total responsibility over the related decision-
making, and policymaking has consequently followed a distinct top-down
direction. In the field of integration, the Spanish central government had
until only recently been reluctant to dedicate significant efforts to integra-
tion policies. Decentralisation of social policies has assigned integration
responsibilities to the regions and municipalities. Bottom-up responses
have thus been extraordinarily diverse when compared across autonomous
communities, municipalities and civil society organisations.
Another difference between the two policymaking subsystems is the de-
gree of continuity. While the field of migration is characterised by relative
continuity, integration is quite the opposite. Interventions in immigration
policy have proven considerably consistent over time and throughout poli-
tical changes because the field has been dominated by a single actor –
namely, the central state. The policy style predominating Spanish politics
also helps account for the degree of continuity in each subsystem: political
elites are described as residing in a position somewhere between little incli-
nation to negotiate between parties and the need to do so for the sake of
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reaching governing coalitions. In the latter instance, changes in immigra-
tion policy have often been approached through modification of an imple-
menting regulation, as opposed to substitution with a brand-new one. The
consistency of migration policy may also be explained by the fact that
Spain’s main political parties (the PSOE and the PP) have had rather simi-
lar approaches. By contrast, stances on integration have been dissimilar –
if not altogether conflicting – particularly on the issue of access to welfare
services for irregular immigrants. In this regard, political colour seems a vi-
able variable, running the gamut of positions within the field of integration.
Since integration policies imply more political conflict between political
parties, they have been regionalised and localised, as well as mostly ap-
proached through administrative regulations.
The subsystems have also been receptive to dissimilar contextual factors
in the framing of policies. When it comes to immigration, the EU has
played a leading role in initiating policymaking. These efforts were under-
taken before immigration had even become a significant phenomenon and,
later, in response to pressure to conform with general EU rules and princi-
ples. As for integration, grass-roots organisations and local authorities have
created bottom-up pressure to trigger policymaking from below. The immi-
gration/integration issue came to be defined in a highly politicised climate.
It was shaped by several political mobilisations that were both pro and
against migrants (such as racist events in El Ejido and Can Anglada and
mobilisations of irregular migrants demanding residence and work permits
in Barcelona and other major cities). The balance that developed between
these forces can be read from the different versions of the Foreigners Law:
while in the first and third versions of the law (8/2000) a European-wide
top-down pressure dominated, the second version (4/2000) tried to intro-
duce the logic of integration and to respond to the specificity of local
needs.
These general tendencies, as they evolved over the years, need to be
viewed in a nuanced light. Two elements should be noted in particular.
First, although the domains are seen as distinct, the attention immigration
gets undoubtedly dominates that given to integration. As such, the policy
goals of the former have priority over those of the latter. The heavy empha-
sis on labour explains not only the chronology of integration policies, but
also their reactionary character and primary focus on first reception.
Second, within the field of immigration, social actors have put bottom-up
pressure on regional and local governments to produce regularisations.
Since regularisation has come to represent the primary avenue for confer-
ring legal status, we deduce that immigration policies have, in practice,
gone far beyond national authorities’ competence.
Finally, this policymaking pattern has revealed inconsistencies. More
than anything else, exceedingly separate relations between policy actors
have produced two fundamental paradoxes. The first is that the model
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lacks inter-governmental instruments that can guarantee the coherence of
policies. Each domain operates independently and the facilities meant to
integrate these two policy areas (government delegation, Institute of
Migrations and Social Services, the Forum and the Superior Council for
Migration Policy) have proved insufficient. Furthermore, the regionalisa-
tion and localisation of integration policies has been implemented without
sufficient coordination between administrations and sectors. An absence of
multilevel cooperation reflects a broad problematic within the system of
the Spanish autonomous communities. The state has established a very de-
centralised power structure without resolving the articulation of the whole
system in a satisfactory way (Aja 1999).
The second paradox is that even though organised civil society has no
formal access to decision-making forums, civil society organisations have
brought integration policy to fruition, both informally and at the operative
level. Public authorities have even mimicked these civic initiatives. Up
until recently, the framing of policies at the national level has tended to
produce measures in immigration, rather than integration. This opened up
opportunities for social organisations to generate a number of integration-
related initiatives on all levels. A lack of receptivity towards stakeholders
and civil society and a lack of coordination among social organisations has
nonetheless stymied the potential impact such actors could have on
policymaking.
Notes
1 Unless specified otherwise, the terms ‘immigration’ and ‘immigrant’ are used in re-
ference to non-Spanish migrants.
2 On 1 January 2007, National Institute of Statistics (INE) data accounted for
45,200,737 inhabitants of Spain (http://www.ine.es); among this population were
4,519,554 foreign residents, or 9.99 per cent of the total population (not including
immigrants who acquired Spanish nationality).
3 Ley 7/1985, Orga´nica de Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en Espan˜a
(Organic Law of Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain) of 1 July 1985.
4 Ley 5/1984, Reguladora del Derecho de Asilo y de la Condicio´n de Refugiado (Law
Regulating the Right to Asylum and the Condition of the Refugee) of 26 March
1984.
5 Reglamento de desarrollo. A regulation is a form of secondary legislation used to
implement a primary piece of legislation appropriately.
6 Royal Decree 19 November1986.
7 Real Decreto 766/1992, Sobre Entrada y Permanencia en Espan˜a de Nacionales de
Estados Miembros de las Comunidades Europeas (Royal Decree on Entry and
Residence of Citizens of the Member States of the European Communities) of 26
June 1986.
8 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 23 November 1984.
9 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 7 July 1987.
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10 Although there was no general prohibition, the exertion of these rights by foreigners
needed prior authorisation by public authorities. This provoked a de facto limitation
on the right of association as well as the right to meet.
11 Izquierda Unida.
12 Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol.
13 Law 9/1994 of 19 May 1994.
14 Royal Decree 203/1995 of 10 February 1995.
15 Royal Decree 155/1996 of 2 February 1996.
16 The Forum’s current status is regulated in Royal Decree 367/2001 of 4 April 2001.
17 The national policies for integration (GRECO (2000) and PECI (2006)) have institu-
tionalised a de facto distribution of tasks.
18 Some of these responsibilities are shared with the local administrations.
19 Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000.
20 Partido Popular.
21 For the period 1996-2000, the PP was in power with just a relative majority.
22 Law 8/2000 of 22 December 2000.
23 Royal Decree 864/2001 of 20 July 2001.
24 Its application spanned the period 2000-2004.
25 Law 14/2003 of 20 November 2003.
26 Judgments of the Constitutional Court number 236 of 7 November 2007 and num-
ber 259 of 19 December 2007.
27 Royal Decree 2393/2004 of 30 December 2004.
28 The 1990s also saw specific regularisation programmes implemented to solve con-
frontational situations in the border cities of Ceuta and Melilla. These programmes
permitted irregular migrants to get a one-year residence permit without having to
undergo the standard process. In exchange, the government required active colla-
boration from NGOs who would see to it that immigrants could move to the penin-
sula. There they were to be granted some basic reception provisions, a gesture
meant to counterbalance the negative impact of their irregular arrival.
29 On 3 January 2001, in the Murcian city of Lorca, twelve Ecuadorian migrants on
their way to work were killed when their van was hit by a train. Widely covered by
regional and national media, the event brought attention to the workers’ living and
labour conditions, thus publicising the precarious situation of many migrants in
Spain.
30 Some of these responsibilities are shared with the local administrations.
31 The confrontation between the party in power (the moderate social-democratic
PSOE) and the opposition’s main party (the conservative PP) has compelled the gov-
ernment to minimise the number of issues on the political agenda. As an energy-
saving strategy, points of conflict thus become very focused, while many other issues
get delegated to bureaucrats so as to reduce general political confrontation.
32 This is also reflected in research: studies dealing with the elaboration processes of
integration policy are rather scarce (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002; Zapata 2002c, 2003;
Ramos et al. 1998), while studies dealing with immigration policy are more com-
mon (Tamayo & Delgado 1998; Carrillo & Delgado 1998; Ramos & Bazaga 2002;
Goma & Subirats 1996; Lopez Sala 2005). Few studies deal with both policy fields
(Casey 1998; Agrela Romero & Gil Araujo 2005).
33 The 2002 Report of the Delegation of Government for Alien Policy and
Immigration declares an expenditure of E 252 million on border control, centres of
reclusion and services for asylum seekers and foreigners. In contrast, investments
in integration are considerably less: E 9 million for the covenants with regions;
E 12.6 million for subventions to social organisations offering services to migrants;
and sundry funds given to refugee and immigrant reception centres.
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34 However, evidence in this regard is inconclusive. See general discussions on the
Welfare Magnet Theory.
35 According to Martı´nez de Lizarrondo (2006), Madrid is the only region that formally
excludes irregular migrants from public (specialised) services. However, Tamayo and
Carrillo (2002) aver that this policy gets blurred in practice.
36 Throughout this chapter, the terms ‘irregular’, ‘illegal’ and ‘undocumented’ are used
synonymously when referring to migrants.
37 As Solanes Corella (2004) observes, the municipal register is a double-edged sword.
Local governments, in collaboration with regional ones, tend to use it as a mechan-
ism of inclusion – by extending service access to all undocumented foreigners who
register as residents (as sanctioned by law 4/2000) – rather than as an instrument
of control – by trying to protect registry data from police access (as permitted by law
8/2000).
38 The formulation of policies by public officers often implies that experts within the
administration develop measures. Some regions have developed public services that
specialise in supporting local authorities in the elaboration of integration policies
(for instance, CRID in Catalonia).
39 One basic typology of civil society organisations distinguishes between Spanish
NGOs supporting immigrants and associations of immigrants (Casey 1998). The
former focus on delivering services for migrants, while the latter tend to take up po-
litical representation duties in public institutions. Since the former task list impli-
cates more resources and thus more influence than the latter, tensions are likely to
arise among the various social actors (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002). Other immigrant-
supporting organisations include trade unions, cultural associations and sponta-
neously formed groups that mobilise for specific migrant causes.
40 Ruiz Vieytez (2003: 186) highlights four additional changes that may take place
within such organisations: diminishment of a long-term strategy; influence by per-
sonal or practical interests within the organisation; loss of a culture of inter-organi-
sational coordination and networking; and a weakening international presence.
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PART III
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

9 The case of the Czech Republic
Marek Čaněk and Pavel Čižinský
1 Introduction1
The area that now constitutes the Czech Republic was, over the last centu-
ries, characterised more by the phenomenon of emigration than by pro-
cesses of immigration. Between 1850 and 1914, the territory of the Czech
Lands experienced a net emigration of about 1.6 million inhabitants
(Drbohlav 2004). The Czech Lands came to be characterised by more sub-
stantial immigration at the end of the twentieth century with the exception
of return migration after 1918 and 1945. Before then, Czech emigration
was mainly directed to other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well
as to the United States and Canada. Migrants’ main motivates were to seek
work and a better quality of life. While these socio-economic factors were
crucial for Czech emigration history before World War II, the situation
changed at the end of the 1930s. At that time, political factors were gaining
significance, causing mass migration movements across the whole of
Europe. After phases of emigration and immigration among displaced per-
sons, the post-war period was characterised by expulsions. Between 1945
and 1946, in response to World War II, nearly the entire German minority
of Czechoslovakia – comprising about 2.7 million people – was exiled to
Germany and Austria. These movements led to both planned and un-
planned migration that would repopulate the area and provide workers for
the national economy (e.g. in heavy industry, agriculture and forestry).
Furthermore, it transformed the Czech part of Czechoslovakia into a fairly
homogenous society in terms of ethnic groups: 94 per cent of the popula-
tion at that time was Czech.
During the Communist era, during which some 420,000 to 440,000 peo-
ple left the country between 1948 and 1990, some immigration occurred.
This flow was mainly facilitated by agreements regarding temporary work-
ers, drawn up with other socialist countries such as Poland and Hungary.
These ‘guest workers’ were hired under so-called ‘international aid coop-
eration’ (Boušková 1998; Drbohlav 2004). Apart from agreements with
neighbouring countries, bilateral agreements were signed throughout the
1970s and 1980s with more distant places, such as Vietnam, Mongolia,
Angola, North Korea, the Republic of Cyprus, Laos and Cuba. This migra-
tion scheme was strictly regulated and involved workers, interns and
students (Boušková 1998). The migrants were usually segregated and
hardly visible. Permanent immigration into the country at that time,
though, was rather marginal and usually politically motivated (Drbohlav
2004). Unlike other Czechoslovakian migrant workers in the 1990s, immi-
grants from Vietnam tended towards de facto settlement in the country.
This happened despite cancellation of the bilateral agreement and the
Czechoslovakian assistance programme meant to provide new jobs for re-
turnees from Czechoslovakia to Vietnam (see Boušková 1998).
The most substantial immigration to Czechoslovakia (or, as of 1993, the
Czech Republic) only started after 1989. This was a consequence of the
Communist regime’s collapse, the country’s gradual inclusion in a globa-
lised capitalist economy and the better economic position of the Czech
Republic compared with other Eastern European countries. In order to un-
derstand post-1989 immigration into the country, we need to look at the
Czech history of political, social and cultural ties to countries such as
Slovakia, Ukraine, Poland, Vietnam, Mongolia and Russia. As former so-
cialist allies, they represented particularly important ties for contemporary
migrations dating back to earlier periods, such as Transcarpathian Ukraine,
which was part of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period. Among the afore-
mentioned countries, migration from Slovakia must be considered sepa-
rately, since Slovak citizens suddenly went from being ‘internal’ to ‘inter-
national’ migrants with Czechoslovakia’s split in 1993. It has, however,
remained a specific kind of migration as Slovaks have continued to be con-
sidered ‘not-yet foreigners’2 (Čaněk 2004). In this sense, no work permit
was required from Slovak citizens before either the Czech Republic or the
Slovak Republic entered the European Union. Yet at the same time,
Slovaks were counted as foreigners in statistics.
Besides migration from the East, there has also been migration from the
West (e.g. the US and Western Europe), already visible from the first half
of the 1990s (see Wallace & Stola 2001). With the 1989 opening of bor-
ders to the West and its relative economic and political stability, the Czech
Republic became a destination of transit from the East to the more affluent
West. Increasingly, the country itself became a destination for immigration:
in only four years, the number of foreigners registered as long-term or per-
manent residents rose fourfold from 49,957 in 1992 to 199,152 in 1996.
Legal immigration slowed down in 2000, but since then has continued to
grow. In 2008, the official figure was double the number of foreigners in
1996. At the end of 2008, the country had 438,301 registered foreigners,
265,374 of whom were long-term stayers (i.e. holders of visas valid for
over 90 days, other long-term residents and holders of temporary residence
permits ) and 172,927 permanent stayers (holders of permanent residence
permits). With, according to the statistics, 10,467,542 people living in the
Czech Republic at the end of 2008, 4.19 per cent of the overall population
were thus migrants. Based on figures provided by the Alien and Border
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Police, most migrants in the Czech Republic as of 31 December 2008 were
Ukrainian citizens (131,965), followed by Slovaks (76,034) and
Vietnamese (60,258). Labour statistics, however, provide a different pic-
ture. As for being employed or self-employed in the Czech Republic at the
end of 2008, first came Slovaks (109,478) and then Ukrainians (102,285)
(Horáková 2009). These statistics as well as data concerning criminality3
point to different regimes for EU and non-EU citizens, as many of the for-
mer do not register with the Alien and Border Police.
Integration of the Czech Republic into the international economy and
the rise of the competition state (Drahokoupil 2009) are crucial factors ex-
plaining growing labour immigration and migration policy liberalisations.
The interests of major foreign investors and employers, especially as repre-
sented by the Czech Republic’s Confederation of Industry, have played an
important role in facilitating both manual and skilled labour. This reflects a
more general convergence towards the competition state (Menz 2009). The
international economic crisis starting in autumn 2008 slowed down immi-
gration to the Czech Republic and reshaped the balance of social forces
influencing immigration policies. Gaining power have been those parts of
administration dealing with security issues and protecting domestic labour
from competition with foreign workers.
This chapter attempts to describe the mechanisms of migration policy-
making in the Czech Republic. It is mainly based on the study of existing
literature, policy documents and legislation as well as on first-hand experi-
ence and informal interviews with migration policy actors.4 It focuses pri-
marily on the developments of the Foreigners Act, thus only minimally
dealing with issues such as asylum and the Asylum Act.
2 The evolution of migration policies: General trends
Before Czechoslovakia’s historic turning point in 1989, Czech state institu-
tions were predominantly interested in controlling emigration. In the for-
mer Czechoslovakia, numbers of foreigners were, by today’s standards,
lower. The 1965 Act on the Stay of Foreigners on the Territory of the
Czech Socialist Republic5 only vaguely covered the granting of residence
permits to foreigners. Baršová and Barša (2005) note that Czech migration
policies in the 1990s developed because the country, as a type of liberal
and post-revolutionary state, had no prior experience handling the immi-
gration of individual migrants. It can be said that the Czech Republic, its
politicians, institutions and the public were largely unprepared to deal with
migration issues after 1989. In the mid-1990s, the Czech administration
and politicians were taken by surprise, realising that the immigrant popula-
tion had risen fourfold in just a few years. Such awareness significantly
influenced the formulation of Czech migration policy, and will be
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investigated in detail in the following section. One particular aspect should
be highlighted to better understand the country’s political and societal de-
velopment: continuity of migration policies in the Czech Republic was lar-
gely ensured by institutions. The Ministry of Interior and the police forces
remained the central authorities governing entry and stay before and after
1989.
In general, the democratisation and liberalisation of the Czech political
and economic systems from 1989 onwards led to the relatively free move-
ment of people. Laissez-faire migration legislation and practices (Baršová
& Barša 2005), as well as prospering economic relations, favoured immi-
gration to the Czech Republic in the mid-1990s.
3 Migration policymaking from the 1990s onwards
Czech migration policy – or rather, policies – developed in the context of
rising, diversifying immigration, the process of integration into the EU and
a relatively low politicisation of the issue. The management of migration
flows and the direction of respective policies were shaped mainly by high-
level Czech administration and business interests, as well as migrant net-
works and intermediaries. In this context, the acting administration and
politicians did, to some extent, respond to public concerns and fears re-
garding the presence of foreigners, as testified to the 1999 Foreigners Act.
The aim of this law was to restrict immigration. Since then, more positive
views of migration have taken hold, with the utilitarian argument being fed
by the perception of economic and demographic needs. There has been
substantial legal (but also undocumented) labour migration (in construc-
tion, the car and mechanic industry, agriculture and the service sector),
which until recently coexisted with a relatively high unemployment rate
among Czech citizens.
Favell (2002) states that the evolution of migration policies in the period
post-1989 can be seen as a gradual inclusionary process into Western
Europe and exclusion from – or of – the East. Eastern European migrants
from the former Soviet Union and Balkan countries have been understood
as a legacy of the past. These flows were defined as problematic, possibly
‘less civilised’ and connected with organised or petty crime and undocu-
mented labour, not to mention associated with low social prestige.
Conditions and obstacles to their movement and settlement were gradually
introduced, justified by the necessity to align migration policy with that of
the EU. After the introduction of the 1999 Foreigners Act, it was no longer
possible to establish residence status from a short-term visa, and in 2000
and 2001, entry visas for citizens of the former Soviet Union were intro-
duced. In doing this, the state tried to reclaim control of immigration. In
the explanatory report to the 1999 Foreigners Act, it was stated that the
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law could prevent a potential growth in xenophobia among ethnic Czechs
by limiting immigration to a certain ‘absorption capacity’ with regards to
the number of foreigners in the country (Ministerstvo vnitra 2000). At the
same time, the human rights dimension of migrants’ presence in the coun-
try grew in importance, coming to the fore above all in the context of the
amendments to the 1999 Foreigners Act.
3.1 Legal provisions
During the first half of the 1990s, some important bills on migration issues
were enacted, among those the Refugee Act no. 498/1990 Coll. and the
Foreigners Act no.123/1992 Coll. as well as readmission agreements and
bilateral agreements on the employment of foreign nationals. The migration
scheme set forth by the 1992 Foreigners Act was described as being ‘liber-
al’ compared to the regimes before and after: ‘The act itself was based on
the assumption that it was not necessary to regulate issues related to for-
eigners in a way that would dramatically differ from the general norms of
administrative law’ (Uhl 2005). Moreover, in the 1990s, the Czech
Republic became a full member of the Geneva Convention and the 1967
Protocol. In 1999, it joined NATO and, as stated above, it became a full
member of the EU on 1 May 2004.
The location of Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, and its loca-
tion along migration routes from East to West (e.g. to Austria and
Germany) meant that it occupied a potentially strategic position for EU
member states: the control of westward transit migration. In this context,
the Czech government agreed upon a formal set of common principles for
migration policy, which included control schemes and combating undocu-
mented migration. The beginning of the 1990s saw an increased urgency
in migration control first and foremost because the country was part of
Europe. The Czech Republic itself, however, was not considered a country
for migrants to settle permanently. A Ministry of Interior document from
1992 states: ‘Uncontrolled migration flows may be an additional threat to
the overall stability and harmonious development of relations among
European nations’ (Ministerstvo vnitra 1992). Although undocumented mi-
gration (especially transit) started to become an issue, largely discussed in
bilateral and multilateral frameworks (e.g. the Budapest Process), immigra-
tion did not. Even if economic immigration to the Czech Republic started
to grow, it went largely unnoticed by the Czech government and the public
during the first half of the 1990s. At that time, special concern was dedi-
cated to the political, economic and social transition of the country. There
was little knowledge of de facto international immigration and its implica-
tions for the Czech Republic. One of the first studies in this area, on the
case of Ukrainian labour migrants, was published in 1997 by Drbohlav.
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Because migrant policy was at first only connected to the presence of
specific groups, such as refugees and ethnic Czech migrants, a programme
providing accommodation and language courses for refugees was set up in
1991. The programme addressed, above all, ethnic Czechs from
Kazakhstan, Ukraine and other places6 (Baršová & Barša 2005). Due to
insufficient accommodation and the housing market’s high prices, the
provision of living space for refugees and ethnic Czechs became a major
concern. This was partly solved by housing asylum seekers and Czech
migrants in former barracks of the Soviet Army, usually in remote and eco-
nomically undeveloped areas. A dispersal policy was developed that dis-
tributed refugees to different municipalities all over the country.
With Employment Act no. 1/1991 and the Trade License Act of the
same year, two basic provisions for legal economic migration were estab-
lished. On the one hand, these acts introduced a complicated three-permit
system for dependent migrant workers: a recruiting permit for the employ-
er,7 a work permit for the employee and a residence permit for the employ-
ee. Under the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and its subordinated
Labour Offices, the permits required for foreigners who wished to be em-
ployed were issued successively in separate administrative proceedings and
entailed no legal entitlements. On the other hand, the acts established a re-
latively easy business registration procedure, administered by the Ministry
of Industry and Trade and its subordinate trade license administrations in
local municipalities. In reality, however, these categories were blurred and
proved their substantial limitations. Throughout the second half of the
1990s, as Czech analysts point out, the trade license regime allowed for a
shift from stricter work permits to more liberal trade licenses. This limited
the control of labour immigration (Drbohlav 2004).
Only in the second half of the 1990s was there a marked tendency to-
wards more immigration control. The shift was catalysed by an economic
recession, rising unemployment rates among Czech citizens, the perception
of foreigners being involved in criminal and illegal activities (organised
crime, petty crime in tourist areas, illegal employment and residence) as
well as some politicians’ view that migration processes were – to put it
simply – getting out of control. Discussed at that time was the introduction
of visa obligations for countries of the former Soviet Union.8 In 1996, the
Foreigners Act was amended to Act no. 156/1996 Coll., introducing re-
stricted conditions for residence permits. However, this did not yet present
a major change in immigration regime; it was more of a response to some
practical lacunae reported by the Alien and Border Police9 (Baršová 1996).
In general, the challenge for the Czech nation-state was to make the transi-
tion from simply registering immigrants to controlling and possibly redu-
cing their numbers. ‘If we don’t wish [the issue of foreigner] to overwhelm
us, we should solve it in an appropriate way,’ said the Minister of Interior
in 1996, reflecting on the growing numbers of foreigners (MF Dnes
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1996b). However, migration control did not seem a completely obvious
matter in a newly democratic country and needed some justification. The
annual migration overview of the Ministry of Interior from 1997 states:
‘The right to free movement and to choose one’s country of residence is
no doubt part of a democratic society. Nevertheless, the state’s right to de-
termine numbers of immigrants, reasons and origin of immigration should
not be questioned either’ (Ministerstvo vnitra 1997).
In 1997, the Czech Republic became an EU accession country, heralding a
number of modifications to developing Czech migration policy. Reaching
EU standards in asylum and border and immigration control became a major
concern. The term ‘EU standards’ is to be understood not only as the clear
adoption of the dynamic EU acquis, but also of EU member states’ actual
practices with the aim of ‘bringing migration flows under control’ (European
Commission 1997). In this context, several issues had to be addressed.
Firstly, Czech legislation needed be harmonised with EU migration policy
(as formulated by the Directorate-Generals for Justice and Home Affairs).
Secondly, Czech institutions had to be reformed (the Alien and Border
Police, in particular). And thirdly, the EU’s pre-accession financial instru-
ment known as Phare and twinning programmes had to be implemented.
The role of the Czech Republic in the externalisation of asylum seekers
and undocumented migrants was strengthened towards the end of the
1990s (see Lavenex 2001). The ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘safe third
country’ principles were included in the Czech Refugee Act in 1999. A
more restrictive migration policy was pursued, with new legislation on the
stay of foreigners and their economic activities, towards the end of the
1990s. The Czech Republic needed ‘sufficient legal instruments to solve
the issue of foreigners who “would not pass” through the filter of the mem-
ber states of the Schengen Agreement’ (Ministerstvo vnitra 2000). The
Czech Republic’s new Foreigners Act no. 326/1999 Coll. was created at a
time when the realist policy frame prevailed in Europe (Lavenex 2001). As
already mentioned, the previous ‘liberal’ law was considered exceptional
in Europe, inefficient and unable to combat undocumented migration. In
this context, the Czech Foreigners Act of 1999 played an important role, as
it also catalogued countries considered potential basins for further irregular
activities and migration (see Moore 2004).10 In fact, it introduced the re-
quirement to apply for a long-term visa at a Czech embassy before entering
the country. This was novel, as most migrants had previously applied for a
visa/residence permit once they were already staying in the Czech
Republic. The aim of such a remote control mechanism (Guiraudon 2001)
was to limit undocumented migration into the Czech Republic and employ-
ment therein. Accordingly, in 2000, the visa regime was extended to peo-
ple from Ukraine, Russia and other countries viewed as ‘problematic’.
Remote control was meant to limit the irregular employment of migrants,
especially those from the former Soviet Union. An additional change in the
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Employment Act (no. 167/1999 Coll.) made it clear that the ideal employ-
ment of immigrants should be temporary: access to an employment permit
was restricted to a three-year maximum with a requisite one-year break be-
fore taking up a job in the Czech Republic again. This condition was, how-
ever, removed by the next amendment of Employment Act no. 155/2000
Coll.
By and large, the new Foreigners Act of 1999 reconfirmed the shift to-
wards migration control policy, which was motivated by both internal and
external factors. National sovereignty was to be reclaimed. The Foreigners
Act followed compulsive EU entry requirements and was inspired by legis-
lation passed by other countries such as Austria, Germany and France. As a
consequence of these restrictive policy matters, the number of legal migrants
entering the Czech Republic fell for the first time since the early 1990s.
The new Foreigners Act, however, also established a new group of im-
migrants who were granted the right to permanent settlement. It introduced
the possibility of transferring from a long-term to a permanent residence
status after a ten-year minimum stay in the country;11 access to permanent
residence was thus not excluded in cases of family reunification and other
particular cases. Before this linkage, ‘“long-term” […] and “permanent” re-
sidency were two separate and unconnected streams’ (Baršová & Barša
2005: 223).
Not being able to legalise one’s stay – for example, converting from a
tourist visa to a permanent visa due to economic reasons – was established
by the 1999 Foreigners Act. It substantially affected Czech refugee policy.
For some undocumented migrants present in the country, the only way to
legalise their stay consisted of appealing for asylum. The ‘abuse’ of the re-
fugee system, in turn, led to imposed restrictions in the Czech Refugee
Act. Before then, however, the effects of the Foreigners Act could be seen
in increased asylum applications, for example, from Ukraine (94 in 1999
compared to 1,145 in 2000).
Immigrant policies became a new activity for the Ministry of Interior in
1999. Before that, the Council of Europe inspired a National Round Table
on Relations among Communities in 1998. A Commission of the Ministry
of Interior was established to deal with the Integration of Foreigners and
with Relations among Communities, and a grant scheme was introduced to
support the activities of NGOs working in this area. In 2001, the
Foreigners Act of 1999 – namely, passages of the law concerning immi-
grants’ rights – was amended in line with critiques from different national
NGOs, the government’s human rights commissioner and the media. One
aspect of the 1999 act that was criticised was its intrinsic promulgation of
tabula rasa: any period of residence prior to the passing of the act was ex-
cluded from the requisite ten years for achieving permanent residence sta-
tus. This idea was eventually rejected, as the 2001 amendment of the
Foreigners Act reflects.
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3.2 Actors
The basic structural division of responsibilities was set up almost immedi-
ately after the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Among the ministries in charge, the
decisive role has always belonged to the Ministry of Interior and its sub-
ordinate bodies, e.g. the Alien and Border Police. This ministry acquired
its authority under the 1990 Refugee Act12 (in force as of 1 January 1991),
which was the first act to establish an asylum system in Czechoslovakia.
The Ministry of Interior founded a special refugee department, though
authority to grant or withdraw refugee status was transferred to the Alien
and Border Service of the federal police force.13 This model was also ap-
plied in other parts of migration administration: the Alien Police, as part of
the police force, grants entry and residence permits, while civilian depart-
ments of the Ministry of Interior handle the conceptual and legislative
work. The division of power between the two bodies has lasted though,
during the past fifteen years, the ministry has gradually come to take over
some of the police’s decision-making authority. At the same time, the
Directorate of the Alien and Border Police exercises a strong informal in-
fluence on the legislation.
Apart from the Ministry of Interior, three other ministries have had a
strong say in regulations concerning migration issues. The main points of
governmental migration policy have circulated among these. Firstly, the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is in charge of employment policy,
and in the new 1991 Act on Employment, its Labour Offices were given
the power to decide both on work permits for foreign employees and re-
cruitment permits for employers. Secondly, the Ministry of Industry and
Trade has authority with regards to the commercial activities of immi-
grants. The local trade offices, which issue trade licenses, are subordinated
to this ministry. Two newly passed acts on commercial activity in 1992
have enabled foreigners to pursue commercial activity either on the
grounds of a trade license issued almost automatically by the trade offices
or through a business company registered in the commercial register run
by the judiciary. The third main governmental stakeholder is the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, which is in charge of consular policy. Other state-con-
trolled or administrative institutions include: customs offices, financial of-
fices, social security offices and branches of the Czech Trade Inspectorate.
At the level of ministries, there has been one substantial change in the
division of authority since 1989. In 2003-2004, the field of foreigners’ in-
tegration was taken away from the Ministry of Interior and given to the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. This measure temporarily strength-
ened the latter’s position vis-à-vis the former’s, as did the initiative taken
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in designing an active immi-
gration policy (the aforementioned pilot project for the Selection of
Qualified Foreign Workers). The project, along with granting authority
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over immigrant policy coordination to the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs, was described in terms of a diversification of viewpoints on immi-
gration. The security perspective was to be partly replaced or complemen-
ted by social and economic aspects (see Baršová & Barša 2005; Drbohlav
2004).
There was, however, another change at the governmental level worth
mentioning. The end of the 1990s marked a strengthening of the human
rights’ dimension in Czech migration policy. Whereas the right-wing gov-
ernments in power until 1998 were seen as paying less attention to the pro-
tection of human rights, the new Social Democratic cabinet decided to cre-
ate three human rights bodies that were not only interconnected in terms of
the themes they addressed, but also shared personnel. The first was the
Governmental Human Rights Representative, followed by a special
Department for Human Rights subordinated to the Prime Minister’s office
as its staff and, lastly, the Council of the Government of the Czech
Republic for Human Rights, which comprises representatives of human
rights NGOs and is composed of several specialised committees. This
reform also established a certain institutional basis for the protection of mi-
grants’ rights.14 The second important human rights institution to be cre-
ated was the Public Defender of Rights (i.e. an ombudsman) with offices
set up in Brno in 2001. The Public Defender of Rights is authorised to
monitor functioning of the state administration and to collect information
on behalf of individual complaints; oversight of the police agenda of for-
eigners’ entry and residence is included here, too. The ombudsman himself
is a former judge. A significant portion of his recruited staff are previous
employees of human rights organisations. For the sake of migration policy,
it is crucial for the ombudsman to have the right to participate in internal
governmental legislative procedure and therefore be able to comment on
drafts of acts. Together these institutions have contributed – from the hu-
man rights standpoint – to gradual improvements in migrants’ rights and to
a slightly more positive view of migration on the whole.
Though the judiciary had only played a minor role in migration policy-
making, lately its role has grown. It can intervene in migration policy and
in the field of administrative and constitutional jurisdiction. During the
1990s, the impact of the judicial review of the state’s administrative acts
(mainly those of the police and the Ministry of Interior) was rather modest,
with only slight corrections to administrative practice in asylum matters
and with regards to decisions on administrative expulsions of foreigners.15
Its greatest effects on migration legislation appear to pertain to two sen-
tences passed by the Constitutional Court in 1998. The first judgement
abolished the legal provision, which allowed for excessively wide grounds
for implementing an administrative expulsion. The second one forbade the
exclusion of some of these decisions from court review. The practical im-
pact of these verdicts was predominantly greater precision in the terms of
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provisions on expulsion in the 1999 Foreigners Act. The role of the judi-
ciary started to grow, however, after the Supreme Administrative Court
was established in 2003. First and foremost, this specialised court is more
innovative and progressive (e.g. in naturalisation matters), and its work has
gained much more respect than that of the Regional and Upper Courts be-
fore it. At the same time, the Supreme Administrative Court has been exer-
cising influence on the legislation itself, partly by direct lobbying (in 2005,
the president of the court himself initiated a restriction on asylum seekers’
access to judicial review in the second instance, which was justified by the
high number of asylum cases in that time) and partly by statements from
some judges in the academic sphere. As for judicial review in general, its
influence is limited by the fact that only a few foreigners actually bring
their cases to court as they cannot afford to wait for a court decision and
are therefore forced to comply with bureaucratic requirements (even if they
are not based on law). Nevertheless, one can assume that the potential
threat of a judicial review has prevented major extremes in state
administration.
In the general Czech context, NGOs developed firstly as refugee-assist-
ing organisations supported by UNHCR, and only subsequently as organi-
sations assisting other groups of migrants. Some are tied to the migration
policy process and implementation through various committees, and par-
take in formal and informal cooperation with governmental and other
bodies. By means of subsidies, some of the NGOs have closer links with
the Ministry of Interior or refugee facilities administration, and have played
more of a service-provider role than performing advocacy work
(Szczepaniková 2008). In general, the various ministerial departments have
found it useful to engage in cooperation with NGOs when seeking practical
information, such as partners claiming to represent migrants, the mobilisa-
tion of external supporters for specific policies or the aforementioned ser-
vice providers. Attempts to build an umbrella organisation of migrant-re-
lated NGOs have generally failed. EU entry brought major changes for
NGOs in terms of financing and cooperation with European partners. Only
a few NGOs have had the capacity, resources or interest to follow the de-
velopments in European-wide migration policy and legislation – being,
above all, those organisations that manage to network more effectively at
the European level.
4 Migration policymaking in the contemporary Czech
Republic
After the first legal steps were taken towards creating a migration policy,
in the early 2000s the predominant ‘security perspective’ of Czech migra-
tion policy began to change (Drbohlav 2004; Baršová & Barša 2005).
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Alternative views on migration emerged within state administration. On
top of the human rights case, a utilitarian argument appeared. The latter fa-
voured immigration to minimise the consequences of population ageing
and the decline in birth rates throughout the country. In 2003, the basic
‘Principles of policy in the area of migration of foreigners’ formulated by
the Czech government stated among its major aims not only that of com-
bating undocumented migration, but emphasising how migration might be
beneficial to the Czech state and society at large. The Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs initiated a permanent selective immigration pilot recruit-
ment programme in 2001 (Resolution no. 975 of the Czech Government,
26 September 2001). Although the Czech Republic never applied a ‘zero
immigration policy’, the decision to institute such a project partly reflects a
general call in the EU to end the zero immigration policy and to introduce
selective systems of immigration (see Hansen 2005). Arguments used to
support establishment of the project included the notion of a future demo-
graphic crisis16 as well as of shortages on the labour market. The pro-
gramme run by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was inspired by
the Quebec point system and was intended to encourage the settlement of
migrants. This selective skilled immigration programme brought only a
minimal number of migrants to the Czech Republic, though, at the same
time, it became a symbol in the media for governmental acceptance of la-
bour immigration.
It should be noted that there had been substantial demand for labour im-
migration within the domestic market (especially in booming areas such as
Prague and Mladá Boleslav), which was deemed unable to satisfy employ-
ers and investors. The demand not only for skilled workers, but also (and
mainly) for manual and low-skilled labour, was justified by Czech labour
offices’ concern over the ‘social welfare system not offering sufficient mo-
tivation’ for unemployed Czechs to seek work (Jíchová 2005). Later on,
especially, the centre-right-wing coalition government in power from 2006
until 2009 used migrant economic activity and decreasing unemployment
(up until 2008) as arguments to legitimise reform of the social welfare sys-
tem; this, they believed, would ‘motivate [unemployed Czechs] to accept
jobs’ (Nečas 2008).
At the same time, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs lost control
over the habit of alleged company co-owners working as employees (see
the Employment Act 435/2004). This was connected to the fact that
Labour Offices could only control the issuing and functioning of work per-
mits, and yet there were other legal forms through which legal labour mi-
gration was occurring. Since the second half of the 1990s, there have been
critiques of incoherent Czech migration policy (see e.g. Drbohlav 2004).
Such inconsistencies, however, seem to have been caused by more than
simple lack of coordination between different ministries. Conflicts arose
between the unrestricted freedom of business and the protection of Czech
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citizens on the labour market. According to some views, the Ministry of
Industry and Trade advocated the former, while the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs advocated the latter. The economic boom following the
country’s entry into the EU led to a decrease in the rate of unemployment
and greater employer demands for the importation of labour. The political
decision to open the labour market to Bulgarian and Romanian citizens fol-
lowing the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU was relatively
unproblematic.
The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004, which created a privileged
category of EU migrants. There were no reciprocal restrictions implemen-
ted on citizens of EU countries where access to Czech citizens was denied.
On the other hand, the category of ‘third-country nationals’ was created.
However, as noted in the previous section, this was a gradual process.
Both in the public’s perception and in the actual practices of the Alien and
Border Police, there was another category of migrant: the privileged,
mainly unproblematic group of ‘Westerners’. This category has included
not only EU citizens but also, for example, US citizens whose often undo-
cumented residence did not concern the authorities, unlike that of other
groups of migrants. At the same time, it should be noted that the non-ac-
ceptability of migrants from certain countries was evolving. While in mi-
gration policy ‘management’ and plans, immigration from Ukraine,
Belarus and other countries of the former Soviet Union evidently became
acceptable or even welcome (see e.g. the inclusion of Ukraine among the
countries accepted by the pilot recruitment programme discussed in section
4), immigration from Arab (i.e. Muslim)17 countries was not met with open
arms.
In 2004, responsibility for the coordination of immigrant policies passed
from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,
reflecting the socio-economic dimension of the integration process and a
shift in the Czech migration policy paradigm. Work continued on the for-
malised concept of integration policy that was being updated and reviewed
yearly. Stress has been put on the gradual acquisition of rights by migrants
as well as on the acquisition of Czech language and basic civic knowl-
edge18 (Baršová & Barša 2005). This reflected trends in the EU regarding
the role of migrants in the ‘two-way integration process’ (Hansen 2005).
Language testing in order to obtain permanent residency status became ob-
ligatory at the beginning of 2009. Different actors from the state adminis-
tration, NGOs and others have reached a consensus on a need to promote
knowledge of the language. Meanwhile, there have also been debates be-
tween the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of
Interior regarding timing, as the former wished to postpone implementation
of the exams to a date later than originally proposed by the latter.
In 2008, the coordination of state immigrant policies returned back to
the Ministry of Interior, from which it was originally transferred to the
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Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Firstly, transfer of authority in this
field reflected the eventual marginalisation of immigrant policy issues
within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.19 Secondly, there was in-
terest on the part of the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Asylum and
Migration Policy to better interconnect immigration and immigrant policy.
This need was subsequently explained by growing immigration, tensions
arising in some urban areas with a high number of foreign manual
labourers, especially in the automobile industry, and a need to change the
integration strategy (Ministerstvo vnitra 2009). This led to the weakening
role of NGOs, which had been a more important partner in the field of im-
migrant policy when the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was respon-
sible for its coordination. The Ministry of Interior deemed NGOs incapable
of solving the situation caused by the recent wave of labour immigration.
Thirdly, this transfer of authority over immigrant policies to the
Department of Asylum and Migration also underscored a greater strategy
of bringing tasks previously done by different administrative bodies under
the auspices of one department. This may eventually lead to the creation of
one administrative body that will be responsible for migration issues, a
matter that has been continually put on the table (Baršová & Barša 2005).
The integration of the Czech Republic into the Schengen Area and the
(gradual) abolition of external borders as of December 2007 represented an-
other turning point in migration policy. The notions of borders and national
sovereignty were transformed. Four ‘zones’ of border control were formed:
the EU’s external border, countries of emigration and transit, international
cooperation and the territory of the Czech Republic itself. The National
Plan for Integrated Border Management also foresaw creation of the
Analytical Centre for Border Protection and Migration, which is a perma-
nent body comprising representatives of different ministries (Ministerstvo
vnitra 2008).
4.1 Legal provisions and actors
Following the Foreigners Act no. 326/1999 Coll. has been a number of
major and minor amendments. Most have aimed to harmonise Czech pol-
icy with the current EU acquis as well as respond to developments in mi-
gration processes and policy gaps. The need to harmonise legislation be-
fore and after the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU produced a consider-
able amount of work for the high-level Czech administration dealing with
migration policies (Baršová & Barša 2005). Migration policies have often
been characterised by Czech migration scholars as ‘mainly EU-driven’ and
mostly influenced by high-level bureaucrats (Drbohlav 2005; Baršová &
Barša 2005).
The transposition of European Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the
right to family reunification and Council Directive 2003/109/EC,
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concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term resi-
dents had far-reaching consequences. These directives substantially
enhanced the rights of migrants and limited national sovereignty over the
permanent settlement of immigrants in the country. Family reunification
was to be newly understood as a ‘right’. The previous requirement of a
ten-year stay to qualify for a permanent residence permit was reduced to
five years. What’s more, the status of permanent residency became even
more secure: it is more difficult than ever before to deport immigrants with
such status. This was a major change when compared to the original
Foreigners Act no. 326/1999 Coll., which tried to limit access to perma-
nent residence by discounting the period of residence prior to the passing
of the act. In general, preparation and application of these acts (no. 428/
2005 Coll. and no. 161/2006 Coll.) in Czech Parliament did not provoke
much debate.20 The affair was described as yet another ‘primacy of law
over politics: thanks to EU accession there has been a forceful transposi-
tion of the EC/EU legislature on a priority basis, without taking into ac-
count the overall direction and coherence of Czech migration and immigra-
tion policies’ (Baršová & Barša 2005: 224).
The main debates over the creation of new acts among various govern-
mental and non-governmental actors mostly took place before these acts
entered the Parliament. This may be termed ‘closed-door’ policymaking
done by civil servants and experts. In this process, a number of viewpoints
played a role, notably those of security, labour market needs and human
rights. Security concerns, however, changed in the post-2001 period. For
example, the Security Information Service became a more active partici-
pant in the discussion of migration issues (e.g. within the committee of the
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on Irregular Migration) and propos-
ing legislative changes.
Migration matters have not been politicised in the sense that Parliament
has not had a major role in detailed discussions on the Foreigners and
Asylum Acts. There is only one committee, the Security Committee (for-
merly the Security and Defence Committee), specialised in migration mat-
ters. This low level of politicisation also shows that political parties have
had neither extremely divergent nor clear views on migration. And since
1998, no extreme-right-wing party has managed to achieve the 5 per cent
quota required to enter Parliament. There has been no extensive parliamen-
tary debate, partly due to migration matters not being a political priority
and partly due to the fact that the Foreigners Act has become too complex
to understand.21
High-level bureaucrats from the ministries, the Public Defender of
Rights, the Representative of the Governmental Council for Human Rights,
NGOs and other institutions have all gotten used to this closed-door policy.
During the preparation of bills within the state administration, there has
usually been space for compromises, which has made it possible to accept
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this approach to migration policymaking; at the same time, NGOs, the
Public Defender of Rights or other actors still try to promote some changes
to legislation in Parliament. There has been an understanding among NGO
workers and policy analysts that a higher politicisation of migration issues
might harm migrants. This consensus on the closed-door policy was, how-
ever, broken in 2007 during parliamentary debates on the amendments of
the Foreigners Act (no. 379/2007 Coll.). A coalition of NGOs refused to
accept the compromises that were made and the reasoning behind some re-
strictive changes proposed by the Ministry of Interior.22
Apart from the aforementioned security and human rights concerns, the
most important issues in migration policy regard growing labour shortages,
the bureaucratic procedures involved in organising legal employment of
migrants from third countries and ways of organising labour migration.23
New actors have appeared (or old actors have become more visible).
CzechInvest, a governmental agency encouraging investment in the Czech
Republic, set up a working group on migration, discussing more flexible
access to foreign labour force that would respond to the immediate and
long-term shortages on the Czech labour market. On several occasions,
CzechInvest asked the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to create a list
of professions in which there were shortages, which could eventually lead
to a specific policy for these professions. Although unsuccessful, similar
ideas have been presented at the Ministry of Industry and Trade due to
pressure from employers and businesses claiming labour shortages. Thus
emerging was the policy known as ‘Green cards – parametric model for
the Czech Republic’.
As mentioned, high-level bureaucrats have been influential in migration
policymaking in the Czech Republic. This is still the case, though becom-
ing more significant is the role of employers and their associations – these
groups being the catalyst for legislative changes related to the green card
(Act no. 382/2008 Coll.). This corresponds to the convergence of the
Czech Republic and other Central Europe states towards externally or-
iented competition states (Drahokoupil 2009). Towards the end of the
1990s, externally oriented economic strategies favouring foreign direct in-
vestment began winning over the once internally oriented ideas of econom-
ic development in the Czech Republic. As part of the rising competition
state, various social and economic policies have been ‘(to different extents)
subordinated to the competitiveness agenda’ (Drahokoupil 2008: 177). The
2008 legislative amendments that liberalised some areas of migrant em-
ployment attest to partial subordination of labour migration policies vis-à-
vis the competitiveness agenda. A motto of one of the new policies was
defined in 2007 as follows: ‘We do not want a situation in which business-
men leave; rather, we want the labour force to come to them.’
(Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu 2007: 9). EU-level proposals allowing
skilled immigration from non-EU countries (e.g. via the ‘blue cards’
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scheme) have not accommodated the local demands for manual and skilled
labour that correspond to Fordist-style industrialisation.
5 Conclusions
Along with other authors, we could claim that integrating into the EU and
the high-profile migration issues occurring throughout the 1990s across
Western Europe played a significant role in the history of Czech migration
policy development. Such policies would not otherwise have been forma-
lised so quickly, or would have altogether developed differently. As part of
EU entry regulations, the Czech Republic has accepted the (ever-changing)
EU acquis in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. Czech clerks have ta-
ken part in twinning programmes, as well as formal and informal meetings
with colleagues from other EU member states or staff from the European
Commission. Facing an abundance of preparatory activities for EU entry
and a lack of local political leadership in the area of migration, the Czech
administration believed for some time that translating EU legislature and
practices into the Czech context would in fact lead to the creation of a na-
tional ‘migration policy’. This, however, has proved wrong. These high-le-
vel administrators also discovered that there was no clear EU migration
policy. It should also be mentioned that, with no clear priorities or con-
tents, Czech migration policy was rather flexible. This led to acceptance of
the EU acquis without conflicts, for example, over its effects on national
sovereignty (Baršová & Barša 2005).
Nevertheless, there have been some dynamic developments in migration
policymaking and immigration in the years following the Czech Republic’s
entry into the EU. This was caused mostly by a restructuring of the Czech
state in the international economy, which tied labour migration to the dis-
course of competitiveness. The liberalisations, as exemplified by amend-
ments to the Foreigners and Employment Acts since the beginning of
2009, should not, however, be seen as structured only by the rise of the
competitive state. Security concerns of the state administration influenced
the concrete realisation of the law. In other Central and Eastern European
countries that have converged to a similar kind of competitive state as the
Czech Republic (Drahokoupil 2009), liberalisation of migration policies
has also been realised to some extent. The impact of the international eco-
nomic crisis has, however, slowed down the opening of labour markets to
non-EU migrant labour. In the long term, one can expect to observe the
continued impact of foreign direct investment on labour immigration.
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Notes
1 We thank the Open Society Fund Prague for its financial support in creating this
chapter, as well as Maren Borkert for her comments.
2 One exception would be Slovak Roma whose migration to the Czech lands has been
considered problematic by parts of local and national Czech authorities. This is
being monitored by the Czech Ministry of Interior.
3 If one considers criminal offence statistics an indicator of the presence of foreigners
on Czech territory, 2008 saw criminal prosecutions against 1,475 Slovak citizens
and 536 against Ukrainian citizens (http://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci.nsf/t/
F20047486C/$File/c08t01.pdf). This might lead to the conclusion that there is
likely a significantly higher number of Slovak citizens than Ukrainian citizens living
on the territory.
4 The authors of this chapter have also been involved in the migration policymaking
process in the capacity of employees of NGOs.
5 Act no. 68/1965 Coll. and the implementing regulation no. 69/1965 Coll.
6 Their return was justified not only on ethnic grounds, but also ecological problems
(caused by the Chernobyl disaster) as well as political and economic instability.
7 This particular permit was abolished as of 1 January 2009.
8 In 1996, the mayor of Prague met with the Minister of Interior and the police chief
to ask for a stricter approach on undocumented migrants in Prague due to rising le-
vels of crime. The possibility of introducing visas for people from a number of coun-
tries was discussed (MF Dnes 1996a).
9 This is the Czech body that administers residence permits.
10 1One such example concerns the so-called border cards that only citizens of specific
countries were supposed to fill in at the country’s points of entry and exit.
11 The first concept of the new law in 1996 suggested this period should be fifteen
years because, only after this length of time, could it ‘be judged whether [the for-
eigner] is able to integrate into society’, as the substantiating report to the act states.
12 Act no. 498/1990 Coll.
13 The department has been known by this name since 1994; it is headed by a
directorate.
14 Up until 1998, there was only a small human rights department in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
15 Up until the 1999 Foreigners Act, most decisions were excluded from judicial
review.
16 This argument was criticised by Czech demographers and stopped being widely
used.
17 See, for example, the statement by the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs regard-
ing a green card scheme and the possible exclusion of Muslims (Lidove´ noviny
2007).
18 Tests of Czech language skills are planned in the context of acquiring permanent re-
sidency status.
19 Head of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs’ Department of Migration and
Integration was not officially appointed for a few years following the former head’s
departure for a job in the European Commission.
20 Barsˇova´ and Barsˇa (2005) are critical in saying that the ‘easiest way to implement’
the EU directive on long-term residents was the one chosen.
21 The Foreigners Act has become especially complex due to numerous revisions,
mostly provoked by EU legislative changes and their casuistic nature.
22 For example, the coalition of NGOs disagreed with amendments to policy on mixed
marriages and asylum procedures at airports.
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23 There have been critiques of the so-called client system. The ‘clients’ are part of a
system organising labour immigration from Ukraine, Moldova and other countries
(particularly from the Commonwealth of Independent States), to the Czech
Republic. The clients are intermediaries, i.e. clients of the mafia. The workers in-
volved in the client system get full service (employment, housing, possibly a resi-
dence permit, etc.) and protection. Czech employers in construction and other sec-
tors of economy have relied on a ready-made supply of migrant workers for whom
they take no responsibility (see e.g. Cˇernı´k 2006).
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10 The case of Poland
Anna Kicinger and Izabela Koryś
1 Introduction1
The Cold War’s division of Europe impacted forms and directions of mi-
gratory movements on the continent. For both ideological and economic
reasons, Poland was excluded from the modernisation process that occa-
sioned mass immigration to Europe starting in the 1960s. As a result, the
country did not experience rapid inflows; nor did it experience its conse-
quences, such as the politicisation of migration issues.
After the collapse of Communism and the dismantling of the whole
Soviet Bloc, a rapid process of transformation started in Central European
countries, affecting the majority of political and economic spheres of life.
The highly developed countries of Western Europe emerged as a primary
reference point for the changes. Many institutions and measures designed
in the West in response to the immigration phenomenon were transposed
to Poland during the process of harmonisation with the EU. This led to a
paradox: attempting to create migration policy before there was a real need
for it, in terms of immigrant numbers.
That Poland needed a proactive migration policy (see Iglicka 2003) was
actually a view transferred from the West along with other migration-
related concepts. The opinion soon gathered much support, mainly among
NGOs and within some academic circles. As such, examples based on ex-
periences of Western countries have often been the only legitimising argu-
ment in favour of the policy changes postulated by migration experts.
At the same time, institutions facilitating or blocking emigration had ex-
isted in Poland since its reestablishment in 1918. This element of migration
policy ‘officially’ disappeared from migration policy discourse as well as
highly publicised government initiatives after 1989. This runs counter to
the fact that it is emigration – not immigration – that should be an issue in
Polish migration policy, given the discrepancies in the scale of the coun-
try’s outflows and inflows. It was only the huge post-accession outflow
that brought emigration back into the political and public debates.
2 A history of migration: From sole emigration to emigration
and immigration
Until recently, migratory flows in Poland have predominantly concerned
the outflow of Polish nationals. Politically motivated emigration dates back
to the end of the eighteenth century when waves of political refugees left
Poland due to the country’s partition, followed by uprisings for indepen-
dence carried over into the nineteenth century. At the same time, the first
half of the nineteenth century witnessed the beginning of economically
motivated emigration from Polish lands both to European countries –
mainly Germany – and overseas, with the Americas as the main destination
(Pilch 1984).
The restoration of an independent Polish state in 1918 did not stop these
large emigration movements. Polish settlers continued to head for the
longed-for yet increasingly difficult destination of the United States,
Canada and South America, as well as many European countries for more
temporary periods (France, Belgium and Latvia) or seasonal stays
(Germany). Consequently, the total population lost to emigration in the in-
terwar era exceeded one million (Janowska 1981).
After the population losses of World War II and the post-war population
and territorial shifts, which resulted in the forced uprooting of millions of
Central Europeans, Communist Poland dissociated itself from migratory
movements. Migration was associated with ‘capitalist’ regimes, a result of
the capitalist-bred inequalities in societies. Yet, Communist attempts to
close off Poland were not successful. Significant numbers emigrated from
Poland via ethnic channels, mainly people claiming German origin and
Jews. Furthermore, the gradual liberalisation of exit rules enabled Poles to
participate fairly actively, albeit mostly in an irregular way, in European
migratory flows during the 1980s (see Jaźwińska & Okólski 2003).
Inflows to Poland under Communist rule were sparse. The post-war
waves of repatriation and returns left many Poles abroad. Repatriation from
the East was stopped due to the political dictate of the Soviet Union, while
many Poles in the West chose to emigrate rather than return to a
Communist country (Kersten 1968). Immigrants were not attracted to
Poland because of the harsh conditions of its socialist economy as well as
its oppressive political system. The exception was student exchanges with-
in the Communist Bloc, which led to the beginning of a Vietnamese dia-
spora in Poland. Communist Poland also had some early, albeit limited,
inflows of political refugees from Greece between 1948-1956 and Chile
after 1973 (Florczak 2003).
To recapitulate, by the end of the Communist period, Poland had hardly
any inflows of foreigners, but its emigration record was active. The
changes that followed the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern
Europe resulted in a radical shift in mobility patterns and placed Poland in
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a new migratory position. Once being purely an emigration country,
Poland started to receive its first transitory migrants, followed by modest
numbers of asylum seekers, until immigrants finally began heading for
Poland itself.
Official immigration figures after 1989 are not high, especially in com-
parison with those of Western countries. According to official statistics, for
the years 1990-2006, officially registered emigration (399,700), outnum-
bered immigration (125,200) by 274,500, and Poland remained predomi-
nately an emigration country (CSO data cited in Kępińska 2007). At the
same time, according to some estimates, foreign workers from the East,
mostly Ukrainians, actually number up to several hundred thousand, being
illegally employed in seasonal or temporary jobs in agriculture, construc-
tion, care-giving and domestic service.
Apart from its new role as a transit and destination country in interna-
tional migratory flows, Poland maintained its old role as a sending country
in European flows. Apart from officially registered permanent emigrants,
Poles joined the more temporary migratory flows. Since the 1990s, Polish
seasonal workers in Germany have represented a significant part of migra-
tory outflows thanks to a bilateral government agreement. Flows gradually
increased, reaching over 290,000 a year in 2003 (Kaczmarczyk 2005). EU
accession heralded a new wave of emigration from Poland. The UK and
Ireland, which opened their labour markets to nationals from new member
states, increased in importance as new destination countries, attracting
much of the post-accession outflow to reach over 1,100 000 persons
(Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009).
Summing up, after 1990, the migration situation in Poland changed sig-
nificantly. New forms of immigration and transit migration emerged
though, at the same time, outflows remained considerable. They have al-
ways exceeded inflows, both in reality and in official statistics.
3 Polish migration policy: Historical background and
development after 1989
Similar to other countries, Poland’s migratory flows have been affected by
predominant factors shaping the emergence and evolution of the state’s at-
titude towards both the international mobility of its citizens and the inflow
of foreigners. The historically shaped vision of the nation and the tradition
of large outflows contributed to Polish migration policy being established
foremost as an emigration policy; emigration was regarded as a necessary
evil in the agrarian Polish economy of the interwar period. Framing the
outflow of nationals in terms of ‘bleeding from the vessels’ (Jarzyna 1933)
but also as a ‘safety valve’ (Głąbiński 1931) that could reduce tension in
overpopulated rural areas, migration policy focused on enabling the
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emigration of Poles and optimally protecting emigrants’ rights (see
Janowska 1981; Kicinger 2005). Throughout the interwar period (1918-
1939), the issues of emigration and the return of Poles thereby dominated
public and political migration debates as well as actual policymaking.
Parallel to emigration regulations, the country established the founda-
tions of Polish nationality law. The first law on Polish citizenship was
passed in the 1920s, and introduced many legal concepts that long re-
mained in subsequent Polish nationality legislation.2 The law covered the
prohibition of dual citizenship and introduced strict criteria for
naturalisation.3
The inflow of foreigners was negligible during the interwar period, yet
the country issued its first, rather restrictive regulations on their entry and
stay in Poland. Rules limiting the sale of land to foreigners were also es-
tablished as far back as the 1920s,4 and this laid the foundations for the
general philosophy of these regulations, which remained unchanged until
the end of century. The precarious geopolitical position of interwar Poland
accounts for this restrictive approach. The newly resurrected state – with
its pressing, unsolved problems of ethnic minorities and faced with
Communist enemy ideology spreading in the East (perceived as the ‘red
blight’) and German revisionism in the West – had no interest in inviting
foreigners in.
Poland, economically and politically backward due to its partition in the
nineteenth century, was a peripheral sending country in European and
world migration flows. This was illustrated by the obvious duality of mi-
gration policy in interwar Poland. The main focus of the policy was emi-
gration issues and the return of Poles. The policy regarding foreigners was
definitely of minor importance.
The Communist iron curtain artificially halted labour migratory outflows
from Central European countries. Yet, the one-sided migration policy, with
its predominant focus on emigration, was maintained during the
Communist rule that characterised the People’s Republic of Poland – in
Polish, the Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (PRL). The core of state policy
was regulating the mobility of Polish citizens, with little interest paid to
the negligible inflow of foreigners. Migration policy came to reflect the po-
litical and ideological agenda behind it. The early Communist decades
were characterised by the state’s totalitarian attempts to ‘close off’ Poland
with severe repressive measures. Arbitrary rulings regarding who could
leave (for either permanent or short stays abroad) characterised the state’s
attitude towards migration, especially in the early decades of the PRL
(Stola 2010). Yet, the state’s efforts to keep its citizens within the bound-
aries of ‘socialist heaven’ were bound to fail. Severe deficiencies of the so-
cialist economy, as well as the oppressiveness of the political system,
prompted many thousands of Poles to undertake permanent or temporary
emigration – both legal and illegal.
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At the same time, development of policy on foreigners was seriously
hampered by the lack of immigrant inflows to Poland. A systemic distrust
of foreigners in the early Communist regime gradually evolved into a more
open approach, especially towards citizens of friendly socialist countries.
An international exchange of labour and students among the brotherhood
of socialist economies was seen as a means to help developing countries
such as Libya, Cuba and Vietnam in their efforts to build a socialist re-
gime. The first comprehensive regulation on foreigners, the Act on Aliens
of 1963, corresponded to the reality of the negligible inflow of foreigners,
having been designed mostly to control these incomers.5
After 1989, traces of the dual nature of migration policy and policymak-
ing also became evident. A distinction could be drawn between policy ad-
dressing co-ethnics (which replaced the former restrictive exit policy) and
policy towards foreigners, as developed in both interwar Poland and the
PRL. Yet relations between the two components of migration policy were
inverted, alongside the changing migratory situation of Poland and the in-
creasing influence of Western migration policy agendas. Mimicking
Western patterns, the policy towards foreigners became a crucial part of
Polish migration policy after 1989 and dominated migration policy content.
As in the West, migration and immigration policy became synonymous,
shaping research and the policymaking process. For the first time in mod-
ern history, the policy regarding co-ethnics played a secondary role.
The policy towards foreigners initially developed around questions of
border control. This was not a surprise considering the increasingly mobile
society and security concerns resulting from real or potential risks con-
nected to this increased international mobility through Polish borders
(Anioł 1995). Within this policy, more and more often perceived and
termed as Polish migration policy, several subfields emerged, with refugee
policy being the first one to develop.
The encounter with world refugee movements resulted in the establish-
ment and gradual evolution of refugee policy. The first changes in Polish
law resulted from the adoption of the Geneva Convention and the New
York Protocol in the beginning of the 1990s. The changes opened up in-
flow channels for asylum seekers, many of whom were headed for the
West while treating Poland as a transit country. The refugee policy gradu-
ally evolved, being affected firstly by Western influences, then by those of
the EU. The 1997 Act on Aliens brought concepts such as ‘safe third coun-
try’, ‘safe country of origin’, ‘manifestly unfounded application’ and ‘ac-
celerated procedure’ into Polish legislation. All were introduced earlier in
Western countries in an effort to curb inflows of asylum seekers.6 The new
Constitution, finally adopted in 1997, guaranteed the right to asylum and
to apply for refugee status with reference to implementing laws and inter-
national agreements (article 56). Subsequent changes were brought about
by the 2001 amendment to the Act on Aliens that had been implemented
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during negotiations on Polish EU membership and bore much more EU in-
fluence than previous regulations.7 The amendment institutionalised tem-
porary protection to Polish law, drawing on European experience with
inflows of refugees from the war in former Yugoslavia. And finally, 2003
saw the new Act on Granting Protection to Aliens within the Territory of
the Republic of Poland8 that introduced the permit for tolerated stay as a
new form of humanitarian protection. This new feature resembled many
European regulations regarding humanitarian protection. The aim was to
offer basic protection to unsuccessful asylum seekers who could not be re-
turned to their countries of origin on humanitarian and human rights
grounds.9 The new form was especially relevant to Chechen asylum see-
kers, who represent the vast majority of asylum applications in recent years
in Poland and, as expected, became the primary beneficiaries of the permit
for tolerated stay. Several amendments were also made to bring other forms
of protection into line with the EU acquis in the field (Kicinger 2009). In
2008, the permit for tolerated stay was to a great extent replaced by the
subsidiary protection10. All in all, the refugee policy was operating on lim-
ited numbers of asylum applications and refugees in comparison to
Western European standards, though it became the most Europeanised sub-
field of Polish migration policy (Kicinger, Weinar & Górny 2007).
Besides refugees, Poland has attracted economic immigrants seeking em-
ployment, business and trade opportunities in its changing economy.
Labour market changes and the economic transition of Central and Eastern
European economies have attracted highly skilled Western specialists and
experts, but have also launched new short-term, intensive forms of mobility
between Poland and the East, especially Ukraine. Many Ukrainians were
attracted to trade above all, and then to irregular employment, on the de-
veloping secondary labour market in Poland (see Okólski 1998a). The pol-
icy addressing labour immigration represented the state’s response to these
inflows. The policy, which was officially designed to be restrictive, proved,
in practice, to be tolerant of the irregular employment of Eastern workers
in Poland (Kicinger 2009). As early as 1989,11 a work permit procedure
for foreigners based on an evaluation of the labour market was introduced.
The labour market test, along with the costly and complicated administra-
tive procedure, represented the primary barriers to legal economic immi-
gration into Poland, especially in view of the fact that unemployment le-
vels had skyrocketed to over 18 per cent at the turn of the century.
Consequently, the numbers of work permits issued to foreigners remained
low for the whole post-1989 period, only once in 2002 reaching 20,000 a
year. The majority, especially in the early 1990s, was issued to Western
counsellors, experts and language teachers.
Yet, as previously mentioned, while the official immigration was limited,
thousands of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians found employment in
the emerging secondary labour market. They took up construction,
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agriculture, housework and care-giving services. It is worth noting that
Ukrainians and other workers from the East entered Poland legally thanks
to the non-visa and, later, short-term Polish visas; but without work per-
mits, their employment was illegal. The large groups of foreign workers
from the East could have been considered a serious policy gap in a state
suffering from severe unemployment, particularly considering its attempt
to protect the native labour force. Yet, such a gap is not as evident if the
state policy is analysed in the context of a policy of tacit tolerance towards
irregular workers from the East (Kicinger 2009). What’s more, this policy
of tolerance had a political and economic rationale. The intense social con-
tacts being bred were desirable in view of foreign policy goals, which in-
cluded developing good-neighbourly relations with the East, whereas the
economic benefits (boost in petty trade, a supply of cheap labour force)
were rather diffused and did not endanger the interests of any influential
social group.
This policy subfield was strictly connected to the liberal visa policy. The
liberal non-visa regime, practically inactive in the PRL period, was main-
tained after 1989 and resulted in the growth of a cross-border mobility that
enabled development of new forms of circular petty trade mobility. This la-
ter developed into seasonal or temporary irregular employment on the sec-
ondary labour market in Poland, concerning the nationals of Poland’s
Eastern neighbours. The visa policy was the only policy field that elicited
public debate about Polish interests during the EU accession process (see
Kaźmierkiewicz 2004). Serious concerns were raised that the EU require-
ment to introduce visas for Poland’s Eastern neighbours could be detrimen-
tal to their good-neighbourly relations and hamper economic development
of the border regions.
Demanding conditions for temporary and permanent residence permits
led to the establishment of longer-term migrants in irregular positions. The
regularisation action launched in 2003 signalled state acknowledgement of
the presence of irregular immigrants in Poland. The criteria for regularisa-
tion were a seven-year stay in Poland and proven means for living. The
main beneficiaries of regularisation, numbering less than 2,500, were mem-
bers of the Armenian and Vietnamese diaspora.
The still nascent, if not embryonic, immigrant policy subfield did finally
emerge. The low official figures, just over 52,000 immigrants according to
2002 Census data (Jaźwińska 2006), was insufficient to elicit politicians to
set up any kind of integration policy. Special integration programmes were
established only for the two relatively privileged groups of incomers: ac-
knowledged refugees and Polish repatriates. These small-scale programmes
could be a good start in terms of further development of the field in the
future.
The restrictive exit policy, the key part of migration policy up until
1989, disappeared after that year. After years of variable levels of
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restrictions on international mobility, the passport law’s final liberalisation
in 1990 seemed to spell the end of the era of emigration policy and shift
the focus of the authorities onto new questions. We claim that there was a
shift in emphasis, that emigration policy changed into policy on co-ethnics.
Three policy subfields can be distinguished within this area: the traditional
yet limited ‘emigration’ policy, the policy of close links with the Polish
diaspora and the revitalised repatriation policy. A lack of concentration of
state activities in these subfields, which can also be seen in a lack of a cen-
tral ministry or organ responsible for this set of issues, contributed to pol-
icy towards foreigners dominating migration policy content.
As Polish citizens regained the freedom to travel abroad, emigration pol-
icy – in the sense of determining who was entitled to leave – became a
thing of the past. Instead, the authorities focused on enabling Polish citi-
zens to travel without visas and to undertake gainful employment abroad.
The former goal was fulfilled in 1991 upon conclusion of an agreement
with the Schengen countries on visa-free travel. The latter came about gra-
dually in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and during negotia-
tions with the EU regarding transitional periods in the free movement of
workers.
Between 1989 and 2002, Poland signed as many as nineteen bilateral
agreements aiming to provide Polish citizens opportunities to work abroad.
Most of them concerned exchanges of trainees or seasonal workers, but the
limits for Polish workers or trainees were usually very low, ranging from
30 workers in the case of its agreement with Luxembourg, to 1,000 in its
agreement with France. Only the agreements with Germany (1990 and
1994) set no limits on the seasonal employment of Polish nationals in the
country for a period of up to three months. These agreements in fact ac-
counted for the largest legal seasonal outflows of Polish citizens, which
rose gradually throughout the 1990s (Kaczmarczyk 2005). The intergo-
vernmental agreement, a result of policy decisions by the German and
Polish governments, proved to be the most important measure to create op-
portunities for Polish nationals to take up gainful employment in EU coun-
tries even before accession. Subsequently, a similar agreement on unlimited
seasonal employment was concluded with Spain in 2002. Yet, in 2003, the
number of seasonal workers amounted to just over 10,000.
The strict accession negotiations in the context of the free movement of
people can also be seen from the point of view of emigration policy, speci-
fically state efforts to enable its citizens to work abroad (see Kicinger
2009). The freedom of movement idea, including the right to take up em-
ployment in any EU country, was perceived by Polish society as one of the
core benefits of EU membership and highlighted as such in the media. The
introduction of transition periods in this field was presented as an unavoid-
able concession given the pressure of public opinion in EU countries. In a
similar vein, post-accession work opportunities in the three countries that
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opened up their labour markets were highlighted. As in the case of bilateral
agreements, the fight to enable Polish citizens to access Western European
labour markets could be regarded as an aspect of the policy aimed at facili-
tating the outflow of workers. To recapitulate, although post-1989 Poland
did not officially have any emigration policy, the aforementioned policy
measures allow us to assume that such policy was pursued de facto.
Another subfield of policy addressing co-ethnics was the policy of repa-
triation. This was seen as the return to Poland of Polish nationals or their
descendants with a view to settling in the mother country, combined with a
privileged channel for acquiring Polish citizenship (Łodziński 1999: 314).
Those entering Poland on a repatriation visa acquired Polish citizenship as
they crossed the border. The concept of repatriation, present in the Polish
migration policy since the interwar period, is based on the assumption that
Poland is open to all people of Polish origin. Yet, under Communist re-
gime, the law remained a dead letter for decades due to political constraints
(Hut 2002). Only the political and economic transformations after 1989
attracted new repatriates to Poland. The obvious inadequacy of former reg-
ulations was overcome with the new law on aliens of 1997, which forma-
lised the repatriation procedure and the status of repatriates (Hut 2002: 48-
51).12 The separate bill on repatriation was adopted in 200013 as a result of
a general consensus of public opinion and among all political parties that
repatriation should be continued.14 Yet, the geographic scope of repatria-
tion was limited to the Asiatic republics of the former Soviet Union, thus
leaving many people of Polish origins in neighbouring countries outside
the scope of the law. Due mostly to financial constraints, the inflow of re-
patriates turned out to be almost numerically negligible in practice, with
less than 6,000 persons arriving between 1997 and 2006 (Kępińska 2007:
95), which is only a tiny fraction of other inflows to Poland.
Finally, the third subfield addressing co-ethnics after 1989 was the pol-
icy on the Polish diaspora. Like repatriation, this policy had long-standing
traditions going back to the interwar period as well as the ignominious
past. The Communist regime was characterised by spying and an infiltra-
tion of secret agents in the Polish diaspora abroad. Establishing links with
Polish nationals and the Polish diaspora abroad slowly moved up on the
political agenda, though only at the end of 1990s. The 1997 Constitution
revoked the special links with Polish nationals abroad (article 6). In 1999,
unsuccessful attempts were made to enact the act on Karta Polaka, a law
that would provide special privileges to people of Polish origin with regard
to border-crossing and the right to stay in Poland. No compromise was
reached over the scope of rights attached to this semi-citizenship status for
people of Polish origin, and doubts were raised over whether the proposal
kept in line with international law and future Schengen obligations. As a
consequence, after a year-long debate, the act never reached the vote
(Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska, Koryś & Weinar 2002: 28-29). After 2005,
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the issue did little more than move up on the legislative agenda until 2007,
when the Karta Polaka was finally passed. The most visible sign of policy
in action came in the form of scholarship that enabled students of Polish
origin to study in Poland, under the premise that these educated people
would return to their place of origin and help maintain the Polish identity
of their local communities. This assumption proved mistaken, as most of
the students chose to remain in Poland after completing their education.
Only recently, after the much-publicised outflow of Poles following EU
enlargement, did serious political debate begin on the nature, consequences
and reasons of this emigration wave. The debate heralded new policy ac-
tions addressing the issue of emigration and the protection of Polish mi-
grants abroad as well as helping them to maintain links with Poland. In
2008 a first governmental return campaign was launched. It aimed to serve
as a practical source of information for Polish migrants considering
return.15
To summarise, the restrictive exit policy of the Communist regime gra-
dually evolved into a multidimensional policy addressing co-ethnics after
1989. The policy focus here was primarily concerned with people of
Polish origin living abroad, especially Polish ethnic minorities in the East,
and resulted in reopening the possibility of repatriation as well as Karta
Polaka regulations. A pro-emigration attitude was witnessed in the state’s
efforts to enable its citizens to undertake gainful employment abroad. Only
in the post-accession period was there a revival of the idea of emigration
policy focused on protecting Polish migrants abroad. The three policy
areas, which developed slowly in reaction to past or present experience of
emigration, constituted a more Poland-focused and Poland-oriented sector
of migration policy. Yet, it was the policy towards foreigners – renamed as
migration or immigration policy – that, due to Western influences, became
more important in policy terms.
4 Migration policymaking: Policy on foreigners after 1989
Irrespective of changing coalitions and political forces, migration policy, in
both its components – addressing foreigners and co-ethnics – developed in
a gradual, extremely bureaucratic fashion (see Weinar 2006). A gradual
evolution would appear to be the most fitting way to describe the develop-
ment of policy and politics on migration. As it is hard to establish any real
turning points, both in development of migration policy and in migration
policymaking after 1989, the analysis of migration policymaking corre-
sponds to the evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, nature of changes in
Polish migration policy.
In the Polish political system established by the 1997 Constitution,
Parliament, comprising the Sejm and the Senat, represents the nation.
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Elected by a democratic voting process, Parliament remains the central
source of power, being the legislative organ able to appoint and control the
government. The government is responsible for all internal and external
policies. The executive is divided between the government and the
President. All state organs are controlled by an independent judicial sys-
tem, including the Constitutional Tribunal.
Poland’s multiparty system led to the creation of centre-left (1993-1997,
2001-2005) or centre-right coalitions (1991-1993, 1997-2001 and 2006-
2007) that have constituted the parliamentary majority-supporting the gov-
ernment. The core of the policymaking process generally takes place in the
Sejm – where the interests of pro-coalition and opposition parties are ex-
pressed and debated in plenary sessions – as well as parliamentary commit-
tees and subcommittees.
This prevailing policymaking pattern did not emerge for migration. The
government and central administration institutions formed the core of mi-
gration policy changes after 1989. The legislative authorities and courts
were involved, but it was undeniably the government that took the lead in
the policymaking process. Thus, the policymaking process itself turned out
to be gradual and bureaucratic, involving a limited number of players.
4.1 The emergence of policymaking structure in the 1990s
The Ministry of Interior came to be the primary governmental organ re-
sponsible for migration and refugee affairs. The first institutions to respond
to the new migratory challenges were developed within the Ministry of
Interior in autumn 1990. Yet, it was the Ministry of Health and Social
Assistance that first undertook actions. The small numbers of refugees who
somehow found themselves in Poland in the 1980s were assisted by the
Polish Red Cross. The problem grew in 1990 when a few hundred people,
mostly of African origin, were sent back to Poland from Sweden, despite
the lack of readmission agreement between the two countries. The Swedish
authorities were able to do this after 1989 without fearing a public outcry
over asylum seekers being sent back to a non-democratic country.
The problem soon outgrew the capacities of the regional authorities ori-
ginally assigned to handle the situation. It became obvious that responsibil-
ity for the new group of incomers had to be shifted to a central level. The
Inter-Ministerial Group for Aid to Foreign Refugees was established as the
first central body to deal with the problem (Szonert 2000). The Ministry of
Health and Social Assistance played a key role in this group whose focus
was on catering to the basic needs of refugees. Meanwhile, the Polish Red
Cross took the lead in implementation.
When Poland’s negotiations with Sweden concerning cost-sharing for
the returned asylum seekers proved unsuccessful, the Polish government
began working with UNHCR, the main global actor in refugee matters.
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The first asylum seekers, who amounted to more than 800, were relocated
from provisional camps on the coast to refugee centres near Warsaw.
Along with this relocation, policymakers realised that the situation had to
be dealt with in a more institutionalised, standardised manner than carried
out in prior ad hoc responses. The Inter-Ministerial Commission for
Refugees (which included representatives of the seven ministries) was con-
sequently established and the Ministry of Interior Plenipotentiary in
Refugee Affairs was appointed as its head (Szonert 2000). At this time, re-
fugee affairs passed to the Ministry of Interior, which had been the main
ministry responsible for migration and refugee affairs until then.
The Ministry of Interior Plenipotentiary gathered an ad hoc inter-depart-
mental group. They were to address the problems of legality as well as the
material needs of the new group of aliens, many of whom disappeared
from the refugee centres to try to make it to the West. The group developed
its activities in close collaboration with UNHCR and newly established
Polish NGO the Helsinki Foundation (Florczak 2003: 202-203).
The events that occurred in 1991 and 1992 convinced Polish policy-
makers that migratory flows were set to be a constant phenomenon in
Poland, and that a more stable institutional structure was needed. First of
all, Poland signed an agreement with the Schengen countries on visa-free
movement, combined with readmission procedures, which could have led
to increased forced returns of foreigners on the Western border. Further,
Poland decided to adopt the Geneva Convention and the New York
Protocol to formally acknowledge the legal status of people in refugee cen-
tres in Poland. Last but not least, Poland became a member of the Council
of Europe, and Polish representatives were involved in the first cooperation
fora that discussed migration and asylum issues. Polish representatives
took part in the 1991 Vienna Conference of Ministers on the movement of
people from Central and Eastern European countries. They were also in-
volved in the so-called Berlin-Budapest process launched in by the Berlin
conference in 1991 with regards to combating irregular migration (see
Anioł 1995). Taking part in the work of the Council of Europe and the EU
bodies concerned with asylum boosted the policy learning process and pol-
icy transfer from the West concerning asylum (Kicinger, Weinar & Górny
2007).
Need for a more stable institutional structure led to 1993’s creation with-
in the Ministry of Interior of the Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs,
which was renamed the Department for Migration and Refugee Affairs in
1997. All issues relating to migration, refugee status and asylum were
handled by this office, which also controlled the implementation of mea-
sures by local authorities. In particular, the department was responsible for
receiving applications and making decisions in refugee procedures, as well
as handling matters relating to the stay of refugees in Poland and their
status.
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Upon creation of the department, the Ministry of Interior strengthened
its role as the primary body overseeing refugee and migration matters.
Within the department (and earlier, the office), legislative proposals regard-
ing the new Act of Aliens were developed. These proposals were sub-
mitted as a government initiative to the Sejm and passed in 1997. It is
worth noting that ministry representatives took an active part in the work
of the parliamentary commissions preparing the new law. Subsequently, of-
ficials of the department worked on the 2001 amendment to the Act on
Aliens, which was also submitted as a government proposal to the Sejm.
The Ministry of Interior also came to supervise the Border Guard, a new
police-like body set up in 1991 to replace the former PRL armed force.
The institutional concentration of migration matters under the Ministry of
Interior undoubtedly had consequences on policy content and fostered the
import of security discourse concerning migration to Poland.
Under the 2001 amendment to the Act on Aliens,16 responsibility for re-
fugee and migration matters was defined even more sharply through crea-
tion of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens (Urząd ds. Repatriacji i
Uchodźców, URiC), renamed the Office for Foreigners in 2007. The first
central administrative institution responsible for refugee matters, repatria-
tion process and matters relating to the admission and stay of foreigners in
Poland, the URiC was intended to be ‘apolitical’ and professional. It has
served as the central body, with a technical mission, handling migration
policy and politics since 2001. Though its establishment could have been a
watershed in Poland’s migration policymaking, the crucial role of the
Ministry of Interior had not diminished. The head of the Office for
Foreigners is appointed by the Council of Ministers on the initiative of the
Ministry of Interior and is then controlled by the Ministry of Interior.
Changes following the advent of the URiC seem to be even less significant
given the fact that the office was established using staff and resources, in-
cluding buildings, from the former Department for Migration and Refugee
Affairs. On an official level, the URiC has a wide range of responsibilities,
though this is not reflected in policymaking. It is treated as a central ad-
ministrative body responsible for the implementation of policy, but not for
its creation. At the same time, the legislative tradition of the Ministry
Department was maintained, as the 2003 Act on Aliens and Act on the
Protection of Aliens on Polish Territory were again developed within the
URiC. Many of the officials who had formerly worked in the Department
for Migration and Refugee Affairs were just transferred – not in a physical
sense, as even the building remained the same – to the new central organ,
the URiC. This type of institutional change only compounded the existing
bureaucratic manner of policymaking, which was based in the realm of
high government officials away from the public eye and political debate.
The group of officials who had devised government proposals for the new
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Act on Aliens of 1997 and its subsequent amendment in 2001 continued to
work on the new acts, which were eventually passed in 2003.
The Ministry of Interior, albeit the leading body in migration policymak-
ing, is not the only ministry involved. Apart from the Ministry of Interior
and Office for Foreigners, other ministries have also been involved in parti-
cular subfields of migration policy. First of all, the Ministry of Labour and
Social Policy should be mentioned. This ministry plays a vital role in regu-
lating labour immigration to Poland and, since 2001, has been responsible
for integration programmes. The Minister of Labour and Social Policy is-
sues ordinances and prepares the legislative proposal of acts regarding the
access various groups of foreigners have to different forms of social and
health services; it also oversees regulations on the work permit system and
exemptions from work permit procedures for selected groups of foreigners.
Limited numbers of foreigners and the relatively short period of inflow
resulted in the Polish state’s lack of interest in integration matters during
the 1990s. Thus, no ministry had the funds or responsibility to handle this
issue. At the same time, the importance of integration issues in old EU
countries led to EU institutions becoming increasingly involved in integra-
tion matters. As a result, the Polish policymakers who had worked closely
with EU and national policymakers in the pre-accession era lacked the for-
mal competences to discuss, let alone present, an integration policy. It was
non-existent. In the initial phase, issues of integration were delegated to
the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE), the leading
central institution handling Polish-EU relations. Yet, as integration with the
EU developed, the need for a ministry to handle integration issues arose,
along with the need to represent Poland in various ministerial meetings at
the EU level. In 2001, the responsibility for integration issues was trans-
ferred from the UKIE to the Polish Ministry of Social Affairs and, within
it, a special department for integration issues was created. The issue of in-
tegration is a clear illustration of the EU’s influence on Polish migration
policymaking process: interaction with the EU led to institutional change
in Poland.
As already mentioned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for
the implementation of Polish visa policy. The ministry traditionally super-
vises the network of Polish embassies and consulates, the latter implement-
ing visa policy in a practical sense. The role of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in the creation of Polish visa policy was especially important, given
that visa policy was viewed as a way of fulfilling foreign policy goals.
One such goal was to develop and enhance good relations with Poland’s
Eastern neighbours, including at the society level. This resulted in main-
taining the visa-free regime with these countries after 1990 and conse-
quently allowed for the development of new temporary and circular forms
of mobility between Poland and the East.
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Clearly, the scope of visa policy was radically limited upon accession to
the EU and acceptance of its visa policy. The EU’s conditionality mechan-
ism made it impossible to reject the policy requirements, yet the date of
visa introduction was delayed as much as possible and the visa procedure
was made as smooth and pleasant as possible (Kicinger 2009).
The role of the President in migration policymaking is generally limited
except for one of the policy subfields, namely the naturalisation procedure.
According to the Constitution, the President grants Polish citizenship and
permission to renounce Polish citizenship.17 According to the Act on
Polish Citizenship, which dates back to 1962 but has undergone numerous
changes, Polish citizenship could be granted to foreigners living in Poland
for at least five years with a permanent residence permit or for at least
three years in cases of being married to a Polish citizen. However, the
President may also grant Polish citizenship to foreigners not meeting these
criteria, and he can also make the renouncement of other citizenships a
condition for naturalisation.18 No legal guarantees to acquire Polish citizen-
ship result from the naturalisation procedure as a presidential prerogative.
Under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Administrative Court, the
President’s decision or refusal to grant citizenship is not an administrative
decision and cannot be appealed in the Supreme Administrative Court
(Jagielski 2001: 26). This situation allows for discretionary decisions by
the President. In reality, numbers of naturalisations in Poland are not high,
reaching an average of 1,600 a year (for the years 2000-2008) (CSO
2009). The data available on naturalisation does not include any informa-
tion on the number of applications for – or refusals to grant – Polish citi-
zenship. This represents a serious limitation when attempting to identify
the President’s naturalisation policy. To recapitulate, the traditional vision
of the President as head of the nation seems to be the determining factor in
naturalisation policy. The recently enacted Law on Polish citizenship
(2009) de facto challenged the status quo and was turned over by the
President to the Constitutional Tribunal to see if it is complies with the
Constitution.
As the two houses of Parliament, the Sejm and the Senat represent the
central institution of power in the Polish political system. Yet, the lack of
interest in migration shown by any political parties has led to Parliament’s
role being reduced to a purely legislative one. Consequently, the involve-
ment of Parliament in migration policymaking has not corresponded to its
role in the state political system. Parliament did not offer a forum for dis-
cussion on policy goals or, for that matter, a place where interests could
clash.
Weinar’s (2006) analysis of parliamentary debates both in committees
and during the Sejm and Senat sessions clearly shows how the legislative
process in the case of the Acts on Aliens and their amendments was not po-
liticised. Subsequent legislative proposals were prepared in the Department
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for Migration and Refugee Affairs and then in the URiC, and later pre-
sented as government proposals to the Sejm. The driving force for change,
especially since negotiations with the EU began in 1998, was the need to
bring Polish law into line with the moving target of the EU acquis (see
Kępińska & Stola 2004). As the dominant argument in favour of the
changes dealt with forthcoming EU membership and the obligations result-
ing from adoption of the EU acquis, the proposals did not elicit any serious
opposition or party political debate. As Weinar (2006: 105) claims, all pos-
sible objections to the legislative process were resolved outside Parliament,
in officials’ cabinets through legal negotiations.
The process of democratic policymaking includes the control of inde-
pendent courts over the legislative and executive powers. The role of the
courts, as well as the intervening role of the ombudsman, cannot be ne-
glected in an analysis of migration policymaking in Poland. From the mi-
gration policymaking perspective, the most important court is the Supreme
Administrative Court, which judges many cases relating to foreigners. The
Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, NSA) is a
special central court that was set up to control compliance of administrative
decisions with the law, as well as the actions and omissions of the public
administration organs. Thus, the NSA is the appeal court for decisions is-
sued by the Ministry of Interior and subsequently by the head of the Office
for Foreigners. Many NSA decisions have dealt with conditions of visa
issuance, the premises for expulsion or granting refugee status, temporary
or permanent residence permits and foreigners’ rights to buy real estate
(see Jagielski 2001). The role of the NSA in defending the rights of for-
eigners cannot be underestimated.
An intervening role has also been played by the Commissioner for the
Protection of Civil Rights, set up in 1987 to safeguard human rights and ci-
vil liberties. This ombudsman focused on legal interventions in cases of
foreigners who alleged that their rights had been violated. It participated in
the legislation process through monitoring any changes from the human
rights perspective. An example of the ombudsman’s work was the change
in regulations regarding foreign children’s access to public primary and
secondary schools in 2001. The ombudsman claimed that the Ministry of
Education’s regulations of 1993, which established fees for public schools,
were unconstitutional and did not comply with the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Iglicka, Kaźmierkiewicz & Mazur-Rafał 2003: 34).
Thanks to this intervention, school fees were waived.
4.2 The role of non-state actors
The policymaking process, albeit bureaucratic in nature, has not been lim-
ited to official state actors. As already stated in this chapter’s introduction,
the deep-seated conviction that international migration is an obvious
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feature of modernisation requiring a proactive migration policy to counter-
act inevitable problems was transferred en masse to Poland, along with
other ideological and institutional principles, during the EU accession and
harmonisation period. One of these principles concerns building an open,
tolerant and multicultural society – a task that in full-fledged democracies
is partially delegated to (and often monopolised by) NGOs in the third
sector.
Grass root social movements (like Solidarity) proved both highly active
and efficient under the Communist regime and significantly contributed to
its collapse. Constructed in opposition to state structures and entailing
spontaneous cooperation on a local level, NGOs initially filled the gap be-
tween the state and the citizen – the institutional and social vacuum be-
tween the two was an acknowledged fact in the previous political system
(Hausner & Klemetynowicz 1991; Wnuk-Lipiński 2003). However, apart
from episodic growth spurts in collective independence, the third sector in
Poland remains only moderately developed. Although thousands of NGOs
have been established, only a tiny share remains active and self-sufficient,
capable of raising funds and attracting volunteers to undertake their
missions.
In the field of assistance and integration for asylum seekers and immi-
grants there is much to be done, as well as money to be raised. Moreover,
the demand for non-governmental services is still usually larger than the
supply of existing organisations and volunteers. This rather empty albeit at-
tractive field was conquered by large NGOs, which have included migrant
issues into the scope of their regular activities. For example, the Polish
Humanitarian Organisation, under its charismatic leader, Janina Ochojska,
has launched special programmes addressing asylum seekers (e.g. running
a shelter for asylum seekers and acknowledged refugees), reintegration of
Kazakh repatriates of Polish origin and awareness-raising initiatives (e.g.
providing educational materials for teachers in lower and secondary
schools). The Stefan Batory Foundation, which operates as an umbrella or-
ganisation, redistributes grants awarded by the Open Society Institute and
the Ford Foundation into small-scale local initiatives. The Batory
Foundation is also known for actively lobbying against the introduction of
visas that limit movement among people from former the Soviet Union
countries, something that has strengthened its position as a key player in
matters concerning these countries. The Helsinki Foundation for Human
Rights in Poland (HFHR) – an NGO established officially in 1989 by
Polish members of the Helsinki Committee but preceded by seven years of
underground activity – is another respected player in the field. HFHR’s mi-
grant- and refugee-oriented activities include monitoring the Polish authori-
ties’ observance of the Polish Constitution, the Geneva Convention of
1951, the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, as well as
Polish legislation concerning foreigners. With respected academics from
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the field of international law among its members, and providing free legal
advice to foreigners and asylum seekers, HFHR became the most influen-
tial advocate of these groups in Poland. It is routinely consulted by the
Polish government, thereby successfully having an influence on the legisla-
tive process.19 A slightly different role is played by think tanks dealing
with international relations (e.g. Center for International Relations) and
public policy guidance (e.g. Institute of Public Affairs). For institutions
such as these, the inclusion of migration issues was a direct consequence
of the politicisation of international migration and the level of public atten-
tion given to this topic in the West.
Also worth exploring is the flow of funds coming from other European
countries and the EU and, at the same time, agenda-setting. As charity
donations from Polish businesses are rather limited, the basic sources of
funding for NGOs are the public and municipal administration or foreign
foundations (Open Society Institute, Ford Foundation, German Marshal
Fund and Freedom House, to name but a few). La Strada, an active and
meritorious NGO assisting trafficked women, was originally established as
a one-year pilot project by the Dutch Foundation Against Trafficking in
Women (Stichting tegen Vrouwenhandel, STV).20 The Centre of Migration
Research, the largest interdisciplinary team of migration researchers, was
set up by a few scientists recruited for the international research project
run and funded by the United Nations as well as the European
Commission.21 Recently established NGOs solely addressing migration
and integration (e.g. Proxenia and Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej)
have also accessed EU funds.
Relying on EU funds and donations from public and municipal authori-
ties, most NGOs limit their scope to addressing specific problems (e.g. run-
ning shelters, providing legal and psychological support) and awareness-
raising actions. Many are aimed at building an open, multicultural society
and fighting xenophobia and racism in Poland’s relatively tolerant society.
They tend to carve out a niche, segmenting the market for migrant-related
services rather than getting involved in the tough competition for available
funding. By the same token, third-sector initiatives in the field are gladly
welcomed by authorities, as they are convinced that NGOs should be in-
volved with and cooperate in assistance and integration for certain migrant
groups in Poland. Only a few NGOs, however, are viewed as real partners
that contribute to migration policy and management.
The few attempts made so far to involve other stakeholders, such as aca-
demics and experts, have been moderately successful. Migration experts
with academic titles are consulted and invited onto advisory bodies like the
Government Population Council. Yet, neither their pleas for the formula-
tion of basic principles to guide migration policy (Okólski 1998b) nor the-
sir specific recommendations on what those principles should be (IPSS
2004) have been ever implemented. Only recently has the Ministry of
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Interior initiated work on the formulation of a Polish migration policy doc-
trine that, it is hoped, will address academics’ postulates.
International organisations operating in Poland (e.g. UNHCR, the
International Organization for Migration – IOM) have also been woven
into the patchwork that is the cooperative segmentation of the migration
sector. To some extent, this is understandable; due to the relatively small
circle of migration activists and experts (e.g. lawyers), the same people cir-
culate between different organisations, among friends and acquaintances,
which tends to foster cooperation rather than promote competition.
Warsaw’s UNHCR office, which was established in 1992 though began as-
sisting refugees earlier, seems to be most acknowledged in this regard.
Their protection of refugees complies with international legal regulations
and attracts much more attention in both the Polish media and among hu-
man rights activists than the field of labour migrants and victims of traf-
ficking, both areas traditionally delegated to IOM.
The last group of stakeholders, seemingly underrepresented in the field,
are organisations comprising migrants themselves. This is hardly surprising
given the scale of inflows to Poland and the fact that settlement immigra-
tion is a relatively new phenomenon. Members of migrant groups still
seem more concerned with their own adaptation and economic activities
than with getting involved in politics or representing their compatriots.
Some migrants’ associations have been established but the most active,
visible groups have limited rules. They tend to act as gatekeepers between
the host society and their poorly integrated compatriots (e.g. Solidarity and
Friendship, an association of Vietnamese people living in Poland), or repre-
sent religious bodies (e.g. the Muslim Association Ahmadiyya and the
Armenian priesthood), or exist largely thanks to the involvement of Polish
members and supporters (e.g. Refugee Association in Poland, Association
for Mixed Marriages between Poles and Foreigners and the dissident
Association for Democracy and Pluralism in Vietnam). A lack of institutio-
nalised representation of migrant groups does not conform to the recom-
mended practice of maintaining relations between the host society’s public
administration and the groups through official associations – let alone does
it fulfil their expected role as consultants in the development of migration
law. Apart from a limited number of cases, the expectations of both public
administration structures and Polish NGOs active in the field of migration
management appear to exceed the actual self-organising potential of set-
tling migrants.
When analysing the context of migration policymaking, public and poli-
tical discourses should be considered. The media, in compliance with its
‘watch-dog’ mission, tends to idealise immigrants and bemoan their trau-
matic experiences and difficult living conditions, rather than giving way to
ethnic and racial stereotypes. Comparative content analysis of press articles
published in 1996 and 2002 in major Polish newspapers and weeklies
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confirmed the pro-immigrant orientation of media coverage. An obvious
shift occurred from framing immigrants in terms of ‘dangerous locusts’
flooding the country, to emphasising their contribution to society through
creativity and spirit of enterprise, a range of skills and the cultural enrich-
ment they provide (Mrozowski 2003: 230-233). A corresponding shift has
been revealed by longitudinal trends in public opinion surveys (see
Łodziński & Nowicka 2003): a movement from relying on generalised
group stereotypes about ‘the aliens’ towards specific content – gained via
more frequent cross-cultural encounters – and a positive perception of ‘the
Other’.
Political discourse has marginalised the immigration issue and restricted
it to legislative procedures in subsequent amendments. None of the politi-
cal parties has taken a clear stance on immigration and migration manage-
ment or included immigration-related issues in their programmes. Memory
of the restrictive Communist exit policy may have discouraged politicians
from public discussion of restrictions on inflows, while the high rate of un-
employment among the native population runs counter to all arguments for
active recruitment of labour migrants.
The general lack of interest in international migration-related matters is
not surprising. To date, Poland has had no dramatic incidents, terrorist at-
tacks or crises to attract the attention of public opinion and policymakers.
Therefore, the only groups interested in stimulating public debate on mi-
gration policy are migration experts and migration- and refugee-oriented
NGOs. Both groups are actually driven by the same assumptions regarding
the nature of the migration process: namely, the challenge that migration
represents for host societies and the desired forms and means of migration
– concepts absorbed from Western democracies.
4.3 The heralds of a change? Migration policymaking after 2004
After 2004, the social, economic and political factors that prevailed led to
some noticeable changes in migration policy and policymaking. The chan-
ging situation of the Polish labour market (falling unemployment levels,
severe labour shortages noted in some sectors or regions), coupled with ex-
aggerated media reports on the scale of emigration from Poland, created a
more positive climate for policy decisions on labour immigrations. A poli-
tical factor was also relevant: Samoobrona, a populist party representing
popular among affluent farmers, was for the first time in the government
coalition and was responsible for employment issues. At the same time,
Polish farmers started to lobby more actively for the creation of a channel
for legal seasonal immigration from the East. They were echoed by repre-
sentatives of the construction industry. Also of importance was the nearing
date of accession to the Schengen area, something bound to end large-scale
legal entry of potential irregular workers from neighbouring countries
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(Kupiszewski, Bijak, Kaczmarczyk, Kicinger, Kloc-Nowak & Napierała
2008). The government responded to employers’ needs and between 2006
and 2009, a seasonal immigration scheme was created. Currently, workers
from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Moldova can by employed without
work permits for up to six months a year in all sectors of the economy22.
Analysing the creation of a seasonal employment scheme, we see the
first potential signs of a politicisation of migration policy. Active lobbying
by employment organisation (e.g. in agriculture and construction) that used
inter alia a political party (i.e. Samoobrona) to voice their interest and cre-
ate change was novel in Polish migration policymaking processes. Time
will tell whether this was just an exception to the otherwise highly admin-
istrative evolution of policymaking in Poland or if it heralded a process of
politicisation.
5 Migration policymaking: Co-ethnic policy after 1989
Policy addressing co-ethnics in lieu of the former exit policy was devel-
oped in the shadow of an immigration policy that was highlighted in the
EU accession process. As described in the second section of this chapter,
three subfields can be distinguished within the policy: the first two, an-
chored in the past and legitimised by nationality and ethnic claims, encom-
pass the concepts of repatriation and maintaining contacts with the Polish
diaspora and descendants scattered around the world. The third subfield,
which has a much more contemporary aspect (despite not being a new con-
cept in Polish migration policy) concerns facilitating the employment of
Poles abroad and alleviating problems encountered by Polish labour mi-
grants who rushed to EU countries upon accession. There are, of course,
differences in the policymaking process according to the policy subfield,
yet, in general, policy addressing co-ethnics should be described as the
more ‘Poland-oriented’ aspect of migration policy, with less EU influence
and a greater role played by political history and tradition. Unlike nascent
immigration policy, lobbies appear to play a more important role, and the
issues concerned are more politicised, as will be shown in the analysis.
The policy of maintaining links with Polonia – the Polish diaspora scat-
tered throughout the world – originates in the interwar period. One of the
key concerns of the reinstated Polish state was protection of Poles abroad
who had thus far been deprived of any form of protection offered by a na-
tion-state. The infamous period of PRL policy, was characterised by suspi-
cions towards emigration and infiltrating emigrant groups. After the turning
point of 1989, there was a return to the approach of the interwar period.
The general line of policy towards Polonia, especially towards Polish
minorities in the East, was reinstated on the wave of positive social feel-
ings of solidarity with Poles in the East and responsibility for them. The
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policy concentrated on providing support to maintain Polish identity and
offering material supplies to people of Polish origin, e.g. a pool of scholar-
ships for students of Polish origin, in-kind support for NGOs assisting
these groups and educating teachers from Polish minorities (Hut 2002: 42-
44). All these forms of support were provided through a specialised net-
work of foundations, formally NGOs that dominated the relations between
Poles in the East and state organs in the country.
The Polish Community Association, known as Stowarzyszenie
Wspólnota Polska, took the lead among those organisations engaged in ac-
tivities for Poles abroad, mainly in the East. Wspólnota Polska was estab-
lished on an initiative by Speaker of the Senate Andrzej Stelmachowski, a
professor who became the organisation’s first president. Albeit officially
non-governmental, Wspólnota Polska, like other organisations (e.g. the
Semper Polonia Foundation under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs), is in fact financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Senat
with budgetary resources that are assigned to their activities. The share of
other beneficiaries, such as state-owned companies, remains very low.
How foundations such as Wspólnota Polska and the Semper Polonia
Foundation function represents an interesting marriage of social and state
engagement, with a predominance of the latter.
The financing of these two organisations illustrates the especially strong
involvement of the Senat in maintaining links with Poles abroad. This
represents a clear reference to interwar period traditions when the Senat
presented itself as the protector of Poles abroad and their interests. Upon
initiative of the Sejm and the Senat, 2 May was declared the annual Day
of Polish Community and Poles Abroad.23 In both chambers of Parliament,
special committees were set up to handle issues regarding links with the
Polish diaspora, and these were especially active under centre-right coali-
tions. The committees prepared legislative proposals on the rights of Poles
abroad, including the Karta Polaka.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still the governmental organ tradition-
ally involved in handling issues regarding Polonia and links with Poles
abroad. These issues are among the ministry’s fundamental tasks and re-
sponsibilities. The work is carried out by the Department for Consular and
Polish Diaspora Affairs, which supervises the network of Polish consulates
abroad and, along with the Senat, represents the interests of Polonia and
Polish minority rights.
A politicisation of Polonia issues can be clearly seen in the revival of
the debate on Poles abroad, including issues regarding Polish citizenship,
when centre-right coalitions are in power. Morally founded arguments as-
serting the collective responsibility of the Polish state for the fate of people
of Polish origin and their descendants, as well as the concept of a nation
being a community based on blood ties, represent a traditional element in
the patriotic rhetoric of right-wing parties.
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Undoubtedly, however, the revival of links with Polonia after 1989 led
to concrete positive effects. One impressive example is support shown for
American Polonia during talks on Poland’s NATO membership. The Polish
lobby in American Congress and many famous political actors, such as US
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeziński, as well as pressure on
Congress by the Polish diaspora, undoubtedly contributed to the US deci-
sion to admit Poland into NATO – a primary goal of Polish security policy
throughout the 1990s. Furthermore, emigrants proved effective not only in
political lobbying, but also in contributing to Poland’s economic success
through efforts to support the inflow of foreign capital to Poland in the first
years of economic transformation.
A revival of the notion of repatriation became part of state policy in the
1990s. This element was closely tied to the idea of the Polish state being
responsible for the fate of Poles who were not abroad by design and had
been unable to return. The policy regarding repatriation – understood as a
return to Poland, an ‘imagined’ rather than real homeland country of the
people of Polish origin and their descendants from the East – reappeared
on the Polish political agenda soon after the 1989 breakthrough. At the be-
ginning of the 1990s, people of Polish origin came to Poland as ‘foreign-
ers’ because of a lack of adequate legal procedures, and only later did they
apply for citizenship. This form of entry proved inadequate when it came
to the issues of retirement and pension benefits. Need for proper regula-
tions concerning repatriation procedures and a delegation of responsibilities
heralded serious government debate on the issues.
It is worth noting that in both public and political discourse, repatriation
was never presented in the context of immigration. Symbolic exclusion of
repatriates from the group of ‘ordinary’ labour migrants fostered the moral
and patriotic rhetoric meant to legitimise a reinstatement of the official
state-governed repatriation process in the 1990s.
Established in 1995, the Inter-Ministerial Group for Repatriation pro-
posed a number of legal solutions constituting a basis for future regulations
to be included in the 1997 Act on Aliens. Worth noting is the fact that, con-
trary to other migration policy subfields, a government programme preceded
the legislative works. The two main principles of repatriation policy agreed
on by the group and maintained later in the 2000 Act on Repatriation24 were
the individual nature of the process and geographical limitations. According
to the individuality principle, repatriates could enter Poland via an indivi-
dual invitation from a local Polish community and/or, after 1997, also from
a private individual in Poland. The second rule restricted repatriation to peo-
ple coming from certain areas – namely, the Asiatic republics of the former
Soviet Union though in practice, Kazakhstan. Both limitations were justified
by government officials in terms of financial constraints. These two princi-
ples were later claimed to be the main reasons for the very limited scale of
repatriation in the years to come.
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The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs naturally
came to be the main two players in repatriation policy. After 2001, the
newly established central body under the Ministry of Interior known as the
URiC became responsible for all matters relating to repatriation.
Nevertheless, the actual numbers of repatriates who arrived and settled in
Poland was relatively low. Regulations on facilitating repatriate integration
– by offering them assistance through small local communities – became
the crucial factor limiting the repatriation stream. This was due to an insuf-
ficient number of municipalities willing to host the repatriates.
Economic migration does not fit into the myth of ‘scattered sons of the
motherland’ separated from their homeland by the tragic twists of fate. For
a long time, therefore, neither majority nor opposition parties paid any par-
ticular attention to the phenomenon. The issue of Poles working abroad
did not generate any serious problems during the 1990s. Government
attempts to enable Polish nationals to find employment in the old EU coun-
tries were seen as a means to alleviate consequences of the structural mis-
matches in the Polish labour market during the period of economic trans-
formation and rising unemployment levels. These issues did not trigger
any political response. Nor did they elicit the involvement of any political
actors apart from the government. Only the impending enlargement of the
EU heralded a change in the policymaking process, as the media joined in
on the political game, initiating a campaign highlighting open EU labour
markets as one of the main advantages of membership in the union.
The same media did, however, set off alarms one or two years after ac-
cession. This was when gaps in the Polish labour market became apparent,
notably in the health care sector and the construction industry, and numbers
of Poles working abroad went skyrocketing – at least according to the
media’s figures. In actuality, as researchers affirmed, the figures for post-
2004 emigration could only be roughly estimated due to a lack of adequate
comparable data, especially for people who had already returned to Poland
after a period spent working abroad (see Fihel, Kaczmarczyk & Okólski
2006). However, an undisputed effect of media involvement was the revi-
val of public debate regarding how to safeguard the rights of Polish people
working abroad, especially in the UK and Ireland.
The ombudsman was one state organ that became actively involved in
the issue of safeguarding Poles abroad. It raised the issue with other state
authorities in spring 2006, and took part in numerous conferences, site vis-
its and other activities to lobby for increased involvement of the Polish
authorities in protecting the interests of citizens working abroad. The om-
budsman’s activities led to an increase in the number of consuls in new
destination countries, yet the idea of setting up a network of liaison officers
in destination countries’ ministries of labour was not welcomed by authori-
ties.25 It is worth noting that the protection of Polish nationals working
abroad is not one of the ombudsman’s statutory goals, but that the activities
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in the field were undertaken on the ombudsman’s initiative as a conse-
quence of a specific ‘mandatory’ loophole that emerged. Furthermore, it
should be pointed out that the ‘new’ Polish economic migrants, contrary to
previous waves recruited from the group with tertiary education, do main-
tain links with Poland via the internet. As they maintain the right to vote,
they represent an attractive target group, which was addressed not only by
the pioneering ombudsman but also by political parties in the 2007 national
elections.
As emigration becomes common among the new generation of Poles –
and the media stays attuned to the phenomenon – the focus of policy will
probably shift and the policymaking process will likely change. The domi-
nance of well-established albeit fossilised structures of cooperation be-
tween the government and government-related organisations dealing with
policy on co-ethnics should make way for more pragmatic policymaking
solutions. These would need to keep in line with the needs and problems
of mobile citizens in a global world with networked societies. After all,
many new ‘emigrants’ maintain their links with the homeland within trans-
national social spaces, such as cyberspace, rather than through a strong at-
tachment to ‘traditionalist’ associations formed by the elderly migrants of
previous generations. New Polish migrant associations uniting representa-
tives of the post-accession wave of emigration (e.g. Poland Street in the
UK) will have to find their place in – and consequently transform – the old
structures of cooperation between the country and its diaspora.
6 Conclusions
A systemic transformation process – and the transfer of institutional as well
as ideological concepts from EU countries – establishes the context for de-
veloping migration policy in Poland. At the beginning, drawing on
Western European experience of migratory inflows, it was tacitly assumed
that an influx of migrants to the country was unavoidable. The former
Soviet Union republics were presented as a potential pool of migrants (see
Anioł 1995). Although to date, this influx has not occurred, the anticipa-
tion of future migratory processes perceived as inevitable gave rise to a
new, vacant policy field. Formal and informal actors, eventually creating a
network of policy actors involved in migration policymaking, started to po-
sition themselves within the field. Some were forced to enter (formal actors
that somehow had to regulate the changing social situation resulting from
the increased international mobility of Poles and foreigners), while others
came on a voluntary basis and found attractive issues to take up as research
areas or political advocacy fields.
Formal actors, namely the government and other state institutions, were
in fact forced to enter the field. They were compelled either by
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consequential events demanding some kind of response (e.g. Sweden turn-
ing asylum seekers back to Poland) or intense pressure from other coun-
tries as well as international migration organisations.
The main impetus for policy changes in the migration field was the EU
and its accession requirements. EU impact on policy and policymaking
was predominant, yet it varied in scope and power across time and accord-
ing to the policy subfield in question (Kicinger, Weinar & Górny 2007).
EU accession, a raison d’être for Polish foreign policy, enabled the union
to play its conditionality mechanism during the negotiation period. In turn,
Polish authorities accepted full harmonisation with the EU acquis in the
migration field, including some solutions that were controversial in light of
Polish interests. These included the refugee protection system, with the
acceptance of the Dublin II regulation, the acceptance of a visa policy in-
cluding introduction of visas for Poland’s Eastern neighbours, as well as
an all-embracing uptake of multicultural and anti-racist rhetoric in an ethni-
cally homogeneous and generally tolerant country.
Unlike the formal actors, the other migration policymaking stakeholders
– NGOs, think tanks and, last but not least, researchers and experts –
gladly engaged in migration policy, looking for interesting, promising
fields of activity or research. In the case of these actors, the transfer of
ideology was even more advanced. Many NGOs operating in the migration
field drew from the experience of their Western counterparts. They also re-
lied on their funding to become self-specialised in human rights and mi-
grant advocacy. Non-formal actors generally entered the field seamlessly,
both from the perspective of their relations with state actors and in terms
of mutual relations. NGOs and other organisations involved in migration
policymaking in Poland could be compared to pioneers entering rich new
lands; an abundance of things to do and the relative profundity of resources
(from the EU, Western foundations and/or other governments), enabled
particular organisations to settle in and carve out a promising niche in the
policymaking process. Cases in point are the Helsinki Foundation, specia-
lising in migrant advocacy, Polish Humanitarian Action and Caritas, which
dominated the charity field.
EU funds, various foundations and other sources of financing guided the
focus of advocacy work, humanitarian activities and, lastly, research to se-
lected policy fields that mirrored Western experiences. They did not neces-
sarily correspond to the Central European situation. This consequently in-
fluenced both the nascent network of policymaking actors as well as policy
content itself.
Due to its limited scale and a range of other issues attracting general at-
tention, immigration is not viewed as a major problem to be solved in
Poland’s post-transformation struggles. Therefore, migration policy remains
a non-politicised issue – which is passed on to academics and migration
experts and subjected to administrative routes of policy development.
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It is therefore fruitless to try to separate out periods in migration policy-
making in Poland after 1989’s major turning point. No significant
watershed events that could have significantly influenced the process fol-
lowed. Rather, policy was developed in a smooth, organic manner, partially
behind the scenes. The only development that could have suggested a turn-
ing point was creation of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens in 2001.
Yet, it soon became evident that this was merely a formal change, not af-
fecting the policymaking process.
Since migration has not yet become a politicised issue, government
changes and political coalitions have not affected policy towards foreigners
in any substantial way, nor has the policymaking process changed substan-
tially. An administrative – or, more precisely, bureaucratic – approach to
policymaking has been the dominant pattern despite the formal involve-
ment of legislative organs in the process.
Undoubtedly, the non-politicisation of migration policy and policymak-
ing is an important factor, contributing as it does to undisturbed, gradual
policy change. The Westernisation of migration discourse, focusing on is-
sues of third world immigrants or refugees, has compelled immigration
policy to take precedence over emigration policy. The former thus gained
in political importance, despite the fact that emigration has always been
within the Polish state’s scope of interests, in the interwar and Communist
eras and post-1989. In reality, work to safeguard the interests of contem-
porary labour migrants remains modest. It has included intergovernmental
agreements on mutual employment and diplomatic efforts to shorten transi-
tion periods in the context of the free movement of people. Yet, it is worth
noting that this policy was developed within the context of substantial
numbers of Polish nationals irregularly employed on EU-15 labour mar-
kets. In this context, it was more politically useful to focus on traditional
policy on co-ethnics, anchored in a historic perspective and strongly im-
bued with national and patriotic rhetoric. A reopening of repatriation
inflows to Poland, which could have been the most consequential co-ethnic
policy decision in terms of impact on flows, did not actually have signifi-
cant results. Rather, it seems the status quo in the subfield has been pre-
served rather than allowed to generate visible policy outcomes. This is due
to both restrictive rules (e.g. limiting repatriation to people from
Kazakhstan) and the various forms of mostly symbolic, rather than materi-
al, support shared with the widely scattered members of the Polish diaspora
through state-dependent and state-financed NGOs.
To recapitulate, migration policy and policymaking in Poland after 1989
developed under a prevailing Western influence that affected both policy
content and the nature of the policymaking process. A reorientation of mi-
gration policy from emigration to immigration issues created a new and
rather vacant field. It was gradually entered into by formal state actors and
conquered by other policymaking participants, who willingly found a place
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in a new, promising field of activities. The smooth relocations of various
organisations within the field, their peaceful coexistence and complemen-
tary nature, as well as undisturbed cooperation with government and other
state actors, contributed to the evolutionary and bureaucratic manner of
policymaking that dominated migration policy in Poland after 1989. At the
same time, the relatively small inflows of immigrants did not raise public
interest in the issue. This meant, in turn, that it was not politicised by poli-
tical parties. Beyond the interest of public opinion and the interest of the
political parties, Polish migration policy was relatively well developed and
managed by state administration in compliance with EU requirements and
with effective cooperation with non-formal actors. Recent developments re-
lated to the creation of a seasonal immigration scheme have brought some
novelty to the migration policymaking process. It is too early to determine,
however, whether these changes may be interpreted as the beginning of a
politicisation of migration in Poland.
Notes
1 The chapter was written with the support of the ‘Polish migration policy: Its princi-
ples and legal aspects’ research grant awarded to the Central European Forum for
Migration and Population Research (CEFMR) by the Foundation for Population,
Migration and Environment.
2 Act on Polish State Citizenship, Dziennik Ustaw 1920, no. 7, item 44.
3 Foreigners wishing to acquire Polish nationality had to reside in Poland for at least
ten years, be competent in Polish, have the means to provide for their family and
have a clean record.
4 Act on the Purchase of Property by Foreigners, Dziennik Ustaw 1920, no. 31, item
178.
5 Act on Aliens, Dziennik Ustaw PRL 1963, no. 15, item 77.
6 Act on Aliens, Dziennik Ustaw 1997, no. 114 item 739.
7 Dziennik Ustaw 2001, no. 42, item 475.
8 Dziennik Ustaw 2003, no. 128, item 1176.
9 Article 97 explicitly recalls the provisions of the Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. It specifies that a permit for tolerated stay may be
issued if expulsion would endanger the foreigner’s life, freedom, personal security,
or should he or she would be subject to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment
or punishment, be forced to work, be deprived the right to a fair trial or be punished
without any legal grounds.
10 Dziennik Ustaw 2008, no. 70, item 416.
11 Law on Employment, Dziennik Ustaw 1989, no. 75, item 446.
12 Persons able to prove their Polish origins before the Polish consul could be granted
a repatriation visa, with the right to enter Poland and acquire Polish citizenship
upon crossing the Polish border.
13 Dziennik Ustaw 2000, no. 106, item 1118.
14 The Constitution of 1997 granted the right to settle in Poland to every person whose
Polish origins could be proved before the Polish consul (article 52.5).
15 http://www.powroty.gov.pl.
16 Dziennki Ustaw 2001, no. 42, item 475.
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17 This regulation is a continuation of PRL regulations from when issues of Polish citi-
zenship were within the purview of the Council of State, a formal collective head of
state.
18 Act on Polish Citizenship, Dziennik Ustaw 2000 no. 28, item 353.
19 http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/en; accessed 3 January 2007.
20 http://www.strada.org.pl/index_en.htm; accessed 3 January 2007.
21 http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/index.php/Project/Causes; accessed 3 January 2007.
22 Dziennik Ustaw 2009, no 21. item 114.
23 ‘Ustawa z dnia 20 marca 2002 r. o ustanowieniu 2 maja Dniem Polonii i Polako´w
za Granica˛’; Dziennik Ustaw 2002 no. 37, item. 331.
24 Act on Repatriation, Dziennik Ustaw 2000, no. 106, item 1118.
25 Schedule of ombudsman’s activities for Polish nationals working abroad (http://
www.brpo.gov.pl/index.php?md=1688&s=1).
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Conclusion: Comparing the making of
migration policies
Giovanna Zincone
1 Introduction
As the introductory chapter of this volume stated, there is substantial litera-
ture on migration and immigrant policies, but very little1 on the processes
by which such policies come about.2 The contributors to this volume are
trying to take a step towards filling that gap. We have done this in the first
place by presenting as case studies ten analytical chapters on European
countries and their immigration and integration policymaking in recent
decades. These country reports are based on a common analytical frame-
work that is, in turn, derived from a state-of-the-art study that I co-wrote
(Zincone & Caponio 2006).3 In it, the literature review was structured ac-
cording to levels (national, local, international – notably at the EU level),
directions of interactions between those levels (top-down, bottom-up, hori-
zontal) and relations between public actors and civil society, which is com-
monly accepted as a second meaning of top-down.
Our review took a multitude of actors into consideration. We looked not
only at the traditional legislative powers of the state, but also the informal
activities of formal actors, such as de facto legislative initiatives by civil
servants and the innovative interpretation of the magistracy, particularly su-
preme courts. Semiformal actors, such as unions, employers’ associations
and representatives of religious denominations, and informal actors, such
as pro- or anti-immigrant movements, NGOs, think tanks and experts, were
also defined as being potentially relevant for policymaking. The labelling
of actors as formal, informal and semiformal may vary in different coun-
tries: employers, trade unions and churches can be classified alternatively
as informal or semiformal actors, depending on their level of inclusion in
the public decision-making process.
All these elements formed part of the common analytical frame for the
country cases. In this chapter, I will try to deepen the scope of the com-
parative analysis. I will do this in a somewhat unorthodox way, not by
summarising the preceding chapters, but by asking two fundamental ques-
tions on comparing policymaking. The first refers to the question of change
or continuity in policies and the factors and actors that provoke or inhibit
change. The second asks whether there is convergence, and what policy-
making factors and actors stimulate or inhibit convergence. Policymaking
is the ‘machinery’ that produces the policies whose similarity and dissimi-
larity, convergence and divergence I am trying to detect. The policies are
the explanandum, or what we have to explain, while the actors and factors
involved in their making are the explanans, or that which does the explain-
ing. Let me start off by explaining this approach and these questions in
more detail.
My analysis is focused on similarities and dissimilarities and on conver-
gence and divergence of immigrant and immigration policies in ten
European countries. The first aspect concerns the dimension of space, i.e.
the different levels of a political system in which policymaking can be ob-
served. The second aspect concerns the added dimension of time. In other
words, I will start by attempting to single out which factors and actors
have played a role in causing policy similarities or dissimilarities in the
past. I will then look at how these actors and factors have been trans-
formed (or not), and how they and other new factors and actors have inter-
vened to produce convergence or divergence among policies in different
political systems at different levels.
Trends towards convergence or divergence, similarities and dissimilari-
ties change over time, which means we need to establish a terminus a quo
(t0) and a terminus ad quem (tp) within the scope of our analysis. While
preparing the chapters, we decided to focus mainly on recent times, more
or less on the past ten years. Nevertheless, we also found it necessary to
trace the evolution of policies and policymaking back to their ‘genetic
phase’: the moment the arrival of immigrants and problems deriving from
their presence forced decision-makers to respond with policies. As a result,
the periods analysed in the chapters vary according to the different evolu-
tions of migratory processes found in each country.
1.2 Time and change
Time can be conceptualised in two ways. Firstly, it may be seen as time in
progress, during which policies can undergo persistence and continuity,
evolution or involution (a return to the past). In such a perspective, crucial
turns – hiatuses in a policy trend – may also occur. Secondly, time can be
conceptualised as revolving or ‘circular’, a sense of time that captures re-
petitive behaviour in recurrent political cycles. This is the case, for exam-
ple, when political parties take a certain stance while campaigning and into
the very beginning of the legislature, they change the policy lines once
well established in power and then change again as new elections draw
near. I will interpret the phenomena observed (persistence, changes, turns,
evolutions, involutions, cycles) according to the following approaches.
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Change and continuity are commonly explained by adopting different
analytical tools. Change is usually explained by making a more or less
conscious use of a systemic approach. In this perspective, changes are re-
sponses to the need to cope with new inputs, new challenges deriving from
the transformation of the context in which decisions are made. For in-
stance, huge inflows and dramatic events force decisions. According to this
approach, which originates from an input-output paradigm,4 decision-ma-
kers react more than they act, albeit through the filter of their ideological
frame.5 By contrast, in a cultural-elitist mentality, changes result from the
capacity political and cultural elites have to conceive and propose innova-
tive interpretations of a situation – a new framing – that can provoke or
contribute to policy turns.6 Here, decision-makers are considered entrepre-
neurs. The cultural and symbolic dimension is then highlighted. Innovative
political entrepreneurs can play with symbols. They might, for instance, re-
vive worn-out traditional religions as a component of national identities to
underscore the alien character of new Muslim communities. Or, on the
other hand, they might present immigration as a needed element in order
to contrast demographic and economic decline.
A ‘rational action’ paradigm can be used to explain recurrent policy cy-
cles. In this framework, political actors aim to optimise their chances of
being elected or re-elected, and consequently tend to promise popular mea-
sures and avoid passing unpalatable policies when elections are imminent.
Nonetheless, the rational action approach is also fitting to explain changes,
not just recurrences. Political actors compete for votes and may modify
their policies – even their ideological equipment – to maximise voting out-
comes or their coalitional potential and consequent chances to become
partners in a majority. It is not surprising that the theory was invented in
the milieu of economics.7
By contrast, specific attention to continuity instead of change is rooted
in a normative action approach that is more often adopted by sociologists,
as Barry ([1970] 1988) pointed out years ago when comparing economic
and sociological paradigms. According to this understanding, all social be-
haviours, including the political, are conditioned by context, by values and
norms that are, in turn, shaped by past events and historical and legal lega-
cies.8 In this chapter, I will make syncretic use of the various approaches
without necessarily referring to them specifically.
1.3 Space
Like time, space has several interpretative conceptions. Similarities and
convergence or their counterparts can be detected at the different levels of
political systems, such as countries, regions, districts or municipalities;
they may refer to broader sets of political systems, such as Southern versus
Northern versus Central Europe; former Communist countries versus other
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EU countries; old immigration countries versus new or almost new immi-
gration countries; border countries versus countries that are distant from
sources of immigrant inflows; transit countries versus destination countries.
Similarity may also be associated with ‘trans-state nations’, those states or
regions within states that share cultural traditions. This is the case with
some similarities across Austria, Germany and the German-speaking can-
tons in Switzerland, as we see in this volume, as well as with the policy
imprint of France on francophone Wallonia in Belgium, or that of the
Netherlands on Dutch-speaking Flanders (Adam & Martiniello 2008).
Newly shared factors can produce similar policies in a set of countries.
The 1973 oil crisis and its ensuing impact on the European economy pro-
voked attempts in several countries to protect national labour by encoura-
ging repatriation of immigrants and by proclaiming ‘zero immigration’.
The economic recession that began in the late 2000s is producing similar
effects. Shocking events – such as 9/11, the 2004 Madrid train bombings,
7/7 (the London bombings taking place a year later) and the assassinations
of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch film-maker Theo van
Gogh – can impact many political systems. They have the potential to pro-
duce wide convergences, even if the events take place in only a few coun-
tries; together they signal a highly relevant transnational phenomenon – in
this case, of global terrorism. Immigration flows may also change direction
because of demographic and economic imbalances, the rise and fall of poli-
tical regimes, state secessions and fusions or political unrest, turmoil and/
or economic crises.
Space may be – or may become – relevant for politics and migration
over time, in a quite literal sense, as state borders shift or new independent
states are established. Sometime, too, states stay the same but a conflict
winner takes part of a loser’s territory. As a consequence, the status of a
number of people may be redefined without those concerned actually being
transformed (i.e. via migration sur place) into aliens. This was the case for
ethnic Russian minorities, once USSR citizens but now considered aliens
or, even if naturalised (which is challenged by the imposition of a language
knowledge requirement), are deprived of certain rights, such being able to
use their mother tongue as an official language in Latvia and Estonia; for-
mer citizens may become welcomed as immigrants, which is what hap-
pened with Slovakians residing in the Czech Republic. Introduction of the
Schengen Area put stress on those member states forming its new external
borders.
On the other hand, space also counts in a more immaterial way through
the movement of ideas, such as the ‘import and export’ of migration poli-
cies over time. The direction of cultural and political influence and the
consequent diffusion of policies and policymaking models through that
space move according to the perceived success or failure of migration pol-
icy models. While it is possible that no country can objectively be labelled
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a ‘success’ (Guiraudon 2008; Joppke & Morawaka 2003), some nations
are regularly held up as paragons, despite their actual policy failures. On
the other hand, the role of positive protagonists leading the policymaking
narrative may change in time according to relative perceptions of ‘better’
performance. Political models that were once considered paragons can in
fact become seen as experiences to avoid (for example, the multicultural
policies – be they real or presumed – once found in the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom). Conversely, criticised models, such as French
Republican assimilationism, can be looked at with increasing interest, par-
ticularly by countries such as the Netherlands and the UK, now seen as
abandoning multicultural models. And still, the political influence one
country has on another can also persist over time, as in the case of the
United States on British immigration policies (Joppke 1999).
I have attempted to single out which actors and factors – under which
conditions – are likely to produce more persistence or more change, and
which changes are more or less likely to generate convergence. In doing
so, I propose a sort of menu of explanatory factors, albeit non-exhaustive
and eclectic. The next section looks at actors and factors that are assumed
to bring about continuity rather than change.
In the second section, ‘Historical and institutional legacies’, I will focus
on a list of features inherited from the past that affect at least the first
phases of immigration and integration policies and their making, and are
generally assumed to promote persistence and continuity rather than to
cause change within a given political system. Such actors and factors of
persistence within the same system may ‘freeze’ similarities and dissimila-
rities among different systems, and thus prevent convergence. Nonetheless,
I will also pinpoint their non-deterministic effects as well as their possible
evolution and dismantlement over time.
This is followed by the third section, ‘Pilots of policy change’, where I
deal with factors and actors that drive changes such as the rise of new re-
gimes, new parties coming to power and the impact of dramatic events.
Here, the question as to whether change leads to convergence or not is an
open one.
‘Co-pilots navigating between continuity and change’ is the fourth sec-
tion, where I turn to the disciplining actors and factors that accompany de-
cision-making, sometimes promoting or reinforcing innovation while at
other times opposing it, and sometimes favouring immigrants’ rights while
at other times restricting them. Since their influences’ potential direction is
uncertain, their impact on convergence is uncertain as well. These factors
and actors are positioned at an institutional level (e.g. the federal form of
the state), at the governance level (e.g. the case of consensual government)
or in public bodies (e.g. the judiciary system or the public administration,
which should not, according to constitutions, be formally devoted to law
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and/or policymaking). The factors can also be placed in civil society, such
as with anti-immigrant movements, pro-immigrant lobbies or unions.
Under the title ‘Cushions against radical change’, the fifth section deals
with actors and factors that do not promote continuity, but just moderate
changes or make it more difficult for them to take place, mainly by con-
trasting or balancing the action of the majority in power. Since cushions
moderate change, they are unlikely to promote the changes needed to
converge.
In ‘Converging trends and contradictory developments’, the chapter’s
penultimate section, I will change point of view, asking which macro-de-
velopments common to, or influential on, all systems could work to pro-
duce convergence of policies, now or in the near future. Common EU poli-
cies are an important factor, though certainly not the only one, since they
often follow policy line changes in the more influential EU countries.
To conclude, I will make some intentionally challenging observations.
Figure 11.1 Why persistence or change? Why divergence or convergence?
Legacies → differences and similarities → 
policy persistence → non-convergence 
Cushions against change → policy relative 
persistence → relative non-convergence 
Co-pilots → uncertain impact on change and its 
direction → uncertain impact on convergence  
Present common challenges → Present trends 
Policy pilots and driving factors → change → 
uncertain impact on change direction and 
convergence 
Source: Author’s own elaboration
2 Explaining persistence and continuity: Historical and
institutional legacies
Actors and factors that foster persistence and continuity may be of different
origin. A first category is composed of features of societies or political sys-
tems inherited from the past that have an effect on immigration and immi-
grant policymaking. They can be considered historical and institutional le-
gacies. Reviewing the preceding chapters, we see a number of these fea-
tures. Historical and institutional legacies can lead to policy persistence
and continuity within single political systems. If they do so, they may also
perpetuate similarities or dissimilarities between systems or sets of systems,
depending on the configuration of the legacy in the various countries.
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Nonetheless, legacies’ effects on the decision-making mechanism do not
necessarily work in favour of policy continuity. This is the case with gener-
al institutional legacies that favour the decision-making capacities of the
system, for instance, granting governments large and stable majorities, and
consequently providing space to innovative policies and changes. Other in-
stitutional legacies that render government decisions more difficult to
make, such as referendums, are likely to act as cushions against change;
still others, such as rigid constitutions and supreme courts, can alternatively
favour or impair changes by imposing decisions and invalidating those that
go against constitutional norms. In this section, however, I will treat only
those legacies that have affected the content of immigration policies for a
long time, generating continuity and stable differences. I will also start
showing the impacts of their possible disruption, which, by contrast, cause
discontinuity and change.
2.1 The colonial past and traditions
Colonial experiences and the legal and institutional treatment of colonial
territories are a good example of past legacies that can affect subsequent
immigration flows and immigrant policies. Former colonial territories tend
to supply consistent migrant flows into the countries that once ruled them.
This has been the case for inflows to Spain and Portugal from South
America, to Britain from India, Pakistan and the British Caribbean Islands,
to the Netherlands from Suriname and Indonesia, and to France from for-
mer colonies in North Africa, the Sub-Sahara and South-East Asia. Special
legal status is often given to nationals of former colonies, and can include
preferential treatment in immigration, access to naturalisation or reacquisi-
tion of citizenship. Such is the case with France, Spain and Portugal
(Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk & Waldrauch 2006a, 2006b). This is parti-
cularly prevalent in former colonies that are largely populated by co-eth-
nics – descendants of the former colonisers – as in the cases of Spain and
Portugal. Also, voting rights at the local level are often granted to nationals
of former colonies before other immigrants.
Pressures to immigrate from former colonies can cause problems. In the
Dutch case, inhabitants of the former colony of Suriname could – and did
– claim Dutch citizenship during a transition period, between 1975 and
1980, which boosted their immigration to the Netherlands (Bruquetas-
Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Morén-Alegret, Penninx & Ruiz-Vieytez this
volume). Past legacies can encourage special relations. The prevalent
Maghrebian composition of France’s immigrant population still steers inter-
national relations to bilateral agreements between these North African
countries and France (Withol de Wenden this volume); this was one of the
factors that contributed to the Union for the Mediterranean’s foundation on
CONCLUSION: COMPARING THE MAKING OF MIGRATION POLICIES 383
14 July 2008, which was fervently promoted by the French EU presidency,
though less welcomed by other EU members.
The process of decolonisation and unexpected immigration flows caused
by the Indian and Pakistani minorities being expelled from newly indepen-
dent East Africa in the early 1970s strongly affected British immigration
policies. These processes of independence and the new immigration flows
(made up of then British subjects) forced the UK to gradually revise the di-
rect relationship between ‘the Crown and its subjects’ and eventually adopt
a modern nationality law connected to birth in the state territory and des-
cent from persons born or residing there. Immigration law reform came
before the reform of nationality. The fairly differentiated legal statutes of
various territories, dominions and Commonwealth members were partially
reflected in differentiated entitlements to enter the UK under the 1971
Immigration Act. The law, passed in order to curb inflows of unwanted im-
migrants, embodied a sort of legal paradox. ‘There were citizens of the
United Kingdom and colonies who did not have the right of abode in the
UK and citizens of independent Commonwealth countries who did’ (Blake
1996: 688). Citizens of excluded territories were given the right of abode
only if they were ‘patrials’, i.e. born to a parent who had been born in the
UK. Only these same selected categories saw their status of nationals re-
cognised in 1981 (Blake 1996; Hansen 2001; Dummett 2006).
On the other hand, the same imperial past generated bonds between
Britain and its former colonies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
US) that still persist, including close international relations. In the field of
immigration and immigrants’ rights, this may even lead to the imitation or
importation of pieces of legislation stemming from ‘related’ countries, as
indicated by Cerna and Wietholtz in this volume, referring, in particular, to
an immigration policy reform that adopted Canada’s point system.9
The possible impact of colonial legacies can also be traced back to the
different features of European colonialism. These include the different le-
vels of administrative and judicial power delegated to the native authorities
and the levels of autonomy granted in matters such as family laws and the
legal status of individuals. A past propensity or reluctance to delegate to
native authorities affected the attitudes towards immigrant minorities and
their organisations in different ways later on. In the beginning, the nature
of the Dutch and British empires was primarily economic (i.e. the exploita-
tion of raw materials and commercial goods), and their early territorial set-
tlements were operated by companies. In the case of the Netherlands, the
public government only lasted from 1880 to 1940. Both countries adopted
an indirect rule – they devolved part of the jurisdiction to native or inland
authorities and allowed local norms to govern family and social relations
(Bryce 1901; Delavignette 1982). Later, they were both more prepared to
entrust relevant functions to immigrant organisations. Conversely, the more
state-oriented French colonialism included a citizenship status given to
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those natives who were prepared to accept the ‘civilising mission of
France’, namely, to learn the language and to be loyal subjects. Full citi-
zenship was given to all Algerians, and their territory became part of the
French Republic. The special status of descendants of those who were na-
tionals before Algerian independence lasted after independence (Weil
2001b: 52-68). Other overseas territories became departments of the
French Republic according to the 1946 Constitution, and their inhabitants
still enjoy full citizenship and political representation in French Parliament.
In sum, different governance styles of empires and different paths of deco-
lonisation have had a crucial impact on even fundamental laws, such as
those concerning nationality, and they still affect the present status of some
minorities of immigrant origin.
2.2 The state, prevalent religions and religious minorities
Similar observations apply to past relations between the main religion or
religions, religious minorities and the state. All contemporary liberal states
respect individual religious liberties and would thus seem to converge to-
wards a sort of common European model. This common pattern includes a
set of values and principles, such as the protection of religious freedom
and the individual rights that come with it, the lack of state jurisdiction on
religious matters, the autonomy of religious denominations and the coop-
eration between states and religious faiths (Ferrari 2003). Nevertheless,
respecting religious freedom rarely implies equality of religions or full
non-intervention by the state. Privileges are still reserved for the majority
religions, and states still claim to have a say in religious matters. Past rela-
tions between states, on the one hand, and majority denominations and reli-
gious minorities, on the other, may transmit significant legacies that mould
the treatment of religious minorities of immigrant origin – of Muslims, in
particular. We can distinguish four main models for religious accommoda-
tion, shaped by their respective histories, though transformed over time
and further adapted in the face of more recent events:
1) separatism, which is essentially separation between religion and state
2) formal state religion or religions accompanied by toleration of other de-
nominations and pluralism
3) former state religion that still enjoys hegemony and has a concordat,
possibly extended in non-egalitarian form to other religions
4) a persisting strong hegemony of the majority religion or religions as a
crucial source of national identity.
In Europe, the only country to have adopted the first model is France.
Unlike the other eminent case of separatism, the US, France chose this so-
lution as a public strategy to emancipate the state from the Catholic
Church, whereas American separatism’s motives were exactly the opposite:
to safeguard religions from state intrusion. Present French secularism is
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thus rooted in a deep tradition of vindicating state sovereignty. As early as
the Ancien Régime, the Catholic Church in France had to submit its main
decisions and appointments for royal approval. The secularism principle is
a modern evolution of the supremacy of secular power over clerical power;
it found an extreme application during the French Revolution, was moder-
ate during the two empires that followed and became common practice
with the 1905 French Law on the Separation of the Churches and State.
This tradition allowed the legal and ideological apparatus to definitively
ban ostentatious religious symbols from public buildings in 2004. The real
target of the 2004 law was the Islamic headscarf, since other religious sym-
bols were widely tolerated until the scarf started to provoke conflicts in
French public schools (Withol de Wenden 1998). The headscarf was also
seen as a symbol of women’s subjugation, often imposed on girls by tradi-
tional religious families. Prohibiting the burqa and niqab in 2010 was simi-
larly motivated, more in defence of women’s dignity and the French princi-
ple of secularism than out of a fear of possible threats to public order.
Europe’s Protestant Belt – the UK and Northern Europe – once followed
the second model of religious accommodation. Countries were charac-
terised by a state religion, or more precisely by religions prevalent in civil
society and consequently imposed on the monarchy and the state. Let us
recall the rebellion of British Parliament, representing the erstwhile
Protestant civil society, against the Catholic kings and crown princes in
Britain, and appointment of the foreign-born Protestant king William of
Orange and his spouse Mary. All Protestant countries, not just Britain, es-
tablished the principle that the religion of the prominent social class should
be the religion of the king and of the state – not vice versa. In these politi-
cal systems, the strong tie between religion and state, as well as the politi-
cal role of the monarchy in the institutional system, weakened over the
course of time, though it did not disappear altogether. The dominant role
of the official religion was reduced but not destroyed; to this day, it can be
revived to re-establish the hegemony of the national culture over those of
newcomers, as illustrated by the Danish example. The 1849 Danish
Constitution, which established religious freedom, simultaneously declared
that the Evangelic-Lutheran Church is the people’s Church and is sup-
ported by the state as such. The strong identity link between the people’s
religion and the nation became embodied in the 1855 law stipulating that
the educational system would be based on religious organisations funded
by the state. Later on, this same system enabled the relatively small
Muslim minority in Denmark to establish the highest number of Islamic
schools in Europe (Jensen 2007). More recently, however, one of the
Danish system’s dormant traditions was brought back: the Lutheran
clergy’s power to vote on the appointment of ministers from other denomi-
nations. This was re-established in order to control imams (Jensen 2006).
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In a similar vein, public education in the UK was initially delegated to
the main religious congregations. Traditionally, Catholic, Anglican,
Nonconformist and Jewish schools have covered about 85 per cent of their
running costs via financial support from the state, something that makes it
difficult to deny financial support to Islamic faith schools. So after lengthy
struggles, state-funded Islamic schools still exist today. Nonetheless,
although under Thatcher the UK reintroduced Christian religious discipline
in school programmes with the main purpose of counteracting secularisa-
tion, the measure proved to function as a welcome reinforcement of
Christian religion versus imported alien creeds. Catholic countries such as
Austria, Italy and Spain – or those with a partial Catholic tradition, such as
Germany – follow the third model of religious accommodation. They adopt
concordats with the Catholic Church and extend such a strategy of agree-
ments to other religions. But this strategy encounters specific difficulties in
including Muslim minorities because Islam does not have a church-like
structure with official representatives and is in fact composed of many
streams that compete with each other. The prominent role played by radical
components is another challenge. Nevertheless, some of the rights of re-
cognised religions have also been granted to Muslim minorities. In
Germany, for example, the ability to teach religion in schools was extended
to Turkish Muslims (Rohe 2004). More recently, during the third German
Islam Conference, taking place in March 2008 in Berlin, the Minister of
Interior recommended a nationwide law that Islamic classes be taught in
the German language.10
The legacy of Muslim domination in Spain had a positive impact on this
religious minority. Acknowledging the contribution Islam has made to na-
tional culture, the Spanish state signed a concordat with a network of
Muslim denominations in 1992, which coincided with the 500th anniver-
sary of the complete Catholic recapture of the Iberian Peninsula (Matecón
2004).
In the case of Austria, Islam has maintained the legal status it enjoyed
under the former empire, even though state borders changed after the coun-
try’s defeat in World War I. The law of 1912, which recognised the rights
of Muslims of the Hanafite creed in the empire, has never been formally
repealed. This law forms the basis of the current recognition of the Islamic
community in Austria, which equates Islam with other traditional denomi-
nations (Wieshaider 2004).
Strongly associating Orthodox Christianity with national identity and the
subordinate position of all the other denominations, including Islam,
Greece11 is an example of the fourth model of religious accommodation.
Still in force as late as 1998 was article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code,
which doomed non-Orthodox Greek expatriates to lose their nationality if
they left the country ‘with no intention of returning’ (Christopoulos 2006).
Unlike the country’s dominant Orthodox identity, descendants of traditional
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Muslim enclaves residing in Greek territory can rely on the protection of
international treaties (Constantinople, Athens and Lausanne) and enjoy a
treatment similar to that provided in the pluralistic Ottoman Millet system,
with the attribution of judicial powers to the Mufti. Even if the Greek gov-
ernment attempted to win back legal sovereignty and uniformity in its terri-
tory with the 1990 reform, Islam still enjoys a certain degree of autonomy
(Tsitselikis 2004).
Romania is another country with strong Orthodox and Catholic tradi-
tions in which Islamic minorities have lived for centuries. The Communist
policy of forced assimilation for national minorities and its authoritarian se-
cularisation of society as a whole seemed to have weakened religious atti-
tudes. After the Communist regime’s fall, however, Catholicism and
Orthodoxy were able to reacquire some popular consent. By contrast, tradi-
tional Islamic minorities were unable to re-establish themselves, and the
‘new Islam’ of immigrants and asylum seekers appears to be missing from
the political agenda of decision-makers (Iordache 2004).
2.3 The state and the working class
Immigrant policies have not only been shaped by the previous treatment of
religious matters, but also by the way in which the working class has been
incorporated into society. Incorporation has followed different paths in var-
ious European countries (Therborn 1977; Turner 1992; Zincone 1992,
1999a), with different roles played by the state and civil society. Organised
civil society, namely churches and workers’ unions, played an important
role as early providers of public education and social security in many
European political systems. That said, the level of delegation of public
functions to civil society organisations and the control of the state over or-
ganised civil society has varied significantly. Public control proved stron-
ger in systems in which the state played a dominant role, such as Prussia
and, later, Germany, than in countries like Britain or Sweden. In its genetic
phase, Germany could be considered a ‘statist from above’ integration
model, in which church and workers’ organisations were repressed and
mollified (Zincone 1992, 1999a). Eventually, however, workers’ and em-
ployers’ unions were incorporated into public decision-making.
Bismarckian Germany adopted a strategy of direct incorporation of the
working classes. First repressing the unions, then co-opting them, it repre-
sented a first tentative example of neo-corporatist governance (Bauböck
1991; Flora & Heidenheimer 1981). In due time, unionised immigrants
also became involved in the decision-making process, albeit in a subordi-
nate position.
Britain had already overcome the religious conflicts and mollification of
working classes before entering the phase of suffrage enlargement, which
made it easier for the state to delegate part of its social functions to mutual
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aid societies and, as already mentioned, to majority denominations, without
strict public control but within a political and social system still strongly
influenced by upper classes. We can consider nineteenth-century Britain a
‘societal from above’ model of integration (Zincone 1992, 1999a) since it
devolved relevant matters to workers’ leagues and unions, only loosely
controlled by the state, without undermining aristocratic and bourgeois he-
gemony. In contrast, the Swedish case can be characterised as ‘societal
from below’: here working-class unions and parties started earlier and
lasted longer, and this endowed them with a stronger leading role. The
management of pensions by unions also lasted for a long time in Sweden
(Zincone 1992, 1999a). Past incorporation models of national working
classes affected the first steps of the immigrant policies in these societal
countries, with a strong emphasis on pluralism and associations.
France is an exception in this respect as well. The French Revolution
had firmly established the penetration of the state in civil society and the
centralisation of the administration, which, as Tocqueville noticed, had al-
ready started under the Ancien Régime. With the Revolution, the process
was completed in a radical way. The traditional powers were dismantled
and substituted by the republican central government (Tilly 1975), and the
Catholic clergy was first submitted and then dismissed. The Revolution
aimed at empowering social classes disregarded by the Ancien Régime.
We can consequently define it as a ‘statist from below’ totalitarian model
(Zincone 1992, 1999a). The Restoration, following the defeat of Napoleon
Bonaparte, only slightly rebalanced the power of organised civil society
with respect to the power of the central state.
2.4 Segmented societies and consociational practices
Consociational practices that were adopted in the past to accommodate dif-
ferent groups – religious or otherwise – such as in the case of Dutch pillar-
isation, were a model for the 1970s and 1980s adoption of a multicultural-
ism avant la lettre (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. this volume; Rath, Penninx,
Groenendijk & Meyer 2004; Sunier 2007; Zincone 1999a). Although a se-
cularisation process led to crisis in the pillar system during the 1960s, and
in spite of the fact that the 1983 constitutional reform abolished the prefer-
ential link between the state and the main religious communities, this pro-
cess of ‘depillarisation’ did not remove the opportunity for Muslim and
Hindu communities to establish their own state-funded schools, broadcast-
ing companies and other facilities (Sunier 2007). Even later attacks on
multicultural policies considered too lenient by anti-immigrant groups have
not dismantled these opportunities.
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2.5 Authoritarian pasts and anchors of democracy
Core features of political systems that are relevant to migration policies are
shaped by another often underestimated legacy: the interrupted path to de-
mocracy. Authoritarian regimes were followed by legal reactions aimed at
strengthening individual and group civil rights. Italy, Germany and Austria
are cases in point after World War II, as were Portugal and Spain later on,
and eventually some of the former Communist countries after 1989. Those
rights were embodied in rigid constitutions that were difficult to reform
and protected by independent supreme courts. In addition, international
treaties and agreements protecting those rights are often subscribed to in
such situations of change, as in the cases of the Czech Republic and
Poland, respectively illustrated in this volume by Čaněk and Čižinský and
by Kicinger and Koryś. This legal protection may, in time, be eroded by
public anti-immigrant attitudes, xenophobic parties and the fading memory
of authoritarian regimes.
2.6 Emigration experience
Past emigration experiences and their interpretation in the national public
narrative are other factors that can influence the perception of new immi-
gration and immigrants’ presence in the receiving country, at least in the
early phases. Emigration has taken place in the majority of European coun-
tries (Hatton & Williamson 1998), though the phenomenon has been per-
ceived and conceptualised in different ways. Germany and the
Scandinavian countries do not self-represent as past emigration countries.
Their migratory history was soon blurred by more recent immigration ex-
perience. By contrast, the emigration country imprint is still lasting in the
cases of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Poland. This is due to
the relatively recent nature of immigration and the significant dimension of
past – and in the case of Poland – also present outflows (SOPEMI 2007;
Pugliese 2006). Self-representing as a country of emigration implies a more
open policy towards immigration flows if and when becoming a receiving
territory, as was the case in Southern Europe.12 These countries have been
more tolerant towards illegal immigrants; they often introduced regularisa-
tions and amnesty programmes (GCIM 2005); they have used planned im-
migration quotas to regularise undocumented immigrants already living in
the country; and they were more inclined than other European countries to
extend rights to illegal immigrants.13 Such pro-immigrant attitudes are ra-
pidly changing, which is the subject of this chapter’s last section on con-
vergence and common present trends.
Emigration countries that are just experiencing immigration, such as
Poland (which is also becoming an immigration or transit migration coun-
try),14 and past emigration ones, such as Spain and Italy, have both
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adopted preferential treatment of former emigrants or co-ethnics in nation-
ality laws15 and preferential admission or readmission to the territory.
Comparable policies have also been adopted by some countries whose
‘nationals’ live outside the country boundaries.16 Generosity towards co-
ethnics tends to persist or to be discontinued depending on the advantage
that those inflows bring to the national economy. Return migration is not
always productive, as is shown by the contrasting cases of Germany,
Poland and Hungary versus Ireland. The need to cope with the side effects
of co-ethnic policies can be seen as a factor of change that has already ta-
ken place in Poland, Germany and Austria, as reported in the correspond-
ing chapters in this volume. It is starting to signal alerts in Italy as well
(Gallo & Tintori 2006).17 The ongoing impact of the economic crisis and
its potential worsening can also affect this privileged immigration.
An early immigration past may shape nationality laws as well. France
invented and, in a well-timed manner, introduced the so-called double jus
soli law, according to which children born in France to alien parents who
were also born in France automatically become French citizens. The mea-
sure was introduced to prevent young people of immigrant origin born in
France from escaping military service, as those who were exempt from
conscription had an unfair advantage as far as work and marriage were
concerned. The double jus soli law was later adopted – for different rea-
sons – in other European countries such as the UK, Belgium, Spain,
Portugal, Greece, and it has often been proposed in reform bills in Italy,
Germany and Switzerland.
3 Pilots of policy change
Actors and factors of change are to be found in different sectors of political
and social systems, at both national and international levels.
3.1 Party systems and politics
Some party systems appear more apt to allow straight decisions and possi-
bly produce changes. Hegemonic parties or large, homogeneous coalitions
that can count on a consistent electoral and parliamentary consensus can
proceed without bargaining with the opposition to pass more innovative
measures, producing changes. The direction of the change depends on the
context and on the attitude of the majority. In comparison with other na-
tional policies, the ensuing convergence or divergence depends on being
more or less in tune with the main international stream, with the policy or-
ientation prevailing in other countries.
Changes in the colour of the parties in power are the most obvious fac-
tor of policy turns. The width of the turn depends on the positioning of the
CONCLUSION: COMPARING THE MAKING OF MIGRATION POLICIES 391
immigration issue in the new majority and government agenda, as well as
on the level of discrepancy between past and new majority attitudes. This
has been the case for France, where reforms and counter-reforms have
accompanied the changing parties in power (Weil & Spire 2006). After
garnering electoral success in 2008 through a promise to control illegal im-
migration and criminality of immigrant origin, the fourth Berlusconi gov-
ernment gave priority to repressing illegal immigration and introducing cer-
tain limits on immigrant rights. Politics matter particularly when strongly
anti-immigrant parties are present in governmental majorities. These politi-
cal components are likely to produce relevant changes, as has actually hap-
pened in the Dutch, Danish, Austrian, Swiss and Italian cases. In February
2000, the formation of a coalition government in Austria between the con-
servative People’s Party and the populist Freedom Party (Schwarz-Blau),
brought a major change not only in national immigration and immigrant
policies, but in the whole political system as well (Kraler this volume). As
D’Amato recalls in his chapter in this volume about the Swiss Peoples
Party:
The SVP, formerly a moderate peasants’ party that transformed in
the early 1990s into a radical right-wing populist political organisa-
tion, won the biggest share of parliamentary votes in the 2003 gen-
eral elections. This upset the traditional consociational system that,
since 1959, evenly distributed power among what were then the
four leading political parties and in which the SVP before had only
access to one seat. Following the elections in December 2003, as
leader of the SVP, Blocher gained for the first time a second seat in
the government and became Minister of Justice and Police, which
also put him in charge of migration and asylum. Thus far, the gov-
ernment approved several of the Minister’s proposals to deal with il-
legal migration, undocumented workers, asylum law abuses and un-
satisfactory international cooperation concerning the readmission of
rejected asylum seekers.18
In their chapter in this volume, however, Cerna and Wietholtz remind us
that xenophobic stances have not always been rewarding. As they state, in
the second part of the 1960s:
a long-lasting consensus evolved in the UK that openly racist re-
marks and ‘playing the race card’ in political campaigns would be
unacceptable. This acknowledgement was exemplified by a high-
profile incidence in 1968, when the British politician Enoch Powell
was sacked by the conservative Leader of the Opposition Edward
Heath’s shadow cabinet the day after Powell gave his ‘Rivers of
Blood’ speech. In it, Powell had vehemently warned against the
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introduction of anti-discrimination legislation (a race relations bill
proposed by the Labour government).
In the present political context of Europe, however, it is less likely to see
politicians or political parties penalised because of their xenophobic
attitudes.
As we underscore the relevance of politics, we should also evaluate to
what extent politics are events-driven. Do politics matter more than events?
Bruquetas-Callejo et al. in this volume seem to think so, maintaining that
in the Netherlands dramatic
events reinforced a new mode of policy discourse, described by
Prins (2002) as ‘hyperrealism’. This entailed a shift from the 1990s
‘realist’ style of discourse – demanding a ‘tough’ approach to inte-
gration so as to turn immigrants into full citizens – to a type of dis-
course in which ‘being tough’ became a goal in itself, regardless of
its potentially problematic amplifying effects. As such, it could be
argued that Fortuyn, and later, erstwhile Minister for Aliens Affairs
and Integration Rita Verdonk, used the immigration and integration
issue to flaunt their ‘tough’ approaches to the political establishment
and, in so doing, to promote their own places in Dutch politics.
In this opinion, it is the political entrepreneur who thus reframes the issue
to exploit dramatic events as opportunities.
In my view, the relation between events and political actors is variable.
Sometimes, events do force – or at least strongly influence – political ac-
tion. Sometimes, politicians use events as opportunities to promote their
preferred policy lines. Political actors can even deliberately allow dramatic
events to happen or decide to fabricate them (though hopefully this is rare
in democratic regimes). The Dutch thesis, however, is appealing because it
helps in explaining a certain set of changes and can also be applied to pro-
immigrant turns. There are a number of significant events that favoured
pro-immigrant policies, often involving immigrants as victims. For in-
stance, there was the killing of an African worker in Southern Italy in
1989, which offered Vice-President Martelli the opportunity to present and
pass a pro-immigrant act in 1990. The 1992 case of a kidnapped and
abused Moroccan girl in Belgium paved the way for the extension of local
voting rights to non-EU immigrants and easier naturalisation. Likewise,
again in 1992, the murder of a Dominican immigrant by a racist gang in
Spain facilitated the introduction of the 1993 integration plan, which was
eventually passed the following year. Nonetheless, events whereby immi-
grants are victims do not always favour more liberal immigrant and immi-
gration policies. Paradoxically, they can produce opposite effects. In Spain,
for example, riots against Moroccans championed a reframing of
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immigration as a social problem and suggested stricter controls of illegal
entries (Morén-Alegret & Ruiz-Vieytez 2006). Or, as Bosswick and
Borkert write in this volume, in the late 1980s: the number of xenophobic
attacks against asylum seekers and foreigners increased (Lederer 1997:
167), suggesting a direct link to the heated public debate on asylum in the
country.
Nevertheless, the government argued that the number of asylum seekers
should be reduced in order to solve unrest within the German population
and to combat this violence, thus legitimising the alleged causes for xeno-
phobic attacks (Bielefeld 1993). Once again, the Dutch thesis works: poli-
tics matter more than events, which are subject to arbitrary interpretations.
On the other hand, politics are embedded in, and disciplined by, contexts.
Restrictive or generous attitudes and proposals can be newly inserted in
the public discourse only when their timing is right – when they can be
well received by a good share of the electorate and political milieu.
Politicians are entrepreneurs who need raw materials for production.
Sometimes, the availability of a given material suggests the kind of pro-
duction that should take place. Readily available and spreading, anti-immi-
grant attitudes provide the raw material for political entrepreneurs. In terms
of context, we meet a crucial democratic actor – the electorate – and we
have to take its opinions into consideration. Parties can fuel, legitimate and
reinforce anti-immigrant public opinion (Taguieff 1988). They cannot sim-
ply create new opinions in a vacuum; they need contexts and events. And
even if, under favourable circumstances, new framing and new measures
are accepted, they are not safe from severe opposition by vocal minorities.
New frames and xenophobic attitudes can even impel the formation of pro-
immigrant advocacy coalitions, as seen in Austrian politician Jörg Haider’s
1992 anti-immigrant plebiscite known as ‘Austria First’.
Routine alternations of majorities in power can also bring about changes
doomed to meet much public resistance. This was the case with the 1986
and 1993 waves of conservative Pasqua reforms. The first reform revised
the nationality law, demanding that children of immigrants born in the
country apply for naturalisation when they come of age instead of getting
it automatically. This seemed to undermine the fundamental principle of
jus soli. The reform was opposed by a wide, hostile mobilisation of pro-
immigrant movements. Once back in power, the centre-left and its Minster
of Interior Chevènment re-established the automatic acquisition of national-
ity. Once the centre-right was in power again, with Sarkozy first as
Minister of Interior and later as Prime Minister, it succeeded in passing re-
strictive measures concerning marriages of convenience and automatic
regularisation.
The case of Sarkozy suggests that we focus on another underestimated
factor: the role of individuals, irrespective of their party affiliation.
Individuals clearly matter when they establish new parties, anti-immigrant
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parties, in particular. But they can also make a difference within the same
party and majority coalitions. Consider, for instance, the transition from
Straw’s human rights-oriented approach to Blunkett’s focus more on com-
munity cohesion and conflict resolution. Note the contrast between
Minister of Social Affairs Aubry and his party colleague at the time,
Minister of Interior Chevènement. See also the role of Italy’s centre-left
Minister of Interior Napolitano, who backed the introduction of repressive
measures such as centres for detention and identification of illegal immi-
grants in the 1998 reform act. And again in Italy, in 2009, the relevance of
individuals was clearly illustrated by centre-right leader Fini. Backing a
liberal reform of nationality law and the extension of local voting rights to
non-EU immigrants, Fini favoured a bipartisan, pro-immigrant alignment,
though his proposals were strongly opposed by the majority of his party
coalition and eventually contributed to his expulsion from the party.
Persons and parties matter especially if they are not overly conditioned by
their partners in government or the opposition. As I will further illustrate
in the following sections, Italy’s past centre-right majorities (1994-1995;
2001-2005; 2005-2006), conditioned by the presence of a Catholic party
and, for a shorter period (2002-2006), also by a Catholic Minister of
Interior, were much more moderate than the fourth Berlusconi governmen-
tal majority coalition that excluded the Catholic party and whose Minister
of Interior was from the Northern League. The People’s Party in Spain,
which was in power with only a small majority from 1996 to 1999, half-
heartedly introduced a reform in 1999 to extend social rights to illegal im-
migrants as well. After the 2000 elections, when it could count on a larger
and absolute majority, the People’s Party reformed the previous act, ex-
cluding those rights from it. Lurking behind the ‘reforms of the reforms’ of
the nationality law in France and the immigration law in Spain appears an-
other piece of the puzzle – another reason for change that the next section
will now address.
3.2 Negative feedback and policy ‘failure’
For our purposes, negative feedback means the real or perceived failure of
preceding measures aimed at managing migration and integration. Due to
the objective difficulty of any policy to solve the problems related to immi-
gration and immigrant presence,19 we sometimes observe a sort of inevita-
ble series of real or presumed policy failures. These, in turn, provoke a ser-
ies of reforms of the reforms. When switches in government majorities oc-
cur, blaming the previous cabinets for policy failures is a mechanism that
helps catalyse new measures or turns. Reforms are then quickly followed
by reforms of the reforms, even by the same majority in government. The
UK’s 2003 decision not to put a moratorium on inflows from the ten new
EU member states was quickly revised in 2006, when inflows of potential
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Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants were limited and all new communi-
tarians were excluded from immediate access to welfare facilities. Policies
do indeed often follow a zigzagging path.
We have discussed the relevance of institutional and political legacies in
shaping immigrant and immigration policymaking, but we have also ob-
served that legacies are not engraved in stone; they can lose significance
and eventually be put aside. Party systems and styles of governance, forms
of the state, models of welfare and conceptions of citizenship can all be re-
formed. They bring specific changes into the very structure of immigration
and immigrant policymaking. All changes discussed so far take place with-
in national systems and in the frame of stable democratic regimes. Yet, dra-
matic effects on migration policies may also originate from territorial trans-
formations of states, the birth of new independent states and the rise or re-
establishment of democratic regimes.
3.3 Changing regimes
The repression of movements for democracy and independence, the rise,
fall and re-establishment of democratic regimes and displacement of per-
sons after a defeat all have a significant impact on migration flows and
consequently on migration policies. Austria was affected by refugees from
Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1968 after the Soviet repression
of the revolts and by the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981.
Democratisation and disruption of former Yugoslavia was another source
of significant flows, not only to Austria. The first immigration waves to
Italy in the 1970s were predominantly asylum seekers originating from
South America and Greece after military coups. In the same vein, the eco-
nomic and political destabilisation of Albania caused masses of desperate
people to flee the country for Italian shores. After the 1995 Algerian crisis,
France decided to widen the legal concept of asylum seeker to include not
only persons threatened by their state, but also by extremist groups, as
Withol de Wenden in this volume reminds us. The disastrous military en-
gagements in Vietnam and El Salvador compelled a source of immigrant
inflows into the US from these countries (Portes & Rumbaut 1996).
The fall of Communist regimes transformed countries with closed bor-
ders into countries of significant labour emigration and transit migration.
Their new democratic condition implied the ‘inconvenient’ status of safe
third country. When the inflow of asylum seekers to Western Europe in-
creased in the 1990s, these safe third countries were obliged to take back
the refugees who had crossed their territories to reach other European
states and were then sent back to their countries of origin.20 Initial policy
supporting the favourable treatment of returning national emigrants was
discontinued at that time, as Kicinger and Koryś illustrate in this volume.
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The revision of favourable policies towards communities of national ori-
gins abroad reveals another factor of change: economic costs and benefits,
as well as the perceptions thereof. This factor is propelling utility-oriented
policy changes currently being effected in many EU member states and at
the EU level. As a result, converging trends in Europe are emerging. The
utility-oriented approach, however, was not always strong enough to coun-
terbalance the identity-oriented one that entails co-ethnic preferential poli-
cies, at least in Southern European countries thus far.
3.4 Changing borders
Border changes after World War II caused significant reallocation and dis-
placement of people in countries like Austria, Germany and Hungary.
After the fall of the Third Reich, German nationals were legally assigned
to different states, sometimes being removed from the territories where
they used to live, e.g. Czechoslovakia and Poland. On the one hand, there
was a huge ‘spontaneous’ inflow of Germans into their former mother-
lands, Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. They came to live
within the Western sphere of influence that rapidly recovered from eco-
nomic destruction. On the other hand, part of the German population re-
mained within the new borders of East Germany, under dramatically differ-
ent democratic and economic conditions. In cases of ‘repatriation’ to
Austria and West Germany, the immigrants of German origin received spe-
cial legal treatment as far as access to nationality and social security were
concerned. After the fall of the Communist regimes and the reunification
of Germany, the perception of ethnic German immigrants as a burden to
social security rose. Moreover, a sense of generosity towards them de-
creased: stricter requirements to obtain the legal status of Aussiedler were
introduced, annual inflow thresholds were imposed and access to welfare
provisions was reduced. The same reluctance to deliver rights and provi-
sions to ethnic Hungarians emigrating from Romania to Hungary could be
observed after the fall of the Communist regimes. However, the right’s vic-
tory in the 2010 election caused a resurgence of nationalism and proposals
to give back nationality to aliens of Hungarian origin abroad.
Disruption of the Soviet Empire also cleared the way for the re-estab-
lishment of independent states. The break-up of an old state and the conse-
quent birth of new ones made internal migration for some an international
movement; meanwhile, it transformed others into immigrants without their
ever leaving home. The case of Slovaks moving into the Czech Republic
(Čaněk & Čižinský this volume) is an example of the former. It reminds us
of the much earlier independence Ireland gained from the UK that changed
the status of the Irish in Britain. In both cases, these ‘half foreigners’ en-
joyed special legal treatments, and continue to do so. As already men-
tioned, examples of the latter (sometimes called migration sur place) are
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found in former Soviet member states that became independent. When
Russian settlers in countries such as Estonia and Latvia saw their status as
citizens become dependent on linguistic requirements, they, too, were es-
sentially transformed into foreigners.
4 Co-pilots navigating between continuity and change
I hazardously define co-pilots as those actors and factors that influence or
cooperate in making decisions without being the main engine themselves;
they do not necessarily favour change. They may favour continuity and
mollify drastic change, on the one hand, or act as starters and accelerators
of change, on the other. As in the previous categories, they can be found in
the institutional or social contexts and at national or international levels.
4.1 Federal and regional systems
The federal form of the state may have significant consequences for policy-
making. Decisions made at the federal level can be blocked by a veto or
minimum quorum by autonomous regions, while the same authorities at
lower levels can promote policy changes that will possibly be adopted at
the federal level. Federal solutions always imply high levels of delegation
of responsibilities to regional authorities and consequent territorial differen-
tiation within the same political system. Sub-national delegation can even
involve matters such as immigration rules or nationality laws, which are
usually the responsibility of the federal government. Differentiation does
not necessarily moderate changes at a local level, and it implies the possi-
bility of either contrasting or reinforcing federal decisions. In Spain, the
classic division of labour between the federal state, which is responsible
for immigration policies, and the regions, which handle immigrant policies,
was partially eroded by revision of the statute by autonomous commu-
nities, such as Catalonia and Andalusia (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. this vo-
lume). According to article 138 of the Catalonia Act of Autonomy, the re-
gion has a say in planning immigrant inflow because it is responsible for
integration services. And what it is perhaps more interesting is that
Spanish regions have vastly differing approaches, as far as the adoption of
multiculturalism strategies is concerned (Ruiz Vieytez 2008).
In Switzerland, different cantons and municipalities can decide to ask
for a supplementary term of residence before a foreigner can apply for nat-
uralisation (D’Amato this volume). In Germany (Heilbronner 2006) and in
Austria (Çinar & Waldrauch 2006), the federal form of the state and the
powers of municipalities allow for very different interpretations and imple-
mentation of nationality laws, and we consequently witness far different
rates of naturalisation.
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In Austria, territorial differentiation of citizenship stems from the past.
After the creation of the Dual Monarchy in 1867, Austrian nationality was
acquired by indirect membership: it was dependent on membership in the
Heimat and the related Heimatrecht. ‘[T]he belonging to a certain territorial
entity such as a town, rural district or other community provided ‘the basis
for relief and care of the poor’ (Brandl 1996: 63). In all these cases, lower
governmental agencies can be seen as co-pilots accompanying the centre
state legislative process and sometime taking the wheel.
4.2 Consensual governance and grand coalitions
The need to accommodate different cultures within one state led to various
solutions for reaching consensus, for instance, consociational forms of gov-
ernment that offer both opportunities for, and constraints to, the decision-
making process. Take the historical Belgian and Dutch examples of pillari-
sation, which is a proportional representation of all the main cultural and
political segments in government (Sartori 1975; Lijphart 1984), or the so-
called ‘magic formula’ in Switzerland. On the one hand, these solutions
permitted approval of unpopular measures since all the main parties could
share the burden of public discontent (D’Amato this volume). On the other
hand, consensual governments also acted as cushions against brisk turns,
since they needed to accommodate different positions. The same remarks
apply to so-called grand coalitions, which have occurred in Germany and
Austria. Consensual governance also imposes both mediation and conse-
quent moderation of political turns, as well as the possibility of introducing
new or unpopular decisions. Unpalatable measures are more likely to be
taken when decisions are kept out of the public eye, being confined to par-
liamentary committees where they stay less heated thanks to the favour-
trading that typically goes on in them (Buchanan & Tullock 1962). The
limited visibility of the decision-making process makes the search for
agreements between the majority and the opposition less embarrassing, not
to mention the fact that outcomes are moderated by the need to accommo-
date different stances.
Decision-making at the level of public administration, along with bipar-
tisan alignments, can facilitate approval of pro-immigrant policies, as they
can shelter unpalatable measures from public opinion. Guiraudon (2000,
2008) observes how social rights are less contested than political rights;
this has to do with decisions on the former being situated more within the
realm of public administration, while decisions on the latter are made in
Parliament and exposed to public opinion. According to this thesis, public
administration should facilitate the extension of welfare entitlements to im-
migrants. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily happen, as we see with the
1972 ‘Fontanet-Marcellin’ circular in France, which stopped the automatic
legalisation of illegal migrants after a certain period of residence. After all,
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the extension of scarce welfare provisions, such as social housing assign-
ment, are decisions usually made by non-elective bodies and they often
provoke strong backlashes. Civil servants’ attitudes towards innovation or
conservation do not depend on the role such individuals play, but on their
personal attitudes and their independence from or dependence on politi-
cians. Their being prepared to facilitate or obstruct political lines depends
on their level of autonomy, which may be the object of reforms and vary
in time, as so happened in the case of Italy illustrated in this volume. The
institutional frame and the sheltered positioning of decisions do not neces-
sarily predict their nature, nor their chances for success.
4.3 Constitutional courts, judiciary power
Law and courts may play an important role in the policy process at differ-
ent stages and levels. A number of clear examples from the chapters in this
volume show the importance of constitutional courts. In 2004, various de-
cisions of the Austrian Constitutional Court obliged the government to re-
vise the 2003 law that had limited asylum seekers’ rights. In Italy, creative
interpretations on the part of magistrates and rulings of constitutional court
judges were able to dismantle part of the centre-right Bossi-Fini measures
of 2002 (Zincone 2006). In 1987, the Spanish Constitutional Court de-
clared some articles of the 1985 act void. In 2007, that court declared that
a 2000 law denying immigrants full associational rights was unconstitu-
tional. A 1984 court ruling had set down a number of basic fundamental
rights valid for everybody, irrespective of their legal status, and the court
did not allow any of them to be curtailed by the 2000 law. In the French
case in 1986, the administrative tribunal of Paris cancelled the exclusion of
foreign mothers form the third child bonus introduced by Mayor Chirac, a
ruling confirmed by the Council of State. In 2000, the French
Constitutional Court voided the law, which limited access of handicapped
services to EU foreign residents. A 2003 ruling of the European Court of
Justice, based on the European Social Charter, obliged the French govern-
ment to revise the limits imposed on undocumented minors’ access to pub-
lic health. Increasingly, French courts have been supporting alien rights to
public education (Heymann-Doat 1994; Guiraudon 2008).
The literature and many of the case studies in this volume affirm the im-
portant role of international and national courts (Soysal 1994; Joppke
1999). Courts can moderate or oppose political measures. An important
area is that of rights of children and the family. Applying the habeas cor-
pus principle, for example, courts have opposed policy measures that sepa-
rated children from their parents, or broken up the family in other ways.
They have played this role in many individual EU member states as well
as at the EU level. Furthermore, by referring to principles embodied in na-
tional constitutions and in international tenets, judges cannot only oppose
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prejudices to human and civil rights, but can also promote and implement
new rights. This happened, for example, when courts enforced the right of
married women to keep their original nationality and pass it on to their
children. Such rulings that were eventually embodied in statute laws had
important consequences, especially in countries with large diasporas and
nationality laws that are generous to descendants of expatriates. This is the
case of Italy, where the rights of married women to keep their nationality
(1975) and pass it on to their children and husbands (1983) were first intro-
duced by constitutional court rulings. In Austria, the right of mothers to
pass on their nationality was also established by a ruling in 1985.
Nevertheless, as in the case of other actors and factors, courts and judges
do not always act as promoters or defenders of immigrants’ rights. They
can also oppose or prevent the extension of rights. And as far as promoting
or opposing rights is concerned, the courts can change their minds over
time. For instance, the German Supreme Court excluded the possibility for
married women to keep their nationality in 1953, but upheld its decision in
1999. From the 1990s onwards, the court no longer opposed government
policies aimed at reducing asylum inflows and the costs involved (Borkert
& Bosswick this volume). Never, though, has it changed its attitude against
local voting rights for immigrants.
The possibility for courts to prevent or oppose government decisions de-
pends primarily on how independent the magistracy is from the executive
branch. Along the same line, the courts’ willingness to intervene depends
on their ideological proximity or distance from the ruling majority. In the
Italian case, for instance, judges were relatively more compliant with cen-
tre-left decisions to limit illegal immigrants’ personal liberty than with the
centre-right’s repressive measures.
4.4 Welfare state regimes
The configuration and the strength of welfare regimes can be listed among
factors impacting the treatment of immigrants and related policies, though
they do not obstruct change or immigrants’ rights – neither do they favour
them. The classic Esping-Andersen (1990) typology distinguishes three
types of welfare regimes: the universalistic (strong and egalitarian), the cor-
poratist (strong but tailored to different categories of workers) and the resi-
dual (weak and supporting only the very poor). In theory, the universalistic
type should be more able to incorporate immigrants, but these kinds of re-
gimes are embedded in public cultures that are based on a high level of na-
tional identity, a sense of belonging to the community and sharing the
same public values, including mutual trust. In such a cultural and political
context, immigrants can be more easily perceived as ‘strangers’ and un-
wanted free-riders. Thus, paradoxically, universalistic welfare systems may
reinforce anti-immigrant backlash. This is the case in Denmark, where
CONCLUSION: COMPARING THE MAKING OF MIGRATION POLICIES 401
welfare transfers are high, funded by taxes and once having been open to
every permanent resident (Jensen 2007). In the same country, welfare can
be considered an obstacle to integration due to its ‘historical staples of
homogeneity and equality’, as Hedetoft (2006) has remarked (see also
Jensen 2007: 10).
In corporatist-type welfare states, where access to welfare depends on
having work, immigrants’ rights and access to social security may be lim-
ited to those who are able to obtain and keep a job. The system is, in prin-
ciple, open to immigrant workers but, in practice, the higher discontinuity
of immigrant employment can be damaging to them, as is illustrated in the
Austrian case (Kraler this volume). In countries of the residual welfare
state type, the perception of high public budget costs due to immigrants’
disproportionate use of relief can lead to the exclusion of non-citizens from
such programmes, as occurred in the 1996 welfare reform in the US. Any
kind of welfare presents potential severity for immigrants. Therefore,
although differences in welfare systems could theoretically be listed among
relevant co-pilots, analysis would tend to indicate that the impacts of dif-
ferent models appear more similar than expected.
4.5 State and civil society
How and to what extent are civil society partners, particularly religious
and workers’ organisations, involved in the decision-making process con-
cerning immigrants’ integration? And how and to what extent is the imple-
mentation of such policies delegated to them? As it emerges in this vo-
lume, countries like Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands initially
saw measures promoted and managed at a local level. NGOs, for the most
part being religiously affiliated, workers’ unions, teachers and social work-
ers played a key role. Generally speaking, civil society organisations are
important actors in policymaking and policy implementation. They do not
only act in accordance with laws, but also in opposition to them. We find
the latter case in Italy, where such civil society actors promoted and in-
itiated illegal practices in the past, for instance, allowing undocumented
immigrants access to public education and public health – practices that in-
creasingly became formalised. In this way, benevolent illegal practices
were increasingly embodied in formalised public decisions that were first
expressed in local circulars, then in national circulars, then in decrees and
eventually in laws (Zincone & Di Gregorio 2002; Zincone 2006b).
Interestingly, this informal lobby and its activity are widely financed by
formal public decision-makers. This does not only happen in Italy, but also
in other countries, as is illustrated by the German Wohlfahrtverbände, i.e.
advocacy coalition.21 Here we see immigrant advocacy coalitions receive
funding from the very same public authorities whose decisions they influ-
ence and whom they may resist or even disobey (Borkert & Bosswick this
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volume). The paradox can be explained by the fact that the coalitions com-
prise prestigious, powerful organisations which politics cannot ignore or
displease. These organisations can both cushion anti-immigrant changes
and promote innovations favourable to immigrants.22
Although most of these organisations have a religious affiliation, lobby-
ist action can in fact also originate from lay associations, such as parent-
and-teacher associations like the Reseau Education sans Frontières in
France. In August 2006, they were able to keep 30,000 families of minor
students excluded from the expulsion plan. Doctors and teachers in the
Netherlands who successfully resisted the 1998 Linkage Law aimed at ex-
cluding illegal immigrants from public health care and education
(Bruquetas-Callejo et al. this volume) are another example. In Germany,
doctors in some hospitals promoted the introduction of a special fund to
provide health services to undocumented immigrants. Nonetheless, compo-
nents of the advocacy coalition can change direction and become less pre-
pared to accept or defend illegal migration, as is in fact happening in some
EU countries. On the other hand, the advocacy coalition’s power depends
on just how open a window of political opportunity is within the local and
central governments. Unlike the previous three centre-right Berlusconi gov-
ernments (1994-1996; 2001-2005; 2005-2006), the fourth Berlusconi gov-
ernment no longer included the small Catholic party (UDC). Other relevant
pro-immigrant Catholic politicians, including former Minister of Interior
Giuseppe Pisanu, were marginalised. Even if some restrictive proposals
were stopped in Parliament by dissenting MPs, the window of opportunity
for advocacy coalitions under the fourth Berlusconi government was half-
closed, and an anti-immigrant-rights sentiment became very explicit from
some government members.
Third-sector organisations are relevant actors in those welfare systems in
which churches have been able to resist the penetration of the state and
where the level of ‘stateness’ remained relatively low, such as in the
Netherlands and Southern European countries (Flora & Heidenheimer
1981). In these systems, the state is accustomed to accepting a certain de-
gree of political dissent from the civil society organisations to which it de-
legates part of welfare functions. By contrast, systems that traditionally
have more control over the delegation of responsibilities and state subcon-
tractors tend to move welfare tasks from NGOs who are perceived as dis-
loyal to more reliable private organisations. This can be seen in the man-
agement of temporary detention centres for illegal immigrants in Austria
(Kraler this volume).
Trade unions are intermittent partners of pro-immigrant coalitions and
are characterised by contrasting roles. They typically discourage immigra-
tion to protect national labour, on the one hand, but they defend immi-
grants’ rights in order to prevent downward competition, on the other. In
general, trade unions in former emigration countries take more favourable
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stances from the beginning, as shown in the Spanish and Italian chapters in
this volume. In countries not perceiving themselves as immigration coun-
tries, as was the case with Austria and Germany, trade unions emerged
from a prevailing anti-immigration attitude. They eventually evolved to
take more favourable stances, when they understood that immigrant labour
was there to stay and that immigrants could be – and were increasingly be-
coming – unionised. The ambivalence still persists. As Cerna and
Wietholtz in this volume observe:
On the other hand, employers’ associations, trade unions and NGOs
are more directly engaged in the migration discussion through the
dissemination of press releases, reports, campaigns and formal me-
chanisms, e.g. having input on parliamentary committees (Ensor &
Shah 2005). The government has also started to engage in close
consultations with the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) and
the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to optimise migration policy con-
cerning economic needs. Overall, unions and employers have dis-
played a comparatively open policy position for labour migration.
All things considered, NGOs and professionals’ associations can align
themselves with unions and employers’ associations over needs to resolve
labour shortages with immigrant workers, at least until a tough economic
crisis forces them to take the side of national workers again.
NGOs of religious affiliation and employers can even find some oppor-
tunities in centre-right majorities, due to the presence of religious and pro-
entrepreneur parties. In countries like Italy, where union and NGO mem-
bers still predominantly belong to the ethnic majority, these organisations
serve as the ‘indirect representation’ of immigrants’ interests (Zincone
2000). Local voting rights of immigrants and the organisational strength of
immigrant groups can reinforce common ground and cooperation: if immi-
grant organisations are capable of mobilising votes for specific parties and
candidates, they can bargain their support for organisational resources, their
members and the immigrant community overall. Consequently, they can
also attract new members and become even more influential (Morén-
Alegret & Ruiz-Vieytez 2006). This applies all the more in countries that
host large communities of immigrants, especially in constituencies where
their vote is pivotal, as is the case with France. In the same vein, in coun-
tries like Britain and Germany, where immigrant associations themselves –
or the immigrant presence in unions – are strong enough, they can attain
‘direct representation’. This may enhance their rights, at least until an eco-
nomic depression overwhelms them with enough pressure from national
workers demanding priority access to jobs and social security. In normal
times, strong actions to protect or promote immigrants’ rights are not only
staged by anti-racist movements, but may also come from more
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multipurpose movements such as the anti-globalisation movement. Della
Porta (2007) found that more than 50 per cent of anti-globalisation groups
consider defending immigrant rights one of their priorities. The aforemen-
tioned actors’ pro-immigrant attitudes may change when national workers
are faced with high levels of unemployment due to economic crises.
4.6 Media, experts and civil servants
Media are often cited as potential co-pilots, as powerful actors and opi-
nion-makers capable of influencing policies. They serve as a selective
sounding board for politicians, experts and, of course, established journal-
ists. Journalists act both as reporters and opinion-makers, screening and in-
terpreting events. Journalism as a profession and journalists as individuals
can be more or less independent from political and economic power, more
or less respected by the political milieu and more or less willing and able
to network with other relevant actors. Societal coalitions that include media
may be powerful. In 2001, the Czech government was forced to amend the
Foreigners Act because of criticism coming from the joint action of NGOs,
the government’s human rights commissioner and the media (Čaněk &
Čižinský this volume). The political attitudes and policy directions sug-
gested by such actors can change over time, irrespective of their level of
independence and prestige and their capacity to form powerful alignments
and networks. They can alternatively influence continuity or change, but
their impact on policies convergence is unpredictable and sometimes
irrelevant.
Experts and civil servants, as well, are neither judgement-free nor indif-
ferent to their careers. It would be naive to consider them neutral or disin-
terested agents. They can both undermine changes and promote new poli-
cies – the direction of their influence can go conservative or innovative,
pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant (Feldblum 1999). When their proposals
are based on cross-national comparative studies and experience, as either
individuals or research centres, they can convey a convergence of policies,
provided the politicians they assist in making decisions intend to act in
tune with the international mainstream, and that the comparison is carried
out competently and objectively. Alternatively, they can produce continu-
ing divergence when their comparisons suggest that not sticking to the
country’s policy legacy would dilute national values without bringing posi-
tive results.23 Transnational think tanks usually adopt comparison as a
means of suggesting that policy lines be shared by different countries, an
attitude that aims at producing convergence (Ruzza 2007). Civil servants
and experts can favour continuity or just soften drastic changes, on one
hand, and promote innovation on the other – at least in theory. The role of
experts and civil servants varies according to the political cycle and to poli-
ticians’ previous curricula and careers. Empirical research shows that
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newly appointed ministers and chairmen, especially, tend to rely more on
experts and top-level civil servants, as is illustrated by the cases of the
Netherlands, Italy and Austria (Penninx et al. 2004; Widgren & Hammar
2004; Zincone & Di Gregorio 2002; Zincone 2006). This category’s influ-
ence depends on the prestige the actors enjoy both as a professional group
and individually.
Intellectuals, experts and civil servants enjoy different degrees of pres-
tige across countries and political cultures. A meeting of the minds be-
tween co-pilots and real pilots (the politicians) is crucial when it comes to
the recruitment of such co-pilots and the basis for their influence. This is
true for experts, in particular, since they are chosen on the premise of shar-
ing values and aims with the political decision-makers who seek their
advice. This, though, may create a catch-22: the closer experts are to a pol-
icymaker, the more they are likely to be listened to, but at the same time,
their capacity to steer decisions in a different direction is less meaningful
(Martiniello 2004).
Generally speaking, experts and civil servants often function less as co-
pilots and more as political tools. Penninx (2005) characterised recent
Dutch policymakers’ approach to selecting academic experts as a ‘pick-
and-choose’ strategy of scientific expertise. In such a strategy, experts can
be used for different purposes. For example, ad hoc committees can be ap-
pointed by large parliamentary agreement in order to remove hot issues
from political debate, letting them cool down (Widgren & Hammar 2004).
But the influence of experts can also change, depending on the political
evolution of immigrant and immigration policies in the country. When the
political elite feels more competent and the issue becomes more politicised,
research and experts may become perceived as troublesome encumbrances
(Entzinger 2008).
5 Cushions against radical change
In this section, I turn to cushions: actors and factors that moderate changes
or make it more difficult for them to take place. The effects of these actors
and factors may be similar to the ones illustrated in the preceding section,
but the mechanism through which they work is quite different. Cushions,
too, are positioned at a different decision-making level.
5.1 Direct democracy
Cushions can act at the institutional level, as in the case of the Swiss politi-
cal system. There, the referendum serves as a decision-making device by
creating high exposure of federal government reform projects to the veto
of the majority of voters. In Switzerland, referendums can even overrule
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the Supreme Court and possibly reform the Constitution, thereby under-
mining the main tools that protect religious and ethnic minorities of immi-
grant origins against discrimination, as D’Amato illustrates in this volume.
Direct democracy has actually played a crucial role in deciding against im-
migrants’ rights.24 This was the case of the September 2004 referendum
that rejected the government proposal to make access to nationality easier
for settled foreigners and minors born in the country, and in the case of the
successful November 2009 referendum against constructing new mosques.
As any social science rule, this one also allows exceptions: the February
2009 referendum to reject the adhesion to Schengen did not pass. But in
Switzerland, it is also the federal system – which foresees a quorum, a
minimum number of regions to pass a law and a qualified minority of re-
gions entitled to veto – that can potentially limit the rights of foreign-born
minorities. This part of the resident population is not allowed to vote in
either national referendums or cantonal elections.
5.2 Ineffective party systems
Governance capabilities largely depend on a party system’s format (i.e. the
number and size of parties) and its mechanics (i.e. the way it operates
according to relations among its parties).25 Highly fragmented and
polarised systems often get stuck; it is difficult for them to form large en-
ough, coherent coalitions (Sartori 1975). Party systems challenged to pro-
duce consistent majorities are forced to limit the scope and the innovation
of their policies, especially in conflicts. They consequently generate only
moderate changes.
Scant majorities that have to come to terms with the opposition must re-
frain from clear-cut reforms, delivering instead balanced, seemingly patch-
work legislation and policy. This is illustrated by Prodi’s Italian centre-left
governments and the last Social Democratic government in Germany (see
Zincone and Borkert & Bosswick this volume).
Even when the majority in government is large enough, if it is also highly
conflictual and hosts antithetical positions in matters of immigration and
immigrants’ rights, dramatic reform cannot be adopted, and things are likely
to stay the way they are. This syndrome is illustrated by the 2002 Bossi-
Fini reform under the second and third Berlusconi governments (2001-
2006): the Northern League’s xenophobic attitudes and the National
Alliance’s traditionally rightist push for stronger repression of illegal immi-
gration stood in stark contrast to the immigrant-friendly attitudes of the
Catholic component. The same happened during the Dutch Purple
Coalition: although the majority of parties involved favoured a shift towards
more state neutrality in religious and cultural matters, a minority that fa-
voured maintaining support for religious organisations and respecting their
autonomy was temporarily able to restrain the policy turn (Sunier 2007).
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5.3 The electorate and lobbies in the political cycle
The electorate and lobbies seem to have different impacts according to the
various phases of the electoral cycle. Irrespective of their strength and poli-
tical creed, elected decision-makers tend to conform to a behavioural pat-
tern that reproduces a sort of political cycle (Howlett & Ramesh 1995).
The cycle takes shape as follows. At the beginning, newly appointed mem-
bers to national or local governments tend to honour their electoral bill of
exchange and stick to their electoral manifestos that tend to please public
opinions’ moods. Later on, they must respond to powerful lobbies. But im-
mediately before new elections, parties in power must respond again to
public opinion, even if the opinions conflict with their own values, since
they do not want to lose to the competition. As some country cases pre-
sented in this volume illustrate, powerful lobbies are not necessarily anti-
immigrant. More often, they act as pro-immigrant advocacy coalitions. By
contrast, public opinion can sometimes be more anti-immigrant, especially
in recent years.
In reality, the political cycle syndrome occurs only on the condition that
all other factors remain the same. If public opinion towards immigration,
labour needs, pressure from lobbies, the volume and nature of inflows or
other relevant elements of the political context alter, parties in power have
to change their line, thus breaking the cycle. Observing the recent period
of French policies, De Wenden in this volume reaches the conclusion that
their making was led by public opinion. I am not sure this remark can be
applied to the whole history of French policies, but it is certainly relevant
for some periods. Yet, this does not hold only for France. What we observe
in a comparative perspective is a contrasting action between electorate atti-
tudes and pro-immigrant lobbies. This give and take can generate ‘ba-
lanced policies’ – that is, moderate innovation.
5.4 Balancing policy inputs
Generally speaking, environmental pressures often act in divergent direc-
tions. This suggests that policymakers must adopt what the authors of the
British chapter in this volume have defined as ‘balanced’ policies, which
are the opposite of radical changes.
Balanced policies are the outcome of a twist effect. Patchwork reforms
and policies can result from, on the one hand, the demands of an increas-
ingly frightened public, the surge of a cultural divide and ethnic turmoil,
deterioration of public order, terrorism, the rise of competitive anti-immi-
grant parties or the role of xenophobic factions within the political majority
and, on the other hand, objective needs for skilled and unskilled workers,
compliance with principles and rights embodied in international conven-
tions or national constitutions, the presence of pro-immigrant parties in the
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majority, vocal pro-immigrant movements and influential advocacy coali-
tions. A case in point is the 1993 British law, which made it possible for
asylum seekers to appeal the rejection of their application while staying in
the country though excluded overstayers and students from entitlement to
temporary permits (Cerna & Wietholtz this volume). Another example
Withol de Wenden provides in this volume is Autain’s 1981 law in France,
which tried to appease NGOs and leftist movements by legalising some
150,000 irregular immigrants while also reassuring a public that was hos-
tile to illegal immigrants by punishing their employers more severely. In
the same vein, the 1998 Italian centre-left law established not only a set of
social rights, but also introduced detention centres for illegal immigrants.
The 2002 Italian centre-right act, in its turn, reinforced repressing measures
and the link between employment and residence permit, on the one hand,
but kept all social rights that were granted by the former centre-left govern-
ment, including access to public health and compulsory free education for
illegal immigrants, on the other. On top of that, the centre-right govern-
ment voted for the largest regularisation provision in Italian history and, at
that time, it was the largest ever adopted in Europe.
The regularity and frequency of the mechanisms that cushion radical
change raises the question as to whether scholars are not too often tempted
to single out dramatic turns in the policies they analyse. In fact, switches
do take place because factors and actors change. But are they as frequent,
one-way and dramatic as we often describe them? Are we sure that they
are not overrated? For example, a significant group of colleagues has de-
creed the death of some national models, particularly multicultural models.
Let me suggest a more moderate thesis. Models were not as homogeneous
and orthodox as they were depicted. As Withol de Wenden reminds us, in
assimilationist France: ‘[f]rom 1974 onwards, “language and culture of ori-
gin” were thus taught in schools to children of foreigners’. Models de-
scribed as multicultural, such as the British, the Dutch and the Danish
ones, were all hiding a creed of the superiority of the national culture, the
pretence of either a spontaneous future assimilation or the hope that by
keeping their own language and customs, immigrants and their descendants
would more easily be tempted, if not convinced, to go back home. In fact,
the same political systems have adopted different models in different peri-
ods (Vasta 2007a; Brubacker 2001; Guiraudon 2008). And we must add
that sometimes public rhetoric and theoretical models, on the one hand,
and real policies, on the other hand, may take separate paths and/or move
at different speeds. However, it has been observed (Hall 1993) that empiri-
cal developments in context do not necessarily produce immediate changes
in policy paradigms. For instance, Geddes (2003) noticed that divergences
among European immigrant policies persisted during the 1970 and 1980s,
while similar challenges had to be faced by the European states. Policies
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and policy frames are characterised by a considerable degree of stickiness
for each set of factors illustrated up until now.
Having said this, we do not want to overrate persistence and continuity,
either. Policies can embody relevant changes as well, straight changes did
and do take place and, as I have emphasised, actors and factors are also re-
sponsible for changes in assigning pilots. Moreover, though divergences
are doomed to persist, relevant convergences do occur and are occurring.
In the next section, I will illustrate some common factors and actors pro-
voking shared changes and convergence between EU countries’ policies,
many of which are embodied in EU provisions and documents.
6 Converging trends and contradictory developments
Having focused in the preceding sections on actors and factors that pro-
mote or hinder policy changes within single political systems, I will now
change gears to ask which macro-developments – common to, and influen-
tial, on all the observed systems – may produce convergence of policies,
now or in the near future. I will also illustrate how these common develop-
ments simultaneously embody relevant contradictions.
6.1 The pattern of migration policies
A first factor explaining current policy convergences across the EU politi-
cal systems originates from the fact that country systems have followed a
similar pattern, one that emerges from many of the cases analysed.26 I do
not intend to dust off the old theory of migratory cycles, nor do I propose
a deterministic vision of the evolution of migration policies. I would just
like to highlight a recurrent evolution of policy. For the sake of simplicity,
let me call that a ‘pattern’.
The pattern I am going to describe is not synchronic. The cases observed
in this volume entered into the pattern at different points in time and with
specific characteristics, and they proceed at unique speeds. This discre-
pancy in timing is one factor explaining differing immigration and immi-
grant policy models of the past, whereas increased synchronisation can be
listed among reasons for, at least in relative terms, the original models
coming to crisis and the present convergence. We can distinguish two fa-
cets to the pattern. The first concerns an evolution of the countries’ interna-
tional relations, notably joining the EU; the other concerns the presence of
immigrants and religious groups of immigrant origins, their perceived de-
gree of social, economic and cultural integration – or non-integration – and
their interactions with the autochthonous community over time.
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6.1.1 EU-prompted patterns
Current member states joined the EU at different points in time, and at
their point of entry, they were not tied by the same commitments on immi-
gration and immigrant policies. The UK, together with Ireland and
Denmark, joined the EU on 1 January 1971. When common immigration
and integration policies started to emerge in the 1990s, the British govern-
ment added a protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty that allowed it to opt out
of decisions made by the majority in matters of asylum and immigration.27
In practice, however, the UK used this option only in a limited number of
cases, and was particularly active and influential in the making of the asy-
lum directive, a hot issue in the country.
Together with Portugal, Spain joined the EU in 1986 with more convic-
tion than the UK. It was consequently more prepared to undertake a rapid
process of adjustment to communitarian laws and standards, and to adhere
promptly to the Dublin and Schengen Treaties. As the authors of the
Spanish chapter in this volume observe, even though there were few immi-
grants in the country then, it was
in 1985, that the first Foreigners Law28 was passed in the central
parliament. The way these events unfolded indicates that Spain’s
full incorporation into the European Communities in 1986 played a
more important role for introducing the law than any immigration
statistics.
Needing to comply with EU requirements appears to be a fundamental fac-
tor in explaining Polish and Czech policies during the preparation period
in which they were under scrutiny. For instance, they had to comply with
the Schengen Treaty as far as the control of the borders was concerned.
More generally, as Čaněk and Čižinský write in this volume: ‘The need to
harmonise legislation before and after the Czech Republic’s entry into the
EU produced a considerable amount of work for the high-level Czech ad-
ministration dealing with migration policies’ (Baršová & Barša 2005).
Although migration policy in the 2000s is described as more conceptual
and active, it is still regarded by experts as being, to some extent, ‘mainly
EU-driven’. Immigration policies have remained a matter of mostly high-
level bureaucrats (Drbohlav 2007; Baršová 2005). Even though prospective
and actual entry into the European Community was the main international
factor, the opportunity to act in concordance with international organisa-
tions such as the Council of Europe, UNHCR, IOM, the Budapest Process
(located at ICMPD) and the ILO influenced the first phases of migration
policies in the re-established Czech Democracy.
Poland also had to conform to Schengen standards, accept the status of
safe third country and comply with EU legislation in general. EU policy
constraints and transfer of experience from some of the older member
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states played a crucial role in developing policies, as Kicinger and Koryś
in this volume observe. The main consequence of their reacquired political
liberty and orientation towards the West implied a cultural and legal re-
framing of emigration, condemned under the earlier Communist regime
and then accepted as a factor of economic growth. And although immigra-
tion was not yet a real political domestic issue, Poland had to get equipped
with dedicated public bodies to manage it: in order to appoint its proper re-
presentative at EU decision-making meetings, Poland had to mirror the de-
cision-making structure of other EU member states.
6.1.2 Internally conditioned patterns
We start noticing that the pattern does not concern only actors and factors
of migration policies, but also the administrative and governmental organi-
sation of policymaking. In other words, it is not just the policy ‘software’,
but also the policy ‘hardware’ – the structure of the state that counts. This
observation also applies to another facet of the pattern: the domestic.
In the beginning, when immigration is still unnoticed, immigrants are
conflated with other foreigners. As stated in the Czech chapter, the migra-
tion regime set up by the 1992 Foreigners Act ‘was based on the assump-
tion that it was not necessary to regulate issues related to foreigners in a
way that would dramatically differ from the general norms of administra-
tive law’ (Uhl 2005). In this phase, responsibilities mostly fall under the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though they can be shared by the Ministry of
Interior if aliens are perceived as a potential treat to the public order.
When the first significant waves of immigrants enter the country, they
are usually seen as labour migrants, and treated as such. Consequently, po-
licies pertain to the regulation of entry, residence and work permits. An im-
portant rationale behind these regulations is the protection of the national
labour force against what is supposed to be a potential source of competi-
tion. Under pressure of the trade unions, initial immigration policies in the
UK were motivated by the desire to protect the national labour force, as
Cerna and Wietholtz note in this volume.
[…]1961 saw a particularly massive increase in immigration num-
bers. A political campaign against non-white immigration conse-
quently emerged first within the public, then among opposition
members in Parliament and finally in the Ministry of Labour
(Hansen 2001). The campaign was ultimately able to stop the open
policy in 1962 with the first Commonwealth Immigrants Act […]
The act ruled that Commonwealth immigrants could enter the UK
only via a voucher scheme unless they were born in the UK, held a
British passport or were included on such a passport.
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In France, Germany, the Netherlands and other European countries, it
was the 1973 oil crisis, in particular, that led to policies protecting domes-
tic manpower and encouraging foreign workers to repatriate, often with the
blessing of trade unions. Pressured by high rates of unemployment, rela-
tively recent immigration countries such as Italy and Spain also adopted
protective measures to deal with the first significant inflows.
Later on, the same trade unions that may have previously opposed immi-
gration became promoters of equal rights for immigrant workers. They did
this for two reasons: first, unions wanted to avoid downward competition
by letting immigrant labour forces go unprotected and consequently be-
come less costly and more flexible than national labour; second, immigrant
workers were increasingly becoming members of unions, some of them
also being active militants. The preference clauses in favour of national
and EU workers, which were initially introduced in many European coun-
tries to protect autochthonous workers, were either removed or simply not
implemented. An additional reason for this choice was that proving the un-
availability of preferred national and EU workers before new immigrants
could be hired turned out to be both cumbersome and ineffective.
Recently, however, new protective measures were again adopted. This hap-
pened when national working-class and long-term resident immigrants be-
gan to perceive newcomers as competitors on a tough labour market.
‘Shifting the “locus” of control from the factory gate to the national bor-
der’ (Gächter 2000) becomes a major objective of trade unions, as reported
by the authors of the Austrian chapter in this volume.
In the second phase of the labour migrant pattern, we observe organisa-
tion of their recruitment. In order to manage workers’ migration, bilateral
agreements with the sending country are signed and some temporary ac-
commodation is provided. With their possible repatriation in mind, new
immigrant groups are allowed to retain their native language and customs.
The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Interior are still relevant, but sig-
nificant responsibilities are assigned to the Ministry of Labour and, in the
case of institutionalised neo-corporatism, social partners also play a role.
In the third phase, immigrants tend to settle, even if not particularly wel-
come, and become a steady part of the population. When nations even-
tually accept that they have become countries of immigration, as in the
case of Germany, incorporation and integration policies are introduced.
Such policies tend to respond to objective needs of immigrants (Bonomi
2008), and they result in equating rights of long-term residents to those of
citizens. EU policy lines conveyed these principles in the 1999
Conclusions of the Tampere Council, which proposed to give long-term
third-country residents ‘comparable rights’, embodied later in the long-term
residents rights directive of 25 November 2003 (see Halleskov 2005). In
this phase, long-term residents acquire a larger share of social rights. In
some European countries, they even get local voting rights and/or other
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lesser forms of representation. Sometimes, a more generous access to na-
tionality is introduced and knowledge of the local language is favoured.
The non-synchronic character of this ‘evolutionary pattern’ clearly
emerges when we observe the evolution of immigrants’ rights that are out-
side the realm of EU policies, such as political rights (Waldrauch 2003)
and access to citizenship (Bauböck et al. 2006, 2007; Aleinikoff &
Klusmeyer 2001; Hansen & Weil 2001; Nascimbene 1996). But that char-
acter is also observable in relation to long-term residents’ rights and family
reunion rights, which are now, in principle, regulated by communitarian di-
rectives though do not necessarily become uniform (Groenendijk 2006).
In this third phase, the sectors of education, welfare and social affairs
are involved in policymaking, but a leading role in coordinating what has
become an intricate web of complex public interventions is usually as-
signed to the Ministry of Interior. Previous and new responsibilities are as-
signed to this ministry, not least because it is responsible for the bulk of
nationality procedures in many legal systems. Ad hoc bodies, such as inte-
gration committees or even ministries of immigration, can be created. EU
directives, being the results of long decisional processes, may eventually
be approved only to find that the European political climate has, in the
meantime, changed. As such, EU directives can be used to restrict immi-
grant rights even though they were conceived with different aims. For in-
stance, Directive 2003/109EC on long-term resident third-country nationals
was used to introduce the language and integration requirements and to
raise the time of residence to deliver permanent stay permits in, for in-
stance, France, the Netherlands and Italy (Bauböck, et al. 2006a: 29).
When racial riots, value clashes, petty and high-profile crime, a real or
perceived welfare burden and/or acts of transnational terrorism start sur-
rounding immigrant communities, immigration and the presence of immi-
grants start being seen as problems to be solved. Public policy’s main aims
become fighting crime, combating illegal entry and trafficking, avoiding
unemployment and free-riding by immigrants and dealing with cultural di-
vides. In the wake of new national priorities such as these, EU policies also
become more oriented towards combating illegal entry, smuggling and traf-
ficking of immigrants, criminality and terrorism. The Conclusions of the
Presidency of the European Council in Seville (21-22 June 2002) can be
considered an important step in that direction: among other things, they es-
tablished the principle of including cooperation agreements in readmission
programmes. Frontex, the European agency responsible for controlling ex-
ternal borders, was created in October 2004, and the new External Borders
Fund 2007-2013 was richly endowed. The European Pact on Immigration
and Asylum approved in October 2008 embodied this attitude as well.29 In
this phase, the core responsibilities remain in the hands of the Ministry of
Interior, though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a relevant role as
well. Often together with the Presidency of the Council, these ministries
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are involved in rebuilding and combining immigration policies by reaching
bilateral agreements with sending and transit countries. The new goals are
enforcing public security, reducing welfare spending and promoting cultur-
al and social cohesion. Vasta (2007a: 10) observes how, since 2000, in
Britain, ‘a new official strategy of commission on “cohesion” has been in-
troduced’ almost annually.
Changes in framing and responsibility shifts have not only taken place
in individual countries, but also within the European Commission. Up until
2000, there was only one specific taskforce within the office of the
Secretary General; migration responsibilities were distributed among differ-
ent directorates – including those for employment, social affairs and equal
opportunities – though they all played important roles. In 2000, the new
Directorate-General for Freedom, Security and Justice was established to
absorb the scattered responsibilities. EU policy lines are the result of single
member states’ positions, their bargaining power and their propensity to
exchange favours – they reflect member states’ policy changes. That said,
such changes at this level are somewhat moderated by the temporal lags
between national and EU elections and by the EU’s complex decision-
making procedures.
The country chapters in this volume, particularly on Austria, the
Netherlands and Italy, underscore the relation between changes in the con-
ceptualisation of immigration and integration, on the one hand, and the al-
location of responsibilities, on the other. All the same, within that general
rule there is complex variation as far as where the responsibilities are allo-
cated. In theory, responsibility in centre-right governments, which are more
security-oriented, should be mainly allocated to the Ministry of Interior,
whereas a more integration-oriented centre-left government should place
more responsibilities in the Ministries of Social Affairs and of Welfare.
Authors of the Dutch and Italian chapters in this volume, however, observe
how both policy attitudes and the allocation of responsibilities can also
vary within governments composed by the same party majorities. In prac-
tice, centre-right as well as centre-left governments can house more or less
pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant ministers who may, in turn, be granted
different levels of responsibility, depending on their influence within the
cabinet. Under the second Berlusconi government, for instance, Minister of
Interior Pisanu was a moderate, and his handling of immigration policies
cannot be read as solely security-oriented.
To conclude, immigration started at different points in time in European
countries, which partially explains the diversity across EU member states’
policies. Furthermore, not only do the reasons for their start and transitions
into following phases vary, but so do policy developments and results.
This is the consequence of the receiving countries’ different institutional
and economic profiles, their different legacies and immigrations’ varying
configuration and impact. Latecomers such as Poland and the Czech
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Republic catch up with their predecessors through the diffusion of policies
imported from political systems possibly considered more advanced or
more experienced in the field. On the other hand, they have to comply with
EU rules once they have joined the EU. But perhaps more importantly, all
these countries now have similar problems, albeit in different measure.
Common challenges are directly shaping the immigration policies of EU
partners and consequently bringing about convergence. Though these com-
mon problems may primarily impact leading partners in the EU, they will
also have an effect on political systems that are less directly affected at
present.
7 Economic and political macro-developments
As the present migratory drama plays out, at work backstage are the same
economic and political macro-factors that are driving current transforma-
tions of affluent societies. Developed immigrations are converging at pre-
sent, and they could very well lead to convergence in the future.
7.1 International economic competition, labour markets and the
persistent transnational crisis
This section will begin by discussing pre-crisis factors, because the eco-
nomic crisis that began in the late 2000s and still persists at the time of
writing did not just introduce new elements, but also aggravated elements
– and problems – that were already there. A first important factor was in-
creased economic competition among members of ‘the old club’ and suc-
cessful new entries from the emerging economies, thus putting pressure on
national businesses and workers to boost their productivity. Labour was
one of these strategic resources. To face international competition, the old
economies required more productive, flexible manpower. This resulted in
policies aiming to cut back the costs of labour and increase productivity. A
delocalisation of production and importing more flexible, less protected
alien manpower were among the tools available to face increasing competi-
tion. Furthermore, increasing competition from abroad led to the curbing
of other costs, taxes and contributory welfare costs. This meant that in
more productive regions, employers and workers, alike, were reluctant to
delegate resources to what they redefined as a parasitic part of the national
stock. Richer regions requested and sometimes obtained a higher level of
control over their fiscal resources, as well as some delegation of economic
responsibilities. At the same time, the current economic crisis obliges them
to devote important resources to create social shock absorbers and tools for
recharging the economy, and to invest parsimoniously. Needing to
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prioritise and search for funds, governments tend to save resources or with-
draw new taxes and contributions from non-voters – that is, from
immigrants.
Furthermore, even before the crisis, increased global competition was
causing national workers to fear economic insecurity. This was exacerbated
by worries of being displaced by newcomers and losing their jobs to them.
Impatience, if not hostility, towards immigrant communities was and is re-
inforced by the disappearance of a familiar – and symbolic – social land-
scape, by the fear of cultural dispossession. From a national perspective, a
negative portrayal of immigrants takes root: immigrant workers, being a
modern labour ‘reserve army’, are more exposed to unemployment and
therefore become perceived as a burden to the public budget. Nationals are
not prepared to redistribute resources or opportunities to immigrants,
whom they are inclined to consider less deserving poor people, if not unde-
serving altogether. As societies become more fragmented and diversified,
the propensity to redistribute decreases, and the boundaries of solidarity
are redrawn. Here we see that ‘useless’ aliens are unlikely to be included,
especially when a society is faced with greater needs and limited resources.
Funds are preferably devoted to incentivising the repatriation of unem-
ployed immigrants; measures of this kind were taken in some EU countries
after the 1973 oil crisis and recently have been proposed again.
Neither the backstage factors nor the reactions to their impact achieve
the same degree of relevance in all European countries, though they are
proving able to lead present policy trends.
7.2 Demographic necessity versus economic insecurity
Behind the mechanism outlined above, another common factor is at work:
Europe’s specific demographic features and their possible consequences.
The problem is widely known by now: birth rates have fallen across
Europe and shortages of labour supply are predicted as a result. Between
now and 2050, the working population (aged between fifteen and 64) will
decrease by 59 million (European Commission 2007).
Of course, the impact of this factor is not homogeneously distributed,30
nor will the effects of the demographic development have the same impact
in all EU countries. Also contingent is the development of national econo-
mies and labour markets. Before the current crisis, December 2007, for ex-
ample, unemployment in the EU varied from 2.8 per cent in the
Netherlands and 3.1 per cent in Denmark to 7.9 per cent in Germany, 7.7
per cent in Portugal, 7.7 per cent in France and 8.7 per cent in Spain – the
EU-16 adjusted average being 7.2 per cent (Eurostat 2009). Even though
the unemployment rates were quite different, public opinion in countries
with fewer economic problems also perceived a certain degree of economic
insecurity. Since unemployment rates are rapidly rising everywhere in
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Europe,31 the impact of this factor will be much stronger than prior. Jobs
once largely rejected by nationals (e.g. housekeeping, care-giving, agricul-
tural labour) are now becoming acceptable. We have already observed a
number of conflicts between national and immigrant workers in European
agricultural regions, as well as protests by blue-collar workers who are los-
ing their jobs due to the recession, and thus demand receiving priority,
even over immigrant workers from old EU member states.
In the field of migration and integration, rising insecurity will play an
important role in future policymaking. That insecurity used to be rein-
forced by rising prices and the loss of purchasing power by employed
workers, which was considered one cause of France’s rejection of the
European Constitution. Though prices at the beginning of a depression de-
cline due to decreased demand, they may rise again, and other serious pro-
blems are likely to occur. Insecurity is reinforced by an increased share of
temporary jobs,32 which these days are the first to be eliminated.
Economic insecurity may become the main ‘fright factor’ able to influence
future policies. In this scenario, all kinds of other factors ‘fall into place’
so as to generate hostility towards immigration, whether the worries are va-
lid or not. As a result, high rates of immigrant unemployment,33 the sup-
posed burden on the welfare budget and competition for social security are
easily accompanied by complaints about immigrants’ poor educational
skills, disloyalty, criminality, etc.
7.3 Public attitudes towards immigration and migrants
As stated earlier, the population’s changing attitudes on immigration and
immigrants – and the focus of their fears – provide important ‘raw materi-
al’ for policymaking. So, what is the current situation? And what can we
expect? Or, at least, how were things immediately before the transnational
economic crisis that began in the late 2000s?
On the positive side, according to comparative opinion polls taken be-
fore the crisis, competition for scarce welfare resources did not top auto-
chthonous concerns. By contrast, substitution of national workers with im-
migrant workers had already been seen as an imminent risk – despite
scientific evidence being more inclined34 to dismiss the supply of immi-
grant workers as having an irrelevant impact on national unemployment.
An important concern linked to immigration, at least in Europe, has long
been crime rates among immigrants and their descendants. In some coun-
tries, this concern used to score higher than the fear of losing one’s job to
an immigrant. Again, these attitudes do not necessarily have empirical
grounds: rates of foreign criminality and indicators, such as the foreign po-
pulation in prison, vary considerably from country to country, depending
on many factors; some categories of foreigners are more law-abiding than
the autochthonous populations; and undocumented immigrants commit far
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more crimes than legal immigrants.35 But according to the majority of
European national statistics, the percentage of immigrants in prison is high-
er than their presence as residents, a factor capable of impacting public
opinion in a negative way. Together with the stories of clandestine entries
stressed by the media, criminality contributes to the image of immigration
as being out of control. Furthermore, cultural and religious minorities are
seen as challenging core national values, such as gender equality and free-
dom of opinion.
Such fears are not felt to the same extent in all European countries, and
they also vary over time. For instance in Germany, France, and new EU
member states (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), the prevailing
fear up until recently was losing one’s job. Meanwhile in Italy, public order
and security were felt to be the most important (Diamanti & Bordigon
2005). Perceptions and the consequent hierarchies of fear that they create
are doomed to change under the pressure of looming economic crises and
international catastrophes. Nevertheless, in this regard one actor has played
the leading role: transnational terrorism. Perpetrated by Muslims and ap-
pealing to poorly integrated immigrant communities, this vicious antihero
in the migratory drama appears here to stay. The combined fears of unma-
naged immigration, failures in immigrant integration and terrorism are of-
ten cited as the top three problems to be faced by future generations of
Europeans (Eurobarometer 2007). Again, the sum of immigration-linked
fears reaches different percentages across countries, but together the pro-
blems score a remarkable average of 40 per cent in the EU-27.
I am aware that this outline is too brief to adequately sketch the complex
globalisation and de-globalisation syndrome studied in depth in a vast
amount of literature. It is also impossible to foresee the evolution and/or
the impact of the current crisis. I do, however, wish to briefly recall some
of the macro-factors setting the scene. The sketch can help explain the
main converging trends that characterise ongoing immigration and integra-
tion policies.
7.4 Focus on utility-selective migration: Is zero immigration back in
fashion?
Although facts, data and opinions related to immigration and its impact are
highly variable across the Continent, policies of European countries present
common trends that are led by the factors and actors outlined above. The
need to reduce public spending while allowing only ‘useful’ immigration
is responsible for a set of shared policy trends, driven by a cost-benefit ap-
proach that is currently referred to with bywords such as ‘managed migra-
tion’ or, in French, ‘immigration choisie’. Though it incorporates a mix of
elements and timelines, this policy trend is visible in most European coun-
tries and EU policy lines. Its basic aim is to maximise the positive impact
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of immigration and reduce or soften its negative impact. Such policies try
to attract highly skilled immigrant workers while simultaneously discoura-
ging the immigration of those who might burden the public budget, such
as reunified family members and asylum seekers. Such policies also adopt
more stringent requirements for immigrant acquisition of legal status, and
they limit refugees’ and reunified family members’ access to welfare provi-
sions. They attempt to spread the costs and impact of refugees over the en-
tire country, doing their best to share the burden with EU member states.
This cost-benefit oriented attitude is not new. It was actually the basis of
the guest worker policies of the 1960s and 1970s. After the 1973 oil crisis
it was strengthened, becoming the driving force behind policy campaigns
such as ‘zero immigration’ and ‘Fortress Europe’. Nonetheless, this attitude
was abandoned when Europe was faced with objective needs for more
manpower, as well as the impossibility of putting a halt on family reunions
and asylum seekers. The limited openness that followed can be defined as
a ‘selective borders’ approach. It intended to admit only ‘useful’ immi-
grants referred to as skilled workers; the unskilled were admitted only inso-
far as they were useful in an immediate way, as is the case with seasonal
and temporary workers participating in so-called circular migration.
Save for some exceptions,36 doors were only opened to highly skilled
immigrants (IT experts, in particular), seasonal or temporary workers and
students. This was the case with Germany’s reforms in 2000 and 2001. It
was also the case with Britain, as Cerna and Wietholtz (2008) remind us:
Over the last decades, the UK has undergone a profound shift from
a ‘zero-immigration country’ to one that adheres to the paradigm of
‘managed migration’ (Layton-Henry 1994, 2004). Since the 1990s,
British immigration policy has been characterised as restrictive to-
wards asylum seekers and illegal migrants but welcoming towards
skilled and highly skilled migrants. To this end, UK governments
have passed several major pieces of legislation on immigration and
asylum, namely, in 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2004.
Introduced in March 2006, the point system left little space for unskilled
immigrants, a labour force to be provided mainly by new EU member
states whose access to welfare benefits was restricted. In 2006, French
Minister of Interior Sarkozy reopened the borders for the first time since
the oil crisis of 1973, but only to skilled and seasonal workers. And in
October 2007, a proposal was presented that would establish common pro-
cedures and possibly a common entry visa for highly skilled workers by
means of an EU directive; it reflected a policy line that by then prevailed
among member states.
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Though the October 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum
explicitly excluded such a prospect, Spain, Britain and Italy announced that
they will possibly be returning, at least temporarily, to a sort of zero immi-
gration policy. Due to EU enlargement, however, blocking new immigra-
tion flows is even more difficult to implement than it was in the 1970s. In
Italy, for instance, Romanians are the largest minority both in terms of for-
eign residents and inflows, and they cannot be expelled for unemployment.
Repatriation programmes, which have already been planned, will prove as
ineffective as they were 35 years ago. Unemployed immigrants who cannot
find a new job go back to their native country on their own, especially if
they have the possibility of moving freely and returning to their receiving
country once the economic situation improves. Greater opportunities for
mobility make it easier for new EU member state immigrants to go back
and forth. They have indeed started to repatriate, but the relatively more ra-
pid and deep crisis of their own countries’ economies is likely to discou-
rage return.
The dire economic situation aside, selective immigration cannot be con-
sidered a rational choice when national economies also need a stable
source of unskilled workers, as then EU Commissioner Frattini noted
(Frattini 2005: 21). Sometimes the discrepancy between rhetoric on selec-
tive borders and actual economic needs has been bridged by a de facto tol-
erance of the undocumented workers who are widely present, even in offi-
cially ‘severe’ countries, as is demonstrated by mobilisations of undocu-
mented babysitters and caregivers in France.37
Subsequently, clandestine and overstaying immigrants can be either reg-
ularised by relatively open, automatic individual procedures, through mass
amnesties or by surreptitiously being inserted in ‘planned’ inflow quotas,
as the Spanish and Italian cases show. In Italy, it has been estimated that
two out of three legal immigrants (Blangiardo 2005) have gone through a
period of illegal residence.38 For much of the last decade, irregular immi-
gration reached over 40 per cent in Spain (González-Enríquez 2009), while
‘extraordinary’ regularisations have been constant immigration policy tools
in Southern Europe (González-Enríquez & Triandafyllidou 2009). Even if
legal flows of low-skilled workers are banned, a way in will be found all
the same. This was the case in the Czech Republic where, after the restric-
tive act of 2001, immigrants started to arrive as bogus self-employed
workers.
From a legal point of view, illegal immigrants, together with asylum see-
kers (bogus ones, in particular) top the list of undesired immigrants. They
are the unwanted immigrants par excellence; collectively labelled as migra-
tion gone ‘out of control’, they are to be combated. Sometimes the two ca-
tegories come from the same reservoir of potential immigrants who switch
between the two possibilities for entry: asylum or illegality, depending on
respective opportunities offered. As Castles (2004: 211) has noted: ‘Since
CONCLUSION: COMPARING THE MAKING OF MIGRATION POLICIES 421
weak economy and weak states generally go together, people move both to
escape impoverishment and human rights abuse. Such multiple motivations
lead to a migration-asylum nexus’. In 1999, the Czech government passed
a law that abolished the opportunity to convert tourist permits, often over-
stayed, into work and residence permits, thus leaving this possibility open
to asylum seekers only. As a consequence, the number of asylum seekers
increased enormously, and a subsequent law came to limit access to asy-
lum. Restrictions move from one position to another like pieces on a chess-
board, always endeavouring to checkmate unwanted immigration.
To facilitate the identification and potential deportation of illegal immi-
grants, temporary detention centres were introduced in the late 1990s. Over
the course of time, the length of detainment in such centres was extended
in a number of countries, for instance, Austria and Italy. The EU directive
of June 2008, which sets a maximum term of eighteen months, was taken
by Italy and Spain as an opportunity to lengthen detention.
Several tools have been introduced to manage asylum inflows. These in-
clude quicker yet more severe scrutiny of asylum applications, the princi-
ples of safe country of origin and safe third country and burden-sharing
among various regions as seen, for example, between Austria and
Germany since the beginning of the 1990s. Territorial distribution and cash
provision limits were adopted in the UK in 1999 through the Immigration
and Asylum Act (Bommes & Geddes 2000). The criteria of safe third
country and the proposal for a minimum common list of European coun-
tries to be regarded as safe was eventually embodied in EU Directive 85/
2005.
The fall of the Communist regimes and EU enlargement have been parti-
cularly beneficial to the countries that once bordered the EU. By contrast,
new EU border countries, such as the Czech Republic, have had to adapt
to their new position, not only introducing the safe country of origin and
safe third country principles (1997), but also adopting other measures of
older EU member states, such as delivering visas to embassies abroad and
forbidding the transformation of work permit applications into asylum ap-
plications (1999). This was all done in order to prepare for inflows of asy-
lum seekers and other unwanted immigrants.
Starting in the early 1990s, marriages of convenience also began being
combated more severely. Stricter requirements for the acquisition of rights,
particularly for residence and naturalisation, were increasingly imposed on
spouses, for instance, in Austria (2002), in France (1993-2003) and via the
2009 Italian Law on Public Security. Immigrant families, elderly parents,
adolescent children and uneducated spouses are considered a potential bur-
den for social security as well as a hindrance to integration, and conse-
quently treated as unwelcome categories.
In order to curtail unwanted inflows, restrictions on one right can be
transferred to another right that has been identified as a more efficient
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‘gatekeeper’. In Austria, for instance, ‘tightening conditions for the acqui-
sition of citizenship can also be seen as an attempt to control inflows in
the framework of the relatively liberal provisions for family reunification’
(Kraler & Stepien 2008). Family reunification was also restricted by direct
measures. In Switzerland and Germany, the maximum age for reunification
of children was lowered to twelve and fourteen years, respectively – this in
order to avoid the difficulties of integrating adolescents into the educa-
tional system. If already over the maximum age threshold, minors are
tested before being admitted. The EU directive on family reunion (2003/
86/EC), the result of a long process of negotiation and bargaining, ulti-
mately provided enough leeway to member states to manage reunification
on their own terms. The European Parliament’s appeal to the Court of
Justice against the directive that allowed restrictions for minor children
was eventually rejected in June 2006.
All the aspects that we have discussed so far relate to immigration as ad-
mission to, and legal residence in, the territory of a country. But there is
another set of measures that concerns both immigration and integration po-
licies, and links the two together. An important common policy trend in
European countries consists of combining immigration and integration po-
licies. This serves the purpose of maximising positive economic impact
while minimising the negative economic and cultural impacts of immigra-
tion. In these measures, policymakers may alternatively reinforce selection
at the territorial borders in order to prevent anticipated integration problems
later on, or selectively tighten the borders of social rights and naturalisation
to prevent allegedly non-integrated immigrants from settling. Territorial
borders and rights borders are becoming interchangeable. The preceding
pages have shown us examples of both, such as the differential policies of
the UK towards citizens of 2004’s ten new accession states and the
Romanians and Bulgarians a few years later, and the revisions of
Aussiedler policies in Germany from the beginning of the 1990s onwards,
which placed restrictions on entry and rights. We will come back to the
growing interconnectedness of immigration and integration policies in the
next section.
7.5 Assimilationism back in fashion
One of the top priorities on the migration policy agenda is preventing cul-
tural integration failures – this even taking priority over economic utility in
the past. Events and factors have pushed cultural integration to the top of
the agenda in many European countries. A revitalisation of Islamic identity,
rising conflicts between this immigrant minority and traditional national
minorities (Jews, in particular) and riots between nationals and minorities
of immigrant origin have motivated39 first, in 2004, France’s banning of
the Islamic headscarf from public buildings and then, in 2010, an
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unqualified prohibition of wearing the burqa anywhere. The terrorist at-
tacks in the US, Spain and the UK and the assassination of public figures
in the Netherlands have spread fear of hosting dangerous enemies within
national and European borders. The Second Gulf War and the worsening
of the Palestinian crisis have appeared to reinforce this cultural divide. As
Vasta (2007b: 713-714) summarises:
Over the past few years there has been a widespread ‘moral panic’
about immigration and ethnic diversity. Populist politicians and
some sections of media have portrayed immigrants as a threat to se-
curity, social cohesion and the welfare system[…] In response main-
stream political parties and governments have been moving away
from the multicultural policies introduced in some countries in the
1970s […]New policies […]often seem like a return to old style of
assimilation, albeit under a more acceptable label.
Incorporation policies are returning to the assimilationist recipe that was
adopted in many immigration countries, with its implicit expectation that
the language and customs of countries of origin be given up. Considered
typical of the French Republican style and once viewed as inadequate by
many scholars and policymakers, this approach it is now coming back into
political fashion in different forms.
In fact, the response to the moral panic about diversity can be summarily
identified as a quest for Leitkultur, the notion that a leading national culture
should be shared, which implies a return to assimilation-oriented strategies.
To adhere to the cultural traditions and public values of the receiving coun-
try, to be part of the society and to learn the language are considered neces-
sary elements of integration. The formula was proposed in the Süssmuth
Commission’s 2001 report to the Bundestag. But Germany had introduced
the linguistic requirement as a condition for residence permit renewal back
in 1999, the first country in the EU to do so (Groenendijk 2006). The goal
of achieving Leitkultur is currently pursued through integration tests aimed
at evaluating the knowledge of immigrants about local traditions, culture,
history and institutions. Passing such tests was introduced as a requirement
for naturalisation by the British Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act
in 2002 and by a German reform in 2008. Such policies are reinforced by
the introduction of oaths of allegiance to the country and adhesion to a set
of shared public values as further requirements of becoming a citizen.
Knowledge of the national language and leading elements of culture are
taught through voluntary or compulsory integration courses that may be
free or partially paid for by immigrants themselves (Entzinger 2004;
Groenendijk 2006; Joppke 2006). At an EU level, the Leitkultur principle
has been confirmed as a Common Basic Principle for Integration.40 The
fact that integration courses are usually not free of charge has been
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criticised by pro-immigrant organisations and scholars. Compulsory educa-
tion should be free and compatible with working schedules. Nonetheless,
we must point out that knowing the language of the society of settlement
has proved to be a crucial element in preventing immigrants’ downwards
mobility (Drbohlav 2007), and that immigrants themselves consider lin-
guistic incompetence a main reason for discomfort (Pendenza 1999;
Cotesta 2002). Current European integration strategies are asking immi-
grants to follow paths marked by the different duties they are to accom-
plish and targets that must be reached. In exchange, they get an increasing
number of rights, or might end up losing their right to stay altogether. So-
called integration pacts are signed before entering the country in order to
obtain stay permits. At this stage, a first requirement often identified is ac-
ceptance of the immigration country’s common values or a minimum lin-
guistic competence. Immigrants must pledge not to become unemployed,
not to depend on social assistance and not to commit any crimes. Goals
include taking integration courses, demonstrating improvement in the lan-
guage and showing substantial signs that they are becoming part of the so-
cial fabric. If the immigrants reach the targets, they are assigned ‘points’.
If they accrue enough, they reach the ‘score’ needed to obtain rights, such
as permit renewal, permanent residence permits and citizenship. If immi-
grants do not reach the targets, they not only remain stuck in an early stage
of integration and deprived of more desirable rights, but they can lose
points. Point loss can lead to deprivation of the right to stay and to even-
tual expulsion. This pattern was demonstrated by integration agreements in
France in 2008, in Italy in 2009 and in the UK with its 2009 nationality re-
form. In general, European policies are converging insofar as they require
stronger proof of integration for immigrants to obtain rights. It is interest-
ing to note that the Netherlands, whose integration policies were once con-
sidered a paragon of multiculturalism, has been the forerunner in introdu-
cing integration courses and requisite proof of integration. Part of Dutch
national policy since 2002, integration courses function more and more as
an element of immigration choisie, a managed migration strategy. As the
researchers of the Dutch chapter in this volume report: ‘integration policy
had become clearly linked – instrumental even – to immigration policy, as
it facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted new flows, particularly
those of asylum seekers, family reunion and marriage migration’
(Bruquetas-Callejo et al. this volume).
Carrera (2006) makes a comparable point: ‘policies on admission are
paradoxically converging with those of social inclusion’. He critically ob-
serves how establishment of a legal framework based on compulsory inte-
gration as a prerequisite to access
secure juridical status’ risks generating counterproductive effects.
Rather than providing a framework for the social inclusion of
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immigrants and the prevention of discrimination, such notions are
(ab-)using the device of ‘integration’ as a tool to put into practice a
restrictive policy.
But this is precisely the aim of ‘selective borders’: to control and select
immigration.
Borders shift, commute even, between the immigration and integration
domain. They can also move outside the receiving country’s territory, such
as when the Netherlands introduced pre-arrival courses for some categories
of candidate immigrants in 2006.41
Sometimes, Leitkultur and other more demanding or restrictive policies
are counterbalanced by immigrant-friendly measures, as policy combina-
tion defined by Cerna and Wietholtz in this volume as the aforementioned
‘balanced policies’. In the case of neo-assimilationist policies, a counterba-
lance is provided by public recognition and an expression of respect
towards the minority groups’ culture. Nevertheless, the balance is far less
established and linear than the neo-assimilation attitude. In fact, in some
countries, offensive expressions and hostile public demonstrations have
been directed towards immigrant minorities and their religions, even at the
level of national government. And more often, an even mild public recog-
nition of Islam has been accompanied by assertion of the receiving coun-
try’s religious and cultural Christian roots.
Interestingly, though, assimilationism is being submitted to partial revi-
sions in places where it was adopted a long time ago. The negative feed-
back on failed integration policies has not only had an impact on so-called
multicultural systems, but also on assimilation-oriented political systems
such as in France, thus leading to some convergence with immigrant poli-
cies elsewhere in the EU. For example, France has introduced affirmative
action measures that contrast with the ‘blind to diversity’ recipe typical of
assimilation-oriented models. As Minister of Interior, Sarkozy promoted a
minority presence in the army, the police and the media. As President of
the Republic, he also endorsed affirmative action, giving a preferential
track to students coming from underprivileged districts – i.e. districts hous-
ing ethnic minorities. Even earlier, French governments had established
group-oriented policies with the introduction of the Conseil de Réflexion
sur l’Islam en France in 1990, the Conseil Consultatif in 1994 and, finally,
the elected Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003. Though a clear
deviation from the assimilation model, the existence of these Muslim coun-
cils in France and Belgium must be placed in a different light. They tar-
geted a somewhat rephrased assimilation concept: that of ‘promoting a
European Islam’, a shared European aim these days and another common
trend. Germany’s proposal to teach Islam in classes conducted in the
German language can be classified in this set of policies.
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While the French may have adapted their policies somewhat, many
European countries have started imitating not only some general values of
French policy lines, but also some practical translations of being ‘blind to
diversity’. This is happening when integration problems are formally
claimed as being connected to places and individuals, rather than to cultur-
al and religious minority groups. In the Netherlands, 1994’s
‘Contourennota’ suggested this strategy, which later developed into the ur-
ban policy framework. Summing up, immigrant incorporation models have
never been as consistent or homogeneous as scholars describe them
(Zincone 2006). Although such models change over time, they do not
change as dramatically as we are tempted to cite. For instance, Cerna and
Wietholtz in this volume comment on so-called ‘multicultural’ Britain:
Rarely have programmes been officially labelled as designed to sup-
port particular groups. Hence, for example, the ambitious housing
regeneration scheme Urban Programme from the late 1960s. Clearly
aimed at ethnic minority neighbourhoods, this was conceived of as
an area-based programme rather than a people-specific one.
On the other hand, many multicultural programmes are still implemented
at the local level. Some caution in emphasising clear past models and pre-
sent discontinuity should not prevent us from focusing in on changes and
trends.
7.6 Shifting responsibilities for policy implementation
Offloading problems on other decision-making bodies or organisations is
another common converging trend. The strategy can be defined in
Pierson’s (2001) words as ‘passing the buck’. The ‘buck’ is passed top-
down from national governments to local governments, from public institu-
tions to the non-profit sector and even to the private sector. It is also
passed bottom-up from national governments to the EU. In the last case,
the time and compromises needed to produce what are watered-down EU
directives can also yield decisions that end up embarrassing national gov-
ernments. However, EU directives can be either implemented – and the
connected blame thus averted from national governments – or, to some ex-
tent, disregarded. Both strategies were applied, for instance, to antidiscrimi-
nation measures in France and Italy.
The buck can be moved abroad as well. Decisions and problem manage-
ment are delocalised. Whenever possible, entry policies are moved to the
countries of origin; the physical burden of taking care of asylum seekers
and illegal immigrants is preferably moved to the transit countries, as was
the case with detention camps in Libya, though their conditions were de-
nounced for contradicting the most basic human rights principles (Boldrini
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2010). In the least unfortunate cases, refugees are detained in safe third
countries, in the case of political upheavals or civil war, and safe regions
in their own countries when natural or economic emergencies take place.
Sometimes, presumed terrorists are abducted and interrogated in countries
where human rights are scarcely respected, however illegal such a course
of action may be. The trend of moving the problems abroad can thus be-
come something more serious and disquieting than the ‘remote control’ of
immigration described by Guiraudon (2001). US President Barack
Obama’s decision to close Guantanamo Bay, forbidding the use of torture
and abduction in unsafe countries, was a relieving democratic turn.
Apart from moving decisions abroad or to other legally competent deci-
sion-making bodies, there is another way of handling difficult policy pro-
blems politically, namely by using different forms of ‘rules production’:
ministerial decrees, circulars, informal instructions. These ‘soft laws’,
which can sometimes inappropriately affect the rights of individuals, go
hand in hand with the accepted discrepancy between laws and their imple-
mentation or enforcement. Adoption of these decisional tools has its pro
and cons. Such tools make public decisions more flexible and adaptable,
though they may also hide deviant circumventions of the law. The legal lo-
cus of policymaking becomes ubiquitous and opaque, and it is no longer
clear who is responsible for what.
8 Concluding observations
In this conclusion to my conclusions, I would like to leave it to the reader
to evaluate the pros and cons of the policy practices and trends discussed.
Let me just highlight some contradictions implicit in these practices and
trends, and, in the process, sketch possible alternative policy lines.
We cannot pretend to import only very qualified workers when we have
economic structures, social services and family customs that also demand
unskilled workers. If we want to avoid illegal entry and overstaying, it is
necessary to open the borders to these workers as well. Some states, like
Italy, have already devoted quotas of planned inflows and targeting regular-
isations to caregivers. We should also favour the mobility of national work-
ers for such jobs, up until now considered unattractive; this measure is sure
to become advisable in the face of the recession and high unemployment
among national workers. But this implies a large investment of public
funds by states and economies, such as those of Southern Europe, which
are in fact constrained by tight budgets.
We cannot profess a firm belief in the capacity of free markets to match
supply and demand, and then block or selectively ‘plan’ the international
supply of labour. We need more flexible immigration policies, such as the
possibility of converting tourist permits into work permits. In South
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European countries, tourist visas and other kinds of generic permits actu-
ally allow entry to find an unregistered job, become an overstayer and
possibly to become regularised. If we want to discontinue hypocritical
treatment of unskilled worker inflows that are at the same time formally
restrictive and actually tolerant of undocumented immigrants, we need to
introduce or reintroduce jobseeker permits, albeit in a revised form.
We cannot make use of immigrant labour as a reserve army and then
make a strict link between employment and renewal of residence permits.
Tolerance of unemployment should be practiced and then balanced by tigh-
ter control of the informal economy, which hides ‘unemployed’ immigrant
workers. An informal economy is the main magnet for illegal immigration.
On the strategy to prevent immigration by opposing unregistered work, the
EU is revealing a neat north-south divide: to date, Southern Europe appears
more aware of black labour’s consequences on illegal immigration.
We cannot expect an immediate or even preventive assimilation to na-
tional languages and public values, while simultaneously pursuing tempor-
ary and circular migration. We should instead tailor requirements for
knowledge of national languages and basic elements of culture to the
length of residence, and consider these requirements as ‘passports’ to gain-
ing important rights such as nationality. We must allow for an exception to
the language requirements at least for elderly people with low education,
to exempt both them and our public administrations from useless, tiring bu-
reaucratic procedures.
We must be aware of the rather conflicting logic underlying national citi-
zenships and EU citizenship, in some ways dealt with by Kochenov
(2010). National citizenships can be acquired by aliens only if they prove
being rooted in the country, showing that they are ‘stable’ inhabitants – as
though they were born and educated there – or if they are long-time resi-
dents. EU citizenship is granted to nationals of member states to entitle
them to move freely from one state to another and thus to match labour
supply and demand. We must allow immigrants to move more freely for
everyone’s benefit – theirs as well as the receiving countries. This means
that we also must be less demanding in terms of assimilating to one coun-
try culture and language, contenting ourselves with people who accept
European democratic values. Carens (2002: 111) observes that ‘a person
who has functioned in a society for several years without knowing its offi-
cial language should be presumed to be capable also of participating in the
political process without knowing that language’. I do not believe that such
immigrants can be considered able to participate in the political process,
even if democratic governments have long ago abandoned the principle
that political rights only be given to ‘capable’ people, i.e. not to illiterates.
With that line of reasoning, we would also have to include ignorant immi-
grants. By contrast, there can be valid reasons to refuse citizenship to
aliens who do not know the language, since illiteracy has been successfully
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defeated in European countries and we can require new citizens to have
this kind of competence. But we can also presume that linguistically in-
competent immigrants who have proven they are able to work and be part
of the social fabric are decent people. Consequently, they should receive a
specific permanent residence permit that would not entitle them to the local
vote, but would allow them to move freely about the EU as well as to
work under certain conditions in other EU countries.
We cannot view the descendants of nationals who emigrated abroad, or
those of former nationals residing in territories that once belonged to EU
countries, as members of a national ethnic group. It cannot be assumed that
they share the culture, are loyal citizens of their ancestors’ countries, while
conversely asking immigrants to let go immediately of their loyalty to, and
cultural identification with, their country of origin. We should give immi-
grants time to adapt to the cultural context. At the same time, we should
make an effort to implement a two-way process of integration. Nationals
must learn to come to terms with the idea that many immigrants are here
to stay, to become part of the permanent population. National majorities
must accept minorities of immigrant origin as co-citizens, not as eternal
aliens. Even though the main effort to integrate is to be carried out by im-
migrants, nationals cannot be exempted from making some effort to under-
stand – and accept – immigrants and the presence of new minorities.
Cultural adaptation is unlikely to find a solution somewhere in the middle
– national culture will obviously be predominant, but cannot pretend to be
exclusive. Furthermore, we must be aware that the cultural adaptation pro-
cess does not involve just two identities (receiving country and country of
origin). Citizens of both countries are bearers of multiple identities, based
not only on nations, but also on regions and towns, religious, linguistic
and political affiliations. Local, regional, linguistic, political and religious
identities compete, often successfully, with the national one.
Multiculturalism is not a novelty brought about by immigration, nor is it
only a specific feature of traditionally pluralist countries such as Belgium,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain and the UK. All countries have always
been culturally plural, politically divided. Living together has always been
a demanding, often unsuccessful task. Globalisation reinforces mobility
and the plurality of national and regional identities (Castles 2004); the re-
quest for an absolute mono-identity and loyalty to a single nation is
doomed to fail.
On the other hand, plural identity should not imply unnecessary and un-
derserved dual or plural nationalities. We should prevent the descendants
of a single expatriate ancestor from inheriting citizenship abroad, without
any proof of a persisting cultural link with their ancestor’s country. We
should avoid granting these ‘ghost citizens’ the right to vote and to send
their own representatives to Parliament. If we embrace French nationality
rules calling for automatic acquisition of citizenship via double jus soli at
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birth (in which the child of a foreigner who was born in the territory be-
comes a citizen) and via simple jus soli when coming of age (in which a
foreigner born in the territory is entitled to become a citizen at the age of
eighteen simply by applying), we must be prepared to extend the principle
to expatriates and their descendants. The second generation residing abroad
would then keep the nationality only on request and after complying with
some linguistic requirements, and the third generation would lose it alto-
gether. This was one of the solutions suggested by Bauböck et al.’s (2006)
‘Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States’ project, also known as
NATAC.
The last and most dramatic contradiction concerns our identity.
Tolerance and respect for religious diversity are listed among the common
values that we ask immigrants to accept whether they want to naturalise or
remain for a limited amount of time. We want them to ‘learn’ tolerance,
but receiving countries are exhibiting very little tolerance towards them.
Clear signs of contempt towards immigrants and their culture are fre-
quently displayed by the same policymakers who claim to teach tolerance
to the new minorities. If not for any reason but consistency, European poli-
ticians and opinion-makers should avoid all open expressions of intoler-
ance towards immigrants, such as hate speeches and discriminatory
proposals.
With this brief, approximate list of contradictions and suggested correc-
tions, I intend to put a cat among the pigeons. More meditated analysis, re-
flections and suggestions are the job of my readers, other colleagues and, I
hope, policymakers.
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the start of their electoral success), they can force other parties – even majorities in
power – to take more severe measures towards immigration and immigrants’ rights.
They are able to reframe the issues and, to some extent, force opponents to accept
their new frame.
19 On the failure of immigration policies, see Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (1994)
and Castles (2004).
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association Arbeiterwohlfahrt. Included later on were the independent NGO umbrel-
la organisation DPWV; the German Red Cross; and ZWST, which comprises Jewish
communities.
22 To survey conditions and legal treatments of undocumented immigrants and stances
taken by associations, unions, politicians and magistrates, see http://www.picum.org.
23 Weil (2001a) and Niessen (2008, personal communication).
24 Generally speaking, such a system is doomed to disadvantage the underprivileged.
This feature has been considered one of the reasons for the weak Swiss welfare,
since the more affluent majority can object to redistribution (Obinger, Armingeon,
Bonoli & Bertozzi 2005).
25 According to the classic Rokkan thesis, modern party systems are the product of his-
torical legacies. The political cleavages (e.g. class, religion, language) present and
capable of generating organised movements when suffrage was on the rise had the
opportunity to transform themselves into mass modern parties and thus shape the
political scenario to come (Rokkan 1970; Flora 1999). Since Rokkan presented his
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thesis, new cleavages have reshaped many European party systems, and even though
some old parties retained their names – and some of their strengths – missions and
electorate compositions changed a lot.
26 To illustrate the evolution of the research-policy nexus, Entzinger (2008) has pre-
sented a similar ‘pattern’.
27 The Danish position was even more independent, keeping the freedom to decide
whether to accept EU decisions on a case-by-base basis.
28 Ley 7/1985, Orga´nica de Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en Espan˜a
(Organic Law of Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain) of 1 July 1985.
29 The pact was approved by the European Council on 30 October (13440/08) on 24
September 2008 in Brussels.
30 Fertility rates in 2008 vary: from 1.32 in Slovakia, 1.35 in Romania and Hungary,
1,42 in Italy to 2.15 in Iceland, 2.10 in Turkey and Ireland (Eurostat 2010a).
31 The Euro Area (EA-16) seasonally adjusted unemployment rate was 10.1 per cent in
April 2010, compared with 10.0 per cent in March. It was 9.2 per cent in April
2009. The EU-27 unemployment rate was 9.7 per cent in April 2010, unchanged
from March 2010, though up from 8.7 per cent in April 2009 (Eurostat 2010b).
32 That said, we found huge discrepancies in this matter as well. Temporary jobs were
registered at 30.9 per cent in Spain, 28.4 per cent in Poland, 22.9 per cent in
Portugal and 18.3 per cent in the Netherlands, but 8.0 per cent in Ireland, 5.9 per
cent in the UK and 1.5 per cent in Romania (Eurostat 2008).
33 Recent official rates of immigrant unemployment vary a lot (Dumont & Spielvogel
2008), and they are not worrisome everywhere.
34 This is the general conclusion reached in a vast meta-analysis of empirical evidence
and based on a large amount of research. Nonetheless, a negative impact is observed
on the ‘old’ stock of immigrants (Longhi, Nijkamp & Poot 2008).
35 Comparative data on national and foreign rates of criminality should be weighted by
education, sex and age of foreigners versus nationals.
36 Italy and Spain are examples of exceptions.
37 Le Monde 31 May 2008: 3.
38 The most recent Spanish mass regularisations have given rise to protests from the
German and French Ministers of Interior who fear the side effects of unwanted im-
migrants in their own countries. No wonder the common EU immigration policy
strategy proposed by France’s Sarkozy presidency included a ban on such mass am-
nesties – with which Spain declared its reluctance to comply.
39 The officially declared motivation in both cases was defending gender equality and
the dignity of women, a principle unfortunately disregarded up until then.
40 Principle Four states that ‘the basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history
and institutions is indispensable to integration’ and that ‘enabling immigrants to ac-
quire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration’. As the
Communication for a Common Agenda for Integration (COM 2005/389) has speci-
fied, introductory programmes to be implemented at the national level can include
pre-departure measures, such as information packages, language and civic orienta-
tion courses in the country of origin and more tailored courses while in the host
country. These introductory programmes should also take different educational back-
grounds and specific social and cultural problems into account.
41 Presented by erstwhile Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration Verdonk, the bill
was approved by Dutch Parliament on 22 March 2005. The law introduces the idea
of ‘pre-arrival integration’ processes or ‘integration of immigrants abroad’ through
the Wet Inburgering in het Buitenland. This law obliges newcomers to pass an exam
that proves their Dutch language skills and basic knowledge of Dutch culture and
society before even entering the country. Once admitted to the Netherlands,
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migrants must attend – and successfully complete – civic integration courses in or-
der to be granted both temporary and permanent permit renewals (Bruquetas-
Callejo, Garce´s-Mascaren˜as, Penninx & Scholten 2008). If integration is not consid-
ered satisfactory, the residence permit can be revoked.
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legacies matter? Were supranational agencies involved? Migration Policymaking in 
Europe begins to answer such questions. The editors set out a common grid in which 
expert authors describe and analyse the policymaking process in ten countries. They 
survey six of them with a long tradition of immigration and integration policies 
(Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the uk), two former 
emigration countries turned high-rate receivers of immigrants (Italy and Spain) and 
two eu 2004 accession states (the Czech Republic and Poland). The concluding chapter 
analyses changes and convergences across the cases, proposing an interpretative model 
employable in further research.
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